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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS., 

BV^Hrtf 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



ELEMENTS OF MORAL THEOLOGY 



BASED ON THE 



SUMMA THEOLOGIZE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 



J 



JOHN J. ELMENDORF, S.T.D. 

LECTURER IN MORAL THEOLOGY AT THE WESTERN THEOLOGICAL 

SEMINARY, AND SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF MENTAL 

PHILOSOPHY IN RACINE COLLEGE, U.S.A. 







NEW YORK 

JAMES POTT & CO., PUBLISHERS 
14 and 16 Astor Place 



-G 



, E (o 



Quvmodo dilexi legem Tuam, Domine: 
told die ?neditalio mea est. 



COPTRIGHT, 1892, BY 

JAMES POTT & CO. 



Press of J. J. Little & Co. 
Astor Place, New York 



TO THE BIGHT REVEREND 

WILLIAM EDWARD McLAREN, D.D., D.C.L., 

BISHOP OF CHICAGO, 
AND TO THE RIGHT REVEREND 

CHARLES CHAPMAN GRAFTON, S.T.D., 

BISHOP OF FOND DU LAC, 

WHOSE KIND ENCOURAGEMENT HAS SO LARGELY INAUGURATED 

AND BROUGHT TO COMPLETION 

THIS HUMBLE ATTEMPT 

TO ADVANCE SOUND MORALS IN THE CHURCH OF GOD, 

ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF GOD, 

IT IS MOST RESPECTFULLY AND DUTIFULLY 

DEDICATED BY 

THEIR SON AND SERVANT 

IN CHRIST AND THE CHURCH. 



- 



* IMPRIMATUR. 



An unlimited imprimatur has not been requested, and could not be 
expected for this first edition of the Elements of Moral Theology ; but 
episcopal approbation, expressed in general terms as follows, has not been 
lacking. The author can only add that, if in any, even the minutest particu- 
lar, he have deviated from the Divine law as given by the Catholic Church, 
or as applied to us by that National Church to which he most directly owes 
loyalty and submission, he makes in advance a humble retractation of any 
such statement. 

The Bishop of Maine: "I am sure it will be very valuable." 

The Bishop of Albany: "I am very sure that it will be well done . . 
and I am very glad to help along the publication of such a book." 

Tlie Bishop of New Jersey : " I am sure your book will be . . . good 
all through. It will meet a long felt need." 

The Bishop of Chicago: "I have heard with pleasure of your intention 
to publish. . . . There is imperative need which I am sure your book will 
do much to supply." 

The Bishop of Springfield: " I hasten to express my gratification at the 
prospect of possessing in English your paraphrase of St. Thomas, with 
your own valuable additions. May your effort, so likely to confer lasting 
benefit upon the Anglican communion, be crowned with success." 

The Bishop of Florida : " I am glad to hear that we are going to have a 
treatise on moral theology at last." 

Tlie Bishop of Delaware : " I am really glad to know of the work which 
you have taken in hand." 

The Bishop of Fond du Lac: "It gave me much pleasure to see your 
MS. on Moral Theology. . . It will be welcomed by our theological semin- 
aries and by many of our clergy. You will make a most valuable con- 
tribution to the Church's literature." 

The Bishop of Ohio : " You are truly engaged in a noble work for the 
Church and her teachers." 

The Bishop of Milwaukee : " Your work is certainly very timely. I 
doubt not the immediate good it will do in making our students and 
clergy more familiar with that magnificent treasury of moral theology 
(the Summa.) 

The Bishop of Pittsburgh : " I am sincerely glad to know that you have 
been able to translate and prepare it for the press." 

J. J. E. 

Western Theological Seminary, 
May, 1892. 



SUBSCRIBERS. 



BISHOPS. 

The Right Rev. John Williams, D.D., LL.D., Middletown, Conn. 

Charles Todd Quintard, D.D., LL.D., Sewanee, Tenn. 

Henry Adams Neely, D.D., Portland, Me. 

William Croswell Doane, D.D. (Oxon.), LL.D., Al- 
bany, N. Y. 

John Franklin Spalding, D.D., Denver, Col. 

John Scarborough, D.D., Trenton, 1ST. J. 

William Edward McLaren, D.D., D.C.L., Chicago, 111. 

George Franklin Seymour, S.T.D., LL.D., Spring- 
field, 111. 

David Buel Knickerbacker, D.D., Indianapolis, Ind. 

Henry Codman Potter, D.D., LL.D., New York. 

William Paret, D.D., LL.D., Baltimore, Md. 

Edwin Gardner Weed, S.T.D., St. Augustine, Fla. 

Leighton Coleman, D.D., LL.D., Wilmington, Del. 

Charles Chapman Grafton, D.D., Fond du Lac, Wis. 

William Andrew Leonard, D.D., Cleveland, 0. 

Isaac Lea Nicholson, D.D., Milwaukee, Wis, 



CLERGY. 



Alcorn, Edwin C. 
Ashley, Edward. 
Ashley, William B. 
Ashton, Amos T. 
Averill, Edward W. 

Babcock, John H. 
Batterson, Hermon G. 
Bigelow, Frank H. 
Blanchet, Clement T. 
Boorom, Sylvester D. 
Boyd, Melville. 



D.D. 



D.D. 



Brewster, S. T. 
Brown, W. R. 
Brugler, Charles E. 
Burleson, Allan L. 
Burnett, Charles P. A, 
Burrell, Frederick H. 
Butler, G. H. H. 

Cady, Philander K., D.D. 
Carter, George G., D.D. 
Cavanagh, William H. 
Clayton, Francis J. 



SUBSCRIBERS. 



Coale, William A. 
Coit, Henry A., D.D. 
Coleman, William B. 
Cooder, Charles L. 
Crockett, Stuart. 
Crozier, F. B. 
Cunningham, Herbert N. 

Davenport, Frederick P., D.D. 

Davidson, Philip G. 

Davis, James 0. 

Davis, John. 

Dealey, A. Sidney. 

Dix, Morgan, D.D., D.C.L. 

Douglas, George W., D.D. 

Drake, Charles F., M.D. 

Drane, Robert B. 

Durlin, Fayette. 

Dyer, H. Page. 

Edmunds, Charles C, Jr. 

Fenn, Percy T. 
Forster, J. W. 
Francis, J. M. 
Fulcher, Thomas B. 

Gailor, Thomas F., D.D. 
Gardner, Walter R., D.D. 
Gibson, Frank M. 
Goddard, Edward N. 
Gold, William J., D.D. 
Grabau, H. P. L. 
Green, Stephen H. 

Hall, Francis J. 
Hall, Joseph C. 
Harding, Alfred. 
Harding, McA. 
Harper, Edward J. 
Harris, Robert. 
Harrison, Jesse B. 
Harrod, George W. 



Hart, Samuel, D.D. 

Hickman, Percival H. 

Higgins, Jesse. 

Hodge, G. Woolsey. 

Hodges, J. Sebastian B., D.D. 

Hoffman, E. S. 

Hoffman, Eugene A., D.D. 

Hopkins, Lucius D. 

Horsfield, Frederick H. T. 

Houghton, George H., D.D. 

Hubbard, William F. 

Jacob, Thomas P. 
Jones, W. Bedford. 

Keator, F. W. 
Kidner, Reuben. 
Knowles, John H. 

Lanpher, Louis A. 
Lightner, Peter B. 
Lobdell, Frederick B. 
Locke, Clinton, D.D. 
Love joy, David H., M.D. 

Magill, G. Ernest, 
Mallory, Charles L. 
Mann, Cameron, D.D. 
McDougall, Howard. 
Mcllwaine, Joseph W. 
MeKim, John. 
McLean, Thomas W. 
McMurphy, Jesse G. 
Mead, James B. 
Meade, P. Nelson. 
Miller, Alexander J. 
Miller, John S. 
Mills, William W. 
Molineux, John H. 
Moore, Melville M. 
Morris, P. 
Moyses, Edward. 
Murphy, Edgar G. 



SUBSCRIBERS. 



IX 



Murphy, P. 
Murray, Gustavus M. 

Neely, Henry R. 

Nelson, Henry W., Jr., D.D. 

Nelson, Richard H. 

Nott, John W. 

O'Brien, W. J. 
Odell, Daniel I. 
Osborne, Richard H. G. 

Pardee, Luther. 
Parker, Edward M. 
Percival, Henry R., D.D. 
Phares, Edmund. 
Piper, Arthur, D.D. 
Pond, Sylvanus B. 
Pope, William C. 
Prout, John. 

Quin, Charles C. 
Quinn, James C, D.D. 

Reazor, Frank B. 
Rede, Wyllys. 
Richey, Alban. 
Riddel, H. 0. 
Ritchie, Arthur. 
Roberts, Daniel 0., D.D. 

Sage, John C. 
Saltus, A. "Weight. 
Sanborn, Frank A. 
Scudder, Henry T. 
Seibt, C. Theodore, D.D. 
Sherman, Addison M. 
Slidell, James. 



Smedes, Bennett, LL.D. 

Smith, George Henry. 

Smith, G. Williamson, D.D., LL.D. 

Smith, Joseph H. 

Smith, J. Stewart. 

Smith, Meredith 0. 

Smith, S. Borden. 

Snyder, William T. 

Spencer, A. 

Steele, J. Nevett, D.D 

Susan, Charles T. 

Taylor, Elbert B. 
Taylor, Frederick W., D.D. 
Thompson, James J. N. 
Thrall, S. Chipman, D.D. 
Tibbits, E. Dudley. 
Tomlins, William H. 
Towers, Frederick. 
Townsend, I. L., D.D. 
Townsend, John H. 
Turner, C. H. B. 

Underbill, Gilbert R. 
Upjohn, Samuel, D.D. 

Van De Water, George R., D.D. 

Walker, Millidge. 
Walker, William Bogert. 
Waterman, Lucius. 
Whitaker, Arthur. 
Williams, John. 
Williams, Pelham, D.D. 
Wright, Edward P., D.D. 
Wrigley, Charles F. J. 

Zorn, Joseph T. 



LAITY. 



J. Acworth, Gen. Theo. Sem., N. Y. 
George A. Armour, Chicago, 111. 

A. Beaumont,' Stockbridge, Mich. 



H. H. Bogart, Faribault : 

Minn. 
C. N. C. Brown, Gen. Theo. Sem. ; 

New York. 



SUBSCRIBERS. 



H. L. Burleson, Gen. Theo. Sem., 
New York. 

Christian Literature Co. (Rev. S. 

M. Jackson), New York. 
Mrs. C. L. Cleveland, Concord, 

N. H. 

C. L. C, Chicago, 111. 

F. W. Corey, Highland Park, 111. 

G. H. Dennison, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
J. W. Diggles, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
E. S. P. Dodge, St. Simon's Mills, 

Ga. 

E. Floyd-Jones, Gen. Theo. Sem., 
New York. 

J. M. Gilbert, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
Wm. L. Glenn, Baltimore, Md. 
H. B. Gummey, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 

W. W. Hance, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
B. V. K. Harris, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
W. L. Hayward, Nashotah, Wis. 
Hunt & Eaton, Detroit, Mich. 

A. W. Jenks, Gen. Theo. Sem., 
New York. 

Dr. Z. S. Leonard, New York. 

D. Porter Lord, Poughkeepsie, 
N. Y. 



W. T. Manning, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
W. A. Masker, Jr., Gen. Theo. 

Sem., New York. 
W. H. Meldrum, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
F. S. Moore, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 

P. C. Pyle, Gen. Theo. Sem., New 
York. 

C. M. Boome, Gen. Theo. Sem., 
New York. 

W. N. Sanford, Poughkeepsie, 

N. Y. 
C. Satterlee, Gen. Theo. Sem., New 

York. 
Sisters of Saint Mary, New York. 
W. W. Smith, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
E. A. Souder, Philadelphia, Pa. 
C. E. Spalding, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
C. W. Swing, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 

Trinity College, Hartford, Conn. 

N. D. Van Syckel, Gen. Theo. 
Sem., New York. 

H. A. Walton, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
A. D. WiUson, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 
H. B. Wright, Gen. Theo. Sem., 

New York. 



PREFACE. 



The reader of these Elements of Moral Theology, a 
student, as I hope, of this great science of God's law, will 
doubtless indulge the writer in a few prefatory words. My 
humble office is that of editor rather than that of author. 
But even as such I would gladly have resigned the task to 
abler hands if any such had appeared. My best hope is 
that this poor attempt will soon be superseded by something 
better. I have called our study a science, for such it is ; sc, 
the science of the law of God, as given to man, in what- 
ever way it is given. This definition distinguishes it from 
Moral Philosophy, which seeks to account for and develope, 
from reason only, the laws and principles of right living. 
Moral Tbeology, on the other hand, is the science of the 
Divine Will as revealed to man. 

Well understood, these two must needs coincide, although 
their methods may be differeut. Moral Theology, making 
use of the other, is also grounded on it, as that in turn is 
grounded on the nature of man and the being of God. 
Both the philosophy and the theology, therefore, require a 
sound psychology, and a true theosophy, which in these 
Elements are assumed. For, like every other special science, 
Moral Theology has its assumptions — e.g., that the law of 
God is revealed in Holy Scripture ; that the Catholic Church 
has authority to apply that law, and to add positive laws, 
under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, which bind the con- 
science of every Christian man ; and that the gifts of gra- 
cious help for the due keeping of God's holy law are freely 
bestowed through the ordained channels of grace. 



Like every other science, also, Moral Theology has its dis- 
puted topics. There are many propositions contained in 
these Elements which, if properly discussed and defended 
against all attacks, might fill many yolumes. It should be, 
indeed, and it has been, the aim of the writer to assert dog- 
matically nothing which is not accepted by the masters of 
our science ; but further than this no scientific manual can 
go. It would be absurd to expect that a primer of astron- 
nomy should give a demonstration of every assertion. It 
may be justly required that principles laid down shall be 
consistent with one another, make a harmonious system, 
and be capable of demonstration or verification. No more, 
I think, can be demanded. 

But our science is indispensable for the priest who is 
ex officio the teacher of God's law. "The priest's lips 
should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at 
his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts " 
(Mai. ii. 7). Although the Holy Scriptures are the supreme 
source of that law, yet in them truth and righteousness are 
only gradually revealed, and with special application to the 
special cases which elicited the Divine enunciations. Moral 
Theology stands or falls with Dogmatic Theology, both 
being equally needed for intelligent understanding and 
application of revealed truth and law. 

And not only does the pastoral office imply a capacity to 
speak with knowledge as well as with authority, in public 
teaching or private counsel ; the injunction, also, to "heal 
the sick " requires a knowledge of inward diseases. Above 
all, no priest should, except in case of extreme necessity, 
receive confessions, who is not duly instructed in Moral 
Theology and casuistry. 

These elements, as their title indicates, are chiefly based 
on the Summa Theologian of S. Thomas Aquinas. For the 
contributions to our science in the Anglican Church since 
the Eeformation have been very, very few. See the list 
provided for students of theology by the bishops of the 



American Church ; and the chief among those few — sc, 
Bishop Taylor and Dr. Sanderson, afterwards bishop — 
based their work chiefly on the common sources of older 
Moral Theology. (See Whewell's Hist. Moral Phil., Lect. 
12.) 

Of the numerous contributions to our science in the 
modern Latin Church I have made moderate use and with 
great reserve. A very large part of their minute casuistical 
distinctions are based on a very different practical discipline 
of the Christian life from our own. 

The first three parts are not a translation of the Summa 
Theologian of S. Thomas Aquinas ; much less are they 
original work. 

They are not a translation ; on the contrary, I have 
avoided, as far as was possible for me, the peripatetic modes 
of expression which mark the Angelic Doctor's work. I am 
perfectly aware that, in doing so, precision of thought and 
expression is, more or less, sacrificed, and I am the farthest 
possible from being satisfied with the result. But, remem- 
bering that few are trained in scholastic philosophy, while 
every priest, at least, has absolute need of the first prin- 
ciples of Moral Theology, I have dared to hope for some 
benefit to the student, even from so poor an effort. 

Peripatetic expressions are avoided " as far as possible/' 
but Aristotelian thought and terminology are too deeply 
engrafted on the language of common life to render such an 
avoidance completely possible. 

A considerable part of the Prima Secundae, valuable in 
itself, did not seem essential to these rudiments of Moral 
Theology. Such portions have been greatly abridged, or 
wholly omitted. 

What I have thought needful to add, however, is generally 
relegated to Part IV. , the Supplement. But even for that all 
claim to originality is explicitly discarded. What place for 
originality is there when we are to treat of that Holy Law 
which has, been, once for all, Divinely given ? Moral phil- 



XIV PREFACE. 

osophers may ingeniously demolish all preceding theories, 
and try their hand at original reconstruction. But Moral 
Theology can only enunciate, systematize, and apply the 
Law of God. The first two have been so well done by S. 
Thomas Aquinas that he would be a bold teacher who 
should try to do so over again. But the application of that 
holy law to each changing cycle of the world's history opens 
new and gravest questions. As the world moves, so must 
Moral Theology move in order to direct aright. 

I have not ventured to ignore all new problems in casu- 
istry, the application of Moral Theology to the practical 
guidance of life. I trust that the road previously marked 
out has been carefully followed. But problems which 
seemed to call for further discussion have been indicated as 
" Queries," even when I have been tempted to give a brief 
and dogmatic answer. 

In the Supplement, citations from the common and civil 
law are introduced because these are among the highest 
applications of the natural virtue of justice, and because 
duty under such law is part of the revealed will of God. 
Moral Theology, therefore, cannot omit all reference to this 
part of its subject-matter. The writer has not aimed at 
completeness in this respect. He has selected what seemed 
illustrative of his subject, or of special practical value. 

And he takes this opportunity to make cordial acknowl- 
edgment of the valuable aid in careful revision of the text 
afforded by H. H. Martin, Esq., Counsellor-at-law, Chicago, 
111. 

The priest will, of course, notice that all such general 
statements of civil law, however correct in form, are prac- 
tically limited by exceptions and qualifications, so that the 
advice of an expert is the only prudent course to be fol- 
lowed. Statements made in the Supplement must be so 
construed. 

It only remains that the writer lay this poor attempt at 
enunciating the will of our one Lord at His blessed feet, 



PREFACE. XV 

publicly entreating pardon for its errors, and asking the 
prayer of every Christian reader to the same end. 

" Unusquisque offert ad tabernaculurn Domini quod po- 
test, alius aurum, argentum, gemmas ; alius pelles aut pilos 
caprarum. Omnibus enim his opus habet Dominus, et 
placet voluntas sequaliter eorum qui insequaliter offerunt." 
S. Jerome. 

J. J. E. 

Western Theological Seminary, 1892. 



CONTENTS. 



Part I. — Introduction. 
CHAPTER I. 

PAGES 

On Beatitude 1-7 

§ 1. What is man's ultimate end ? § 2. What is beati- 
tude ? § 3. On the obtaining of this beatitude. 

CHAPTER II. 

On Will 8-24 

§ 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary ? 
§ 2. On the circumstances of human acts. § 3. Acts 
elicited by the will. 1. The end. What is willed in 
reference to the end. § 4. On motives. § 5. How 
is the will moved ? § 6. On the choice of means for 
the end. § 7. On acts commanded by the will. 

CHAPTER III. 

On Good and Evil in Human Acts 25-43 

§ 1. Whence are they derived ? § 2. The good and evil 
of the inward acts of the will. § 3. On good and evil 
in outward human acts. § 4. What results from the 
moral character of human acts ? 

CHAPTER IV. 

On Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul 44-5? 

§ 1. General view. § 2. Love. § 3. Hate. § 4. Concu- 
piscence. § 5. Pleasure. § 6. Pain and sorrow. 
§ 7. Anger. 



XV111 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER V. 

PAGES 

On Virtues 58-75 

§ 1. On habits. § 2. The essence and subject of virtue. 
§ 3. On Intellectual virtues. § 4. On moral virtues. 
§ 5. On the theological virtues. § 6. How are virt- 
ues acquired ? § 7. On the connection of virtues. 



CHAPTER VI. 

On Vices and Sins 70-117 

§ 1. The nature of vice and sin. § 2. Divisions. § 3. On 
the comparative guilt of sins. § 4. The subject of 
sin. § 5. The causes of sins. § 6. Relations of 
ignorance to sin. § 7. The moral relations of sense- 
appetite to sin. §8. Sins of malice, i.e., of deliberate 
wickedness. § 9. External causes of sin. § 10. The 
effects of sin. §11. Venial and mortal sins. 

CHAPTER VII. 

On Law 118-152 

§ 1. What is law ? § 2. Eternal law. § 3. The law 
of nature. § 4. Human law. § 5. Divine law. 
§ 0. The Evangelical law. 



Part II. — The Theological Virtues. 
CHAPTER I. 

Faith and its Opposite Vices 153-174 

§ 1. Faith. § 2. The inward act of faith. § 3. The 
outward act of faith. § 4. The virtue of faith. 
§ 5. Infidelity, heresy, apostasy, and blasphemy. 

CHAPTER II. 

Hope and its Opposite Vices 175-184 

§ 1. Hope. § 2. Vices opposed to hope : despair and 
presumption. 



CONTENTS. XIX 

CHAPTER III. 

PAGES 

Charity 185-237 

§ 1. Charity in general view. § 2. Charity in subjective 
view. § 3. The object of charity. § 4. The order 
of charity. § 5. Love. § 6. Joy. § 7. Peace. 
§ 8. Mercy and pity {misericordia). § 9. Benefi- 
cence. § 10. Alms-giving. § 11. Fraternal cor- 
rection. § 12. The precepts of charity. 



CHAPTER IV. 
Vices Opposed to Charity 238-260 

§ 1. Hatred. § 2. Spiritual sloth (" acedia "). § 3. Envy. 
§ 4. Discord and strife. § 5. Schism. § 6. Wars, 
quarrels, and seditions. § 7. Scandal. 



Part III. — The Cardinal Virtues. 

CHAPTER I. 

Prudence and its Opposite Vices 261-271 

§ 1. Prudence. § 2. Vices opposed to prudence. 

CHAPTER II. 

Justice and Injustice 272-295 

§ 1. Right. § 2. Justice. § 3. Injustice. § 4. Judg- 
ment. § 5. Commutative and distributive justice ; 
restitution. 

CHAPTER III. 

Vices Opposed to Justice 296-324 

§ 1. Respect of persons. § 2. Homicide. § 3. Theft 
and robbery. § 4. Injustice in legal proceedings. 
§ 5. Injurious words. § 6. Frauds in trade. 
§ 7. Sins of Omission. 



XX CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER IV. 

PAGES 

Religion and Vices Opposed to it 325-362 

§ 1. Introduction. § 2. Religion. § 3. Devotion and 
prayer. § 4. Outward acts of Divine worship : 
Adoration, sacrifices, and oblations. § 5. On Vows. 
§ 6. On oaths. § 7. Superstition. § 8. Irreligion ; 
viz., Tempting God, perjury, sacrilege, and simony. 

CHAPTER V. 

puties towards others, depending on justice, and 

their Opposite Vices 363-402 

§ 1. Piety, reverence, and honour. § 2. Obedience and 
disobedience. § 3. Gratitude, ingratitude, and ven- 
geance. § 4. Veracity and vices opposed to it. 
§ 5. Affability and liberality, with their opposite 
vices. §6. Equity (" epicheia ' ; ). § 7. The precepts 
of justice : the Ten Commandments. 

CHAPTER VI. 

Courage and Fortitude : Their Allied Virtues, and 

Their Opposite Vices 403-423 

§ 1. Courage and fortitude (fortiiudo). § 2. Cowardice 
and rashness. § 3. Magnanimity, and its opposite 
vices, presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillan- 
imity. § 4. Magnificence, and its opposite vices, 
meanness and wasteful extravagance. § 5. Patience 
and perseverance, with their opposite vices. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Temperance : its Allied Virtues and Their Opposite 

Vices 424-498 

§ 1. Temperance. § 2. The sense of shame (verecundia). 
§ 3. Abstinence, fasting. § 4. Gluttony, sobriety, 
ebriety. § 5. Chastity, modesty, virginity. § 6. Lust 
(Juxuria). § 7. Continence, incontinence. § 8. Meek- 
ness and clemency ; anger ; cruelty. § 9. Humil- 
ity. § 10. Pride. § 11. Moderation ("modes^'a "). 
§ 12. Precepts of temperance. 



CONTENTS. XXI 

Part IV. — Supplement. 

CHAPTER I. 

PAGES 

Conscience 499-502 

CHAPTER II. 

Supplementary Notes on Law 503-509 

§ 1. General principles. § 2. Human law. § 3. Ecclesi- 
astical law. § 4. Civil law. 

CHAPTER III. 
Supplementary Notes on the Ten Commandments 510-521 

CHAPTER IV. 

Right and Justice 522-529 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Dominion. § 3. How 
is dominion acquired ? 

CHAPTER V. 
Injury 530-542 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Theft. § 3. Resti- 
tution. § 4. Damnificatio. § 5. The unjust acces- 
sory. § 6. What things are to be restored ? 

CHAPTER VI. 

Contracts 543-556 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Requisites for a 
yalid contract. § 3. Defects in consent. § 4. Gra- 
tuitous contracts. § 5. Onerous contracts. 

CHAPTER VII. 

The Law of Sacraments 557-592 

§ 1. Sacraments in general. § 2. Holy Baptism. § 3. Con- 



firmation. § 4. The Holy Eucharist. 



XX11 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

PAGES 

Sacramental Penitence 593-606 

§ 1. The virtue and the sacrament. § 2. Contrition. 
§ 3. Confession. § 4. Absolution. § 5. Satisfac- 
tion. 

CHAPTER IX. 
The Visitation of the Sick 607-009 

CHAPTER X. 

Holy Orders 610-619 

§ 1. Introductory. § 2. Holy Orders a sacrament. 
§ 3. The law. 

CHAPTER XI. 
Holy Matrimony 620-043 

§ 1. The law of nature. § 2. The sacrament of Holy 
Matrimony. § 3. The contract. § 4. Impediments. 
§ 5. Divorce. 

CHAPTER XII. 
Duties and Obligations of the State and of the Citizen. 644-647 



MORAL THEOLOGY. 



Part I. — Introduction. 



CHAPTER I. 

OK BEATITUDE. 

§ 1. What is man's ultimate end? 

Man, as a free and rational agent, directs his actions for 
the attainment of some end. 

Those actions are properly human which are character- 
istic of man as man. Now he differs from irrational creat- 
ures in having lordship of his acts. Such acts are properly 
human. But man is lord of his acts through reason and 
free will, whereby he chooses to do what he does. Other 
acts of his may be called actions of a man, but they are not 
properly human, since they do not proceed from that delib- 
erate will which is characteristic of man as man. And 
since every power is directed to its appropriate object, and 
the object of the will is some end, some good, it is evident 
that human acts are for the attainment of some end. This 
end may be last in execution, but it is first in the agent's 
intention. It is therefore called the final cause. 

The very action itself may be the ultimate end, but still 
it is voluntary. The human power called the Will may 
produce something objective to itself, as walking or talking 
for some remoter end ; or it may will the action for its own 
sake. Then this action is the end which the will aims at. 



2 ON BEATITUDE. [Qu. I. 2, 3, 4. 

To act for an end is peculiar to a rational creature 
directing self toioards that end. 

Every agent in the universe in acting is directed towards 
some end. Otherwise, it would no more produce any one 
result than any other. In order that it shall produce a de- 
termined result it must have a direction (from without or 
from within) towards that result. But in a rational being 
this is done by that rational seeking of an end which is 
called the Will. An action or motion may tend to its end 
from either of two causes : either because the agent moves 
itself towards that end, as our consciousness informs us that 
man does ; or because it is directed by another, as an arrow 
moves towards the mark. Rational beings move them- 
selves towards the end, because, through free choice, they 
have lordship over their own actions. 

This then is peculiar to a rational being, for if the 
brute has not this power, he may apprehend the imme- 
diate end of his actions, but he does not, properly speak- 
ing, move himself towards it, nor know the ultimate end. 
Some other and a rational being is needed to direct the 
brute towards that ultimate end. He may, and doubtless 
does, seek some particular good for himself ; but the notion 
of the good in general as the object of action he has no 
power to comprehend. 

Human acts are moral acts. 

As such they differ in kind according to the ultimate end 
aimed at. For this is prior in intention. Each act, in- 
deed, is directed to some immediate end which determines 
the species of act. But the same specific act, the killing 
of a man, for example, may be directed to various remoter 
ends. And these remoter ends will determine the moral 
character of the act as good or bad. 

Ttiere is an ultimate end in human action. 

The end directly sought may have a remoter end for 



Qu. I. 4, 5, 6.] WHAT IS MAN'S ULTIMATE END? 3 

which it is the means ; but it is impossible that there 
should be regress of this kind ad infinitum. In such a 
chain if you take away the first link, you annul all that 
follow. In ends there is a two-fold order : that of inten- 
tion, and that of execution ; and in both there must be a 
first. That which is first in intention is the mover of the 
desire for all that follows from it. Take away this, and 
that desire is moved by nothing. The first in execution is 
that from which operation begins. Take that away, and 
no one begins to do anything. But the ultimate end is 
that which is first in intention ; other things are willed 
only as means to attaining this. And the first in execution 
is the first of those means to attaining the end desired. On 
neither side is it possible to proceed ad infinitum. For if 
there were no ultimate end nothing would be sought, no 
action determined to an end, no aim would rest in any- 
thing. And, on the other hand, if there were no first in 
the means used, no one would begin to do anything, no 
plan would be determined in any direction. 

All this is true, however, of a connected order only. 
Where there is none, there may be an indefinite number of 
aims or means. 

One man can make, at one time, only one tiling his ulti- 
mate end, 

Because each one seeks that as his ultimate end which is 
for him the perfect good that rounds up and completes his 
nature. This is for him his good. It fills up his desire 
and leaves nothing more to be sought for. Therefore there 
cannot be two such objects of desire. Men may seek at 
once pleasure, rest, goods of nature, virtue ; but all these 
as going to make up that one perfect good which is the 
ultimate end. 

All things which man seeks for, he seeks on account of the 
ultimate end, 

Because whatever man seeks for he seeks as good, if not 



4 ON BEATITUDE. [Qu. III. 1, 2. 

as the perfect good which is his ultimate end, yet as tending 
towards that. It is not necessary that that ultimate good 
should be consciously in the mind at the time, but its power 
remains in every desire. So it is not necessary that he who 
is going anywhere by a road, should at every step think of 
the end of his journey. 

Do all men seek the same ultimate end ? 

The question admits of two answers. If we have in mind 
the (subjective) idea of that end, since all seek their per- 
fection, all agree in seeking one end. But if we speak 
(objectively) of that in which the notion of such perfection 
is found, by no means do all agree, since some make riches 
the perfect good, others, pleasure, and so on. So tastes 
differ, though all like the agreeable. Even in sinning, man 
seeks a seeming good. Different courses of life result from 
men's finding their ultimate good in different objects. 

§ 2. What is beatitude? 

Is it any created tiling ? 

Our term, "the end," is equivocal, since it may mean 
either the thing which we desire to obtain, or the getting, 
the possession, use, or enjoyment of that thing. 

Thus the avaricious may desire money simply for itself ; 
the ambitious, the pleasure-seeker, for what it gives. In 
the first sense, the ultimate end of every man is uncreated 
good, even God, because He only, by His infinite goodness, 
can perfectly satisfy our will. But in the other sense, the 
ultimate end of man is something created, and existing in 
himself, sc, the obtaining and the fruition of that ultimate 
end. Men obtain beatitude by participation in the perfect 
beatitude of God. 

Beatitude is perfect activity. 

For it is the final perfection of man. But nothing is 
perfect in which any power remains in purely potential ex- 



Qu. in. 2, 3, 4.] AVHAT IS BEATITUDE ? 5 

istence. Beatitude, indeed, is said to be eternal life (Eom. 
vi. 22) ; but life, in this sense of the word, is not mere 
existence ; it is the fulfilment of the operations of life 
(S. John, xvii. 3). Such operations of the inward life are 
thinking, feeling, willing. Such can constitute beatitude. 
Perfect beatitude is not to be found in this life ; for that 
activity of the soul in which man may find some imperfect 
union with his heavenly Father cannot be uninterrupted 
union. There may be some participation of beatitude, but 
its fulness can only be found where there is one, continuous, 
uninterrupted union with God. 

This beatitude has not its seat in the sensitive nature, 
sc, in the feelings and sensations by which we now attain 
to intellectual truth. Its seat is in spiritual reason and holy 
will. Yet true it is that in the resurrection this perfect 
beatitude may overflow into the lower parts of the perfected 
human nature. It is the vision of God, of which S. John 
spoke (1 Ep. iii. 2). This leaves nothing more to be 
desired and sought for. And it is reason's highest flight 
and final rest to know the first cause, the source of all that is. 

What are the conditions of this beatitude ? 

(1) Joy is caused by the rest of desire in the good 
obtained ; therefore beatitude cannot exist without the con- 
comitant spiritual pleasure. 

(2) Three things must concur in perfect beatitude, viz., 
perfect vision, which is perfect knowledge of the end of 
reason ; comprehension of the object of vision, which 
implies its presence in the soul ; fruition, which is perfect 
delight in the object of love known and possessed. 

(3) Eectitude of will is required both antecedently and 
concomitantly. The first, because attaining to the end 
implies a due order of the will with reference to that 
end, and the means of reaching it ; the second, because the 



6 OK BEATITUDE. [Qu. v. 1, 2, 3. 

will of one who sees God necessarily loves whatever he loves 
in its relations to God (Heb. xii. 14). 

§ 3. On the obtaining of this beatitude. 

It is the obtaining of perfect good. 

Man is capable of this perfect good, for his spiritual 
reason can comprehend it, and his will can seek it ; not 
perfectly under present conditions indeed, but when he has 
attained to the perfection of the supernatural life for which 
he was created. 

Since beatitude is perfect and sufficient good it must 
exclude all evil, and satisfy all desire. 

In this life all evil cannot be excluded ; ignorance, 
inordinate affections, bodily pains all stand in the way. 
Neither can all desire be satisfied. For man naturally 
desires permanence of the good which he possesses ; but 
the goods of this life are transitory ; and so is life itself, 
while man naturally shuns death. Therefore perfect beati- 
tude cannot be found in this life. 

If we consider, again, that in which beatitude peculiarly 
consists, sc, the vision of God, of which man is in this life 
incapable, the conclusion will be the same. In this life 
man can only rejoice in hope of it or in some imperfect 
participation of it. 

Tliis beatitude can never be lost. 

For, (1) it satisfies all desire, and excludes all evil. But 
man naturally desires to keep the good which he has, and 
he cannot be perfectly happy if he thinks that he may lose 
it. Or if, again, he is deluded by false opinion that he will 
never lose it, that false opinion is itself an evil, while per- 
fect beatitude excludes every evil. 

And («2) this vision of God so satisfies the soul, is so per- 
fectly free from every drawback to felicity, that the blessed 



Qu. V.4, 5.J (XN" THE OBTAINING OF THIS BEATITUDE. 7 

cannot wish to lose it ; God will not withdraw it, which 
would be penalty for fault ; neither has anything the power 
to withdraw the soul from this vision. Man is made to par- 
ticipate in the eternity of God, finding his own destiny in 
this everlasting beatitude (S. Matt. xxv. 46). 

Man, by his natural powers, cannot acquire beatitude. 

For its perfection is found in the vision of God ; but this 
is above the nature of every creature. Its natural cognition 
is after the manner of its being. But the Divine essence 
infinitely exceeds every created substance ; therefore no 
creature can by its natural powers obtain this ultimate 
beatitude. It is indeed the end of man ; but in this, as in 
other respects, man, having free will, is to use that in turn- 
ing to the One who alone can make him perfectly happy. 
The greatness of the end makes him exalted above those 
irrational creatures which can attain their end, so much 
lower than his, by their own natural powers. 



CHAPTER II. 

OJST WILL. 

§ 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary? 

Human acts are peculiarly voluntary. 

In some actions or motions the impulse which produces 
them is to be found in the agent, or thing moved. In 
others, we find an external impulse. Thus we speak of the 
attraction of the earth towards a stone, and of the stone 
towards the earth, as if there were an inward impulse pro- 
ducing the motion. But when the stone is thrown upwards, 
the impulse is from without. But some of those actions or 
motions which proceed from within are those of self- 
moving things, others are not. Granting that there is an 
end or object to be attained by the motion or action, we 
find that some things act with knowledge of that end ; they 
act on account of, for the sake of, that end. In these there 
is not only the impulse to act, but to act for the sake of 
that end. Where there is no knowledge of the end, which 
nevertheless guides the action, an external principle or 
cause must be assumed which possesses that knowledge. 
Such things are not said to be self-moved, but to be moved 
by others. But those which have knowledge of the end are 
called voluntary agents. 

Now man knows the end of his operation, and moves 
himself ; therefore human acts are voluntary. 

It may be objected, (1) that his desire is moved by what 
is desirable. But this does not conflict with the definition 
of the voluntary given above, for the inward principle of 
action need not be the- first principle of action ; i. e., if we 



Qu. VI. 1,2.] VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. 9 

consider some other kind of motion or action, such as is 
the presenting ah extra of some object to our desire.* 

Every new motion or action of "desire must have an out- 
ward antecedent as a condition of the new existence, but 
this does not hinder the inward motion being self-caused 
with knowledge of the end, i. <?., voluntary. 

(2) Man does not act per se, for God is the source of all 
action or change (S. John xv. 5). It is true that God is the 
first mover of the will, as He is of all natural motions. 
But in neither case is the action thereby robbed of its 
proper character whether as natural or as voluntary. 

The voluntary may be found where there is no act. 

For a thing may proceed from the will not only directly 
but indirectly. So a shipwreck may result from a nega- 
tive cause, sc, the pilot who desists from his official duty, 
when he can and ought to attend to it. In this case he is 
rightly called the cause of the disaster. For if he were not 
able to direct the vessel or had no charge of it, he would 
not be the cause of the event. So the will by willing and 
acting can prevent the not willing and the not acting. 
And if it ought to do so, but does not do so, then the not 
willing and the not acting are imputed to it. Thus, then, 
there may be an interior act without the exterior, as when 
we will not to act ; or even the interior act may be absent, 
as when we do not will to act. It is plain, therefore, that 
there is a difference between the privative concept of being 

* This will be rendered clearer to the student if he considers the 
seven steps in a consummated act of will ; sc. : 

(a). Natural inclination to the object, which is involuntary ; 

(h). Voluntary contemplation of the object by the intellect ; 

(c). Complacency in that contemplation (involuntary) ; 

(d). Desire of the object (natural and involuntary) ; 

(e). Consent of the will to try to possess the object ; 

(/). Rational choice of means for attaining the object 

(g). Voluntary use of those means (Duct. Dubitant., iv. 1, rule 3). 
See p. 23. 



10 ON WILL. [Qu. vi. 3. 

unwilling, i. e., willing not to act, which is voluntary ; and 
the purely negative concept of not willing, which causes the 
involuntary. The same thing is true of the act of cognition 
which accompanies the voluntary. We may will not to con- 
sider ; or we may act inconsiderately in a simply negative 
sense, which so far goes to make the action involuntary. 

Can the will be forced f 

The act of the will is two-fold : (1) the immediate willing, 
which, we may say, is elicited by the will itself ; (2) acts 
commanded by the will (i. e., by ourself ), and accomplished 
by the mediation of other powers, as walking or speaking. 

As respects the second, the will can be said to suffer vio- 
lence, since the members of the body may be hindered from 
doing what we will. But the will itself (our proper self) 
can in no manner be forced. For its act is one proceeding 
from an inward, conscious principle ; but force is external, 
and contrary to the very nature of the will. The man can 
be violently dragged, not his will. 

It may be objected (1) that God is all-powerful, and can 
move the will irresistibly (Prov. xxi. 1). But if this were 
by force, it would not be with the act of the will ; the will 
would not be moved, but something accomplished against 
the will. 

(2) The will indeed is moved by that which seems to it to 
be desirable. But this is not violence, for that means what 
is contrary to the nature of the thing passively acted upon. 
In all alterations or generations of things there is an inward 
disposition which may make the change natural. So is it 
with the will. 

(3) But is not the act of sinning against nature ? And 
does not the will therefore suffer violence therein ? The 
ansAver is, yes, and no. That to which man tends in the 
act of sinning is indeed against a rational nature, but it 
is apprehended nevertheless as good and suitable to the 
perverted nature of the sinner. 



Qu. VI. 4, 5, 6.] VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. 11 

Violence therefore causes the involuntary , so far as acts 
commanded by the will are concerned. 

Observe, also, that when the will does not actively con- 
tribute to the result, it may do so passively by consent. 
And the action of the man, though produced simply by an 
external agent, will not in that case be properly involun- 
tary. 

What shall we say of the effect of fear 9 

Actions done through fear have a mixed nature. In 
themselves considered they are not voluntary, yet they are 
conditionally so : sc, in order to avoid an evil which is 
feared. Simply they are voluntary, and involuntary secun- 
dum quid. The individual act, here and now and under its 
other individualizing conditions, is willed, i. e., is voluntary. 
So goods are voluntarily thrown into the sea, in order to 
preserve the vessel. But the action may be viewed in a 
general way as apprehended in thought apart from the 
sj)ecial conditions. So viewed it is not willed ; therefore 
it is involuntary secundum quid. 

(Grave fear, therefore, does not totally excuse actions 
which are intrinsically bad ; but it may diminish their 
guilt.) 

Force and fear differ not only in reference to present 
violence and future injury dreaded, but also in that the 
will does not consent at all to the one, but does to the 
other, not on its own account, but on account of something 
else, sc, the avoiding of the dreaded evil. But not only is 
that voluntary which we will for its own sake as the end 
Avhich is sought for, but also that is voluntary which we 
will as means to an end. The will then contributes some- 
thing in what is done through fear. 

Does concupiscence cause the involuntary f 
(Understand by this term the motions of the sensuous 
nature opposing the spiritual nature, while they are seeking 



12 OK WILL. [Qu. VI. 7. 

some pleasurable good.) Instead of concupiscence causing 
involuntary action, it is rather to be said that it renders 
action voluntary. For by concupiscence the will is inclined 
to will that which it so desires (that which we desire). 

The passion of fear is different ; for it directly regards 
the evil, which is contrary to the nature of the will ; 
whereas the seeming good is in agreement with its nature. 

The incontinent, it is true, may act contrary to his pre- 
vious purpose, but he has changed his purpose ; so that 
his act becomes simply voluntary ; while, on the contrary, 
the fearful man acts in opposition to that which at the time 
and in itself he wills. 

It may also be objected that the voluntary act requires 
cognition of it, which cognition concupiscence tends to 
destroy. And it is true that if that concupiscence should 
totally take away reason, it would at the same time prevent 
voluntary action. But then the man would be insane, and 
his action would be neither voluntary nor involuntary. 
But sometimes, also, cognition of those things which are 
done through concupiscence is not totally destroyed. It is 
only actual consideration of the particular thing which is 
to be done which is thus taken away. Yet this very want 
of consideration is in the power of the man, for he can 
resist his passion, and choose to consider if he will. 

Does ignorance cause the involuntary f 

I answer that that ignorance does so which takes away 
that knowledge which is requisite to make action properly 
voluntary. But it is not every kind of ignorance which 
does so. With respect to the act of will, ignorance has 
three relations : (1) concomitant ; (2) consequent ; (3) 
antecedent. 

(1) The first is when there is ignorance of that which 
is done, and yet, if it were thoroughly understood, it would 
still be done. Ignorance is not the cause of the act of will, 
but is, as it were, accidental to it. So some one wishes, 



Qu. VI. 8.] VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. 13 

indeed, to kill his enemy, but ignorantly shoots him while 
aiming at a deer. Such ignorance produces not the 
involuntary, but the not-voluntary. That is, the act is 
neither voluntary nor involuntary. 

(2) The second is when the ignorance itself is voluntary 
in one of two ways : (a) when the ignorance is directly 
willed, wilful ignorance, in order to have an excuse for 
sinning, or in order not to be prevented from sinning 
(Job xxi. 14); (b) when there is voluntary ignorance of that 
which one can and ought to know. In this way one does 
not actually consider what he can and ought to consider, 
which is the ignorance of an evil choice, either from pas- 
sion or from previously existing habit. Or, again, one 
does not take pains to acquire the knowledge which he 
ought to have. So, in human law, ignorance of that which 
one is bound to know is treated as voluntary, since it pro- 
ceeds from antecedent, voluntary ignorance.* Such igno- 
rance does not cause the involuntary, speaking simply, but 
only the involuntary secundum quid, since it precedes 
the act of will which produces the action in question, 
which would not have been done, say something done 
in heat of passion, if full consideration of it had been 
present. 

(3) The third is when the ignorance is not voluntary, 
and yet it is the cause of the willing what would not other- 
wise have been willed (invincible ignorance). One may be 
ignorant of something connected with his act which he 
was not bound to know, and consequently he may do what 
he would not have done if he had known that circumstance. 
For example, he is firing his rifle with all requisite precau- 
tions, and shoots a man. Such ignorance causes the simply 
involuntary. 



* Common law makes no excuse for ignorance of the law, because it 
is so easily counterfeited. Ignorance of the fact may be complete or 
partial justification (Blackst., iv., p. 25). 



14 ON WILL. [Qu. VII. 1, 3. 

§ 2. On the circumstances of human acts. 

Whatever we consider to be outside of the substance of the 
act, and yet to pertain to it in any manner (so that that 
individual act could not exist without these conditions, i. e., 
is inseparable from them), we call its circumstances, its acci- 
dents. 

For three reasons Moral Theology must consider these 
circumstances : (1) because it views human acts in their 
relation to man's beatitude, and these acts are fitted to it by 
due circumstances ; (2) it considers acts as they are moral 
in various degrees of goodness and badness, Avhich circum- 
stances vary; (3) it considers human acts as meritorious 
or blameworthy, and this view of them requires that they 
be regarded as voluntary, and they are judged to be volun- 
tary or involuntary according as there is knowledge or 
ignorance of the circumstances of the act. Note, however, 
that we are not speaking of all accidents of the act, but of 
those which are related to its end as a moral thing. 

Aristotle (Nic. Eth., iii. 1)* wisely makes eight circum- 
stances of an act : quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, 
quomodo, quando, circa quid. These are connected, first, 
with its cause ; (a) the final cause (why ?), some end con- 
nected with the act, as when one acts courageously in order 
to save his country ; (b) the material cause, or object 
(what ?), the outward act ; (c) the efficient cause or agent 
(who ?), i. e., the peculiar state or condition of the agent as 
constituting a special circumstance of the action, as when 
a police officer shoots a criminal escaping from arrest ; 
(d) the instrumental cause (with what instruments ?). 

* The student should be reminded, once for all, that in the science of 
practical ethics our author closely follows the Nicomachean Ethics of 
Aristotle. But our divine science, while employing a work which still, 
perhaps, remains without a rival in its own sphere, lifts up natural and 
rational ethics to a far higher plane, places them before the throne of 
God, and subjects them to His revealed law. 



Qu. VIII. 1, 2.] ON MOTIVES. 15 

Secondly, the act itself has its circumstances : (e) when ? 
(/) where ? (g) how ? in what manner ? 

Thirdly, the effect or result of the act (h) what ? Thus, 
in pouring water on the hands, the cooling or the washing 
of them is a circumstance of the act. 

§ 3. Acts elicited by the will. 1. The end. What is willed 
in reference to the end. 

The end ivhich ive will is only the good, or the seeming 
good. 

For will is rational desire. But desire can never be of 
anything except the good, i. e., what is so regarded. For 
desire is an inclination to that which appears to be in some 
way suited to that which seeks for it. Our avoiding evil 
may be called unwillingness (noluntas, not voluntas). It is 
true that we sometimes will non-entities, as not to walk or 
not to talk ; but these maybe called entities of reason, i. e., 
negations regarded as desirable and so chosen and willed. 

Do we will also the means to the end ? 

I answer that we may consider our power of willing, or 
the immediate act of the will. If the first, we see that the 
idea of the good and desirable, which is the object of the 
will, is found not only in the end, but in the means to that 
end. But if we speak of the act of willing, it is principally 
and properly of the end alone. For that is on its own 
account good and is willed. But the means are not deemed 
good and willed for their own sake, but in order to the end. 
Our will is directed to those means only as it is directed 
to the end which is in view ; therefore, what in them we 
will is the end. 

§ 4. On motives. 

Is the will moved by the reason ? 

A power which is potentially capable of many results 



16 OK WILL. [Qu. ix. 1, 2. 

needs to be directed by some actual thing in order that it 
may be actually exercised. But a power of the soul is two- 
fold in this respect : first, it is capable of acting or not 
acting ; and next, it can act and produce this or that. It 
therefore needs a motive, first, to produce action, next, to 
determine the act produced. The first depends upon the 
agent himself ; the second upon the object from which the 
act gets its "specification." The first takes its origin in 
the end sought for. The good in general being the object 
of the will, in this regard the will moves the other powers 
of the soul to tbeir appropriate acts ; for we employ those 
powers when we will to do so. But the intellect presents 
some object conceived under a general notion, and so deter- 
mines the will to that specific object. 

In like manner the imagination presents some desirable 
individual thing to sensuous desire, and, if it is viewed as 
desirable or injurious, it moves that desire. 

It is, then, the practical, not the speculative reason, 
which we are now considering. And it is true to say both 
that the will moves the reason and that the reason moves 
the will ; the first, in producing the exercise of its func- 
tion ; the second, as determining the act of will. 

Is the will moved by sensuous appetite? 

Anything appears good and agreeable from two circum- 
stances ; sc, first, from the condition of that which is pre- 
sented ; next, from the state of that to which it is presented. 
The agreeable is a relation which depends upon each of the 
things related. Thus the sense of taste in different condi- 
tions finds the same thing agreeable or disagreeable. Now 
any passion of the sensuous appetite changes the disposition 
of a man. Under the influence of that passion a thing 
appears to be agreeable which would not so appear under 
different conditions. It is so in the case, e. g., of an angry 
man. In this way sensuous appetite moves the will. 

Thus the inferior power may have strong influence over 



Qu. IX. 2, 3, 4.] ON MOTIVES. 17 

the superior. And this is especially true because actions 
and choices concern individual things ; and such are the 
objects of sensuous desire, not those general notions which 
belong to the sphere of reason. Season, indeed, has natural 
authority over passions ; but, as Aristotle remarks (Polit., 
i. 3), its sway is not despotic, but limited ; i. e., the passions 
can make resistance. 

Is the will self -moved? 

I answer that the will in willing the end moves itself to 
will what is requisite in order to reach that end. This is 
not saying that it moves itself in all respects, but that when 
it actually wills the end, then its power, by its own activity, 
becomes actual in respect of the means. 

Is the will moved by any external moving and efficient 
cause f 

I speak now of the very exercise of its act of willing, not 
of the determination to this or that object. It is a uni- 
versal principle that any agent which is not continually 
acting needs, in order that it may change from its passive 
state of power to actual exertion of it, some external 
impulse. But it is manifest that we begin to will what 
previously Ave were not willing. According to this uni- 
versal law we must, therefore, have been moved from 
without. 

"We have seen that in willing the end, Ave make ourselves 
to Avill the means. But this requires the mediation of some 
deliberative thought. Thus, when one wishes to be cured 
of disease, he may reflect how this can be brought about. 
And having thus found the means, he chooses them. But 
because he is not continually Avilling to be cured, he needs 
some external motive power to lead him to begin this new 
act of will. If he moved himself to begin it, he would still 
need some deliberative act to produce that act of will. 
Now Ave cannot go back in this way ad infinitum. There- 
2 



18 ON WILL. [Qu. x. 1, 2. 

fore we must assume some primal impulse of an exterior 
mover. 

What is voluntary must indeed have its principle within 
the agent ; but it is not necessary that this be the primal 
principle unmoved by any other. The will is not forced to 
act. For in that case, it would contribute nothing to the 
result. But it is we ourselves who will, though moved by 
another, sc, God. 

God only can do this. 

We may be moved from without by that which is not the 
cause of our being, but this cannot be voluntary motion. 
But the will is a rational power caused by God, being 
created by him (and sustained by him). And the will has 
relation to the universal good. Any special good cannot 
give this inclination to the universal good. God is this 
good, He only ; therefore He only can move the will 
efficiently. Without this man can will nothing. But by 
his reason he determines himself to will this or that good, 
or the seeming good which in reality is evil. 

§ 5. How is the will moved ? 

Do we naturally will any tiling from necessity? 

The will naturally tends towards the good in general, its 
ultimate end, as every power does towards its proper object. 
In general we naturally seek what is in accordance with our 
nature, its powers, our whole human constitution. Thus 
we seek knowledge of the truth, which is the object of our 
reason ; and we naturally seek to live, and the like, which 
belong to our human nature. 

7s the ivill necessarily moved by its object? 

The will is moved in a two-fold manner : (1) as respects 
the exercise of its power, (2) as respects the specification of 
the act in willing this or that. In the first manner it is not 



Qu. x. 2, 3.] HOW IS THE WILL MOVED ? 19 

necessarily moved by any object, for it is able to exclude 
that object from thought. Then there is no act of willing 
that object. But as regards the second, the will is neces- 
sarily moved by some objects of it, by others, not. If an 
object is proposed to us which is universally good in every 
point of view, our will necessarily tends to that, if we will 
at all, for Ave cannot will the opposite of it. Such good is 
happiness (beatitude). 

But if some special good be presented to us which is 
good only from certain points of view, we do not necessarily 
will it. Being deficient, it may be regarded as not good, 
our attention being given to that deficiency. So the object 
may be rejected or approved by the will, since we may view 
the same thing in different lights. 

Not only the ultimate end, but those means which are 
regarded as necessary for the attainment of that end, are 
necessarily willed ; e. g., life itself. But other things which 
are not so regarded are not necessarily willed by him who 
wills the end. 

Is the will necessarily moved by lower appetite f 

This, through some passion, disposes a man to judge some- 
thing to be agreeable and good, which would not be other- 
wise so judged. Passions may change the condition of the 
brain to such a degree that the man is insane. Here there 
is necessity. We may conceive of the condition of the 
brutes in the same way. 

But sometimes, also, the reason is not totally annulled by 
passion, and its free judgment still remains. So there still 
remains some free motion of the will. In this case the 
will does not of necessity incline to that towards which 
passion draws it. 

S. Paul, indeed, says (Rom. vii. 19), " The good which 
I would, I do not ; but the evil which I would not, that I 
do." But he seems to mean that we cannot prevent the 
motions of concupiscence from arising. Yet we have the 



20 ON WILL. [Qu. X. 3, 4. 

power of not willing to have these motions, or of not con- 
senting to them. 

Man has two natures, the rational and the sensitive. If 
his being is well ordered, the sensuous part of it is totally 
subject to the other. This constitutes the virtuous man. 
The opposite case is that of some forms of insanity. But 
sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, it still 
remains more or less free. Then the man can either totally 
repel the passion, or prevent himself from yielding to it. 
In such a condition diverse parts of the soul are diversely 
disposed ; one thing seems good to it according to reason, 
another according to passion. 

It may be objected, finally, that the will is not moved to 
any particular good, except through the mediation of sen- 
suous appetite, the function of which concerns those 
special goods and not the universal good which is the 
object of the will. I reply that the will is moved not only 
by the universal good apprehended by reason, but by the 
particular good apprehended by sense. So it can be moved 
to that good without any passion of the sensuous appetite, 
by free choice of such a good. There is uo necessity in 
that act of will. 

Is the will necessarily moved {compelled) by God ? 

Divine Providence preserves, does not destroy all cor- 
ruptible things. Hence all things move according to their 
constitution (their condition). From necessary causes fol- 
low, through Divine power, necessary effects ; from con- 
tingent causes, contingent effects. And the will is an 
active principle, not determined to one thing, but capable 
of turning to many things. God moves it therefore, not 
turning it of necessity to one thing, but leaving its action 
contingent, except in those ends to which it is by its 
nature directed. 

(1) It is said, indeed (Rom. ix. 19), " who hath resisted 
his will?" But that Divine will not only orders that 



Qu. XIII. 0, 5.] CHOICE OF MEANS FOR THE END. 21 

something be done by the thing which He moves, but also 
that that be done in accordance with the nature which He 
himself has given. It would be more repugnant to the 
Divine motion that the will should be compelled, which is 
contrary to its nature, than that it should freely move, which 
is according to its nature. 

(2) It may be objected, again, that the will necessarily is 
moved in that which it naturally wills, and that is natural 
which God Avorks in it ; therefore, we necessarily will what- 
ever God moves us towards. But I reply that that is natu- 
ral to each thing which God makes so. But He does not 
will that all which He works in things shall be natural to 
them, e. g., that the dead should rise again. (That is super- 
natural.) But He wills it to be natural to everything that 
it should be subject to His power. 

(3) It is true, again, that if G-od moves the will to any 
particular thing, we shall be drawn to that precisely accord- 
ing to the exertion of His power, for otherwise His opera- 
tion would be inefficacious. But that truth does not affect 
the question before us. 

§ 6. On the choice of means for the end. 

Choice is ahoays of means, not of the ultimate end. 

But that which is the end in one point of view may be 
the means for something else. Thus in the science of 
medicine the restoration of health is the ultimate end, and 
does not fall under the physician's choice. But if that 
restoration of health is a means to the health of the soul, 
or if its opposite were so, it would fall under judgment and 
choice of means. 

We choose only ivhat we regard as possible for us. 

Our choice always has reference to some action of ours. 
Such action is deemed possible, otherwise it would not be 
chosen. We choose it in order that through it we may 
attain our end, or that which leads to that end. If it is 



22 OlST WILL. [Qu. xiii. 2, 6. 

deemed impossible in this regard, it is abandoned for other 
means. No one is moved towards that which seems impos- 
sible. ISTo one tends to an end Avhich seems totally out of 
his reach, because the means are unattainable. Therefore, 
that which is impossible cannot be chosen. 

I am speaking, however, of the perfect act of the will, 
which implies operation. For that imperfect act of it 
which is called wishing for a thing means that we would 
will it if it were possible to be accomplished. But choice 
means the determination of the will to that which is now to 
be done in order to reach the end sought for. 

It will be seen that in speaking of the possible and the 
impossible, we have in mind what is so judged by the agent. 

Are we free in choosing? 

"What is possible to be or not to be, does not exist of 
necessity. JS"ow it is possible to choose or not to choose. 
(1) It is of the very nature of a rational being that he can 
will and not will, act and not act. He can will this or 
that. For whatever the reason apprehends as good, the 
will can incline to. But the reason can apprehend as good 
not only the willing and acting, but also the not willing 
and the not acting. (2) And again, in all particular goods, 
it can consider the notion of that good and its defects 
which are regarded as evils. And so it can apprehend any 
such good as a thing to be chosen or to be shunned. But 
only the perfect good, which is beatitude, the reason cannot 
apprehend as possessing any evil or any defect. Therefore 
man necessarily wills his beatitude, and cannot will to be 
not happy, or to be miserable. But since choice is not 
of the end, but of means to the end, it is not of the 
perfect good, which is that happiness, but of some par- 
ticular goods. Therefore man chooses, not of necessity, 
but freely. 

(1) It is true that this principle may require that means 
which are necessary to the end be necessarily followed. 



Qu. XVII. 1, 6.] ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL. 23 

But this is not true of everything which has some relation 
to the end. 

(2) And the judgment of reason about things to he done 
is, in this case, a judgment respecting contingent things, 
which are possible, to be done. Those are necessary only 
under a condition ; e.g., if he will to run, he must move. 

(3) Two things apparently equal in one point of view 
may be presented to choice. But nothing hinders their 
being regarded as unequal from some other point of view. 

Deliberation of reason precedes choice. For actions 
respect contingent things, which require a preceding search 
of the reason before a judgment is made. This only con- 
cerns the means, not the ultimate end, respecting which 
there is no such deliberation. 

Then follows consent, not to the end, but to the subject 
of judgment, sc, the means for attaining that end. 

Next comes the use of those means by the will under the 
direction of the reason. 

§ 7. On acts commanded by the will. 

Self-command belongs to the higher nature of man, his 
reason and his will. 

Each of these controls the other. Reason can say to us, 
' ' this is now to be done ; " and, on the other hand, we will 
in issuing this command. We will in attending to this or 
that, which is a prerequisite for the exercise of reason. 

Can the act of reason be commanded? 

This act can be considered in two lights. If we speak of 
the exercise of the act, it is always in our power to attend, 
or not to attend, to use or not to use our reason. But as 
regards the object of our thought, it is not in our own 
power that we apprehend the truth presented to us. We 
can only say that this is seen by some natural or super- 
natural light. But there is, also, a rational (and voluntary) 



24 ON" WILL. [Qu. xvn. 6, 7. 

assent to the truth presented ; not, however, in all cases, 
for the assent to knowledge proper, to truths scientifically 
demonstrated, is not in our own power. But there are also 
things apprehended which do not so convince the reason 
but that we can give or withhold our assent, or suspend our 
judgment respecting them. 

Herein, then, the act of reason is in our own power. 
(Such are the verities of the Christian faith.) 

Are acts of the sensuous appetite subject to our higher 
nature ? 

First note that these appetites are connected with bodily 
organs (the brain and nervous system). The will is not so 
connected. But every act of a power employing a bodily 
organ depends not only on the soul's power, but also on the 
condition of that organ. So far as the former is concerned, 
it follows apprehension of the object. But the aj)prehen- 
sion of the imagination, which is of particular objects, is 
regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is of the 
universal idea of the same object. So far the act of the sen- 
suous appetite is subject to the empire of reason. But the 
condition of the bodily organ is not (directly) so subject. 

Sometimes, also, it happens that the sensuous appetite is 
suddenly excited through sense or imagination presenting 
the object to it. Then that motion is not subject to reason, 
although the higher part of the man might have hindered 
the motion, if it had been foreseen (venial sin). 

The acts of what Aristotle called the " vegetative soul " 
(hunger, thirst, etc., natural appetites) are not subject to 
the dominion of reason. 

If we consider the bodily organs, we notice that there 
are some vital organs, nutritive, generative, etc., which 
are not subject to the empire of reason. They belong to 
the e: vegetative soul." (It is different with organs which 
directly serve the higher part of our nature. ) 



CHAPTER III. 

ON GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. 

§ 1. Whence are they derived ? 

Is every human action good, or are some evil 1 
What S. Thomas proved in Pars Prima is here to be 
remembered. For good and evil in actions are like good 
and evil in things, since each thing produces action 
according to its essential -nature. Now it is a fundamental 
principle of truth, which was shown in Part I., that Good 
and Being are convertible terms. (Being is good, and the 
good is Being viewed as desirable. ) As much of Being as 
anything possesses, so much of good it has. G-od alone 
has absolute plenitude of being. But each thing which 
He has made possesses such plenitude of being as He finds 
suitable for it according to its peculiar nature. 

Some things, however, may have being, and yet lack that 
plenitude of being which they ought to have. Thus a man 
is compounded of body and soul, with all their suitable 
organs and powers. If any one of these is lacking, there 
is defect in his plenitude of being. Such defect is an evil. 
A blind man, e.g., has the good of life, but he has also the 
evil of defect, his blindness. But if he lacked everything 
which belongs to being, we could not apply the words good 
or bad to him. Where there is defect, the thing is good 
secundum quid. I conclude, therefore, that every action, 
so far as it has being, has goodness ; but so far as it lacks 
that plenitude of being which is due to human action, it is 
bad; e. g., if it lacks the due quantity, or the due place, etc. 
The evil acts by virtue of the deficient good. If there 



26 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. [Qu. xvill. 1, 2, 8. 

were no good, there would be no being, no action. If there 
were no deficiency, there would be no evil in the being or 
in the action. So the action actually produced is in such 
a case a defective good, good secundum quid, but simply 
evil. 

Anything may be, in one regard, actual, in another 
deprived of actuality ; and thus deficient action will be 
caused. A blind man has power to walk (which is a good) ; 
but wanting sight, he walks hesitatingly (which is an evil). 

An evil action may have some effect per se, which is in 
one way good, but evil as opposed to the due order of 
reason, e. g., conception following adultery. 

Does human action derive goodness or badness from its 
object ? 

The kind of action is primarily determined by its object 
as the terminus of the action. Not, indeed, the object as 
viewed in itself, but in its relations to the actor, as in 
accordance or disaccordance with right reason so far as 
he is concerned. In this way actions are good or bad in 
their nature. Thus unjustly taking another's property is 
malum per se. 

In speaking of the object thus, I am not speaking of an 
external thing which is in itself a good, but of the related 
action. 

The goodness of the action is not caused by the goodness 
of its effect ; but an action is called good because it can 
produce a good effect ; and so the very relation of an action 
to its result is a cause of the goodness of that action. 

Is human action good or bad according to the circum- 
stances of it f 

I answer that the plenitude of being in (individual) 
action is not totally due to its nature, but also (in part) to 
the due circumstances. Hence, if anything be lacking in 
these due circumstances, the action is bad. 



Qu. XVIII. 3,4, 5.] WHENCE DERIVED ? 27 

Is human action good or had according to its end 9 

(Here Ave speak, not of the intrinsic end which coincides 
with the object spoken of above, but of the extrinsic 
object.) This is the extrinsic cause of the action. Due 
proportion and relation to that end is requisite in order to 
constitute the action good. 

So then, in human action there may be four-fold good- 
ness : (1) in its genus, sc, action ; because as much of 
action and being as it has, so much it has of goodness ; 
(2) in the kind of action, according as it has a fitting 
object ; (3) in the accidental circumstances of the (indi- 
vidual) action ; (4) according to the end, its relation to the 
goodness of its cause. 

Observe, however, with reference to this last, that this 
final cause may be only the seeming good, and so evil 
action may follow from it. And especially, it is to be 
noted that an action having goodness of one of these four 
kinds may be deficient in another of them. It may be 
good according to its species or its circumstances, and bad 
in the intention of the one who does the action. And an 
action is not simply good unless all four kinds of goodness 
are found in it. 

Does the end aimed at make an action specifically good or 
bad? 

Some acts are called human inasmuch as they are our 
voluntary acts. 

Now, in the voluntary act is found a two-fold action ; 
one, the interior act of the will, another, the outward act. 
And each of these has its object. The end is the proper 
object of the inward voluntary act ; but that about which 
the outward act is concerned is its object. And as the 
outward act takes its specific character from its object, ... 
the inward act gets its specific character (as good or bad) 
from the end sought for. But the outward acts are only 
moral so far as they are voluntary. We use our members 



28 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. [QlX. XVIII. 8, 9. 

as instruments of our will. Therefore human acts, although 
they may be described according to their outward object, 
the " material " part of them, are yet specifically good of 
bad according to the end, the "formal" part of them. 
Aristotle, accordingly, observes (Nic. Eth., v. 2) that he 
who steals in order to commit adultery, is even more an 
adulterer than a thief. 

Indifferent acts. 

A human act, i. e., a moral act, gets its species from its 
object as related to the (directing) principle of human acts, 
which is reason. Hence, if the object of the act embraces 
what is in accordance with the order of reason, the species 
of act will be good, e. g., to give alms. But if it include what 
is repugnant to the order of reason, the act will be, specifi- 
cally, a bad act ; e. g., to take unjustly another's property. 
But the object of the act may possibly embrace nothing 
pertaining to the order of reason, e. g., to pick uj) a straw 
from the ground. Such acts are in themselves indifferent. 

I say, in themselves ; but when we consider the indi- 
vidual who does the act the case is altered. For a moral 
act has goodness not only from its object, but also from its 
circumstances. And every individual act has circum- 
stances by which it may be rendered good or bad ; the 
intention at least may produce this result. For since it is 
the part of reason to direct, an act proceeding from deliber- 
ate reason, if not ordered for the due end, is, on that very 
account, repugnant to reason, and is bad ; but if it is 
ordained for a due end, it is in accordance with reason, 
and is so far good. 

But every act of a man which proceeds from deliberative 
reason is either ordained or not ordained for a due end ; 
therefore, considered with reference to the individual, it is 
either good or bad.* But if it does not so proceed, as when 

* Xote that what is not intrinsically evil may become such indirectly, 
through contempt of the law, or of the law-giver, through scandal, etc. 



Qu. XIX. 1,2.] INWARD ACTS OF THE WILL. 29 

one rubs Ms beard, or moves his hand or his foot, such an 
act is not, properly speaking, human or moral, and is indif- 
ferent. 

Does any circumstance constitute a specifically moral act, 
tad or good ? 

I answer yes ; because the species of moral acts, as 
species, depend upon the concepts or forms, as framed by 
the mind. And so what in any act is viewed as a super- 
vening circumstance, may again be viewed as one of the 
chief conditions of the object. Thus taking unjustly an- 
other's property is theft in general ; but we may also con- 
sider some circumstance which adds a special deformity 
contrary to the order of reason, as the place, the time, the 
person, the manner. And so theft may be robbery or 
sacrilege. 

§ 2. The good and evil of the inward acts of the will. 

A good will depends upon its object. 

Good and evil per se pertain to the will, as the true and 
the false pertain to the intellect. But in human acts 
different objects make a difference in kind. Good and evil, 
therefore, in acts of the will depend upon the object of it. 
It is true that the will can only seek the good ; but what 
seems so may be only the apparent good. And so the act 
of will is sometimes evil. 

The goodness of the ivill depends upon the object alone, 
not on the circumstances of the act. This object is the end 
sought ; we are speaking, therefore, of the intended end. 

If the will is for the good, no circumstance can make 
that a bad will. If you say that any one wills any good 
when, or where, or as he ought not to do, your words are 
equivocal. For you may mean that that circumstance is 
willed. And so he does not will the good. Because the 
willing a good when, or where, or as, one ought not so to 



30 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. [QlT. XIX. 3, 4, 5. 

do, is not willing the good. But again, you may mean the 
very act of willing ; and so it is impossible that any one 
should will the good when he ought not to, because he 
ought always to will it ; unless, perhaps, accidentally, when 
in willing this good, he is hindered from willing some good 
which he ought to will. And the evil does not arise from 
his willing that good, but from his not willing the other. 

It may be objected that ignorance of circumstances 
excuses the evil of the will ; and that this proves that the 
goodness or the evil of the will depends upon those circum- 
stances, and not upon its object only. But this excuse 
regards the circumstances as a part of the thing willed, 
i. e., we are ignorant of the circumstances of the act which 
is Avilled. Thus the objection falls to the ground. 

Hie goodness of the will depends upon reason also. 

For the object of the will is proposed to it by the reason. 
This is not the good of sense or imagination. That is 
offered to the sensuous appetite, not to the will. The 
object of reason and will is the good as viewed in its general 
conception. 

The goodness of the will depends, still more, upon eternal 
law. 

The light of reason which is in us can show us the good, 
and regulate our reason, only so far as it is derived from 
the eternal light (Ps. iv. 6). This shines on us in the form 
of eternal law. We do not know it, indeed, as it exists in 
God ; but our reason is the image of God in us, and natu- 
rally, or by supernatural revelation, sees in part that eternal 
law which orders our reason itself as the measure of our 
acts. 

Every will discordant ivitli reason, whether that reason is 
correct or erring, is a bad will. 

By conscience I understand the act in which we ajyply 
our moral judgment : (1) testifying concerning what we 



Qu. XIX. 5.] ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE. 31 

have done or left undone ; (2) judging that something is to 
be done or not to be done ; (3) judging that what has been 
done was rightly or not rightly done, sc, an accusing or 
excusing conscience. So understood, the question before 
us may be otherwise stated, sc, does an erroneous con- 
science create obligation? In things indifferent (in their 
own nature) a will discordant from reason, an erroneous 
conscience, is, in a certain way, bad on account of the 
object on which good or evil in the will depends ; not 
indeed on account of the object as it is in itself, but as it is 
regarded by reason, being viewed as good or bad, to be done 
or to be shunned. And because the object of the will is 
that which is proposed to it by reason, if anything is 
presented by the reason as evil, a will following that is a 
bad will. 

But this is true not only of things indifferent, but also 
of those which are in themselves good or bad. For that 
which is good may be viewed as evil, and that which is evil 
may be regarded as good. To abstain from fornication is a 
moral good. But we do not seek this good as a good 
except as it is presented by our reason. If, therefore 
it is presented by an erroneous conscience as evil, we 
follow that abstinence under the idea of its being sin 
And the will is bad because it wills what we regard as evil 
To believe in Christ is per se good and necessary to salva 
tion. But if our reason judges that faith to be an impost 
lire, we accept it as an evil thing ; our will is a bad will 
Therefore S. Paul says (Rom. xiv. 23), ' ' Whatsoever is not 
of faith is sin." 

It may be objected, (1) that reason is the rule of human 
will because it is based on eternal law, but an erring reason 
is not derived from eternal law, and so is not the rule of 
human will ; neither is the will bad if it does not agree 
with an erring reason. But, nevertheless, that erring 
reason proposes its judgment as true and based on God's 
law. (2) Erroneous conscience sometimes proposes what 



82 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. [Qu. XIX. 6. 

is contrary to the command of God, and therefore imposes 
no obligation. But if any one believes that the order com- 
ing from a subordinate officer is the command of the chief, 
in despising the one he despises the other. So if we were 
aware that our reason dictated something contrary to God's 
command, we would not be bound to follow that. But, in 
that case our reason would not be totally erroneous. But 
when erring reason presents anything as a commandment 
of God, to despise that dictate of reason, and to reject the 
commandment of God, are one and the same. 

Is a will which agrees with erring reason a good will ? 

This is the same as the question whether an erroneous 
conscience excuses. It has already been shown (qu. vi., 
art. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes the involuntary, 
sometimes does not. And since moral good and evil 
imply a voluntary act, it is evident that that ignorance 
which makes action involuntary, totally removes from it 
the notion of good or evil ; but not that ignorance which 
does not cause the involuntary. And it has also been 
shown that ignorance which is directly or indirectly willed, 
does not produce the involuntary ; such ignorance is 
directly willed, when it is intentional ; it is indirectly willed 
when it results from negligence, from our not willing to 
know that which we are bound to know. If then reason 
or conscience err through directly or indirectly voluntary 
ignorance, such error being with regard to that which we 
are bound to know, it does not hinder a will which agrees 
with erring reason or conscience from being a bad will. 

The will of those who slew the apostles was a bad will ; 
but they thought that their action was one of reason and 
piety towards God. The Lord himself said, "The hour 
cometh that whosoever killeth you shall think that he 
offereth service unto God" (S. John xvi. 2). 

But if the error be that which causes the involuntary, 
coming from ignorance of some circumstance, in which 



Qu. XIX. 6, 7.] ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE. 33 

error there has been no negligence, then such error excuses 
and the will agreeing with erring reason is not a bad 
will. 

But if the will discordant from erring reason is bad, why- 
is not the will which agrees with it good ? I answer, 
because the good requires the full, complete conditions 
indicated already, and defect in any one is evil. The will 
is bad in following that which is actually evil, or that 
which is deemed such ; but that the will be good, both are 
requisite.* 

Eternal law cannot err, but human reason can err ; 
therefore a will agreeing with human reason has not always 
rectitude, nor is it always in accordance with eternal law. 

This truth produces no perplexit} r , nor any necessity of 
sinning. Suppose that one does what he is bound to do 
out of a spirit of vainglory. He sins, whether he does it 
or leaves it undone. But there is no perplexity, no need 
of sinning; he can cast away his bad intention. From vin- 
cible and voluntary ignorance follows evil in the will ; but 
the error can be removed ; therefore there is no necessity 
of sinning. 

Does the goodness of the ivill respecting the means depend 
upon the intention or end aimed at ? 

This intention may be viewed as preceding or as following 
the act of the will which we are now considering. It pre- 
cedes causally the act of the will, when we will something 
on account of our aiming at a certain end. And then this 
relation to the end is regarded as one reason why the thing 
willed is good. Thus one may will to fast out of a sense of 
obligation towards God ; and that fasting is so far good, 
viz., because it is done for G-od's sake. Since, then, the 
goodness of the will (as we have seen) depends upon the 

* See Bishop Sanderson's fourth Serm. ad Glerum, "Whatsoever is 
not of faith is sin. " 
3 



34 GOOD AND EVIL IN" HUMAN ACTS. [Qu. XIX. 7. 

goodness- of the thing willed, it necessarily depends upon 
the end aimed at.* 

But the intention may follow an act of the will, in a cer- 
tain way, e. g., if one wills to do a certain thing, and after- 
wards refers it to God. Then the goodness of the first act 
of will does not depend upon the subsequent intention, 
except so far as the act of will is repeated along with that 
subsequent intention. 

I anticipate three objections. (1) It has been said that 
the goodness of the will depends upon the object alone ; but 
when we will the means to an end, the object willed is diff- 
erent from the end intended. I answer that when the 
intention is the cause of the act of will it is the relation to 
the end which is the reason why we attribute goodness 
to the object directly willed. 

(2) Willing to keep the commandments of God pertains 
to a good will ; but this may be referred to a bad end, e. g., 
vainglory or covetonsness ; as when one wills to obey God on 
account of some earthly benefits which he expects thereby. 
But the will is not good if a bad intention is the cause 
of its act. He who wills to give alms, because he expects 
to get a good name thereby, wills that which in itself is 
good under the idea of evil. Therefore, so far as willed by 
him, it is evil and his will is a bad will. 

(3) The badness of the will does not depend (solely) on 
the evil end ; for he Avho wills to defraud in order that he 
may be able to give for charitable ends, has a bad will, 
although he aims at a good end. 

But it has been already pointed out that the evil results 
from either one of the possible defects ; whereas the good 

* All choice of bad means for any end whatsoever is bad (Rom. iii. 
8) ; but not all choice of good means is good. Choice of good means 
for a good end constitutes a double goodness, and choice of bad means 
for a bad end makes a double evil. 

(Qu. Bribing a legislator in order to secure a useful and even neces- 
sary law ?) 



Qu. XIX. 7, 9, 10.] GOODNESS IN" THE HUMAN WILL. 35 

requires completeness in its requisites. The will is bad 
whether it seeks what is in itself evil under the notion of 
good, or what is good under the idea that it is evil. But 
for a good will it is required that it seek the good under the 
notion of good, i. e., that it will the good for the sake of 
the good. 

TJie goodness of the human will depends upon its con- 
formity to the Divine will. 

For the goodness of the will depends upon its end, and 
its ultimate end is the highest good, which is God. The 
object of that infinite will is the highest good, and thus 
that Divine will is the measure of rectitude and goodness 
of will throughout the universe. Our will, indeed, cannot 
be conformed to that by equivalence, but only by imitation. 
So is it also with our knowledge, so far as we are able to 
know the truth. 

Is it necessary that our ivill be conformed to the Divine 
will in the very thing willed, in order that ive may have a 
good luill? 

We have seen that the will is directed to its object as pro- 
posed by reason. Now since anything may be viewed by 
reason in different lights, in one way it may be good, in 
anotber evil. And therefore, if the will of one person fol- 
low it according as it is good, he has a good will ; while 
another, willing the same thing not to exist, because it has 
evil in it, has also a good will. So the judge has a good 
will when he wills the criminal to be executed, because the 
punishment is just ; but the will of the wife or child, in 
willing the opposite, may also be a good will, because that 
execution is a sundering of natural ties. But since will fol- 
lows reason's apprehension of a thing, it follows that that 
good will is of a higher sort, which seeks the higher good 
which reason apprehends. Thus, in the example before 
us, the judge has a care of the higher good, sc, that of the 



36 GOOD AND EVIL IN" HUMAN ACTS. [Qu. XIX. 10. 

community, viz., justice. Therefore he wills the execution 
of the criminal as related to the common good. But the 
wife looks at the good of the family, and, for the sake of 
that, wills that the criminal be not executed. But what 
God specially regards is the good of the universe, of which 
He is Creator and governor. Hence whatever He wills falls 
under the notion of the universal good, His own good- 
ness. But our apprehension, according to our nature, is 
of some particular good proportioned to our nature. Now 
that may be good, so viewed, which is not good in more 
general relations, and conversely. Hence it is that di- 
verse wills of different men may be good though directed 
towards opposites, as falling under diverse particular 
notions. 

But there is no rectitude of will in willing some special 
good, unless that be referred to the general good as the 
end. For from the end is derived the reason for willing 
the means to the end. In one way, then (what Aristotle 
calls the " material " part), a right will seeks the particular 
good; but (in the "formal" part), in the ultimate inten- 
tion, that right will seeks the common good which is 
Divine. 

Our human will, therefore, is bound to be conformed to 
the Divine will in its ultimate intention, *'. e., to will under 
the same notion with the Divine will, to will because God 
wills (saying "not my will, but Thine be done"). But it 
is not necessarily so obliged in the special thing which is 
willed (the material part of the act, respecting which we do 
not know the Divine will). But even in both in a certain 
way the right human will is conformed to the Divine will. 
For in being conformed to that in the general notion of the 
thing willed, it is so conformed in the ultimate end ; while, 
if not conformed in the special thing which is willed, it 
nevertheless is so in the idea of the efficient cause, since 
the special inclination to the special good is derived from 
God its maker. Hence we may say that our human will is 



Qu. XX. 2.] OUTWARD HUMAN ACTS. 37 

conformed to the Divine will when we will that which God 
wills that we should will. 

From the grace of charity man wills what God wills, and 
as God wills it. And this is the being conformed to the 
Divine will, since the ultimate end is the object of charity. 

(1) No objection then can be found in the fact that we 
are often ignorant in particulars of what God wills, while 
we are unable to will what we are ignorant of. For in 
those particulars we are not obliged to conform our will to 
the Divine will. But we do know what kind of thing is 
willed by God. For we know that whatever God wills, He 
wills under the idea of the good. And therefore, whenever 
we will a thing as good, we have a will conformed to God's 
will in that general notion. 

(2) But how can man will the damnation of him who 
dies in mortal sin ? Yet God wills this. I answer that it 
is not as death or as damnation that God wills such a thing, 
for He wills that all men be saved. But He wills death and 
condemnation under the idea of justice. Therefore it is 
enough for man to will that the order of justice and the 
order of nature be preserved. 

There is no repugnance of wills when diverse things are 
willed from different points of view. True repugnance is 
found only where the thing is viewed under the same 
notion. 

§ 3. On good and evil in outward human acts. 

Does all the good or evil of outward acts solely depend on 
the moral character of the loill ? 

I answer that we may consider either the due matter and 
circumstances, or the relation to the end. The latter 
depends solely on the will. But the former depends on 
reason, and on this depends the goodness of the will. 
Eemember that any one of the defects already pointed out 
(p. 26-7) makes anything evil ; but that anything be good, 



38 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS. [Qu.' XX. 4, 5. 

simply, one requisite does not suffice, but complete integrity 
is requisite. If therefore the will be good, both as regards 
its proper object and the end sought for, the outward act 
will be good ; but it is not sufficient that the aim be good. 
But if the will be bad, either in the intention or in the act 
willed, the outward act will be evil.* Both are sins of the 
will. (Where there is no will, there is no sin.) 

Does the outward act add anything to the good or evil of 
the inward act ? 

If we speak of the good or evil derived from the end 
sought for, then the outward act adds nothing in that 
respect, unless it happen that the will in itself is ren- 
dered better by good deeds or worse by evil deeds. This 
may happen (1) by repeated acts of will ; (2) by prolonged 
inward action ; (3) by the increased intensity of will which 
pleasurable acts produce, while painful acts have the 
opposite effect. And the more intense the will is in tend- 
ing to good or evil, the better or the worse it is. 

But if we speak of the goodness or the badness which 
the outward act has according to due matter and circum- 
stances, since that outward act is the terminus and end of 
the will, it adds to the goodness or the badness of the will. 
For every such motion reaches its perfection at its terminus. 
"Will is only perfect when it operates, if the opportunity of 
doing so is afforded to it. But if there is no possibility of 
action, and the perfect will is present, it would act if it 
could. The outward defect is simply involuntary. This 
involuntary state of things adds nothing to the merit or 
demerit, and takes nothing away. 

Do consequences add anything to the goodness or the bad- 
ness of outward acts? 

The event which follows action is either contemplated 

* Rom. iii. 8 ; Sanderson's Praelect., ii. 9. 



Qu. XXI. 1.] EESULTS OF MORAL ACTS. 39 

beforehand, or it is not. If it is so intended, it manifestly 
adds to the goodness or the badness of the act. For when 
one foresees that from his act many ill consequences may 
arise, and yet does not on that account refrain from action, 
his will is evidently the more inordinate on this account. 
But if the result which follows was not contemplated in 
advance, then a distinction is to be made ; because if, per 
se, and ordinarily, this result is wont to happen in con- 
sequence of such an act, then the resulting event does 
add to the goodness or the badness of the act. For it is 
manifest that that is a better act in its kind from which 
many good results may flow ; and that is a worse act from 
which naturally flow many evil consequences.* 

But if we speak of an accidental result, which follows 
only in exceptional cases, then such an event adds nothing 
to the moral status of the act. 

Note that acts may be similar in their nature, but very 
different from a moral point of view. 

§ 4. What results from the moral character of human acts ? 

Human acts as good or bad fall under the notion of recti- 
tude or of sin. 

The word " bad," used in its widest extent, is of broader 
signification than "sin," as "good" is of wider extent than 
"righteous." For every privation of good in anything 
whatsoever, is bad. But sin, fault, is found only in the act 

* The ill effects of our act are imputed to us, even though that act 
be imperfectly voluntary, on three conditions, se., (a) if those effects are 
in some degree foreseen even in confuse- ; (b) if the cause of them could 
be avoided ; (c) and if by reason of those ill effects we are bound not to 
do what produces them ; otherwise we may merely permit the ill 
effects and not be answerable for them. 

The good end sought for by us may justify our action even though 
some ill effects follow from it, if (1) that end is good ; (2) if the action 
is itself good, or, at least, indifferent ; and (3) if the good effect which we 
expect is at least as near to the end as that bad effect and equal to it. 



40 GOOD AND EVIL IK HUMAN ACTS. [Qu. XXI. 2. 

which is produced for a certain end, when that act has 
not due relation to that end. 

But that due order with respect to the end. is measured 
according to some rule. In natural agents this rule is the 
natural inclination to the end. ; and rectitude of action, the 
absence of fault, consists in undeviating following of that 
rule. But in those things which proceed from will, the 
proximate rule is reason ; the supreme rule is eternal law. 
Whensoever, then, man's act proceeds toward the end. ac- 
cording to the order of reason and eternal law, the act is 
right ; but when it deviates from this rectitude, it is sinful. 
Hence it follows that in human conduct the good and the 
bad are the righteous or the sinful. 

Human acts, as good or bad, are laudable or culpaMe. 

An act is called laudable or culpable when it is imputed 
to the agent. But it is so imputed, when it is in his 
power, so that he has dominion over his action. But this 
is true of all voluntary acts, because by will we have such 
dominion. And only voluntary acts are laudable or culpa- 
ble. 

(1) It is true that fault exists in what is produced by 
nature, which is neither laudable nor culpable. But such 
acts are not in the power of the natural agent, since nature 
is determined to a single result. Therefore the idea of 
blame has no place in this matter. 

(2) There is fault, not always blame, in what is done by 
man's art. But the question is a different one from that of 
morals. There are two kinds of fault in connection with 
art. The artificer may deviate from the particular end 
aimed at by his art ; intending to make a good work, he 
may make a bad one. This will be fault in his art with its 
particular end. But, also, this particular end is ordained 
for the common end of human life ; and in this way there 
may be fault and sin in the artificer if he intend fraudu- 
lently to make a bad piece of work, and actually does so. 



Qu. XXI. 3.] KESULTS OF MORAL ACTS. 41 

But this is the fault of the man rather than of the artificer 
as such. In the first case he is blamed as an artificer, but 
in the second, as a man. Bat in morals, where the order 
of reason is regarded with reference to the common end of 
life, fault is always a deviation from the order of reason 
respecting the common end of human life. Eor such fault 
a man is blamed as a man and a moral agent. 

(3) Infirmity or weakness may take away or diminish the 
blame. And evil, as such, is weak, impotent. But the 
infirmity which is found in voluntary evil is subject to 
man's power ; and, therefore, it neither takes away nor 
diminishes the blameworthiness. 

Human acts as good or evil have merit or demerit accord- 
ing to retributive justice (between man and man). 

The prophet says (Is. iii. 10), " Say ye to the righteous, 
that it shall be well with him : for they shall eat the fruit 
of their doings. Woe unto the wicked : it shall be ill with 
him : for the reward of his hands shall be given . him." 
Merit and demerit express the relation of human acts to 
retribution according to justice. But this retribution is 
due to any one according as he injures or benefits another. 
But each one living in any society is a part and member of 
that society. In doing good or evil to another member his 
act affects the whole society, as he who cuts off a haud 
injures the man. In benefiting or injuring another, there 
is a two-fold merit or demerit ; one, as retribution is due 
from the individual who is aided or injured ; another, as 
retribution is due from the society. But when any one 
ordains his act primarily for the society, retribution is due 
to him primarily and principally from the society, but 
secondarily from all members of the society. And even 
Avhen any one acts for his own proper good or harm, retri- 
bution is due to him, inasmuch as his action affects the 
whole society, of which he is a part. 

(1) It may be asked, how is this reconcilable with the 



42 GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN" ACTS. L Q«J. XXI. 4. 

dominion which man has of his own acts ? For no one is 
blamed for disposing as he will of that in which he is abso- 
lute lord. If he destroy his own property, he does not 
deserve to be punished as if he were destroying another's. 
I answer, that man himself belongs to the community of 
which he is a part ; before that community, therefore, he 
has merit or demerit according as he orders his acts well or 
ill. So, also, if he dispose of his property well or ill, with 
which he is bound to serve the community. 

(2) It is true that "virtue is its own reward "and evil 
is its own punishment. But the good or ill which one does 
to himself affects also the community (and calls for retribu- 
tion from it). 

Are human acts, as good or bad, meritorious or demeri- 
torious before God? 

The Holy Word says (Eccl. xii. 14), " God shall bring 
every work into judgment, whether it be good or whether it 
be evil." We have just seen that acts have merit or demerit 
as they are ordained with reference to another, either for 
his own sake, or for that of the community. In both modes 
our acts, good and bad, have merit or demerit before God; 
by reason of Himself, because He is the ultimate end of 
man to which all acts must be referred; but by reason 
also of the universal community of which He is Governor 
and Lord. For he who rules has the care of the common 
good, and it therefore pertains to him to reward and punish 
what is done well or ill in that community. If there were 
no such merit and demerit, God would have no care of 
human acts. 

(1) It is easy to object that our acts can do no harm, 
confer no benefit, upon God. But man can withdraw some- 
thing from God or render it to Him, by observing or not 
observing the due order which God has instituted. 

(2) Again, it may be objected that man is only an instru- 
ment of Divine ordering ; and an instrument has no merit 



Qu. XXI. 4.] MORAL CHARACTER OF HUMAN ACTS. 43 

or demerit with him who uses it. Isaiah said (x. 15), 
" Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth there- 
with ?" I reply that man is so moved as an instrument 
of God that he also moves himself with free choice of his 
action. 

Again, it may be objected that human acts obtain merit 
or demerit from their being ordered with reference to 
another. But not every act is ordered with reference to 
God ; therefore not all have this merit or demerit. I 
answer that not the whole man, with all that he has, is 
ordained to be referred to the political community. And 
therefore not every act of his has merit or demerit before 
that community. But the whole man, and all that he has, 
is ordained for God. Therefore every act of his is the 
occasion for reward or punishment. 

(S. Thomas explains further this notion of merit in qu. cxiv. art, 1. 
It means a reward, not from absolute justice, which herein is out of 
the question, but according to conditions of reward pre-ordained by 
God Himself, and fulfilled with the aid of His prevenient and sus- 
taining grace. In the strict sense of merit, Tennyson's words are 
unchallenged : 

" Merit lives from man to man, 
And not from man, God, to Thee.") 



CHAPTER IV. 

ON GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL. 

(A psychological view of the passions of the human soul belongs to 
our subject only so far as it is necessary for a clear understanding of 
our moral relations. For if good and evil have in any way those pas- 
sions for their subject, it is evident that we cannot understand our 
proper theme unless we have first clearly seen what man is in these 
powers which may be corrupted. Knowledge of the corruption implies 
knowledge of that which is corrupted, But our space allows of only a 
rapid glance at that which S. Thomas endeavors to analyze and con- 
sider in detail.) 

§ 1. General view. 

The word "passion" indicates that the soul is rather 
acted upon than exerting its spontaneous activity, while 
at the same time it undoubtedly reacts upon the external 
stimulus. But, in feeling, the soul is acted upon through 
the bodily frame which is united with it, the body itself, 
first and chiefly its nerve-centres, undergoing a mysterious 
alteration. Passions are closely connected with desires, for 
these desires are the peculiar reaction of the soul towards 
that which is presented to it through the passions. 

And what distinguishes these passions and desires from 
the higher nature of reason and will, is that the former are 
directly conditioned by bodily (nervous) alteration. 

The (Aristotelian) division of passions into the concupisci- 
ble and the irascible is serviceable for our purpose. The 
object of the former is the sensible good (simply such) as 
pleasurable or painful. But sometimes the soul undergoes 
difficulty or conflict in obtaining some such good, or avoid- 
ing some such evil. And so the same good or evil, with the 



Qu. xxiv. 1, 2.] GENERAL VIEW. 45 

added quality of special difficulty, is the object of the irasci- 
ble passions. To the former class belong such passions as 
joy, sorrow, love, hate, and the like ; to the latter class, 
courage, fear, hope, etc. 

Are moral good and evil found in the passions'? 

We may consider these passions in themselves, or as they 
are subject to the dominion of reason and will. In them- 
selves they are motions of irrational appetite. So viewed, 
there is neither moral good nor moral evil in them, for 
these require reason as their basis. 

It is quite otherwise if we view those passions as under 
the dominion of reason and will. For as the motions of 
the bodily members are good or bad, morally speaking, so 
far as they are voluntary, so and much more so the motions 
of the passions, which are nearer to the higher nature than 
the body is. Acts of passions are voluntary either because 
they are commanded by the will, or because they are not 
prohibited by it. 

Here is the common ground of man and brute. Both 
have these passions. But in the brute there is no spiritual 
reason which can command them. Therefore the brute's 
life is not a moral life. 

But in man passions and desires are, in a certain way, 
rational, because it is one human being who possesses the 
reason and is affected by the passions. 

Is every passion of the soul morally bad? 

The Stoics seem to say that they are so. But they do 
not distinguish between will and desire, between sensibility 
and reason. Therefore every rational exertion of desire 
they call will, and every act which transcends the limits of 
reason they call passion. So viewed, passions are diseases 
of the soul. But we may understand by passions every 
motion of sense-appetite. So viewed, if governed by reason 
they are not diseases, they are not evil. 



46 GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS. [Qu. xxv. 2. 

It is true that they incline to sin, so far as they are out- 
side of the domain of reason ; but, as ordered by it, they are 
the subject of virtue. 

Does passion add to, or diminish from, the goodness or 
the badness of our act ? 

According to the Stoic, every passion diminishes the 
goodness of our act, because that passion is a disease of our 
reason. But if by jDassions we mean all motions of sense- 
appetite, we see that the government of those passions by 
reason pertains to the perfection of human good. That 
good is rooted in reason, but it is more perfect the wider 
its power extends. No one doubts that the directing the 
acts of our bodily members by reason pertains to the per- 
fection of moral good. And since the sense-appetite, also, 
can obey reason, the same thing is true of that. As, then, 
it is better that a man both will the good and produce the 
outward act accordingly, so it is better that a man be moved 
to the good not only by his will but also by his affections. 
So the psalm says (lxxxiv. 2), "My heart and my flesh 
rejoice in the living God/' Where, if "heart" (according 
to Hebrew usage) represents spiritual reason and will, 
" flesh " will stand for the affections of sense-appetite. 

Morally viewed — sc., looking at the object of the passion 
as harmonizing with reason or discordant from it — passions 
may be good or bad in their own nature ; e. g., envy, which 
is sorrow at another's good. 

Which is first in the order of passions f 

Love, among those of the concupiscible soul. For its 
object is the good, of which evil is only the privation im- 
plying the prior good. In the order of attainment first 
comes love, which is complacency in its object ; next, de- 
sire of that good, a motion of the soul towards it ; and last, 
joy or pleasure, which is rest in its possession. But if 
we speak of the order of intention, it is the reverse of 



Qu. xxvi.] ON LOVE. 47 

this. For the pleasure aimed at causes the desire and the 
love. 

Hope is prior among the passions of the irascible soul ; 
for those passions are naturally prior whose object is the 
good. And hope is inward motion towards an absent good. 
This makes it first in order. 

The four principal passions are joy, sorrow, hope, and 
fear. In present good, there is joy ; in present evil, sorrow ; 
of future good, there is hope ; and of future evil, there is 
fear. 

§ 2. On Love. 

Love is one species of inclination or appetite for the 
good. In nature we find such an inclination without appre- 
hension of its object. In brutes we find it (apparently) 
accompanied by apprehension of its object. We call it 
instinctive love. But there is another kind of seeking for 
the object of love, which is rational and according to free 
choice. In each there is a principle of motion towards the 
desired end. Sense-love, then, is complacency in the good 
of sensitive appetite ; as spiritual love is complacency in 
the good of reason and will. The sole cause of love is the 
good, because that is the object of love. Evil is never 
loved except it be apprehended as good, because it is a good 
secundum quid. Man is said to love iniquity, inasmuch 
as by it he expects to obtain some good, as pleasure or 
money. 

We speak, indeed, of a love for the beautiful. But this 
is the good in another and special point of view. For the 
good is what all things seek, and rest in when obtained. 
But to the idea of the beautiful it pertains that desire rests 
in the outward or inward contemplation of it. And so the 
beautiful adds to the notion of the good a certain relation to 
our cognoscitive power. That is simply good which pleases 
desire ; but that is beautiful whose apprehension pleases. 

Knowledge, at least partial knowledge, is a pre-requisite 



48 GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS. [Qu. XXIX. 4, 5. 

and cause of love. But since cognition pertains to reason, 
its perfection requires a completeness of intellectual appre- 
hension which is not needed for perfect love. This re- 
quires that the thing be loved so far as it is apprehended. 
Consider, in this regard, our love of God. 

§ 3. Hate. 

As in animal or in rational apjjetite love is a certain 
agreement of the desire with that which is apprehended as 
harmonizing with self and beneficial to self, so to that 
which is repugnant and injurious to well-being is felt the 
passion of hate. This repugnant and injurious thing is 
evil, and so evil is the object of hate. All hate springs 
from love ; for nothing is hated except as it is opposed to 
that which is regarded as good. 

Can one hate himself? 

Properly speaking, this is impossible. For each thing 
naturally seeks its own good, and can desire nothing for itself 
except as good. Evil is always opposed to the will. But 
to love any one is to will the good for him. Hence, self- 
love is a necessity of nature. But still, one may be said 
{per accidens) to hate himself, for two reasons : (1) He may 
seek what is, secundum quid, a good for himself, while it is 
simply evil ; (2) He may chiefly regard his animal nature, 
and love himself according to his own estimation of him- 
self. But he hates that which he most truly is, in willing 
what is contrary to reason. In both ways, he who loves 
iniquity hates not only his soul, but himself. 

Even the suicide apprehends his death as a good thing; 
viz., the cessation of pain or misery. 

Can any one hate the truth f 

The Good and Being and the True are one in essence, 
but differ in our thought. For the G-ood adds the idea of 



Qu. xxx. 3.] CONCUPISCENCE. 49 

what is desirable ; but not so the thought of Being or of 
the True. And, therefore, the Good as good cannot be 
hated, neither universally nor in particulars. But Being 
and the True cannot be hated in their general notion, be- 
cause disagreement is the cause of hate, and the opposite 
is the cause of love. But Being and the True are common 
to all things. But, in particulars, nothing prevents a cer- 
tain being and a certain truth from being hated, inasmuch 
as it contains the idea of contrariety and repugnance. For 
these are not opposed to the idea of Being and of the True, 
as they are to the idea of the Good. (1) Man may will that 
not to be true Avhich is so ; and so he may hate the truth. 
(2) Truth in his cognition may hinder his attaining what he 
loves, and so it is hated. So one may will not to know the 
verity of the faith in order that he may freely sin. Thus we 
read in the book of Job (xxi. 14), that the wicked said unto 
God, "Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of 
Thy ways." (3) Some particular truth may be repugnant 
and be hated, as it exists in the mind of another, as when 
one wishes to continue in his sin, and hates that another 
know the truth concerning that sin. 

§ 4. Concupiscence. 

I mean by concupiscence the desire of pleasure, not in 
the good of reason, which desire belongs to the soul alone, 
but in the good of sense, which belongs to the creature 
compounded of body and soul. Such desire is in sense- 
appetite. It is a special passion, springing from love and 
tending towards pleasure. 

Some concupiscences are natural ; some are not. 

In two modes is anything pleasurable and desired. 
First, as in accordance with the animal nature, as food, 
drink, etc.; desire of these is natural concupiscence. In 
another mode anything is pleasurable, according to appre- 
hension of it {i.e., to the soul viewing it). Desire of this 
4 



50 GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS. [Qu. XXXI. 7. 

is not " natural" (in the same sense of the word), and may 
be called cupidity. The natural concupiscences are com- 
mon to man and brute (since they have the same animal 
nature). But the non-natural are peculiar to man, since 
it is his peculiar gift to consider something as good and 
suited to himself beside what nature requires. 

But the same thing may be sought for by natural appe- 
tite, and by cupidity when it is contemplated by the mind 
as a good. 

Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite, for it 
is only of what nature requires, though it may be indefi- 
nitely prolonged, since corporeal goods fail, and need to be 
renewed. But the non-natural, since it follows reason 
which has no bounds, is unbounded. He whose cupidity 
is directed to riches, has no limit to his desire. If, indeed, 
riches were the means to another end — say, the necessities 
of life — there would be a limit to the desire of them. But 
if riches are the eud itself, there can be no limit. 

§ 5. Pleasure. 

Pleasure is an emotion or passion of the soul following 
upon the good attained. It is, indeed, a sort of rest of the 
soul in that good, but not an inactive rest. 

Pleasure is not always joy. For as there are certain 
natural concupiscences and certain ones non-natural, so 
there are natural pleasures, and others which follow reason. 
These latter are what we call joy. Hence we do not (prop- 
erly) attribute joy to brutes, but only pleasure. We may, 
indeed, have joy in natural pleasures, but not conversely. 
Pleasure, therefore, is a word of wider extent than joy. 

Joy is found in the rational appetite, the will. It is 
purely in the soul ; whereas sense-pleasure involves bodily 
transmutation. 

Can any pleasure be unnatural ? 

What do we mean by natural ? In man the word may 



Qu. XXXII.] PLEAS UKE. 51 

have two meanings. Since reason and understanding are 
the distinctive characteristics of man's nature, we may call 
natural pleasures those which properly belong to man as a 
rational being. To take pleasure in the truth and in the 
practice of virtue is natural to man. But, in another way, 
nature may mean what is common to man and other 
animals, as opposed to man's peculiar gift of reason. Ac- 
cordingly, what pertains to the preservation of the individual 
or the species may be said to be naturally pleasurable. 

But, according to both meanings of the word natural, 
some pleasures are simply unnatural, though, in a sense, con- 
natural. For that which is contrary to the nature of man, 
either as respects reason or as regards the preservation of 
the body (or the species), may become connatural to some 
individual on account of the corruption of his nature. 
Either body or soul (or both) may be so corrupted ; and 
the result will be similar in both cases. 

Activity is the antecedent of pleasure. 

For pleasure requires the attaining of a suitable good, 
and knowledge of its attainment. Both of these are oper- 
ations of the soul. Therefore operation is the antecedent 
of pleasure. Pleasure is also the result of concomitant 
activity. For there is a transmutation of the soul itself in 
the presence of the pleasurable good ; that good increases 
its influence with its continued presence ; and, thirdly, 
there is growing desire to know the pleasurable thing more 
perfectly. 

Hope and memory make the past or the future to be 
present to the mind. Therefore they are causes of joy ; 
and most especially hope, because there is added to appre- 
hension of the future the possibility of obtaining the delect- 
able good. 

Even sorrow, in a certain Avay, may be the cause of pleas- 
ure, first, by bringing back to mind the lost pleasure, whose 
very presence in the memory has some pleasure connected 



52 GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS. [Qu. XXXIV. 1, 2. 

with it. But far more is sorrow, when it is escaped, the 
cause of pleasure. For the very escape is itself regarded as 
a great good. And of the blessed in heaven it may be said 
that the greater the danger (and sorrow) in the battle, the 
greater the joy in the triumph. 

The actions of others may be the cause of pleasure to 
ourselves, (1) when by them we obtain some good ; (2) 
when through others we get higher estimation of our own 
pro]3er good, by praise and honor ; so even the flatterer is 
pleasurable to some ; (3) love may lead us to regard the 
good actions of others as if they were our own. 

Doing good to others may be the cause of pleasure for 
various reasons. (Other causes of pleasure are here 
omitted.) 

Is every pleasure evil? 

Pleasure is the rest of the soul in some good which is 
loved, and it follows some activity of the soul. A pleasure 
is good when the higher or lower desire of the soul rests in 
that Avhich is accordant with reason, and evil when it rests 
in that which is discordant with reason and with God's law. 
Again, since the concupiscences of good operations arc 
good, which desires precede action, much rather are the 
pleasures good which are conjoined to such operations. 
We conclude, then, that the pleasures of good action are 
good ; the pleasures of bad action, evil. 

It is true that pleasures which corrupt prudence and im- 
pede the use of reason are bad in general ; but pleasures 
from the exercise of reason do nothing of this kind (but 
rather exalt the exercise of reason itself). 

Temperance (and Sobriety) do not consist in fleeing from 
all pleasures, but from the immoderate ones, and those not 
consonant with reason. 

Is every 'pleasure good ? 

As the Stoic makes every pleasure evil, so the Epicurean 



Qu. XXXV.] PAIN AND SORROW. 53 

considers pleasure, as such, to be a good, and every pleasure 
good. But they should distinguish between what is simply 
good and that which is good, relatively, to this man or that. 
What is not in itself a good may be so, relatively, to the in- 
dividual for two reasons : (1) His unnatural state makes 
that to suit his condition which otherwise would be un- 
suited, unnatural; (2) His false estimation of good may 
cause him to find pleasurable rest in that which is not 
truly good. (Such pleasure is evil, like its source.) 

The highest pleasure in beatitude is the highest of human 
good things. 

Is pleasure the measure and rule by which tve judge moral 
good and evil? 

These are principally found in the will. But whether 
the will is good or bad is known from its end. And that 
is esteemed as the end in which the will rests. But this 
rest is pleasure. And so the pleasure which a man finds in 
this or that is the measure by which the good or the bad 
man is judged to be what he is. The virtuous man is he 
who delights in virtuous operation ; the bad man is he 
who finds his pleasure in evil actions. 

But the pleasures of sense-appetite are not the measure 
of moral good and evil (since the will is not directly con- 
cerned therein). 

Action is not perfectly good, unless there be pleasure in 
the good ; for since pleasure perfects operation as an end 
of it, not indeed as the end for which a thing is done, but 
as a supervening good ; and since, also, the agent who finds 
pleasure in action acts more energetically in consequence 
thereof ; and since the goodness of a thing depends upon 
its end, in a certain way the goodness of pleasure is a cause 
of goodness in the action. 

§ 6. Pain and sorrow. 

Pain is a passion of the (sensitive) soul, following upon 



54 GOOD AN"D EVIL IN" THE PASSIONS. [Qu. XXXIX. 2. 

what injures the body, when that evil is perceived. Sorrow 
is a species of inward pain which is due, not to sense-appre- 
hension, but to the inward apprehension of reason or imag- 
ination. The outward sense perceives only the present 
condition of the body ; but the inward cognition embraces 
also the past and the future ; therefore sorrow has wider 
extent than pain. 

Since sorrow in the soul is a motion away from its object, 
its object is rather the evil conjoined to the soul than the 
lost good. But love of that good is the cause of that sorrow 
for its loss. But the loss itself is apprehended as an evil. 

Is all sorroiv evil ? 

In itself it is simply an evil, for the very fact that man's 
desire is oppressed by present evil, is itself an evil. But, 
in another way, a tiling is called good or evil when we as- 
sume a certain hypothesis. 

Thus shame is said to be good after a base fault. If we 
suppose, then, some due occasion for sorrow, it pertains to 
goodness that one be saddened by a present evil. If it were 
not so, the reason would be either that the evil was not felt, 
or that it was not regarded as evil. And both of these are 
manifestly evil. " It is still a good that we grieve for lost 
good ; for unless some good remained in nature, in penalty, 
there would be no pain for lost good." (S. Aug., Gen. 
ad lit., viii. 14. ) 

Can sorroiu be a moral good ? 

The Lord said (S. Matt. v. 5), "Blessed are they that 
mourn, for they shall be comforted," which word of His 
answers our question. But we may examine the reasons 
for the affirmative answer. Sorrow is, as we have seen, a 
good from its containing a knowledge of evil and an aver- 
sion to it. So bodily pain attests the goodness of the 
nature which feels the bodily evil, and shuns what is in- 
jurious to the body. But in the inward sorrow there is 



Qu. XLVI. 2.] ANGER. 55 

sometimes right judgment of reason, and an abhorrence of 
evil by a well-constituted will. But all moral good comes 
from this rectitude of mind and will. Therefore sorrow 
may be a moral good. 

It may be said that we feel sorrow concerning those things 
which happen against our will ; but not to will whatever 
God sends is to have a will opposed to His Divine ordering ; 
and rectitude of will requires a conformity of our will to 
the Divine will. But I answer that some things — viz. , sins — 
happen contrary to God's will. And a will repugnant to 
sin is not discordant from the will of God. Penal evils 
happen indeed with God's consent. But rectitude of will 
does not require that man will those things considered in 
themselves, but that he do not oppose in his soul the order 
of Divine justice. 

Wo pain or sorroiv is man's greatest evil. 

For every pain or sorrow is either concerning what is 
truly evil, or concerning some apparent evil which is truly 
good. But pain or sorrow from the first is not the greatest 
evil, for there is another worse, which is either not judging 
that to be evil which truly is so, or even not avoiding it. 
But pain or sorrow from the second is not the greatest evil, 
for it would be altogether worse to be so alienated from the 
real good. 

There is always some mixture of good in pain or sorrow ; 
so., a will repugnant to evil. 

Passing by most of the passions of the irascible soul, we 
will consider lastly, 

§ 7. Anger. 

Anger is a passion of the irascible sensitive nature, com- 
pounded, as it were, of two opposite passions. 

For whoever is angry at another seeks for vengeance on 
him. And so the soul's motion in anger tends towards two 
things ; sc, first, to the vengeance which he seeks and hopes 



56 GOOD AND EVIL IN" THE PASSIONS. [Qu. xlvi. G, 7. 

for as a good, and, secondly, anger is directed towards him 
from whom vengeance is sought, as towards an injurious 
and offensive object. 

Love and hate regard one object only, the good and the 
evil in each case. But anger regards one object as good — 
sc, the vengeance; another as evil — sc, the injurious man, 
on whom vengeance is sought for. 

Hate, therefore, is much graver than anger ; 
for he that hates seeks his enemy's evil as evil, but the 
angry man seeks evil for the one at whom he is angry not 
as evil but as good, so far as he judges that evil to be just — 
i.e., vengeance. And herein the virtue of justice may be 
exercised, if the anger be subjected to reason. (Wo leave 
out of view the Christian grace of charity.) But anger is 
deficient in this only, that it does not obey the command 
of reason in taking vengeance. 

Anger may be more intense than hate ; but as regards 
the thing desired, anger may have more of mercy in it. 
For hate is satisfied with no measure of evil. For those 
things Avhich are sought on their own account, are sought 
without measure. So the avaricious seek riches without 
measure. But anger seeks the evil under the idea that it 
is just. Accordingly, when the evil exceeds due measure, 
then the angry man may have pity. 

Vengeance seeks for penalty of wrong-doing. But 
penalty implies something contrary to the will, afflictive, 
and produced for some fault. And therefore the angry 
man seeks that the injurer may perceive, and feel, and 
know, that that penalty is come upon him in consequence 
of the injury which he has done. But he that hates another 
cares for none of these things, because he seeks the evil of 
his enemy as evil. This is far worse. 

The foregoing considerations will make it plain that 
anger can only come in where justice and injustice are 
concerned. 



Qu. xlvii. 2. J ANGER. 57 

All causes of anger are reducible to loiu esteem or contempt 
of the injured man. 

Aristotle (Ehet. ii. 2) very properly distinguishes three 
kinds of low esteem ; viz., contempt, hindrance to executing 
our will, and contumely. This low esteem produces anger, 
since vengeance is sought on account of that which seems 
to be unjustly done. 

But injury is done in three ways : through ignorance, 
through passion, through deliberate choice of it. And 
the latter, most of all, produces anger, because the injurer 
seems to be sinning through contempt of the injured. 

Again, low esteem is opposed to the proper excellence of 
man. But, out of all our goods, we seek this most of all. 
And therefore whoever does us injury, derogating from our 
excellency, seems to be acting through low esteem of us. 



CHAPTER V. 

ON VIRTUES. 



1. On habits. 



Since virtues and vices are habits of a human agent, Ave 
need to take a brief view of what habits in general are. 

A habit is a (fixed) quality or disposition of our soul, 
whereby we are well or ill regulated, either in ourself or 
relatively to something else. (Arist. Met. v. 25.) Habits 
stand between our active powers and their operations. For, 
by their definition, they have a two-fold relation: on one 
side to the subject of them ; on the other side, to the end of 
that .subject, which i.s its activity, its operation, as either 
the end, or Leading t'> tin- end. 

We may speak of bodily habits, when we mean, not the 
natural operations which require no habit, but that which 
the body does in the direct service of the soul. The body 
may }>v well or ill disposed as the servant of the soul. Such 
dispositions of the body we call habits. 

But habits are specially in the powers of the soul. 

Some are found in the sensitive soul, not as it operates 
from natural instinct, but as it aets under the dominion of 
reason. 

Since a habit is something which we can rationally use or 
not use, we cannot properly say that the brutes have habits. 

There are habits of the intellect and of the will, which 
will be treated of when we consider particular virtues. 

Some habits are implanted in us by nature, whether dis- 
tinctive of human nature in general, or peculiar to the 
individual. Thus some men may have a natural habit of 
temperance or chastity. 



Qu. LIII. 3.] ON HAL ITS. 



59 



But many habits are caused in our faculties, so far as 
they are naturally passive, by repeated acts. Thus the 
habits of the desires are rendered virtues, by repeated acts 
according as they are moved by reason. 

Some habits are infused by God. 

For, first, there are some habits by which man is well 
constituted with reference to an end exceeding the powers 
of human nature (in itself). Such habits must be propor- 
tioned to their end. Therefore they cannot be naturally in 
man, but need to be supernaturally given ; sc, the super- 
natural virtues and gifts. Secondly, God may show His 
power by supernaturally giving habits which might have 
been (slowly) produced by natural powers. Thus He gave 
to the apostles the habit of speaking in languages which 
they had not acquired by study. 

Habits are increased by acts if the intensity of the act is 
proportioned to the strength of the habit. If the intensity 
of the act is deficient in this respect, such a negligent act 
tends to weaken the habit. 

As habits are generated and increased by acts, so ceasing 
from action diminishes them and sometimes totally destroys 
them. 

For it removes those acts which keep off causes that cor- 
rupt or diminish those habits. Habits are per se corrupted 
or diminished by contrary agents. And where those con- 
traries increase with lapse of time, such habits may at last 
be totally destroyed by long-continued cessation from their 
operation, as is manifest in habits of virtue and knowledge. 
For when any one does not use his habit of virtue to moder- 
ate his passions or inward operations, it is necessary that 
they advance beyond the limits of virtue, owing to the 
(natural) inclination of sense appetite and other powers 
which are directed to outward objects. So it is with those 
intellectual habits whereby one judges rightly concerning 



60 



ON VIRTUES. [<^U. LVI. 3. 



the objects presented in the imagination. When a man 
ceases from the use of his intellectual habits, extraneous 
images arise and sometimes distract the mind ; so that, 
unless by frequent use of the intellectual habit they be cut 
off or repressed, a man is rendered less apt to judge rightly, 
and sometimes is totally disposed to the contrary. And so, 
by cessation from action, the intellectual habit is diminished 
or destroyed. 

§ 2. The essence and subject of virtue. 

Human virtue is a habit. 

The word virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power 
or "faculty of the soul." But the perfection of each 
thing is specially viewed with reference to its end. Now 
the end of a power is action, and hence a power is said to 
be perfect as it is determined to its act. 

But there are some powers which in themselves are de- 
termined to their acts, as the natural active powers. These 
arc sometimes called virtues (in a loose or wider sense of the 
word). But the rational powers which are peculiar to man 
are not determined in any one direction, but are indeter- 
minate towards many directions. They are determined 
to acts through habits, and therefore human virtues are 
habits. 

Virtue is a good habit of action, and productive of good. 

S. Augustine's definition is, Virtue is a good quality or 
habit of the soul, by which one lives rightly, and which no 
one uses badly, and which God as the sole efficient cause 
produces in us. 

Aristotle says that '"'virtue is that which renders him 
that has it good, and his work good." (Xic. Eth., ii. G.) 

Can the intellect he the subject of virtue ? 

Virtue, according to our definition, is a habit which one 
uses well. But a habit is ordained for good action in two 
ways : (1) Inasmuch as by a habit of this kind is acquired 



Qu. LVI. 3.] ESSENCE AND SUBJECT OF VIETUE. 61 

a faculty of good action. Thus man may acquire the fac- 
ulty of speaking correctly, through what may be called the 
grammatical habit, although he does not always actually 
so speak. (2) In another way habit gives not only facility 
in acting well, but also brings it about that one rightly 
uses his faculty, as justice not only makes a man's will 
prompt to do just things, but also causes him actually to do 
them. But we call good not what is merely potential, but 
what is actual. Therefore from habits of this latter kind 
a man is said to do good, and to be a good man. And since 
"virtue is what makes a man good, and his work good," 
habits of the second class are properly and specially called 
virtues. But habits of the first class are not simply called 
virtues, because they do not make the work good except as 
one faculty is concerned, neither do they make the agent 
good. A man may be a good grammarian or a good arti- 
san without being a good man. He is good secundum 
quid, and so there are intellectual virtues which are virtues 
secundum quid. But the subject of virtue proper is the 
will or some other human power as it is moved by the 
will. The will moves the powers of a man, as they are 
rational, to their respective acts. And therefore when a man 
actually does well, this results from his having a good will. 

The intellect may be moved by the will, when one con- 
siders anything because he wills to do so. And so, as the 
intellect is related to the will, it may become the subject 
of virtue, properly speaking. In this way the reason is the 
subject of faith, for it is moved to assent to the objects of 
faith by the dominion of the will. For no one unwillingly 
believes. This belongs to the speculative intellect. 

But the practical intellect is the subject of the virtue 
prudence. For since prudence is "right ideas concerning 
things to be done," it requires that a man be well disposed 
with reference to the principles of those things, i.e., to the 
ends for which they are the means, which right disposition 
comes from rectitude of will. 



62 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LVI. 4. 

All proper virtues depend in a certain way on love, which 
is the virtue of the will ; therefore they depend on a good 
will. 

It is true that intellectual virtues do not make a good 
man ; but since the end of each thing is its good, and since 
the true is the end of the mental powers, to know the true 
is a good act of those powers. Hence, such a habit may be 
called an intellectual virtue. 

Are the passions the subject of virtue? 

We may consider the irascible and the concupiscible pas- 
sions as they an- in themselves, belonging to the sensitive 
nature of a man. So viewed, they cannot be the subject of 
virtue. In another way they may be considered as they 
are naturally made to obey reason, and BO participate in 
reason. So viewed they can be the subject of human vir- 
tue. For the act which proceeds from one power as that 
power is moved by another, cannot be perfeel unless both 
powers are well disposed with reference to their respective 
activities. So the act of the artificer cannol be perfect in 
its kind, unless he, as artificer, is in good condition, and 
his instrument also. In those things, therefore, which are 
done through the passions as moved by reason, there must 
be some habit perfecting to good action, not only in the 
reason, but also in the irascible or concupiscible nature. 
Tlie latter virtue is nothing else than a certain habitual 
conformity to reason in those powers. 

Brutes cannot have such virtues, though they have such 
passions, because their passions are not subject to the em- 
pire of reason. 

(1) S. Paul, indeed, said (Rom. vii. 18), C 'I know that 
in my flesh (i.e., sense-appetite) dwells no good thing." 
But this is doubtless spoken of it as it is in itself. 

(2) It might be objected, again, that since virtue is en- 
tirely in the soul, all that virtue belongs to the rational 
part which governs the rest ; as virtue is not in the body, 



Qu. LVI. 6.] ESSENCE AND SUBJECT OF VIRTUE. 63 

but in the soul which governs the body. But very different 
is the government of the passions from the government of 
the body. It is a very suggestive observation of Aristotle 
(Polit. i. 5), that "the soul rules the body with a despot- 
ical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a 
constitutional and royal rule." Therefore there is no virtue 
in the body, but only in the soul. But the passions do net 
obey like a slave, and they have their own proper motions, 
by which they sometimes oppose reason. Therefore there 
must be in the passions some virtues by which they may be 
well disposed for (good) action. 

(3) Another objection. The principal act of moral virtue 
is choice. But the passions do not choose, but only the 
reason chooses ; therefore virtue is found in reason only. 
I answer that in choice are found two things ; sc, aiming 
at the end, which pertains to moral virtue, and selecting 
of means to that end, which pertains to prudence. But 
right intention as respects the end is (partly) due to a good 
disposition of the passions. Therefore there are moral 
virtues of the passions, while prudence belongs to reason. 

There are virtues of the will. 

Any power of the soul needs a habit perfecting it for 
good action, i.e., a virtue, when the proper nature of that 
power does not (by itself) suffice for that purpose. So far, 
then, as the object of the will is a good of reason propor- 
tioned to the will, so far no perfecting virtue of the will is 
needed. But if any good ought to be willed by man which 
exceeds the natural limits of the one who wills, whether it 
be a good transcending the natural limits of human nature, 
or a good which exceeds the natural proportions of the in- 
dividual (as the good of his neighbour) ; therein the will 
needs a virtue. And therefore virtues of this kind, which 
order the affections of man towards God and towards his 
neighbour, have the will for their subject, as charity, jus- 
tice, and the like. Each thing, it is true, naturally seeks 



G4 OX VIRTUES. [Qu. lvii. 1, 2. 

its own good, and so does the will naturally tend to rational 
good. But this is the good of the one who wills, manifested 
in the virtues of the passions, as temperance, fortitude, 
and the like.* 

The virtue of the will (which is rational by its partici- 
pating in reason) is either moral or theological. 

§ 3. Intellectual virtues. 

Every virtue is ordained for the good ; but any habit is 
called virtue for one or both of two reasons : first, that it 
gives the power to act well ; secondly, that with the power 
is also a good use of the power. Speculative intellectual 
habita do not perfect the will, but only the intellect. 
T efore they may be called virtues in the first sense of 
tin- word, since they give a power of good action as regards 
truth, which is the good of reason ; but they are not virtues 
in the second sense, since they do not secure a good use of 
the power or habit. But a virtue which perfects the will, 
as charity or justice, causes one to use well these specula- 
tive habits. 

There are three intellectual virtues. This will appear if 
we consider that the perfection of the speculative intelli- 
gence has reference to the consideration of the true, Avhich 
is its proper good. Now the true may be contemplated in 
two ways : first, as self-evident ; in another way, as known 
through some other truth. Self-evident truth, seen im- 
mediately when presented to the mind, implies a virtue of 
the mind perfecting the intelligence to such contemplation. 
This virtue may be called spiritual reason (" intellectus"). 

But the true which is known indirectly — i.e., through 
the medium of something else, through rational search — 
may be either the ultimate in our special subject of inquiry, 

* All virtues, indeed, are voluntary ; but for these the nature of the 
•will (so far as the will is concerned) suffices. But a special virtue of 
the will is needed where an extrinsic good is to be sought for. 



Qu. lvii. 5. J INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. Go 

or the ultimate in all human thought. For the first, there 
is a virtue, science (" scientia"), which perfects intelli- 
gence. For the second, there is a habit, a virtue, by which 
one assents promptly to those necessary truths which are 
first in the order of truth, but last to be discovered by us. 
This is wisdom {" sapientia"). 

Art may be called a fourth intellectual virtue, operative 
(not speculative), since it gives the power of producing 
good work, though not, as art, of making a good use of the 
work. 

Prudence is distinguished, as an intellectual operative 
virtue, from art by the consideration of the things to be 
done by each. Art concerns things to be made ; prudence, 
things to be clone. The latter not only gives the power 
of doing good work, but also of making a good use of the 
thing which is done ; for it presupposes rectitude of desire. 
It is related to human actions, as art is related to things 
which are made. We see that prudence requires that man 
be well disposed towards the ends which he aims at, which 
is by right desire ; and therefore this virtue requires moral 
virtue, which is not presupposed by art. The artificer who 
intentionally errs is more praised than the one who goes 
wrong unwillingly. But the man who sins willingly errs 
more against prudence than he who goes wrong uninten- 
tionally. 

Prudence is a virtue peculiarly necessary for human life. 
For living well consists in acting well. And for this, it is 
demanded not only that the action be good in itself, but 
that the manner of doing be good also; sc, that it be done 
according to a right choice, and not merely from the im- 
pulse of passion. But since choice is of means to the end 
sought for, rectitude of choice requires both a due end, and 
suitable means for that due end. For the latter, man is 
disposed by the virtue which perfects the appetitive soul. 
But for the choice of suitable means he must be perfected 
by a habit of reason ; for taking counsel and choosing are 
5 



66 ON" VIRTUES. [Qu. LVIII. 2, 4. 

actions of reason. This virtuous habit is prudence. It is 
therefore peculiarly necessary for a good life. 

On the distinctions hehueen intellectual and moral virtues. 

Eeason is the primal constituent of all human opera- 
tions ; and whatever other constituents are found, obey 
reason, some without contradiction, as the members of the 
body ; but others may oppose reason or impede its opera- 
tion. In order, then, that man may act well, not only 
must reason be well disposed by a habit of intellectual vir- 
tue, but also the will and desires must be well disposed by 
a habit of moral virtue. As, then, the will and desires are 
distinguished from reason, bo are the one kind of virtues 
distinguished from the other kind. And as the appetitive 
soul is a principle of human action participating in reason 
(after a certain manner), so a moral habit, so far as it is 
conformed to reason, is human virtue. 

Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue? 

Wisdom, science, art, are not necessary for moral virtue, 
but spiritual understanding (" intellectus ") and prudence 
are indispensable. For moral virtue is a habit by which a 
good choice is made ; and this requires (as we have al- 
ready seen) not only that the will seek a good which 
accords with reason, which is its due end, but also that 
man rightly take the means for attaining that end ; and 
this can only be through reason's rightly considering, judg- 
ing, and commanding, which pertain to prudence and the 
virtues adjoined to it. Hence moral virtue cannot exist 
without prudence ; and, for the same reason, not without 
spiritual understanding ; for by this are known natural 
principles both for speculation and for action ; and prudence 
presupposes these principles, which are naturally known. 

Something more than a natural inclination is needed, for 
inclination in moral virtue is accompanied by a free exer- 
cise of choice. 



Qu. LVIII. 5.] INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 67 

It is not necessary that every exercise of reason be per- 
fect in order that a man be virtuous, but only as respects 
what things are to be virtuously done. In those, the vir- 
tuous man is the rational man. 

Natural inclination to any moral good is a certain in- 
choate virtue, but it is not perfect virtue. For inclination 
of this kind can be more dangerous the stronger it is, 
unless right reason be adjoined to it, by which is made 
right choice of means for the due end. So a horse running 
away, if he is blind, strikes an obstacle the harder, and 
injures himself the more, the faster he runs. 

Can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue ? 

Every such virtue can so exist, prudence alone excepted. 
Prudence is right reason applied to things which are to be 
done, not only in certain general principles but also in such 
particulars as actions are. For right reason demands prin- 
ciples from which it may proceed. But when it is em- 
ployed about particulars, it proceeds not only from general 
laws, but from principles which specially concern the 
special case before it. As regards the first, man is rightly 
guided by his natural understanding of primary principles, 
by which he knows that evil is not to be done, etc. But 
this does not suffice for right reasoning about particular 
cases. For a general principle of this kind may be cor- 
rupted in its particular application by some passion. When, 
e.g., concupiscence overcomes a man, that appears to be a 
good which he desires, although it may be against the 
general judgment of reason. And, therefore, as man is 
rightly disposed respecting general principles by his virtue 
of spiritual understanding, or by his (moral) " science," so 
in order that he may be rightly guided in the special prin- 
ciples of his action, he requires certain habits by which it 
may become natural, so to speak, for him to judge rightly 
respecting his ends ; and this is brought about by moral 
virtue. For the virtuous rightly judges about the end of 



08 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LXI. 2. 

virtue. Therefore, for prudence it is requisite that man 
have moral virtue. Many may deliberate well, who lack 
prudence, which not only considers rightly, but also judges 
and orders well. This cannot be unless first be removed 
the impediment of passions which corrupt the judgment 
and the precepts of prudence. 

§ 4. On moral virtues. 

Can any moral virtue exist apart from the passions? 

Understand here, as previously, by the word passion any 
motion of sense-appetite. So understood, it is evident that 
moral virtues which have the passions for their proper sub- 
ject cannot exist without those passions. For, otherwise, 
moral virtues would render those passions wholly inoper- 
ative. But it does not pertain to virtue that those things 
which are subject to reason want their proper actions, but 
that they obey the command of reason while fulfilling their 
natural functions. Hence as virtue orders the members of 
the body with reference to their due outward acts, so it 
orders the sense-appetite for its proper and appointed acts. 
But moral virtues which do not directly order the passions, 
but concern operations, can exist without passions ; e.g., 
justice, by which the will is applied to its due act, which 
is not passion. But yet on the act of justice follows joy, 
which, although it is not a passion, may by a certain " re- 
dundance " overflow into the sensitive nature (the feel- 
ings). And so, the more perfect the virtue, the more 
feeling it may excite. 

Wliy have four virtues teen distinguished as cardinal? 
TTe can consider the essence of virtue, its "formal prin- 
ciple," which is rational good. If we consider reason in 
itself, we find one principal virtue, which is prudence. Or 
w 7 e can again look at the objects to which the order of 
practical reason is applied. And these we find to be 
either operations, the virtue of which is justice ; or pas- 



Qu. LXII. 1.] ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES. 69 

sions, concerning which there are two virtues. For passions 
may impel to something which is contrary to reason, in 
which case it is necessary that the passion he suppressed by 
the virtue of temperance. Or the passion may keep us 
hack from what reason dictates, through fear of dangers or 
labours. And so it is necessary that we be strengthened in 
what is reasonable, and this virtue is fortitude. 

In like manner we may look at the subjects of the virtues, 
which are four in number. And practical reason is per- 
fected by prudence ; the will by justice ; the concupiscible 
nature by temperance ; and the irascible, by courage or 
fortitude. 

§ 5. On the theological virtues. 

Are there any theological virtues? 

Through virtue man is perfected for the acts by which 
he is prepared for beatitude. Now there is a two-fold beati- 
tude or felicity of man. One is proportioned to human 
nature, which can be attained by natural principles. But 
there is another, exceeding human nature's powers, to which 
man can attain only by divine virtue, a certain participa- 
tion of Divinity, of which S. Peter speaks (2 Ep. i. 4, 
"partakers of the Divine nature"). And because this bless- 
edness exceeds the proportion of human nature, natural 
principles do not suffice to order men for this beatitude. 
It is accomplished by certain principles divinely super- 
added. Aud these are well named theological, both because 
they have God for their chief object, because they are in- 
fused by God only, and because our knowledge of them 
rests on revelation only, through the Holy Scriptures. 

What man has not by nature, he may have by participa- 
tion with the Divine. Note, also, that these virtues are 
called Divine, not because they are imputed (as such) to 
God, but because by them we are Divinely made virtuous, 
virtuous towards God. Will and reason are naturally or- 
dained for God, as their beginning and their eud, but still 



70 OST VIRTUES. [Qu. LXII. 2, 3. 

according to the proportions of nature. But for God, as 
the object of supernatural beatitude, they are not by nature 
sufficiently ordained. 

Tliese principles sufficiently distinguish theological vir- 
tues from the intellectual and moral virtues. 

The object of the first is God Himself, as He exceeds the 
natural cognition of our reason. The object of the sec- 
ond is something which can be comprehended by human 
reason ; e.g., the intellectual virtue of wisdom considers 
divine things so far as they can be investigated by natural 
reason ; theological virtue goes beyond that. 

The natural love or affection which may be found in the 
four cardinal virtues is not the supernatural gift and virtue 
of charity. 

Tlie three theological virtues are those which the apostle 
names (1 Cor. xiii. 13), viz., faith, hope, and charity. 

For theological virtues prepare man for supernatural 
blessedness, as by natural inclination he is ordained for his 
natural end. But this comes about in two ways : first, as 
his intellect contains the primal, universal principles known 
by us through the natural light of reason ; secondly, 
through rectitude of will, which naturally tends towards 
rational good. But these two fall short of what is requisite 
for supernatural beatitude, as the apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 0), 
■• Eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard, neither have 
entered into the heart of man, the things which God 
hath prepared for them that love Him." Hence, it is 
necessary that in both respects something be supernatu- 
rally added to man which may prej)are him for this super- 
natural end. 

And first, indeed, are given to his intelligence certain 
supernatural yet fundamental truths which are received 
through divine light. These can be believed, and the vir- 
tue which receives them is (the theological virtue) faith. 



Qu. LXin. 1.] HOW ARE VIRTUES ACQUIRED ? 71 

But, secondly, the will may tend towards that end as attain- 
able by us, which pertains to the virtue of hope ; and may 
reach a certain spiritual union with its object, which is 
gained by charity, a certain conformity of the will with its 
(supernatural) end. 

In the natural order, indeed, faith and hope imply a cer- 
tain imperfection ; since faith is of things not seen, and 
hope of tilings not possessed. But to have faith and hope 
respecting things which exceed our natural faculties, is 
supernatural virtue. 

§ 6. How are virtues acquired ? 

Are any virtues naturally in us 9 

There is certainly in us by nature an aptitude, a certain 
imperfect foundation for virtue, in two ways, both as re- 
spects the constitution of human nature, and of the indi- 
vidual man. For the first, in man's reason are natural 
principles of things to be known and things to be done, the 
seed-plots, so to speak, of moral and intellectual virtues. 
In the will, also, is naturally a rational desire of good. 

For the second, the nature of the individual, some men 
are (naturally) better or worse constituted with respect to 
certain virtues, through their bodily constitution, so far, 
namely, as their nervous system aids or impedes the actions 
of their sensitive soul (which depend on that nervous sys- 
tem), and, consequently, the operations of their rational 
powers which make use of the sensitive soul. One man, 
accordingly, has natural aptitude for science, another for 
courage, another for temperance. 

But this natural aptitude for certain virtues is not the 
consummation of them. For nature is determined to one 
end alone, whereas perfected virtue is not directed in one 
channel only, but is varied according to the diverse matters 
and the diverse circumstances wherein the virtue operates. 
(Consider the natural operation of instinctive sympathy.) 



72 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LX1II. 2, 3. 

As from bad acts habits of vice are produced, much rather 
from good acts are produced habits of virtue. 

Man's good is measured by rule. That rule is two-fold ; 
sc, human reason, and Divine law. And because Divine 
law is the superior rule and measure, its extent is wider ; 
whatever is regulated by human reason is regulated also by 
it, but not conversely. The virtue which is regulated by 
human reason can be caused by human acts, inasmuch as 
acts of this kind proceed from reason, under whose power 
and regulation stands the good of man. 

But the virtue which ordains man for good, as regu- 
lated by Divine law, and not simply by human reason, 
cannot be caused by human acts, but only by Divine 
operation. 

But is it not true that man needs the grace of God in 
order that he may avoid sin ? And is not sin incompatible 
with the possession of virtue ? I grant that the perfection 
of supernatural virtue is incompatible with any mortal sin ; 
but this is not true of virtues acquired by human efforts. 
For the employment of our habit is subject to our will. 
But not by one act of sin is a habit destroyed ; for act is 
not directly contrary to habit, but the contrary habit is. 
Therefore, although without grace man cannot live without 
committing some mortal sin, yet lie is not hindered thereby 
from acquiring some habit of virtue by which he may in 
general abstain from evil deeds, especially those which are 
in the highest degree contrary to reason. There are, also, 
some mortal sins which man without grace cannot possibly 
avoid, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the 
theological virtues. 

Are any moral virtues infused by the Spirit of God ? 

All virtues, intellectual and moral, which are acquired by 
human acts, proceed from certain natural principles pre- 
existing in us. But for a supernatural destiny other vir- 
tues are needed which bear the same relation to the three 



Qu. lxv. 2, 3.] CONNECTION OF VIRTUES. 73 

theological virtues, as moral and intellectual virtues do to 
their seminal principles. 

§ 7. On the connection of virtues. 

Can moral virtues exist without charity '? 

Since moral virtues, so far as operative of good with 
reference to an end which does not exceed our natural 
faculties, can be acquired by human efforts, it follows that 
they may be so acquired without charity. So it has been 
in the case of many heathen. But as they are operative of 
good for a supernatural end, they are more truly and per- 
fectly virtues ; and such cannot be acquired by human 
acts, but are infused by God. Such moral virtues cannot 
exist without charity. This may be proved as follows : 
The other moral virtues require prudence as an essential 
condition of their existence. (See page 66.) And pru- 
dence cannot exist without moral virtues which are pres- 
ent in consequence of it ; inasmuch as moral virtues cause 
one to be well related to certain ends, and this involves 
the idea of prudence. But much rather does true prudence 
demand that one shall be well related to the ultimate end, 
which is the work of charity. Hence it is manifest that 
neither can the infused prudence exist without charity, 
nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, which cannot 
exist without prudence. 

Imperfect virtues, virtues of the lower order, may be 
found in evil men, but not in their perfection, since they 
make him good who has them. 

Can charity exist without the other moral virtues'? 

God works as perfectly in grace as in nature. But in 
nature's works we see that where a faculty of any kind is 
found there are also found the means for its due operation. 
But it is manifest that charity, ordaining men for the 
ultimate end, is the principle of all good works which are 
related to that end. Accordingly, together with charity 



74 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. lxv. 8, 4. 

are infused all moral virtues needed in order that man may 
be able to perfect the various kinds of good works belong- 
ing to his supernatural life. He, then, who loses charity 
through mortal sin, loses also all infused moral virtues. 

(1) These are not superfluous where charity exists. For 
in following the means by which the supernatural end is 
reached, man must not only have the virtue which con- 
cerns the end — i.e., charity — but also the virtues which 
concern the means. These, indeed, are subordinate to the 
other, but nevertheless they are also requisite. And S. 
Taul. in speaking of charity (1 Cor. xiii.), is pointing 
out the principle and the motive of the subordinate virtues, 
which principle and motive is charity alone. 

(2) It may still farther be objected that one who lias a 
virtuous habit finds pleasure in the exercise of that habit ; 
whereas many who have charity, and are free from mortal 
-in. nevertheless find difficulty in virtuous acts, and no 
pleasure except as the acts are referred to the motive of 
charity which produces them. But the answer is that the 
habits of infused mural virtues encounter difficulty of this 
kind through some contrary dispositions which are due to 
the effect of preceding acts. This difficulty does not ap- 
pear in the acquired moral virtues, because, through the 
exercise of those acts by which they are acquired, the con- 
trary dispositions arc removed. 

(3) All the true children of God have the grace of 
charity ; but they may lack some virtues. " The saints 
are more humbled on account of the virtues which they do 
not possess, than exalted by the virtues which they have." 
But the truth is that they have the habits of all the 
(infused) virtues, but may find difficulty in the exercise of 
them. 

Can faith and hope exist without charity ? 
We may consider faith and hope as existing, like moral 
virtues, in a certain inchoate state, which is very different 



Qu. LXV. 4, 5.] CONNECTION OF VIRTUES. 75 

from their perfection as virtues. Perfect virtue produces 
perfectly good work. Not only is that good which is done, 
but it is well done. Thus, if any one does just actions, he 
does good things, but they are not perfectly good, unless 
they are well done, i.e., through rectitude of choice, which 
is prudence. Therefore justice without prudence cannot 
be perfect virtue. In like manner, faith and hope may 
exist after a manner without charity, but they are not per- 
fect virtues. For since it is faith's office to believe God, 
but to believe means to assent with one's will, if a man does 
not duly will, faith will not have its perfect work. But it 
is by charity that one wills in due manner, since charity 
j)erfects the will. The same thing is to be said of hope. 
For the act of hope is the expecting future beatitude from 
God. And this act is perfect if it is a well-grounded hope ; 
and this requires charity. But if one expects the same 
things through merits which he has not as yet, but pro- 
poses to acquire, this imperfect act of hope can exist with- 
out charity. 

Can charity exist without faith and hope? 

Charity signifies more than loving God. It implies what 
we may call a fellowship of mutual love and communion. 
So S. John says (1 Ep. iv. 16), "He that dwelleth in love, 
dwelleth in God and God in him." This converse with 
God begins in this life through grace, but it Avill be per- 
fected in the future life. Now, no one can have such 
friendship with another if he disbelieve or despair of the 
possibility of having fellowship with him. So one cannot 
be truly called (as Abraham) the "friend of God," unless 
he have faith in this converse of man with God, and hope 
that he will attain to it. So charity cannot exist without 
faith and 



CHAPTER VI. 

ON VICES AND SINS. 



Is vice contrary to nature? 

Vice is contrary to virtue. But the virtue of each thing 
consists in its being well disposed towards what is agree- 
able to its nature. And vice cousists in the contrary dispo- 
sition. But man is specifically distinguished by his rational 
soul. Therefore that which is contrary to the order of 
reason, is contrary to the nature of man, as man. But 
man's good is the living according to reason, and his evil 
is the living unreasonably. Therefore human virtue which 
"makes a man good, and his work good/' is so far accord- 
ing to his nature, as it agrees with reason ; but vice is so 
far against human nature, as it is contrary to the order of 
reason. 

(1) But virtues are not naturally in us, since they are 
produced either by inspiration, or by practical efforts : how, 
then, can vices be contrary to nature ? I answer that it is 
true that perfect virtue is not caused by nature, but yet 
virtue inclines to what is according to nature, i.e., what is 
according to the order of reason. So far, virtue is accord- 
ing to nature, and vice contrary to it. 

(2) It may be objected, also, that nothing which is con- 
trary to nature is found in the majority of those who have 
that nature ; but vices are found in the majority of men. 
But man has a two-fold nature, sensitive and rational. 
Through the operations of sense man arrives at rational 



Qu. Lxxi. 4, 5.] NATURE OF VICE AND SIN. 77 

acts ; and more follow the inclinations of the sensitive 
nature, than those who follow the order of reason, and so 
they fall into vices and sins. 

Can sin coexist together ivith virtue? 

Sin is related to virtue as a bad act to a good habit. But 
a habit in the soul does not necessarily produce its opera- 
tion ; but a man uses that habit when he wills to do so. 
Hence, while a habit remains in a man, he is able to refrain 
from using that habit, or he can produce an opposite act. 
So, while still having a virtue, he may proceed to the act of 
sin. And a single act does not destroy a habit, any more 
than it creates such a habit. But if we consider the causes 
of virtues, we shall see that some virtues may be corrupted 
by a single act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, 
which is the root of all the infused virtues as virtues. And 
therefore by one act of mortal sin, charity being excluded, 
all the inspired virtues are excluded also as virtues. Faith 
and hope, then, may remain in a dead condition after mor- 
tal sin, but they are not virtues. 

But venial sin, since it is not contrary to charity, excludes 
neither it nor the other virtues. 

But the acquired virtues are not taken away by any one 
act of sin. So, then, mortal sin cannot coexist with the in- 
fused virtues ; but it can so exist along with the acquired 
virtues ; but venial si a may coexist with both. 

In every sin is there some act ? 

S. James answers this question (iv. 17), saying, " To 
him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it 
is sin." Sins of omission are now before us. And if we 
consider in them that only which, per se, pertains to the 
idea of sin, Ave see that sometimes the sin of omission is ac- 
companied by an inward act, as when one wills not to go to 
church, to stay away. But sometimes the sin of omission 
has no act either inward or outward, as when one, at the 



78 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXI. 5. 

hour in which he is bound to go to church, does not think 
either of going or of not going. 

But if in the sin of omission we include the causes or the 
occasions of the omission, then it is necessary that there be 
some act. For there is no sin of omission unless one pre- 
termit what he is able to do or to leave undone. But our 
not doing that which we can do or leave undone, must be 
from some cause or occasion conjoined or preceding. And 
if, on the one hand, that cause is not in a man's power, the 
omission is no sin, as when one omits going to church on 
account of some (physical) infirmity. But if the cause or 
occasion of the omission is subject to the will, the omission 
is sin; and then, in every case, that cause, as voluntary, 
has some act, at least the interior act of the will. This 
act indeed is sometimes directly turned to that omission, as 
when one wills not to go to church in order to avoid the 
trouble of doing so. Then such an act, per se, pertains to 
the omission. Fur the willing of any sin pertains to that 
sin, since all sin is voluntary. 

But sometimes the act of the will is directed to some- 
thing else, through which a man is hindered from doing 
what he ought. This may be conjoined to the omission, 
as when one wills to play at some game when he ought to 
go to church ; or it may precede the omission, as when 
one wills to sit up late, and in consequence misses the 
morning service in church (when he ought to be there). 
In this case the inward act is per accidens with respect 
to the omission, since the latter was not intended. 
"We may say, then, that some sin can exist without any 
act. 

Eemember that more is required for good than for evil, 
since the good demands "the whole, complete cause, but 
evil arises from particular defects/' Merit, therefore, can- 
not exist unless what one does he does voluntarily and as 
he ought. So it requires an act. The act of sin is not 
parallel with this. 



Qu. LXXII. 2.J DIVISIONS. 79 

Every sin is voluntary ; and where there is no will there 
is no sin. But the not-willing is voluntary whenever it is 
in the power of a man to will or not to will. 

There is a seeming objection, that if this be true one sins 
continually who never does what is his due act. But this 
is false. 

I answer that we must remember that the sin of omission 
is against some affirmative precept. And such precepts 
do not bind continually. The sin, therefore, is prolonged 
just as long as the precept binds which is neglected. 

§ 2. Divisions. 

(1) S. Augustine's division, viz., a toord, deed, or thought 
which is contrary to eternal law, rests upon most solid 
foundation. 

For while the primary cause of sin is in the will, yet 
there are outward acts commanded by the will which are in 
themselves bad and so are distinguished in the division. 
And the root of sin in aversion from God is pointed out in 
the second part of the definition, viz., sin is "contrary to 
eternal law" {i.e., the Divine Eeason and Will). Accord- 
ing to positive law, indeed, not every sin is evil because it 
is prohibited ; but some things are prohibited because they 
are evil. But according to the law of nature, which rests 
upon eternal law, every sin is an evil because it is pro- 
hibited. 

(2) Sins are also either spiritual or carnal. 

They take their species from their objects. But every 
sin consists in inordinate desire of some changeable good ; 
and, consequently, when that good is obtained, there is in- 
ordinate pleasure. But pleasure is two-fold : one, spiritual, 
derived from the apprehension of some thing desired and 
possessed, e.g. , the applause of men; another, corporeal 
or natural, from which may spring carnal sins, as glut- 



80 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxii. 4. 

tony or lust. In sins of the latter kind there is a spiritual 
act — sc, the act of reason— but the end is corporeal 
pleasure. 

(3) Sins are also either against God, against self, or 
again it our neighbor. 

Sin is an inordinate act. But there is a three-fold order 
to which ii i;in is hound to conform : one, the rule of reason 
as the director of all our actions ami passions ; another, the 
rule of Divine law by which we ought to la- directed in 

all things. And if man were naturally a solitary being, 
this two-fold order would suffice. But man belongs to 
society, and a third order is needed by which man may he 
ordained with respect to other men among whom he ought 

to live. 

But the second of these orders (the Divine law) contains 
the first, and exceeds it. For whatever things are con- 
tained under the order of reason are contained under the 
law of God Eimself. But some things an- contained 
under the latter which exceed human reason, as those 
things which are of faith, and are due to God alone. 
Heme, those who sin in such things are said to sin 
against God, as the heretic, the sacrilegious, the blas- 
phemer. 

Similarly, the .second order contains the third and exceeds 
it. For in all things which concern our neighbour we are 
to be directed by the rule of reason. But in some things 
we are directed by reason which concerns ourselves only, 
and not our neighbour. In these a man is said to sin 
against himself, as the intemperate, and the wasteful. 
This distinction is according to the objects of sins, which 
diversify their species. 

Observe, also, that by the theological virtues man is 
ordered with reference to God ; temperance and courage 
are cardinal virtues directed towards self; but justice is 
towards one's neighbour. 



Qu. LXXIII. 1.] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SDsTS. 81 

Do circumstances change the species of sin? 

Where the motive for transgression is different, there is 
difference in the sin ; for the motive is the end and object. 
But sometimes where the circumstances are corrupt the 
motive remains the same ; as the illiberal man from the 
same motive may keep when he ought not to do so, and 
where he ought not, and more than he ought, all on account 
of his inordinate desire of wealth. In such corrupt cir- 
stances, the sin is one and the same. But when such cor- 
ruptions spring from different motives, the species of sin is 
changed. 

§ 3. On the comparative guilt of sins. 

Are all sins necessarily involved in one another? 

The intention of him who acts virtuously in following 
reason is different from him who sins in turning away from 
reason. For the aim of the virtuous is one, sc, to follow 
the rule of reason ; and therefore all virtues tend towards 
the same end, and are connected in the right view of 
things to be done, which is prudence. (See page 65. ) But 
the aim of the sinner is not to recede from what reason 
demands, but is rather towards some desirable good, from 
which his sin derives its specific character. 

But such goods are diverse, have no (necessary) connec- 
tion, and are sometimes even contrary to one another. 
Sins therefore have no necessary connection. 

(1) But does not S. James say (c. ii. 10), ''Whosoever 
shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he 
is become guilty of all " ? But he is speaking of sin, not 
as the turning to transitory good, but as aversion from the 
commands of Divine law. But all the commandments have 
one and the same origin, as S. James himself says. And 
so in every sin God is despised. Thus he who offends in 
one point is guilty of all because he incurs the penal guilt 
of contempt of God, which is one in all sins. 
6 



82 ON VICES AND SINS. [QtJ. Lxxm. 3, 5. 

(2) Bat as the love of God is the root of all virtues, is 
not self-love the root of all sins, and consequently the 
ground of connection, so that he who has one, has all ? I 
reply that the cases are opposites ; for the love of God 
draws our affections from many to one ; and therefore the 
virtues which are caused by that love are connected. But 
self-love draws thr affections to various and diverse ends, 
and therefore the vices and sins which arc caused by it are 
not so conn 

Sins differ in gravity according to their objects. 

The gravity of sins differs as one sickness is more serious 
than another. For as the good of health consists in a cer- 
tain proportion of the animal frame, its constituents, n 
functions, to the needs of the animal, bo the good of virtue 
depends upon the proportion of human acts, their due 
relation, to the rule of reason. But the sickness is more 

serious the further the departure from the above standard, 

and the nearer it approaches to the vital organs. Disease 

of the heart is ordinarily more dangerous than disease in 

So in is more grave the more the disorder 

touches higher principles. Bui reas m orders all actions 

with reference to the end ; therefore the sin is gi 

which concerns the higher end-. And the end of the 

on. Thus difference in the 

gravity of sins depends on the difference in their ohjects. 

■ sin against a man is greater than the sin which 

concerns merely external things ; homicide is more serious 

than theft. And still greater is the sin which is committed 

immediately against God, as infidelity or blasphemy. 

Spiritual sins are of greater guilt titan carnal sins. 

that every spiritual sin is greater than any carnal 
sin : but, other things being equal, the former are of 
greater guilt. And this for three reasons. (1) Spiritual 
sins pertain to the spirit to which it belongs to be converted 



Qu. lxxiii. C] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SINS. 83 

to God or to turn away from Him. But carnal sins are 
consummated in fleshly pleasure which chiefly turns to 
corporeal good. And therefore carnal sin (as such) is more 
marked by a turning towards the thing. But spiritual 
sin contains more of aversion (from God), from which 
comes the guilt, and it is therefore a greater sin. 

(2) Carnal sin, as such, is against one's own body, which, 
in the order of charity, is less to be loved than God and our 
neighbor, against whom spiritual sins are committed ; and 
therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. 

(3) .The stronger the (outward) impulse towards sin, 
the less is its guilt. But carnal sins have the stronger im- 
pulse (outwardly), from the inborn concupiscence of the 
flesh. And therefore, once more, spiritual sins are, as 
such, of greater guilt. 

There are apparent exceptions to this rule — e.g., adultery 
is a graver sin than theft ; but the former is not only the 
fleshly sin of lust, but the spiritual sin of injustice, and 
that of a graver sort than simple theft. 

And the devil is said to rejoice especially in the carnal 
sin of lust, because it cleaves most closely to a man, and is 
most difficult to escape from. Incontinent concupiscence, 
which is carnal, is also more shameful than incontinent 
anger, because it is irrational, and makes man more like 
the brutes. 

Does the gravity of sins depend upon the cause of sin? 

The question is equivocal, because we may consider, first, 
what is per se the proper cause of sin, which is the will to 
sin. Sin is the fruit of that tree, and "the tree is known 
by its fruit." And the greater this cause, the greater is 
the sin. 

But other causes are extrinsic and remote, from which 
the will is inclined to sin. And we must distinguish 
among these. For some induce the will to sin, in agree- 
ment with its own nature, as, e.g., the end, which is the 



84 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LX3UU. 8. 

proper object of the will. And from such a cause the sin 
is rendered greater. For he sins more gravely whose will, 
aiming at a worse end, is inclined to sin. But there are 
other causes which Incline the will to sin, against the 
nature and order of the will itself, which is naturally made 
to move freely by its own direction according to the reason. 
Eence causes which diminish the judgment of reason — e.g., 
ignoranci — or which diminish the free action of will, as 
infirmity, or \ iolence, or Eear, in diminishing the voluntary, 
diminish also the sin. Ami if the act in; altogether invol- 
untary, ii is lot a .-infill act. 
It may be -aid that the greater the concupiscence, the 
• the sin, and therefore the greatness of the cause makes 
the Bin bo much the less. But it' we include in concupis- 
the motion of the will itself, then, where there is 
greater concupiscence, there is greater -in. Bui if by con- 
cupiscence we mean a passion of our lower nature, then 
greater concupiscence, if it precede the judgment of the 
reason ami the motion of the will, diminishes the Bin ; be- 
cause he who -ins under the influence of greater passion, 
falls through greater temptation, and le-< is imputed to 
him. But if concupiscence, bo understood, follows the 
jndgment of the reason and the motion of the will, then, 
where there - _■ ti r concupiscence, then- is greater sin. 
For sometimes this stronger passion rises because the un- 
bridled will is tending to its desired object. 

7s sin greater as the injury //one is greater? 

The injury has one of three relations to the sin. (J) It 
is foreseen and intended, as a malicious homicide or theft. 
And then the quantity of injury directly increases the grav- 
ity of the sin,, because injury \± per se the object of the sin. 

(.2) Sometimes, again, it is foreseen, hut not intended, as 
when one, passing through a field in order to commit a 
crime, knowingly does harm to the growing crop, but not 
with the intention of doing harm. Then, also, the quan- 



Qu. LXXIII. 8.] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SINS. 85 

tity of injury aggravates the sin, but indirectly ; inasmuch 
as it proceeds from a will inclined to sin, that he does not 
avoid doing harm either to himself or another, which, 
simply, he would not have willed to do. 

(3) But sometimes the injury is neither foreseen nor 
intended, and if it is accidental with respect to the sin, 
it does not directly aggravate the sin. But, on account of 
negligence in not considering the injury which might hap- 
pen, the evils which happen unintentionally incur a penalty 
if a man was engaged in an unlawful act. (Cp. Common 
law.) 

(4) But if the injury per se follow from the act of sin, 
though it be neither intended nor foreseen, it directly ag- 
gravates the sin ; because whatsoever per se follows from 
sin pertains in a certain way to the sin itself ; e.g., if scan- 
dal follow from the sin, though not sought for nor clearly 
foreseen, the sin is directly aggravated by this. But be- 
cause sin is aggravated by the injury done, it does not 
follow that this is the only aggravating condition. For sin 
per se is greater as it is more inordinate. And the injury 
itself aggravates the sin so far as it makes the act more 
inordinate. So it does not follow that if sins against our 
neighbor do most harm, they are therefore the worst of 
sins. There is greater disorder in sins against God, and in 
some of those which are against one's self. 

It may be said, also, that although no injury can be 
directly done to God, it may be attempted against those 
things which are especially related to God, as the attempt 
to exterminate the faith, to profane what is holy, which are 
gravest sins. 

It is said, also, that no one willingly injures himself, and 
that this shows that consequences do not aggravate sin, 
for some of the gravest sins — e.g., suicide — are against one's 
self. But this is only true secundum quid, for the suicide 
knowingly and willingly does harm to himself, though he 
is seeking as his end some apparent good. 



86 OX VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXIV. 1, 2. 

§ 4. The subject of sin. 

Is the will the subject of sin f 

There are acts which do not, like sawing wood, pass over 
to exterior matter, but remain in the agent of them, as de- 
siring and knowing. -Moral acts, whetherof virtue or vice, 
are of this latter class. So, then, the proper subject of the 
.sinful act is the power which is the principle of activity. 
And since it is characteristic of moral acts that they are 
voluntary, it follows that the will, which is the source of 
voluntary acts, is the scat of sin. 

It might be objected, (' > 'ha! evil is always against will 
and intention. And that is true, it' it be regarded as evil. 
But some evil is apparent good, and sin is so regarded, and 
is voluntary. 

(2) But, agaii . ajar ling evil as good seem 

rather defect of understanding than defect of will ? 
1 answer that if the defect of knowledge wen- oot subject 
to our will, there would be no sin cither in will or judg- 
ment. This is true of those who labor under invincible 
ance. But, otherwise, this defect of understanding is 
sin. 

Ts (he wiU alone tht subject of sinf 

Voluntary we have seen (sec page LO), are not 

only those which are elicited from the will, but those which 
are commanded by the will, and which other powers execute, 
all those powers which can be moved to their acts by 
the will, or restrained from thos the will, can be 

the subject of sin. And these same powers also are the 
subject of moral habits, good or bad. 

Will, then, is the cause of sin, not the only subject of it. 

The members of the body are not a parallel case. For 
they are merely the organs of activity, and are in no 
sense free. Therefore there is no moral transgression in 
them. 



Qu. lxxiv. 3.] THE SUBJECT OF SIX. 87 

There may be sin in sense-appetite. 

For there may be sin in any power of the sonl whose act 
is voluntary and inordinate. Among .such acts are those of 
sense-appetite ; therefore there can be sin in them. 

(1) But is not this sensuous nature common to us and 
the brutes ? Whereas sin is peculiar to man, who alone is 
praised or blamed for his acts. So it seems that there can 
be no sin in it. The answer to this is easy. Our sensuous 
nature is joined to reason and fitted to obey reason. Thus 
the acts of our sense-appetite may be voluntary, and the 
subject of sin. 

(2) Again, it may be said that no one sins in what he 
cannot avoid; but we cannot avoid the inordinate acts of 
sensuality as long as we live this mortal life. I answer that 
it is true that the perpetual corruption of our sense-nature, 
our birth-sin, is never totally taken away in this life. 
But such corruptio fomitis does not prevent man from re- 
pressing by reasonable will each inordinate motion of 
sensuality as it arises, say, by diverting his thoughts into 
another channel. But while one is doing this, some inor- 
dinate motion may arise from this new source. Thus when 
one, wishing to avoid the inordinate motions of concupis- 
cence, turns his thoughts to science, some unpremeditated 
thought of vainglory may arise in his soul ; and so man can- 
not avoid motions of this kind, on account of this innate 
corruption. But the idea of voluntary sin in this con- 
nection implies that we can shun the separate motions 
as they present themselves. 

(3) There is indeed no deliberate action in these cases, 
and what a man does without rational deliberation is not 
perfectly his act. Consequently it cannot be a perfect act 
of virtue or of vice. Hence, such motions of sensuality, 
anticipating reason, may be venial sin, as sin (in a certain 
way) imperfect. 



88 <>N VICES A XIi 3IN8. [Qu. i.xxiv. 1. :>. 

Ca« ///'/•- h mortal sin in ovr sense-nature f 
Disorder which corrupts the principle of spiritual life, 
the altimate end, causes the spiritual death of mortal 
sin. But to ordain anything Eor its end docs not belong 
to sensuality, bul to the reason alone. To it. there- 
fore, alone belongs inordination with respecl to the end. 
Eence, mortal sin i< n<>t attributed to the lower nature, but 
i- only in tin- bigher. 
(l) We may sin mortally with reference to sensuous ob- 
because the sensuous act can concur in that .-in. I int. 
the sin is not mortal because it belongs !•> Bense-appetite, 
hut bi - a rational act, and it is reason's office to 

order man with reference to the end which he aim- at. 

, there are virtues of the irrational nature, such 

a- ten ind fortitude : hut the act of virtue ie per- 

by reason and will which has power to choose ; for 
the act of virtue requires choice. Hence, with the virtue 
<>f tic ' the passions, is joined (if they arc com- 

pletely vir; of prudence, which perfects 

our rational nature. So i- i'. also, in mortal sin. 

(3) Tin- venial sin which ma. exisl in the Bensuous 
natun □ for mortal .-in which belongs to the 

rational nature only. 

Y : and that in t. For reason's office is two- 

. to know its proper object, which i- any truth: 
powers of the soul. In both re- 
- there can he sin in reason. First, as it errs concern- 
ing the truth, when it can know and is hound to know that 
truth : next, when it either commands the inordinate 
of the lower nature, or deliberately neglects to check them. 
The objector may ask, Is not error due to defect in 
.to ignorance, which is an excuse for wrong rather 
than a sin ? And this ohjection stands, if we speak of in- 
voluntary ignorance. A madman is not responsible for 



Qr. lxxiv. 6, 7, 8.] THE SUBJECT OF SIN. 89 

his acts. ' But ignoranee of that which one can know and 
ought to know, is itself a sin. But reason's defect iu 
directing the other powers of the soul is always imputed 
to it as a sin. 

Is voluntary pleasure in the thought of sin, "morose 
delectation," a sin of reason ? 

Eeason can direct not only outward acts, but also inward 
passions. And when it fails to do so, there is sin in it. 
But there are two kinds of sin in this inward government ; 
one, when a man deliberately excites in himself the (inor- 
dinate) passion of anger or concupiscence (or whatever the 
passion may be) ; another, when he does not repress the 
illicit motion of passion. He perceives that the thought is 
inordinate, but yet he allows it to remain, does not expel 
it. So, the sin of morose delectation is in the reason 
(though not in that alone). I am not speaking of the mere 
length of time that the evil thought remains in the mind, 
but of the deliberate failure to repress the thought of evil, 
in which the desires of the soul find pleasure. 

The supreme judgment and final consent to the act of sin, 
which inwardly consummates that sin, is in the higher 
reason alone which turns aioay from the eternal law of God. 

Consent to the pleasure of that sin is only a preamble to 
that final judgment, and is a lower act of reason. 

Consent to pleasure in the thought of sinful acts is itself 
a sin ivhen it means that the affections are voluntarily in- 
clined to those acts. 

For one takes pleasure only in that which is conformed 
to his spiritual or bodily state. But that one deliberately 
choose such conformity of his disposition to mortal sins, is 
itself a mortal sin.* 

* We may distinguish three forms of internal sin : (a) free and con- 
tinued pleasure in imagined evil, implying consent to it, the " deledatio 



'.ft OH VICES AND SIN8. [Qu. lxxv. 1. 

§ 5. The causes of sins. 
//■■"' can sin have a can - 

sin is any inordinate act. As act, thru, it must have a 
. like any other act. But as inordinate, it has a cause 
ijatioD or privation ia caused. Bui a cause of a nega- 
tion may be assigned in two ways : first, the absence of the 
productive cause is a cause of the negation as such. For 
on removing of the cause follows removing of the effect; 
: the sun is the cause <>f darkness. But, in 
r way, that cause which produces a certain result is 
negation— u .. of the ab- 
imething else which is inconsistent with that 

ally follows from the acting cause. Thus, 

if col : I as positive \ bing, the fire is the 

■ idens of il 

the inordination of Bin and every evil wh 
ever are not mere negations, but privations <>f that which 
a thii .. i_ r ht to have, such inordinai ion 

must have an efficient causi dens. For that which 

anything naturally has and ought to have will nev.-r be 
pt through some impeding cause. And thus it, 
vil which consisl a in any priva- 
tion ha }," or an efficient cause per acci- 
■ this carries us back to an efficient cause per se. 
ie, then, sin on the part of the inordination has an 
efficient cause \ ■ pari of the act 
done it lias an efficient cause p^r se, it follows that the in- 
ordination of t ; Its from thecal of the 
-. 

morosa " of the tex* ; rin, implying appro- 

•f it, although ski! in trade), may be admired with- 

out approving the act, as "the lord commended the unjust steward" 
(lascivious tales, however, having their own special danger) : (c) sinful 
- with an act of will, which is efficacious, when there is intention 
of acting out the desire (S. Matt. v. 28). The evil thought rejected at 

not sin. 



Qv. LXXV. 2, 3.] THE CAUSES 01' SINS. 91 

And our conclusion is that the will which is not directed 
by the rule of reason and the Divine law, in aiming at some 
transitory good, causes the act of singer se, but the inor- 
dination of the act per accidens, and apart from the inten- 
tion ; for the lack of order in the act results from lack of 
direction in the will. 

We find a cause of sin, therefore, because sin is not only 
privation, but an act in which that privation is found. 

And causality does not here imply necessity of sin, for 
necessary causality means a sufficient cause with no hin- 
dering cause. And sin as caused, is not necessary effect, 
because the result can be hindered. One might ask 
whether good or evil is the cause of sin, and say that good 
cannot be such a cause, and evil is the very sin itself which 
is in question. But I reply that ungoverned will is the 
cause of sin, and the cause is good, along with the absence 
of another good.* 

We may find four inward causes of sin, and sometimes all 
four concur. 

First, the senses or the imagination, which present some- 
thing pleasurable to the soul ; next, desire, which is inclined 
to it as pleasurable ; next, reason, which approves of it 
without reference to the due rule and law ; lastly, the will, 
which consents and perfects the act of sin. 

Has sin an outward cause ? 

Such outward cause, if it exist, might be the cause of sin 
in either of three ways ; either by directly moving the will 
itself, or by acting on the reason, or by moving sense-appe- 
tite (the senses, the imagination, or the desires). 

But God only, who cannot be the cause of sin, can direct- 
ly move the will. Nothing outward, then, can be the cau&« 

* The reasoning of S. Thomas Aquinas may here seem very subtle 
to one who has not previously looked into its subject. But it demands 
and will well repay careful and prolonged thought. — J. J. E. 



92 OH VICES AXI> sixs. [Qu i.x.ivi. 1. 

of .-in. unless it move the reason by persuasion, or unless it 
move the sensual desires, as Borne outward sensible tilings 
act upon those desires. But when anything is to he done. 
persuasion does nol move the reason by force of necessity. 
o outward thing i\ move the desires except 

in certain abnormal conditions of the soul (when one is 
not responsible for his acts). Desire, also, does not of 
and will. Eence an outward cause 
may contribute to the .-infill act, hut is not an adequate 
can-'-. That adequal the will only. 

> 6. Relations of ignorance to sin. 

Is ignorance err the tin f 

A cause may be Buch per accidens, by removing what 
hinders the result (as a flaw in a casting may he, per acci- 

steamer). In this way 

may he thi Infill act, for i; 

privation of that knowledge which perfects reason as di- 

of human actions ami capable of prohibiting tin- act 
of sin. B - human acts through two-fold 

know: ral, the other particular (knowledge 

of the law, ami knowledge of the fact). For when one con- 
nail do, he has a sort of syllogism in his 
miml ; and his conclusion i- his judgment, choice, or oper- 
And his particular decision i.- brought under some 
al rule or law by Bome particular proposition. Thus 
a man is prevented from the act of parricide by knowing 
that fathers are not to he killed, and by knowing that this 
man is his father. Therefore ignorance of the law or igno- 
rance of the fact may cause the act of parricide. Hence it 
is evident that not all ignorance on the part of the sinner 
is the cause of his sin, hut only that which prevents the 
knowledge which would have prohibited the act of sin (ante- 
cedent ignorance is cause of the outward act ; consequent 
ignorance, of its sinfulness). Hence if the will of any one 



Qu. LXXVI. 2.] RELATIONS OF IGNORANCE TO SIN. 93 

is so disposed that lie would not be hindered from the act of 
parricide by knowing that the man is his father, his igno- 
rance of his father (concomitant ignorance) is not the cause 
of his sin. He does not sin through ignorance, but he sins 
in ignorance. (Nic. Eth., iii. 1.) 

(1) Ignorance may be purely a negative ; but negatives 
may be causes per accidens, in removing what hinders a 
result. 

(2) It is true, also, that every sin is in a bad will, and 
that a thing must be apprehended and not unknown, in 
order that it may be willed. But that which is willed may 
be partly known and partly unknown. Thus one may 
know that the being whom he kills is a man, without know- 
ing that it is his father. 

Is ignorance a sin ? 

Distinguish ignorance from nescience. The latter is 
simply negative, the simple negation of knowledge. 

But ignorance is privative, privation of knowledge of 
those things which one is fitted to possess. But some of 
these things every one is bound to know ; sc, those things 
without which it is impossible to perform rightly the acts 
which are due from us. Hence all are bound to know the 
first principles of the faith and of the law of nature ; and 
individuals are bound to know those things which belong 
to their state or office. But there are other things which 
we are fitted to know, which we are not in general bound 
to know, as the theorems of geometry. 

But it is manifest that whosoever neglects to possess or 
to do what he is bound to have or to do, is guilty of a sin 
of omission. Ignorance, therefore, of those things which 
one is bound to know, if it be due to negligence (" conse- 
quent ignorance "), is a sin. But negligence is not imputed 
to a man who does not know what he cannot know. This 
ignorance is called invincible, that which cannot be overcome 
by due inquiry. Such ignorance, not being in our power, 



04 OX VICES A\H SINS. [Qu. LXXVI. 2, 8. 

is involuntary and is not sin. But vincible ignorance is 
sin, if .it concern those things which one is bound to know.* 

(1) This is not inconsistent with our definition of sin, as 
"a word, deed, or thought opposed to God's law/' for the 
opposite negations are included in the definition, so far as 

• on has the nature of sin. And so negligence which 
makes ignorance to be Bin, is included as a (wilful) passing 
by of what oughi to be said, done, or thought, in order to 
acquire due knowledge. 

(2) Sin is more directly opposed to grace than to igno- 
rance. I *» i ; i privation of grace is rather a penalty follow- 
ing on .-in than itself a sin. Why. then, i- privation of 

knowledge a .-in. and not privation of grace? To this I 
reply tiiat i . also, in preparing one's Belf Tor the 

tion of that grace, may it-e|f be a .-in. And yel even 

herein there is a difference; since man can acquire the 
knowledge now Bpoken of by his own acts, hut grace is 
purely tire gift of God. 

(3) Again, it may be objected that sin is taken away by 

penitence, bui ignorance is not so removed, and therefore 

it cannol be .-in. Bui observe that the negligence doe- not 

remain after penitence, and so what makes ignorance to he 
removed. 
tli Though the .-infill ignorance constantly continues 
in the .sinner, he docs not continually .-in. hut. as in other 
sins of omission, only at that time when the affirmative 
precept i? obligatory; »c, when there is fit opportunity to 
acquire that knowledge which he is hound to possess, f 

Does ignorance totally excuse from si 

Ignorauce in itself renders the act which it causes an 

* If one knows that the outward action is wrong, no invincible 
ignorance respecting the laws of spiritual morality can excuse his 
evil desire of that action. 

+ Affirmative laws bind only under suitable conditions ; negative 
laws are continually binding. 



Qu. LXXVI. 3.] MORAL RELATIONS OF IGNORANCE. 95 

involuntary act. But ignorance is said to cause that act 
which would be prohibited by the corresponding knowl- 
edge. Such an act would be contrary to the will if knowl- 
edge were present ; i.e., it would be involuntary. 

But if that knowledge would not prevent the act from 
being done, because of the will's inclination to it, ignorance 
of this knowledge does not make a man to act involuntarily, 
but he acts, not willing the result. (Note the distinction 
between unwilling, and not-willing.) (Nic. Eth., iii. 1.) 
Such ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, 
not causing the involuntary, does not excuse from sin. 
The same is true of any ignorance which does not cause the 
sinful act, but is consequent upon or concomitant with the 
sinful act. But ignorance antecedent to the act of will, 
since it causes the act, produces au involuntary act, and 
does excuse from sin. 

And yet sometimes that ignorance which is the cause of 
the sin does not totally excuse it, for two reasons. First, on 
the part of the thing which is unknown. For ignorance so 
far excuses from sin, as one does not know the action to be 
sin. But it may happen that one is ignorant of some circum- 
stance which, if known, would prevent his doing the sinful 
act, and yet he knows that he is doing wrong. He may 
do bodily injury to some one, knowing that he is injuring a 
man, and yet not know that that man is his father, which 
is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin. Or per- 
haps he does not know that, striking another, he will be 
struck back, which knowledge might hinder his doing so. 
And although such a one sins on account of ignorance, yet 
he is not totally excused from sin, because he knows that 
he is doing wrong. Again, the ignorance itself may be 
voluntary, either directly, as when one does not wish to 
know, in order that he may be more free in sin ; or in- 
directly, as when one, on account of the labor required, or 
other occupations, neglects to learn that which would keep 
him back from sin. Such neoiigence makes the i°;norance 



96 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXVI. 4. 

voluntary and a sin, if it is of those things which one can 
know and is bound to know. Such ignorance, therefore, 
docs not totally excuse from sin. But if there be ignorance 
altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or 
becanse it is of that which one is aol bound bo know, such 
ignorance altogether excuses from sin. 

Does ignorance diminish sinf 

Sine,, every .-in is voluntary, so far as ignorance dimin- 
ishes the voluntary, bo far il diminishes sin. lint it is 
mauifest that the ignorance which totally takes away the 
voluntary, and bo takes away the .-in, does no! diminish, 
hut annuls it. But the ignorance which is not the cause 
of the -in, hut concomitant with it. neither diminish* 
augments the .-in. Therefore only that ignorance can 
diminish the sin, which i- the cause of it, and yet does 
imt totally excuse it. Bui Bometimes it happens that such 
ignorance is directly and per 86 voluntary (consequent ig- 
norance), as when one wilfully is ignorant in order that 
he may more Ereely .-in. Ami such wilful ignorance 

(" ign. affectata") ms to increase the voluntary, and 

the sin. 

But Bometimes the ignorance which is the cause of sin is 
not directly voluntary, but only indirectly ; as when one is 
too lazy to study, and bo is ignorant ; or he wishes to drink 
wine immoderately, and so loses Bober judgment. Such 
ignorance may diminish the voluntary and the sin. For 
when anything is not known to be sin, it is not directly 
chosen as sin. Hence the contempt of Divine law is 
less, and consequently the sin is les3. So S. Paul says 
(1 Tim. i. 13), "I obtained mercy because I did it igno- 
rantly." 

It is true that every sinner is ignorant, but his ignorance 
is not the cause of his sin, but it is something consequent 
to the proper cause, which is a passion or habit inclining 
to sin. 



Qu. LXXVII. 1, 2.] MORAL RELATIONS OF SENSE-APPETITE. 97 

§ 7. The moral relations of sense-appetite to sin. 

Is the will moved by the passions ? 

Passion cannot directly draw the will after it, but it can 
do so indirectly in two ways : first, by what we may call 
abstraction. I mean that since the soul is one agent (and 
of limited power), when it acts in any one direction, its 
power in other directions is reduced, or even totally an- 
nulled. In other words, the operations of the soul require 
a certain energy, which, if it be vehemently applied to 
one object, cannot at the same time be applied to another. 
And in this way, when the motion of sensuous appetite is 
strengthened through some passion (this is so far an ab- 
straction of mental strength), of necessity the strength 
of rational appetite, i.e., of the will, is diminished or to- 
tally impeded. 

Secondly, the same result is produced on the side of the 
object of the will, which is the good apprehended by 
reason. For the judgment and apprehension of reason are 
impeded through the vehement and inordinate act of the 
imagination and that animal power of apprehension which 
we share with the brutes (vis cestimativd). We see this in 
many insane persons. But this apprehension and judg- 
ment follow the passions, just as the judgment in taste fol- 
lows the condition of the nerves of the tongue. Hence we 
see that men who are moved by any passion do not easily 
turn their imagination from the things which so affect 
them. Consequently the rational judgment, and then 
the motion of the "will which is naturally adapted to 
follow that judgment, follow the impulse of the pas- 
sions. 

Can reason be overcome by passion, against its 'knowledge'? 

That is, is it possible for a man overcome by passion to 
do what he knows is forbidden, while he knows this ? 
Socrates thought that knowledge could never be overcome 



98 ON VICES AND SINS. |_Q U - &*XVn. 2. 

by passion, and hence he assumed that all virtues were 
(habits of) knowledge, and all sins resulted from ignorance. 
And this, in a certain way. is true ; because, since wc 
always will the good or the apparent good, the will is never 
moved to evil as evil, but only as an apparent good. Ig- 
norance or error of reason accompanies all transgression. 

But experience also shows that many act contrary to 
their own knowledge. '''That servant which knew his 
lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his 
will, shall he beaten with many stripes " (S. Luke x i i . 47). 
"To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to 
him it is sin" (S. James iv. L7). We mnsl therefore 
make a distinction. (Nic. Eth., vii. 3.) For since man is 
directed in right conduct by a two-fold knowledge, defect 
in either suffices to hinder rectitude of will and act 
(p. v.',. 

(1) Sometimes it happens that a man has knowledge of the 
universal law, hut yet does not know in particular, that 
his desired act conies under the law. This will suffice to 
prevent his will from following the principle which he 
clearly knows. 

(•-2) Again, it is to be considered that nothing prevents a 
thing from being habitually known, which is not actually 
taken into consideration. It may happen therefore that a 
man knows the principle of conduct and has correct knowl- 
edge of his individual act. and yet does not actually con- 
sider, and so he may act against his knowledge. 

But that a man does not consider in the particular case 
what he habitually knows, may result (a) from defect of 
intention alone ; as when he is familiar with the principles 
of geometry, but lias no intention of considering the con- 
clusions of the science, which he can do at once if he 
chooses so to do : (b) but sometimes a man does not con- 
sider what he habitually knows, on account of some super- 
vening impediment, say, on account of some other occupa- 
tion, or of some bodily infirmity. And in this mode, he 



Qu. LXXVII. 2, 3.] MORAL RELATIONS OF SENSE-APPETITE. 99 

who is under the strong influence of some passion does not 
consider in the particular question before him what he 
knows in its principle. And passion may impede his con- 
sideration, first, by what we have previously called a kind 
of abstraction ; next, by opposition, since passion generally 
inclines to the opposite of what is known in its principle ; 
and lastly, through the bodily effect produced by passion, 
which may prevent reason from freely exerting its proper 
influence. So sleep and intoxication through the body en- 
chain the mind. Certainly this may happen also through 
intensity of passion, which may be so strong as to render a 
man totally deprived of reason, and (for the time at least) 
insane. 

(1) It may seem as if the stronger were overcome by the 
weaker, since the certitude of knowledge is the most fixed 
of our mental possessions. But it must be remembered 
that general principles which are so fixed, are not chief in 
action which concerns particulars, individual things. It is 
not so strange, therefore, that passion should act against 
knowledge of principles, when consideration of the particu- 
lar application of those principles is lacking. 

(2) It is passion which makes some thing appear good to 
reason, which is not so, and thus the special judgment is 
against reason's general knowledge. 

(3) It is true that one cannot have two contrary opinions 
at once. But he can have one habitual principle while its 
opposite is immediately before his mind. 

(4) Speaking logically, he may subsume his particular 
judgment, under another universal (say, that pleasure is to 
be sought for) instead of the one which he habitually pos- 



Sins of passions are rightly called sins of infirmity. 

For as the body is infirm when any of its operations are 
enfeebled or hindered by the disorder of any of its organs, 
so the soul may be impeded by the disorder of any of its 



100 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXVII. 4, 6. 

powers. And as the parts of the body are said to be disor- 
dered when t hoy do not follow the order of nature, so we 
speak of an inordinate condition of the soul, when reason 
is not supreme. Sins of infirmity, thru, are found when 
the passions affect the sensuous soul, contrary bo the order 
of reason. 

Inordinate self-love is the cause of all sin. 

For the proper and per se cause of sin is the turning of 
the soul to transitory good. This comes Erom some inor- 
dinate desire. But this inordinate desire has its origin in 
inordinate self-!. 

n inordinate desires are distinguished by the apostle 
as " the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride 
of life" (l Ep. S. John ii. 16). 

Do passions diminish the gravity of sins f 

Sin consists essentially in the act of free choice, which 
proceeds from the reason and the will. But passions, the 
motions of sense-appetite, can either precede or follow this 
free choice. Antecedently, the passion may incline the 
reason and the will. But, on the other hand, subsequently, 
the intensity of our will may draw after it the passions. 

Now in the firsl passion which precedes the act 

of sin dimin gravity. For the act is so far sin as it 

is voluntary, and in our own power. And the less our act 
proceeds from the impulse of passion, the more fully vol- 
untary it is. Passion, then, diminishes sin so far as it 
diminishes the voluntary nature of our act. 

But it is the opposite with consequent passion, which is 
a sign of the greatness of the sin, because it shows the 
intensity of the will in sinning. 

(1) More intense passion does not make greater sin, be- 
cause the passion is the cause of the sin on the side of sin's 
turning to seeming good. But the gravity of sin, on the 
other hand, depends upon the soul's turning away from God 
(or, the intensity of the will in such turning away). 



Qu. LXXVir. 7.] MOKAL RELATIONS OF SEXSE-APPETITE. 101 

(2) In like manner good sentiments following the judg- 
ment of reason, increase the merit of virtuous acts ; but if 
they precede it, the man acts more from feeling than from 
reason, and his act is less meritorious on that account. 

Does passion totally excuse from the guilt of sin ? 

Any act which is bad in itself is entirely excusable only 
when it is entirely involuntary. Passion, then, which has 
this effect renders the act excusable ; otherwise, not. 

With respect to this consider two things : (1) a thing 
may be in itself voluntary, when the will is directly turned 
to it ; or it may be voluntary in its cause when that cause 
is willed, and the effect is not directly willed. Thus, to 
him who voluntarily intoxicates himself, his drunken acts 
are rightly imputed. 

(2) A thing may be voluntary directly or indirectly when 
the will could prohibit it and did not. 

Passions, then, may be so great as to take away totally 
the use of reason. But if the beginnings of the passion 
were voluntary, the resulting acts are voluntary in their 
cause, and are imputed as sin. Here is the voluntary in- 
toxication of the soul. But if the cause was not voluntary 
but natural — say, some bodily disease depriving of reason — 
then the act is strictly involuntary, and is no sin. 

But often the passion is such as does not intercept totally 
the use of reason, and then the passion can be excluded by 
our turning to other thoughts, or by our impeding its re- 
sults. Such passion does not entirely excuse from sin. 

(1) But does not S. Paul say (Gal. v. 17), "The flesh 
lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; 
for these are contrary the one to the other ; so that ye may 
not do the things that ye would" ? And, if so, does not 
passion totally excuse sin ? I answer that the impossibility 
spoken of does not refer to the outward act, but to the 
inward motion of concupiscence, from which the Christian 
would gladly be free. So S. Paul says (Rom. vii. 19), 



102 ON VICES AND sins. [Qu. i.xxvii. 8. 

"The evil which I would not, that I do." It is true, also, 
that the will through passion ads against its own preceding 
purpose. 

(2) But if passiou causes ignorance in the particular case 
in question, why is it not a complete excuse for sin? I 
reply that the excusing ignorance is that (invincible) igno- 
rance of the circumstances of the case which cannot he sur- 
mounted by any diligence. Hut passion causes ignoranoe 
of the law iii its Bpecial application, by hindering one from 
applying his knowledge of the law to his particular case, 

■which passion reason ran repel. 

(3) Bodily infirmity may be a total excuse, since it is 
involuntary . as in the insane. 

Sim of passion may be ///<>/•/"/ sins. 
Mortal .-in consists in aversion from God, man's ultimate 
end. This aversion belongs to deliberative reason, whose 

oilier it i-' to ordain man with reference to hi.- end. The 
only way, therefore, in which it cau happen that the in- 
clination of the soul t<> what is contrary to its ultimate cud 
may not he mortal .-in. i- thai deliberative reasou has no 

-hare in that inclination. This happens in the sudden 

llloti' ••!!. 

But when any one proceeds from this to the act of sin, 
or to deliberate consent, this is not a sudden action. And 
deliberate reason can exclude, or, at least, impede, the pas- 
sion. If it does not, the sin is mortal. So we sec that 
many murders and many adulteries arc committed through 
passion. 

(1) But is not sin of infirmity venial ? And are not sins 
of passion sins of infirmity? But observe that venial is 
used iu three different senses : (a) When the sin has some 
cause of pardon which diminishes the sin ; and so sin of 
infirmity or of ignorance is called venial in that sense. 
(b) Again, all sin becomes venial — i.e., obtains pardon — 
through repentance, (c) There arc certain sins which are 



Qu. lxxviii. 1.] SIN'S OF MALICE. 103 

venial in their nature, as an idle word ; and only in this 
sense is venial opposed to mortal. The objection is based 
on the first meaning of the word venial. 

(2) Observe, again, that passion is the cause of the sin, 
on the side of the turning to transitory good ; but what 
makes it mortal, is the turning away from God. And so, 
though in the sensuous nature cannot be mortal sin, yet the 
sin proceeding from passion may become such. 

§ 8. Sins of malice, i.e., of deliberate wickedness. 

When does any one sin from malice, i.e., from deliberate 
wickedness 9 

Man naturally desires the good. Hence, if his desire de- 
cline to evil, it is because of some corruption or some inor- 
dination in him. But the principles of human action are 
intellect and sensuous or rational desire, which latter is 
called will. Some sin, therefore, results from defect in the 
intelligence, as when one sins through ignorance. Sin also 
results from defect in sensuous desire ; these are sins of pas- 
sion. And, lastly, sin results from inordinate will. But 
the will is disordered when the less good is more loved than 
the greater good ; when, consequently, any one chooses to 
suffer loss respecting the good which is less loved, in order 
to obtain what is preferred. So a man may deliberately 
consent to have his leg cut off, in order to preserve his life, 
which he values more. In this way, when any one inordi- 
nately loves some temporal good, as riches or pleasure, more 
than the order of reason or of Divine law — i.e., more than 
the love of God — it follows that he may be willing to suffer 
the loss of some spiritual good in order to get the other, the 
temporal good. And since evil is nothing else than priva- 
tion of some good, it follows that he is consciously willing 
some spiritual evil for the sake of earthly good. Such a 
one sins from fixed malice or deliberate purpose, since he 
consciously chooses the evil. 



104 OX VICES AMI SIN'S. [Qu. LXXVIII. 2. 

(1) Is there any ignorance in such sin ? Sometimes one 
is ignorant that the thing which he is doing is wrong in 
general ; his is a sin of ignorance. Sometimes the sinner 
docs not know that the particular act which he is then 
doing is wrong ; as when he sins from passion. But some- 
times there is do thought that the evil is not to he chosen 
in order to gain the desired ir< "..l ; though he knows that it 
is simply evil. This is the ignorance of malicious wicked- 
ness. 

(2) Evil cannoi be, as such, aimed at by any one. But 
yel it may be aimed at in order to avoid some other evil, or 
to attain some g 1: and in such a case the Binner would 

to attain the good for which he seeks, even with loss 

of the otlur. So a lascivious person would prefer to enjoy 
his pleasure without offending God ; bui if the two alter- 
natives are presented, he wills to incur the displeasure of 
God by sinning, rather than to be deprived of his pleasure. 

? every om who sins from habit sin from malicious 
wicked 

V it is not the same thing to sin while possessing 

a habit, and to sin from the habit. For it ig noi Decessary 
that the habit shall be constantly ased. it is used when 
we will : and. therefore, as it can happen thai one having a 

vicious habit does some virtuous act,, because his reason is 
not totally corrupted by his habit, so it may happen also 
that instead of acting from his vicious habit, he sins from 

- m or even from ignorance. But whensoever he uses 
his vicious habit, he must sin from malice, because, when 
any one has a habit, that is chosen which is agreeable to it, 
the habit becomes a second nature, and certain things are 
now '• connatural."' But this thing which is agreeable to 
the vicious habit, excludes spiritual good ; and so spiritual 
evil is chosen in order to get what habit makes to appear 
good. This is sinning from malicious wickedness. 

There are habits of venial sins, indeed ; but since these 



Qu. lxxviii. 3, 4.] SIX8 OF MALICE. 105 

do not exclude the love of Grod, say, the habit of using idle 
words, they are vicious habits secundum quid, but not 
simply such. 

What shall we say of the remorse of habitual sinners ? 
He who sins from habit always rejoices in his act while he 
is using his habit. But he is able also not to use it, and 
may be sorrowful when his reason, as yet not totally cor- 
rupted, is dictating some other thing. He grieves at what 
he has done through sinful habit, not in general, because 
the sin is in itself displeasing to him, but because of some 
unpleasant result. 

But one may sin from malice who is not sinning from 
vicious habit, 

some hindrance being removed which has prevented his 
inordinate soul from acting out its choice and forming a 
vicious habit. 

Sins of malicious wickedness are graver than sins of 
passion. 

There are three reasons why this is true : (1) Since sin 
is primarily in the will, the more the will is concerned in it, 
the greater, other things being equal, is the sin. In malice 
the motion to the sin is more purely from within, i.e., 
from the will ; whereas in sins of passion there is an out- 
ward impulse. Hence the more vehement the malice, the 
greater the sin ; whereas, as we have seen, the more vehe- 
ment passion diminishes the gravity of the sin. 

(2) The passion which inclines to sin is transient, and so 
a man may quickly return to a good purpose, but the 
habit by which one sins from malice is a permanent 
quality. The one is more likely to be penitent after sin 
than the other. 

(3) He who sins from malice is badly disposed with 
reference to the end itself. So his deficiency is more dan- 
gerous than that of him who sins from passion, whose 



106 OX VICES AND SINS. [Ql\ LXXIX. 1. 

general purpose may tend to the good end, although his 
purpose has been temporarily interrupted by his passion. 

This malicious wickedness is in one way based on igno- 
rance, but it is self-chosen ignorance, which does not palli- 
ate the sin. 

Both in sin of passion and of malice there is a choice of 
evil, but the first is not a sin from choice, because choice is 
not the primal principle of the sin. Something is chosen 
which would not have been ohosen but for the passion. 
Whereas the .-in of malice is a deliberate choice of evil, 
and this choice is the primal principle of the sin. 

S 9. External causes of sin. 

/ Qod the cause of sin .' 

(I mean, not the positive and moral ad, which, owing to 
defect i'i it. ie sin, hut of the sin as sin.) Man maybe 
the cause of .-in in another man, either directly, by temp- 
tation, by inclining the will of that other to sin ; or 
indirectly, by ooi doing one's besl to withdraw another 
from the aci of ,-iii. But God cannot !"• directly the cause 
of sin in any one, because all sin is departure from God, the 
ultimate end <'i' II - creatures. But God draws all beings 
i" Eimself, aa t<> their ultimate end. Neither can He be 
indirectly the ca lb- may not afford that aid 

which would, if given, hinder nun from sinning against 
Him ; hut this is done according to the order of His wis- 
dom and justice. Hence the sin of any being is not to 
be imputed to Him as the cause of it ; just as the pilot is 
not the cause of the shipwreck of the steamer which he 
does not steer, except when he is able, and when it is his 
duty, to take charge of the vessel. 

(1) It is said (Rom. i. 28), "God gave them up unto a 
reprobate mind to do those things which are not fitting." 
But the very words show that those spoken of had that rep- 
robate mind, and God did not prevent their following it. 



Qu. LXXIX. 2, 3.] EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN. 107 

(2) But it is, also, a familiar objection, that God is the 
author of freedom of the will, which is the cause of sin ; 
and, therefore, the author of the cause is the originator of 
the effect, which proceeds from that cause. And this is 
true when the mediate cause is subjected to the ordering of 
the primal cause ; but if that mediate cause violates the 
order in which it is made to act, the result is not imputable 
to the first cause. If an agent does anything contrary to 
the express command of his employer, that employer is not 
(morally, at least) answerable for the consecmences. He is 
not the cause of them. 

Is the act of sin from God ? 

The sinful act, as act, is being and act. But every being 
whatsoever is derived from the primal Being. And every 
action is caused by some being which has active (not pas- 
sive) existence. But all activity is reducible to the primal 
activity as its cause ; i.e., God, who is pure activity, is the 
cause of every action. 

But sin is being and action containing some defect, which 
defect is from the created cause, viz., free-will departing 
from the order of God the primal agent. Hence that defect 
is not reducible to the causality of God, just as a halting 
gait is referable to defect in the bones of the leg, etc., not 
necessarily to the motive power of nerves and muscles. 

The act of sin is a certain motion of free-will, but the will 
of God is the cause of all motions, therefore His will is the 
cause of the act of sin. 

Is God the cause of blindness and hardness of heart ? 

These may mean two different tbings ; first, a motion of 
the soul cleaving to evil and averse from Divine light. 
This is mortal sin of which God is not the cause. 

But, again (as penalty), there may be a withdrawal of 
Divine grace, so that the mind is not Divinely illuminated 



L08 <>N" \ K ES A Nil suss. [Qu. LXXX. 1. 

to see rightly, and the heart of man is not softened to live 
rightly. So far God is the cause of blindness and hardness 
of heart. God is the universal cause of the enlightening of 
souls (S. John i. 9 : "That was the true light which en- 
lighteneth every man that cometh into the world''). So the 
sun i.s the universal cause of the illumination of bodies. 
This is through uecessity of nature, but God is the cause 
of spiritual light according to His will and wisdom. But 
the Bun may find Borne impediment and leave a body dark, 
as when the window Bhntters are closed; and the sun is not 
the cause of that darkness, bul its cause is the one who 

the shutters. The sun exercises no judgment in the 
matter, bul God, according to His own judgment, withholds 
the light of His grace, where He finds Borne obstacle to it. 

the cause of the absence of grace is not only he who 
puts the obstacle in its way. but also God according to His 
righteous judgment. So He is the cause of blindness of 
sight and dulness of hearing, in not perfecting the mind by 
the gift of wisdom, and of hardness of heart in not soften- 
ing the soul through the fire of charity. 

Is the devil directly the cause of sins committed by man .' 
Thu proper principle of the sinful act is the human will, 
since all sin is voluntary. But God is the only Being who 
can directly act upon our will. The will, indeed, is moved 
not only by this inward Divine influence, but also by its 
object. This in three ways : (1) by the object itself which 
is proposed, as we Bay that food excites the desire of eating ; 

(2) by him who proposes or offers an object of this nature ; 

(3) by him who persuades that the proposed object is good, 
because he thus proposes the specific object of the will, 
which is rational good, cither real or apparent. In the first 
way, sensible things move the will to sin. But in the second 
and third ways, the devil or our neighbour may incite to sin, 
either by offering to sense or imagination what is desirable, 
or by persuading the reason. But none of these are the 



Qu. LXXX. 2, 3.] EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN". 109 

direct cause of sin, because the will is not of necessity moved 
by any object except the ultimate end. 

Can the devil offer inward temptations to sin ? 

The soul has three functions, viz., feeling, knowing, will- 
ing. The latter cannot be directly influenced by Satan 
and his angels. And the intellect, per se, is moved by what 
illuminates it to know the truth, which illumination is cer- 
tainly not the aim of the devil, but rather a blinding of the 
reason through imagination and sense-appetite, in order that 
it may consent to sin. Hence the whole inward operation 
of Satan seems to be on the imagination and the sense-appe- 
tite. Images may be presented to the phantasy, appetite 
may be excited to some passion. For corporeal nature (as 
we see in our own physical constitution) naturally is subject 
(within certain limits) to spiritual forces. It is conceivable 
(to say the least) that the brain should be acted upon by 
demons, whether the man is waking or sleeping. In which 
case images will be the result. Passions also result from a 
certain condition of the brain and nervous system, and it is 
conceivable again that the devil may cooperate in these, at 
least through the brain, etc. 

(1) Images, feelings, etc., are, indeed, the works of a liv- 
ing agent, and require an inward impulse ; but environment 
also cooperates, and we are regarding outward temptation 
as the environment of the soul. 

There is nothing in this which contradicts the known 
order of nature. 



Can the devil produce a necessity of sinning ? 

S. James (iv. 7) says, " Eesist the devil and he will flee 
from you." This would not be true if Satan had power 
to produce necessity of sin. For he has no direct power 
over the reason ; and if it be free, there is no necessity of 
sinning. If there be a case where Satan takes entire posses- 



110 ON" VICES AND SIN'S. [Qr. i.xxxv. 1, 2. 

sion of a man. so that his acts are no longer free, his acts 
are not sinful. 

That which is apprehended by sense or imagination, 
whether presented by demons or in any other way, does not 
of necessity move the will it' a man still has use of his reason. 

| 10. The effects of sin. 

Does sin diminish the good of )tithtrc? 

We may consider (1) the Brsl principles of human nature 
which constitute thai nature, and the properties resulting 
from them, such as are often called the faculties of man ; 
(-.') the \er\ inclination to virtue, which is itself a good of 
nature; (3) the gift of original righteousness, which, in 
the lir.-t man. was conferred on the human race, and can 
be called a natural good. The firsi is neither taken away, 
nor diminished by sin ; hut the third was totally taken 
away through the sin of OUT lir.-t parents. But the second 
is diminished through sin. For through human acts comes 
a certain inclination to similar act-, ami anything which is 
inclined to one of two contraries, ha- diminished inclina- 
tion to the other. Heme, since sin is contrary to virtue, 
man'- .-in diminishes the natural good of an inclination to 
virtue. 

Can the whole good of nature be taken away through sin? 

We mean now the natural inclination to virtue which 
belongs to man as a rational being. Sin cannot take 
away man's rationality, for then he would be no more 
capable of sinning. This good of nature, then, cannot be 
totally taken away through sin. But it is diminished so 
far as hindrances are put in the way to prevent its reach- 
ing its end. So it can be diminished ad infinitum, because 
hindrances can be increased ad infinitum. But the root of 
such inclination to virtue still remains, since human nature 
remains with all its essential attributes. 

There would be no remorse of conscience in the lost if 



Qu. lxxxy. 3, 5.] THE EFFECTS OF SIX. Ill 

there were not remaining in them the natural inclination 
to virtue. 



What are the four wounds of human nature? 

Through the gift of original righteousness reason per- 
fectly governed the lower powers of the soul, and reason 
itself was perfected by being subject to God. This original 
righteousness being taken away through the sin of our first 
parents, all the soul's powers remain deprived of their 
proper order. And this constitutes the four wounds. For 
there are, as we have seen (page 60, ff.), four powers 
which can be the subjects of virtue : sc, the reason, which 
is the seat of (spiritual) prudence ; the will, in which is 
justice ; the irascible soul, the seat of courage ; and the 
concupiscible, in which is temperance. Now the reason, 
destitute of its due relation to truth, is afflicted with the 
wound of ignorance ; the will, destitute of its due order 
with reference to the good, is wounded with malice ; the 
irascible nature is wounded with infirmity, and the con- 
cupiscible nature is wounded with the inordinate desire of 
pleasure. And since the inclination to virtue is diminished 
by actual transgression, those four wounds result, also, 
from other sins ; the reason is dulled concerning what is 
to be done ; the will hardened with respect to the good ; 
the difficulty of acting rightly increases, and concupiscence 
burns more hotly. 

What shall we say of death, and other corporeal defects ? 

Per accidens one thing is the cause of another if it re- 
move hindrances in the way of that result. Thus he who 
pulls down a column is per accidens the cause of the fall of 
what rests upon that column. So the sin of our first parents 
is the cause of death and other like corporeal defects, by tak- 
ing away that original righteousness by which not only the 
lower powers of the soul were subject in orderly way to 



112 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxxvii. 1. 

reason, but the body was the perfect servant of a perfect 
soul. The loss of this original righteousness renders human 
nature corruptible in all its parts, even to the disorganiza- 
tion of the body itself. This is the penalty of the firsi Bin, 
nol aimed at by the sinner, but ordained by the punitive 
j u Mire of God. 

Considered in itself, the animal body is corruptible, but 
God (by special L r it't) supplied the defect of nature, and 
made man's body to be incorruptible through the super- 
natural spiritual gift 

The penal guilt of sin (reatus). 

It is a law of nature and of man, that whatever rises 
•:her will be put down, if possible. But wliat- 

evi r things are contained under one order arc in a certain 
way, one in that order. Hence whatever rises against any 
order will be put down by that order and by its head. Bui 

-in is any inordinate art, it is manifest that he who 

sins offends against some order which will Beet to put him 

down. This is penalty. Now there are three orders against 
which man can sin. and with a three-fold penalty lie can he 
punished : In- human nature is subject firsi to his own 
proper reason : next, to outward government, spiritual or 
temporal ; lastly, to the universal order of Divine rule. 
He wh - against reason, against human law, against 

Divine law. Therefore be incurs a three-fold penalty — «?., 
from himself, remorse of conscience ; from man. what law 
inflicts ; and lastly, (rod's punishments. 

The penalty indeed is just, whether from man or from 
God ; and so it is good, and not directly the effect of sin, 
which can have no good effects. But sin makes man guilty, 
which is an evil. "To be punished is not an evil, but to 
become worthy of punishment is an evil." 

Every disordered soul is its own punishment ; but also it 
becomes liable to other punishment from perverting the 
order of Divine or human law. 



Qu. lxxxvii. 3.J THE EFFECTS OF SIN. 113 

Does any sin incur eternal penalty? 

Sin incurs guilt, because it perverts some order. But 
while the cause remains, the effect remains. Hence, as 
long as this perversion of order continues, so long continues 
the penal guilt. But sometimes one perverts order irrepar- 
ably, and sometimes not. For if defect destroy the founda- 
tion of anything, its first principle, such defect is irrepa- 
rable. But otherwise, this first principle remaining, it may 
have power enough to repair the defect. But if by sin is 
corrupted the principle of order by which the human will 
is subject to God, this inordi nation is in itself irreparable ; 
only Divine grace can repair it. But this principle is the 
ultimate end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore 
whatever sins turn man away from God, in taking away 
charity, incur the guilt of eternal penalty. 

(1) It is commonly objected that just penalty is adequate 
penalty ; but sin is a transient thing, and therefore cannot 
incur eternal punishment (which would be out of all pro- 
portion to the offence). 

But I answer that it is true that the sharpness of punish- 
ment is proportioned to the offence both in Divine and in 
human judgment. But this is not the question of duration. 
In no judgment is proportion sought for in that respect. 
A murder may be committed in a moment, yet the punish- 
ment may be imprisonment for life. The murderer is cut 
off forever from the society of the living, and so he repre- 
sents, after his manner, the eternity of punishment Divinely 
inflicted. S. Gregory points out the justice of this, when 
he says (dial. iv. c. 44), " He who has sinned in his own 
eternity against God, is punished in the eternity of God/' 
Man's " own eternity " does not mean simply the contin- 
uation of his act during this transient life, but that, having 
made sin his end, he has the will to sin forever. " The 
unjust would will to live forever, in order that they might 
forever continue in sin " {Greg., Moral., iv.). 

(2) But are not punishments medicinal ? And no such 

8 



114 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. Lxxxvill. 5. 

curing process can run on forever. I reply that not all 
human punishments are for the cure of him who has 
offended ; the murderer is hung, that others may fear to 
offend. And the eternal punishment of the reprobate may 
be medicinal for others who (more earnestly) abstain from 
sin. 

(3) Again it is said thai do one forever docs that in 
which he takes do pleasure. But God takes no pleasure in 
the perdition of men ; therefore it will not go on forever. 
The reply is that God takes do pleasure in suffering on its 
own account, bu< Ee takes pleasure in the order of His own 
justice, which requires the penalty of sin. 

Penalty is proportioned /<> sin. 

But in sin are two elements ; the one, aversion from the 
infinite incommutable good. On this side sin is infinite ; 
its penalty, infinite loss {pana damni), the loss of infinite 
good, sc, of God. On the other side, sin is inordinate 
turning to mutable good. This is Unite, like the good itself. 
For it is doI the act of ao infinite creature. To this corre- 
sponds a finite penaby of suffering (proportioned to the 
offence). 

§11. Venial and mortal sins. 

are either venial or mortal. 

This distinction follows from the diversity of the inor- 
dination which is involved in sin. For there is a two-fold in- 
ordination : one which casts off the very principle of order, 
another which still preserves it, although this inordination 
concerns things which are derived from that order. So 
in the body disorganization may attack the very life itself, 
and death is the result ; or it may appear as sickness (which 
is not mortal disease). 

But the first principle of all order in morals is the ulti- 
mate end. Hence, when the soul is disordered through sin 
even to aversion from the ultimate end. which is God, to 



Qu. Lsxxvnr. 1.] VENIAL AND MORTAL SINS. 115 

whom we are united through charity, the sin is mortal. 
But when the disorder does not proceed so far as that, the 
sin is venial. For as in the body mortal disorganization is 
naturally irreparable (while sickness which is not mortal 
may be cured by suitable means), so is it with the soul. 
He that sins by (wilfully) turning away from the ultimate 
end, so far as the nature of the sin is concerned, undergoes 
irreparable loss, and therefore his sin is mortal, its penalty 
eternal. But he who sins without wilful aversion from 
God, is disordered in a manner which, according to the 
nature of the sin, can be repaired, because the first prin- 
ciple of spiritual life is preserved ; and therefore he is 
said to sin venially, because the result is not eternal death. 

Mortal and venial sin differ infinitely as respects the 
aversion in the two sins. But it is not so as respects the 
turning to transitory good. Hence, in the same kind of 
sin may be found the one and the other, as the very first 
motion of the soul towards the sin of adultery may be venial, 
and an idle word, which is often venial, may become a 
mortal sin. 

Venial sins contain inordination, not with respect to the 
end, for the life of charity remains in the soul, but with 
respect to the means for that end. Such sins are repar- 
able. 

(1) It might be said that all sin is mortal because it is 
against the law of God. But venial sin is imperfectly siu, 
for it is not a Avord, thought, or deed (intentionally done) 
against that law. He who sins venially does not do what 
the law prohibits, nor omit what the law commands ; but 
he acts aside from law, in not observing those limits of 
reason which the law aims at. 

(2) It is commanded, indeed, that we do all things to the 
glory of God ; and he who sins venially does not at that 
time do so. But he may habitually refer himself and all 
his affairs to the glory of God, which is essentially obe- 
dience to such an affirmative precept. 



116 OX VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxxvih. 3. 

Some sins are venial in their species, some are mortal. 

Some sins may be venial from their cause, as infirmity 
or ignorance, which diminishes the gravity of the offence. 
Or, again, and this is what we are now considering, venial 
sins may be those which do not take away due relation to the 
ultimate end, oor merit everlasting punishment. In this 
sense, and aa the object determines (he specific character of 
the act, some sins are venial in their proper nature, and 
some are mortal. For when the will is directed to any- 
thing which in itself is opposed to charity, which orders 
man for his ultimate end, the Bin is mortal in kind, whether 
it be against the love of God, as blasphemy, perjury, and 
the like, or againsi the love of our neighbour, as murder, 

adultery, and the like. But if the will is directed Id that 
which contains some inordination, indeed, but is not 
directly contrary to the love of God and of our neighbour, 
as the idle word. etc.. Buch bid is venial in its kind. But 
Since moral acts take their character not only from (heir 
objects, but also from the disposition of the agent, what is 
in itself venial may become mortal on the pari of that 
agent, either because he makes it his ultimate end, or be- 
cause he uses it as means for some other and a mortal sin. 
So again, on the part of the agent, that which is in itself 
mortal may become venial, because the act is imperfect, 
i.e., not proceeding from deliberate reason.* 



* But inadvertence itself, which of ten seems to be a note of venial 
sin, may show an habitual affection for sin, even when the act is not 
perfectly voluntary; i.e., a perfected sin. 

A positive doubt respecting the deadly malice of the- act may itself 

constitute full advertence, and make the sin a mortal one. Deadly, 
also, maybe needless exposure to the danger of falling into mortal Bin; 
it may be the sin of presumption. 

It is grave sin to deliberate about consent to mortal sin. 

The matter of venial acts may coalesce into mortal acts. Thus the 
apparently trifling act of giving light weight and short measure in re- 
tail trade accumulates its results, and it may enrich one, who may be 
thus guilty of serious theft. 



Qu. lxxxviii. 3.] VENIAL AXD MORTAL SINS. 117 

Observe that in choosing what is opposed to Divine char- 
ity, a man prefers that thing to the love of God ; he loves 
himself more than God. This is mortal sin. 

In two tuays venial sin may dispose towards mortal sin. 

(1) The habit being augmented by repeated acts, the lust 
of sinning can increase so far that he who sins makes the 
venial sin his end. And so by repeated acts of venial sin, 
the sinner is prepared for mortal sin. This on the part of 
the agent. 

(2) Again, a human act may jjrepare the way for some- 
thing by removing hindrances. Venial sin may thus pre- 
pare the way for mortal sin. For in accustoming the will 
in minor matters to neglect the due order of life, the way 
is prepared for casting off that order as respects the ulti- 
mate end, in choosing mortal sin. 

Sin in itself venial may become mortal (a) through an erroneous 
conscience, which regards it as a more serious offence ; (b) through 
scandal given by it ; (c) through gravely evil intention, as contempt 
of the lawmaker (consider the "forbidden fruit" in Paradise); (d) 
through evil affection preferring the little sin to God ; (e) through 
directly leading to mortal sin. 

(In doubt, especially in the case of sensitive souls, the confessor 
takes the milder view and leaves the rest to God.) 



CHAPTER VII. 

OS LAW. 

§ 1. What is law? 

Law is grounded in reason, 

For law is bhe rule and measure of acts, commanding or 

forbidding them. Bat reason is the rulo and measure of 

human arts, for it ie reason's office to ordain man with 

: bo his end. Mere will without reason would nut 

make the law, but rather injustice. 

/. ■ it ■ \ys ordained for the common good. 

In practical reason, bhe firsi principle is the ultimate end 
and aim. Law, therefore, the rational rule and measure of 
conduct, must principally and especially aim at that. Now- 
tin- ultimate end of human life is felicity or beatitude. 
This, therefore, is the special object <>f law. 

And, again, Bince every part is ordained for the whole, and 
each man is a part of tin- community, law properly regards 
the common felicity. Properly speaking, then, no pre- 
cept is law which has not relation to the common good. 
This, of course, does not exclude special aims and particu- 
lar goods, hut all must have the general good as the ulti- 
mate aim. 

Who can make I 

Since it primarily regards the order for the common good, 
and since to ordain anything for the common good belongs 
either to the whole community or to their vice-gerent, the 
power of making law belongs either to the whole com- 
munity, or to him who has charge of that community. 



Ql\ xc:. 1.] ETERNAL LAW. 119 

For they to whom that end belongs have the right and 
duty of ordaining for the end. 

In a certain way, you may say that each one is a law to 
himself, as participating in the rational law which regu- 
lates his life. 

A private person can only admonish ; but his admonition 
has not that co-active force which is essential to law. But 
the community or its vice-gerent has such force to compel 
obedience, or to inflict penalties for violated law. 

The head of a family can lay down precepts for his 
household, but they are not properly laws, because that 
family is ordained for the good of the complete community, 
the state of which it is a part. 

Promulgation is essential in law. 

For as rule and measure it must be applied to what is 
regulated and measured by it. Hence, in order that law 
may obtain obligatory force, which is essential to it, it must 
be applied to the men whom it is to regulate. But such 
application is bringing it to men's notice, i.e., promulga- 
tion. This, therefore, is essential for the validity of law. 

From these four principles we may collect a definition of 
law; sc, Law is an ordination of reason with reference to 
the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of 
the community. ^ 

§ 2. Eternal law. 

If the whole universe is directed by Divine Providence, 
the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine 
reason. 

That very government of all things, existing in God as 
the Lord of the universe, contains the idea of law, and 
because the Divine reason conceives an eternal thought, 
such law must be called eternal. Not that the things gov- 
erned are eternal, but they are foreknown and foreor- 
dained in that eternal Eeason. 



120 ON LAW. [Qu. xcm. 1, 2. 

As in every artificer preexists the idea of those things 
which are to he produced by his art, so in every governor 
jneexists the idea of the order of those things which are to 
be done by those who arc under his rule. 

This is part of the idea of law. But God by His Wis- 
dom is the founder of the universe, and the governor of 
all the acts and motions which are found in the individual 
beings of the universe. And as the thought of Divine 
Wisdom, by which all things were created, is the pattern or 
••idea" of all things thai are, bo the thought of Divine 
Wisdom, moving all things to their due end, is law. We 
define eternal law, therefore, as the thought of Divine 
mi, directive of all actions and all motions. This one 
law directive of acts in order to the common good, gives 
unity to the multiplicity of species of things. 

Do nil know eternal lawt 

A thing may be known in two ways : in itself, or in its 
in which some similitude of it is found. One may 
not know the Bubstance of the sun, hut still may know its 
irradiation. So no one of men on earth can know eter- 
nal law, as it is in itself; but every rational creature knows 
it, more or less, according to some irradiation. For all 
knowledge of truth is a certain irradiation and participa- 
tion of eternal law, which is incommutable verity. But all, 
in some way. know the truth, at least the general principles 
of the law of nature But otherwise, some participate more, 
some less, in the knowledge of the truth, i.e., of eternal law. 
(See Rom. i. 20.) Although every one according to his 
capacity may know something of eternal law in the man- 
ner indicated above, none can comprehend it, for it is not 
totally manifested in its effects. It is not requisite, there- 
fore, for such knowledge that the whole order of things 
should be known. 



Qu. xcill. 3, 5.] ETERNAL LAW. 121 

All laws whatsoever are based on eternal law. 

Wisdom says (Proy. viii. 15), "By me princes decree 
justice." Law, as we have seen, is grounded in reason 
directive of acts to their end. But as in all ordered 
motions the power proceeds from the first mover, so in the 
administration of government the governing reason of the 
superior is derived to the subordinates. Since, therefore, 
eternal law is the Reason of the supreme ruler applied in 
governing the universe, necessarily all lower reason in sub- 
ordinates is subject to that, is derived from eternal law. 
Hence all laws, so far as they participate in right reason, 
are based on eternal law. And S. Augustine well says 
(Lib. Arb. i. 6), " In human law nothing is just and legi- 
timate which men have not derived for themselves from 
law eternal." 

(1) What, then, shall we say of unjust laws ? Human 
law is so far truly law as it agrees with right reason. But 
so far as it recedes from that, it is unjust, and is to be 
called oppression rather than law. And yet even in such 
injustice is preserved a semblance of law, on account of the 
authority from which the law (so-called) proceeds. For 
"there is no power but of God " (Rom. xiii. 1). 

(2) Again ; how, then, can S. Augustine say (Lib. Arb. i. 
5) that "human laws rightly permit many things which 
are avenged by Divine Providence " ? Is not eternal law 
the thought of that Providence ? I reply that human law 
may permit some things, not as approving of them, but 
because it is unable to direct them. Many things are 
directed by Divine law which cannot be touched by human 
law. Hence, this non-interference of the latter is itself 
part of the order of law eternal. It would be very differ- 
ent if human law should approve what the other condemns. 

To this eternal laic are subjected all created things, 
whether necessary or contingent. 

Herein is a wide difference between human laws and the 



123 on law. [qv. xciii. G. 

law of God. For the former only extends to rational creat- 
ures, who can be subject to the community. For law 
directs the actions of those only who are subject to its gov- 
ernment. Hence, no one, properly speaking, imposes a law 
on his own actions. But whatsoever things are done in 
using the irrational things which are subject to man, are 
done by the act of the man himself moving those things. 
Therefore man cannot impoBe a law on those irrational 
things, although they may be in his power. For they do 
not move themselves. 

l'.nt as man may imprint on human minds his law with 

its precepts and warnings, so God imprints on all nature 
the principles of its proper acts. " He has given them a 
law which cannot be broken" (Ps. cxlviii. 6). Thus all 
motions and actions of all nature arc under eternal law; 

irrational creatures being moved by Divine Providence, but 
rational creatures knowing the law which governs them. 

Even defects in natural things arc subject to the higher 
laws of Providence, though they seem to be outside of the 
regular laws of the creature concerned in them. 

All human affairs are subject to eternal law, though dif- 
ig in the case of the good and of the lad. 

There are two modes in which anything is subject to 
eternal law : one, by participating in it through knowledge 
of it ; another, by action and passion. In this latter mode 
irrational creatures are subject to it. But rational creatures 
are subject in both manners. For they have some (imper- 
fect) notion of it, and there is in them a natural tendency 
towards what is in harmony with that eternal law; for man 
is made for virtue (Xic. Eth., lib. ii.). But both these are 
corrupted in the wicked, the natural inclination to virtue 
being depraved by vicious habit, and the natural knowledge 
of good being obscured by passions and evil habits. 

But in the good each mode is found more perfectly, be- 
cause to the natural knowledge of good is superadded the 



Qu. XCIV. 2.] THE LAW OF NATURE. 123 

knowledge of faith and wisdom ; and to the natural inclina- 
tion for virtue is superadded the inward motives of grace. 

The spiritual are not under the law (Gal. v. 18), as a 
burden on them, because, through that charity which the 
Holy Ghost pours into their hearts, they fulfil the law vol- 
untarily, and not unwillingly and through fear of the pun- 
ishments which the law denounces on those who break it. 

§ 3. The law of nature. 

The rational creature in a peculiar manner is subjected 
to Divine Providence, inasmuch as it is a participator of 
that Providence in providing for itself and for others. 

In itself it participates in eternal reason, through which 
it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. Such a 
participation of eternal law in a rational creature is called 
the "law of nature." 

What does the law of nature command f 

As being is what first falls under the notice of simple 
apprehension, so the good is what first comes to the notice 
of practical reason which is ordained for operation. There- 
fore the first principle of practical reason is, " The good is 
what all things seek/' And the first precept of the law of 
nature is that " the good is to be done and sought for, and 
the evil is to be shunned/' On this are founded all other 
precepts of the law of nature. The good has the idea of 
the end, and hence reason naturally apprehends as good all 
those things to which man has a natural inclination ; and, 
consequently, they are to be actively sought for, while their 
contraries are evil and to be shunned. According, there- 
fore, to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the 
precepts of natural law. And there is in man, first, the 
inclination to his own good according to his nature, in 
which he communicates with all beings, since each one after 
its manner seeks its own conservation. According to this 
inclination those things pertain to the law of nature by 



L24 on LAW. [Qu. xciv. 3, 4. 

which the life of man is preserved and the opposites are 
hindered. ("Self-preservation is nature's first law.") 

Secondly, there is in man a natural inclination to some 
more special things in which he communicates with other 
animals. In this way those things are of the law of nature 
which nature teaches all animals, as the propagation of the 
species, the bringing up of children, and the like. 

Thirdly, there is in man a natural inclination to rational 
good, which is peculiar to him. And thus man has a 
natural desire to know the truth concerning God, and to 
live in society with his fellows. And so to natural law per- 
tains thai man avoid ignorance, that he do no harm to 
t hose \\ ith whom he is to associate, etc. 

Are all virtuous acts part of the law of nature f 
Certainly everything to which man by nature is inclined 
pertains to the law of nature. Bui thai natural inclination 
is to act according to reason, which is all one with acting 
according to virtue. In this way all virtuous acts are ac- 
cording to the law of nature. But if we consider the sepa- 
rate acts of virtue, we perceive that many things are virtu- 
ously done to which nature does not at first incline, hut by 
rational search they are found useful for a virtuous life. 
Some acts are virtuous in certain persons, according to their 
condition and state of life, which would not he so in others. 

Is the law of nature one law among all men ? 

To the law of nature, as we have seen above, pertain all 
those things to which man is naturally inclined, among 
which, peculiar to man, is the acting according to reason. 
But reason proceeds from general principles to special de- 
ductions from them, while practical reason is concerned 
with contingent things, among which are human opera- 
tions. And, therefore, while those universal principles 
may be necessary ones, as we descend to particular infer- 
ences we are liable to find deficiency. In speculative prin- 



Qu. XCIV. 4.] THE LAW OF NATUKE. 125 

ciples which deal with necessary truths, the truth is the 
same among all men, both in its first principles and in 
the deductions from them, though the conclusions are not 
equally known among all. But, in practical matters, there 
is not among all the same truth or practical rectitude in 
special inferences, but only in the general principles. And 
where there is the same rectitude in special applications of 
first principles, it is not equally known by all. So, then, 
as respects the general principles of reason, whether specu- 
lative or practical, our answer to the question is, that there 
is one verity or rectitude among all and equally known by 
all. But as regards the special conclusions of speculative 
reason, there is the same verity among all, though, not equally 
known by all. Thus, among all it is true that the sum of the 
three angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles, 
though this is not known by all. But as respects the special 
conclusions of practical reason, there is not the same verity 
or rectitude among all, nor, even where it is the same, is it 
equally known by all. For among all it is right and true 
that they should live according to reason. But from this 
principle it is plain deduction that a loan should be repaid. 
And this is true in most cases. But it might happen that 
doing so would be doing harm, and consequently irrational 
{e.g., a drunken man's revolver ; or if the loan were going 
to be used against the country of the parties concerned). 
And the more we descend to particulars, the greater the 
contingency in the conclusions, as if, say, that the loan be 
returned in such a manner or on such a day. The more 
particulars are specified, the more multiplied are the possi- 
bilities of defect making it not right to return the loan 
under those conditions. So, then, we assert that the law 
of nature is the same among all in its primal general princi- 
ples, both for rectitude and for knowledge of it. But for 
inferences from those principles, it is generally the same, 
though in some cases there may be deficiency both in recti- 
tude and in knowledge. And this because some have reason 



L26 ox law. [Qu. xci. 3. 

depraved by passion, or bad customs, or evil constitution of 

nature. 

the law of nature be changed? 
Something may be added to it ; nothing hinders its 
being changed in thai way. And many things beneficial to 
human lift' have been Baperadded both by Divine law and by 
human laws. Bui If we speak of subtracting anything from 
the primal priucipli - of the law of nature, and bo changing 
it. it is altogether immutable. But if we speak of second- 
ary deductions from it. special impeding causes may rarely 
occur which release from the obligation of such precepts. 

Can the law of natun be expelled from the hearts of men? 

If we mean those general principles <>f living which are 
known by all, those cannot hi- expelled from the mind. 
But if we have in view practical applications of them, 
may In- hindered in making them by concupiscence 
or other past ;. :iL r ain, if we refer to remoter deduc- 

tions from those first principles, the law of nature can be 
expelled through evil persuasions, or depraved customs, 
and corrupt habit-. 

;j 4. Human law. 

What is hi i in" i bin- .' 

q the case of speculative reason, from indemonstrable 
principles intuitively known are produced the conclusions 
of various sciences which are not innate but discovered by 
processes of reasoning, so also from the precepts of natural 
law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, reason 
proceeds to order the special details of human life. These 
special orderings so derived are human laws, under the con- 
ditions specified for law in general. 

This practical reason being directed to individual and 
contingent things (viz., actions), cannot give to laws that 



Qu. XCV. 1.] HUMAN LAW. 127 

infallibility which belongs to the conclusions of demonstra- 
tive sciences. The measure, therefore, of human acts pro- 
Tided by human laws is not altogether fixed and infallible, 
and the approach to this is to be sought for only under the 
necessary limitations. 

The utility of human laws. 

Though there is in man by nature a certain aptitude for 
virtue, yet man must reach the perfection of virtue by some 
discipline. So we see that in natural needs, as food and 
clothing, man has the natural provision of reason and 
hands, but must aid himself by his own art and industry, 
while other animals are better provided by nature. 

But for this discipline in right living, man is scarcely 
sufficient for himself, because the perfection of virtue con- 
sists in withdrawing him from undue gratifications of his 
passions, to which he is very prone. Youth especially needs 
this efficacious discipline. This discipline, therefore, must 
come from without. And paternal discipline may suffice 
in youth where there is disposition for the acts of virtue 
either from natural character, or from habit, or, rather, 
from Divine bounty. But because some are found who 
are "headstrong" and prone to vice, and not easily moved 
by admonition, it is necessary that they be restrained by 
force or fear, that they may both leave others to pass a 
quiet life, and by force of habit may themselves be led to 
do voluntarily what they began to do through fear, and so 
may become virtuous. But this discipline, compelling the 
vicious through fear of punishment, is the discipline of 
laws. Hence human laws are necessary for the peace and 
virtue of men. " Man when perfected is the best of ani- 
mals ; but when separated from law and justice, he is the 
worst of all" (Arist., Pol. i. 2,) ; because he has the arms 
of reason to expel concupiscences and ferocities, which 
other animals have not. 

(1) It is true that well-disposed men are better led vol- 



128 02* law. [Qu. xcv. 2. 

untarily by admonition than driven by force ; but there are 
also those who cannot be so led and must be compelled. 

(2) But why not leave all such matters to the arbitra- 
ment of upright judges ? Is not living justice in that form 
better than inanimate justice under the name of laws ? 
There arc three reasons why law is preferable: (a) It is 
easier to find the few skilful legislators than the many up- 
right judges who would be needed for all the separate cases 
of judgment; (b) the law-makers have abundant time for 
reflection on all the various cases which may come under 

ili'- bco] f ih'- law, while judgments in individual cases 

must be given more <>r less " off-hand ; " * (c) legislators 
judge in the general and of the future ; in the other case, 
nun judging of the preseni are liable to be affected bv 
love or bate or some cupidity and so their judgment may 
be depraved. Because, therefore, the animated justice of 
the judge is doI found in many, and because it is liable to 
swerve from the right, it is necessary that in as many cases 
as possible law determine what is to be judged, and that the 
fewest possible things be left to the discretion of the judge. 

(3) Human acts are countless in detail, and we admit 
that there are endless details which law cannot reach, say, 

ler the act charged has been committed or not. Many 
things, therefore, must be left to judge (and jury). 

Is human positive law derived from, the law of natun ? 

That is not truly law which is not just. So far as a 
statute has justice, so far it has the force of law. But in 
human affairs that is just which is right according to the 
rule of reason, and reason's first rule is the law of nature. 
Therefore, every law made by man has so far the nature of 
law as it is derived from the lex natures. But if in any 

* I should add here that the decisions of such judges create a pre- 
cedent and custom which soon obtains the force of unwritten law. as 
in the common law of England and the United States, which did not 
come within the purview of our author. 



Qu. xcvi. 1, 2.] HUMAN" LAW. 129 

respect it is discordant from that, it will not be truly law, 
but a corruption of law. 

But this derivation may be in two ways : (1) from the 
general principles of the law of nature conclusions may be 
drawn. " Thou shalt do no murder/' is a conclusion drawn 
from the lex naturae, "thou shalt do no harm to any 
one." (2) Determinations may be made of the same law 
of nature ; e.g., since it requires that he who does the 
wrong shall be punished, the law of nature may be deter- 
mined by human positive law in fixing the punishment as 
this or that. The former are not merely positive laws, but 
derive some force from the lex naturae. The latter are 
purely positive laws, and rest on human enactment only. 
(They may order or prohibit what is in itself indifferent.) * 

The first give us "jus gentium," laws which are requisite 
in every organized community ; the second, "jus civile," 
laws which vary according to the different conditions of 
human society. 

Human laws should be general, not individual " privi- 
legia." 

The end of the law is the common good, and must be 
proportioned thereto. But the common good consists of 
many things, and the law, therefore, must regard that 
many, both as respects persons, and actions and time. For 
the community is composed of many persons, and its good 
is derived from manifold actions, and it is established for a 
permanent duration. 

It does not pertain to human law that it prohibit all vices. 

The measure should be homogeneous with what it meas- 
ures. Now, law is the rule or measure of human acts. 
Therefore it should be imposed upon men according to 
their condition. It should be possible, and according to 
nature and the custom of the land. Now, the power of 

* For conditions of positive law, see Supplement, p. 5. 



130 OX LAW. [Qu. XCVI. 3. 

action proceeds from interior habit or disposition ; for the 
same things are not possible to him who has not a habit of 
virtue and to the virtuous, nor to the boy and to the 
grown man. Many things are permitted to boys which are 
denounced in adults and punished by law. And, similarly, 
many things are permitted to men of imperfect virtue 
which would not be tolerated in virtuous men. But hu- 
man law is made for the multitude, the majority of whom 
fall far short of the standard of perfection. Therefore all 
vices from which the virtuous abstain arc not prohibited 
by human law. bul only those graver vices from which 
it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to 
abstain, and especially those vices which injure others, and 
without the prohibition of which human society conld not 
subsist : as homicide, theft, and the like. 

Human law must aim to make men virtuous, not by a 
sudden hap. but gradually. On the imperfect multitude 
it would be useless and worse to impose a burden which they 
could not bear, but, easting it off, would fall into greater 
evils (of license and lawlessness). The new wine of the 
precepts of a perfect life must not be pul into the old wine- 
skins of imperfect men. else the skins burst, and the wine 
is spilled; /.<.. the precepts are contemned, and through 
contempt men rush headlong into greater evils. 

Neither does human law enjoin the acls of all virtues. 

All the objects of virtues can be referred either to the 
private good of some person, or to the common good of 
society. Thus the acts of courage can be directed either to 
the preservation of the state, or of the rights of a friend. 
But law is ordained for the common good, and therefore 
there is no virtue whose acts the law might not enjoin. 
Bat yet human law does not give order concerning all acts 
of all virtues, but only concerning those which can be 
ordered for the common good, either directly or mediately, 
as having reference to that good discipline by which the 



Qu. xcvi. 4.] HUMAN LAW. 131 

common good of justice and peace is preserved. (Qu. : 
The closing of liquor "saloons " on Sunday ?) 

Note that an act may be called virtuous in two -ways: (1) 
it is viewed simply as an act external to the will ; thus it is 
an act of justice to do right things, and an act of courage 
to do courageous things ; and so the law enjoins some acts 
of virtue ; (2) an act is called virtuous because it is done as 
a virtuous man does it (out of a good heart) ; such acts 
proceed from virtue, and do not fall under the prescription 
of law. But they should be the law-giver's aim. 

Does human law impose obligation on conscience f 
Laws enacted by man are just or unjust. If they are 
just, they oblige in foro conscientice, by reason of the eter- 
nal law from which they are derived. (Prov. viii. 15.) 
But laws are called just both from the end, sc, when they 
are ordained for the common good, and from their author, 
when the law enacted does not exceed the legislator's 
authority ; and from their form, when burdens are laid 
upon those subject to the law in due equality of propor- 
tion in order to the common good. Each man is part of 
society, and is what he is, and has what he has, as such a 
part. Laws, therefore, which impose burdens in due pro- 
portion are just, and oblige in foro conscientice ; they have 
the true idea and form of law. 

But laws may bo unjust in two ways : (1) they may be 
opposed to the common good in either of tbe three points 
just named — either (a) in their end, when the law-maker 
imposes onerous laws, not pertaining to the common good, 
but rather for his own interest or ambition ; (h) when he 
issues a law beyond his authority to enact ; (c) when unequal 
burdens are laid upon the members of the community, even 
though they be ordained for the common good. These are 
rather acts of oppression than laws. "That does not ap- 
pear to be law which is not just" (S. Aug., Lib. Arb. i. 5). 
Hence such laws do not oblige in foro conscientice, except, 



132 ON LAW. [Qu. XG VI. 5. 

perhaps, for avoiding scandal and disturbance (the lex na- 
tures comes in prohibiting such scandal or riot) ; on account 
of which a man ought to yield his right, according to the 
Gospel law (S. Matt. v. 41), "If any man would go to law 
with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak 
also." 

(2) In another way laws may be unjust through opposition 
t<> Divine good, as laws of tyrants informer ages compelling 
idolatry, and, in our age, whatever is against Divine law. 
Such laws ii is ii"! lawful in any manner to observe : "We 
oughi to obey God rat her t han man " (Acts iv. 19 ; v. 29). 

But how ran the lower power which enacts human law 
impose obligation before that Divine tribunal which we 
call "in- conscience ? The Apostle replies (Rom. xiii. 1), 
'• There is do power hut of God, and the powers that be are 
ordained of God ; therefore he that resisteth the power" (in 
those things which pertain to it) " withstandeth the ordi- 
nance of God." And this makes him guilty before the bar 
of conscience. 

How are all under law ? 

Law is not merely the rule of human acts ; it has (as 
such) co-active force. As regulated in action by law, all 
are under it who are under the authority which enacts it. 
though higher authority by its dispensation may release 
from the laws of lower authority {eg., State law and 
national law). But, in another way, some are under law as 
constrained by it ; and in this way virtuous and just men 
are not subjected to law, but only evil-doers. For that 
which is constrained and violent is contrary to the will ; but 
the will of the good is in harmony with the law from which 
the will of the evil is discordant. In this sense the Apostle 
says (1 Tim. i. 9), " Law is not made for a righteous man," 
because such "are a law to themselves, in that they show 
the work of the law written in their hearts" (Rom. ii. 15). 
Spiritual men are led by the law of the Spirit, which is 



Qlt. xcvi. 6.] HUMAN LAW. 133 

higher than any human law, and they are not under such 
law as opposes that guidance ; but still it is part of that 
guidance that those who are led by the Spirit be subjected 
to human laws. So S. Peter says (1 Ep. ii. 13), "Be sub- 
ject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake." 

Is it ever admissible to act contrary to the letter of the 
law ? 

Every law is ordained for the common good, and thus 
gets its force and meaning. As it departs from this it loses 
its obligatory power. "~No law or equity allows that the 
things which are introduced for the benefit of men, should 
by us be turned, through too rigid interpretation of them, 
to a severity which is against the common good." But it 
oftentimes happens that something is generally useful to be 
observed for the common benefit, which in some cases is 
highly injurious. Therefore, because the legislator cannot 
consider every individual case, he enacts a law which fits the 
great majority of cases, directing his intention to the com- 
mon utility. Hence, if cases emerge in which the observ- 
ance of such a law is injurious to the community, it is not 
to be observed (natural equity and common sense are higher 
law). 

But if there be no sudden emergency which must be met 
at once, it does not pertain to each one to judge what is 
useful or injurious to the commonwealth, but the question 
must be submitted to the proper courts. But in case of 
sudden emergency necessity itself dispenses from the law ; 
it " knows no law." 

This is not to judge the law, but the individual case where 
the law does not bind. 

Evident injury may show that the legislator did not have 
such case in his intention. In doubt, the letter of the law 
must stand or authority be consulted. 

No doubt wise legislators knew how to express their 
meaning in their words, but there are limits to the possi- 



134 ON law. [Qu. xcvn. 1, 2. 

bilities of such expression ; and, even if it were possible to 
consider every case, still it would lead to hopeless confusion 
to attempt it. Laws must be made for what ordinarily 
occurs. 

Tlie mutability of human laivs. 

Law is the dictate of human reason whose natural prog- 
ress is from the imperfect towards the perfect. The first 
attempts at legislation proving to be deficient in many cases, 
Bubsequenl legislation corrects more or less of those deficien- 
cies. Also, since laws regulate human conduct, they are 
rightly changed with the changed condition of men, for 
which different things become expedient. "If a people be 
Belf-controlled and serious, it is a righi law that such a peo- 
• •<•! the magistrates by whom the commonwealth may 
be directed, Bui it. little by little, tin- same people become 
venal in the exercise of suffrage, and entrust the govern- 
ment to the most corrupt anions them, it will be right that 
they lose the power which they have so abused " (8. Aug., 
. Arb. i. 6). The law ^f nature, beinga participant of 
it' rnal law, is, like it, immutable. But human reason is 
imperfect and mutable; therefore so is its law. Natural 
law contains aniversal precepts (fitted to all circumstances), 
but human law contains special precepts for certain vari- 
able conditions. 

A measure ought to be a- permanent as the nature of 
things admits; but in mutable things, no such measure 
may Vie possible. 

It is true, also, that what is once right is always right ; 
but it does not follow that what is once law should always 
be law, for the rectitude of law is relative to the common 
utility, which is a variable thing. 

Should human law always he changed whenever something 
better j)re*e/ifs itself? 

It is rightfully changed if the common utility calls for 



Qu. xcvn. 3.] HUMAN LAW. 135 

such change. But the very change in itself, as change, is 
detrimental to the common good, because custom is a 
weighty element in law. What is clone contrary to usage, 
even if it be easier in itself, seems harder to do. When 
law is changed, the sense of obligation towards it is dimin- 
ished, inasmuch as custom is violated. Change there- 
fore demands an equivalent compensation for this loss. 
That is, either there must be the greatest and most evident 
utility in the change, or the gravest necessity for it, or 
some manifest wrong in the established law, or some great 
injury done by it. 

Laws may be based on reason, but much of their force is 
due to usage. 

Can custom obtain the force of law? 

The reason and will from which law proceeds are mani- 
fested not only by words respecting what is to be done, but 
by deeds. Each one seems to choose that as good which he 
actually does. Now, as human words, manifesting reason's 
thought, can enact and change laws, so, through manifold 
acts which create custom, can law be enacted or changed. 
For when a thing is oftentimes done, it seems to proceed 
from the deliberate judgment of reason. In this way cus- 
tom gets the force of law, abolishes law, and interprets 
laws. 

(1) But no custom proceeding from human will can 
change the Divine and the natural law or have any force 
against them. " Custom must give way to authority ; law 
and reason must overcome evil usage" (Isidore). 

(2) Some one objects, again, that many wrongs cannot 
make a right. He who first begins to act against the law 
does wrong ; multiplied acts of the same kind can never 
make the action right. But I reply, also, that human law 
is necessarily deficient in some cases ; and hence it is 
possible in such a case that the act which is contrary to 
the law is not evil. And when such cases are multiplied 



136 ox LA\v. [Qu. xcvir. 4. 

through the changed condition of society, then custom 
shows that the law is no longer useful as distinctly as 
if a contrary law were promulged. But if, on the other 
hand, the grounds of the law still remain unchanged, 
then law has the supremacy over custom, not custom 
over law, unless perhaps when the law seems useless, heing 
not possible according to the custom of the country, 
which custom was one of the conditions of the w >ry law 
in quesl ion. 

(3) It may be argued i hat cu>tom -rows strung from the 
acts of private individuals as such: hut thai they cannot 
make a law. But, 1 reply, where there is a free people 
which can pass a law for itself, the assenl of thai people to 
the obsen ing of any regulation is of t be essence of law, and 
this assenl is manifested by custom. Individuals as such 
cannol make a law, bul the whole people can. And even if 
the people are aol free to make and to abolish laws, yet 
pn valenl custom among them gets the force of law, because 
it is tolerated by the law-makers ; and so they seem to ap- 
prove whal custom has introduced. ("Silence gives con- 
sent.") 

.1 power of dispt nsatio 
from purely human law, not from the law of nature, 
may fitly be (nt rusted to the rulers of the people. For a 
precept which is generally advantageous for the common 
good may not fit this particular person or this special 
case, because some better thing may be prevented or some 
serious evil be brought about ; and, except in evident and 
sudden danger, there is great risk in leaving this power 
of dispensing with law for one's self in each individual's 
hands. It is safer and better, within the sphere of human 
authority, to entrust that power of dispensation to the 
executive. (Pardoning power.) 



Qu. XCI. 4.] DIVINE LAW. 137 

§ 5. Divine law. 

Besides the lex naturm and human law, a Divine law is 
necessary for the direction of human life. 

This for four reasons : (1) Because by law man is 
directed towards acts which, are related to his ultimate end. 
And if, indeed, man were only ordained to an end which did 
not exceed the proportion of his natural faculties, he might 
need no other direction on the part of reason than the law 
of nature and human law derived from that. But because 
he is ordained to an eternal beatitude which exceeds the 
proportion of his natural faculties, he needs to be directed 
towards this end by a law Divinely given. for this purpose. 

(2) On account of the uncertainty of human judgment, 
especially in contingent and particular cases, judgments 
about human acts are diverse, from which also proceed 
diverse and contrary laws. Therefore, in order that man 
without any doubt may know what he is to do and what he 
is to avoid, he needs to be directed in his proper acts by 
law Divinely given, in which there can be no error. 

(3) Man can make law only concerning those things in 
which he is able to judge. But his judgment cannot be 
respecting the hidden inward acts, but only respecting the 
outward apparent motions. And yet the perfection of 
virtue requires that man be right both outwardly and in- 
wardly. Therefore, human law cannot restrain and ordain 
sufficiently inward acts, but a supervening and Divine 
law is needed. 

(4) Human law cannot punish or prohibit all things 
which are ill done, because in aiming to take away all 
evils, many good things would be taken away also, and the 
utility of the commonwealth, which is necessary for human 
conservation, would be impeded. In order, therefore, that 
no evil remain unprohibited and unpunished, a Divine law 
is needed which prohibits all sins. We may find all four 
reasons for Divine law in Ps. xix. 7 : " The law of the Lord 



138 ON" law. [Qu. xcvm. 1. 

is an undefilcd law," permitting no turpitude of sin ; 
"converting the soul," because it directs not only outward 
acts but the inward also ; "the testimony of the Lord is 
sure," on account of its certitude of truth and righteous- 
ness ; " giving wisdom unto the simple," by ordaining man 
to his supernatural and Divine end. 

Divine I""' is either the old and imperfect, or the new and 
perfect. 

The one was for children, the other for grown men (Gal. 
iii. 23). Note the difference between the perfect and the 
imperfect in three respects: (1) It pertains to law that it 
order for the common good a- i he end ; the Old Law ordered 
directly for a sensible and (.'art lily good, the New for a 
spiritual and heavenly good. (2) Law directs human.con- 
iluct according to the order of righteousness j the New Law 
is above the Old in ordering the inward acts of the heart. 
(S. Matt. v. 20: ■• Except your righteousness shall exceed 
thai uf the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter 
into the kingdom of heaven.") Therefore it is said that 
•• the Old Law restrains the hand, the New Law restrains the 
Bool." (3) It pertains to law that it lead men to observe its 
mandates. This the Old Law did by threats, bat the New 
Law by love which is shed abroad in our hearts through the 
grace of Christ, figured in the Old Law, conferred in the 
New. 

How was the Old Law imperfectly good ? 

It was good, for it harmonized with created reason in 
]■• pressing concupiscence whicb is opposed to reason ; e.g., 
saying, ''Thou shalt not covet." Thus it prohibited very 
many sins which are contrary to reason. But that may be 
good which is, nevertheless, imperfect in its kind. In the 
means to an end, that is perfectly good which is per se suf- 
ficient for that purpose. But the imperfectly good con- 
tributes to that end without being sufficient, as medicine 



Qu. xcix.j DIVIDE LAW. 139 

may benefit a man without curing his disease. But the end 
of Divine law is different from that of human law. The 
latter aims at the tranquillity of an earthly society, at which 
it arrives by restraining outward acts, in those evils which 
can disturb the peaceful state of society. But the end of 
the Divine law is to lead man to eternal felicity, which end 
is hindered by every sin, inward as well as outward. There- 
fore what suffices for the perfection of human law — sc, 
that it prohibit sins and affix their penalties — does not suf- 
fice for the perfection of Divine law ; but it must make 
man fit for the participation of everlasting felicity, which 
can only be done through the grace of the Holy Ghost, 
through which love is poured into our hearts and fulfils 
the law. For "the gift of God is eternal life" (Rom. vi. 
23). The Old Law could not confer this grace ; it was re- 
served for Christ. "The law was given by Moses; grace 
and truth came by Jesus Christ" (S. John i. 17). 

All the precepts of the Old Law were one in the end sought 
for — sc, the love of God and our neighbour (S. Matt. xxii. 
40) — but their multiplicity includes three classes of pre- 
cepts, viz., moral, ceremonial, and judicial- 
It had moral precepts, because the chief aim of Divine 
law is to establish friendly communion between man and 
God, which can only be through virtue. It had ceremonial 
precepts, because it ordained man with reference to God, 
which is done not only by inward acts of the mind, as be- 
lieving, hoping, loving, but also by those outward actions 
in which man offers homage to God. The worship of God 
as an act of virtue pertains to the moral law ; it is part of 
the law of nature ; but the determination of this precept to 
such and such gifts and sacrifices belongs to Divine posi- 
tive law — i.e., to the ceremonial law. 

The Old Law had judicial precepts, for it determined, the 
law of nature respecting justice between man and man by 
positive laws which we name judicial. 



140 ON LAW. [Qu. C. 1, 2. 

All precepts of the Old Law are reducible to these three, 
or to directions respecting the manner of observance. 

The moral precepts of the Old Law. 

Moral precepts regard those acts which pertain to a good 
life; such harmonize with reason, the proper principle of 
human conducl ; and every judgment of human reason is 
in some way derived from natural reason, cither by direct, 
immediate, simple deduction from principles naturally 
known, or after more careful consideration of special cir- 
cumstances has been required, <>r where special Divine in- 
struction has l"ii! necessary. In one way or other all moral 
precepts pertain t<> the law of nature. " Honour thy father 
and thy mother; fchon shall do no murder; thou shall not 
steal" reason instantly judges thai these arc right. But 
the command to rise ap before the gray head, and to honour 
the person of the aged, is deduction from first principles. 
For the Second Gommandmeni Divine instruction was nec- 
essary, although it is part of the lex natures. 

.i/v ,/// acts of virtue embraced in the moral precepts of 

It is a different community for which Divine law is or- 
dained from that for which human law is ordained. For 
the latter regards the civil community of men in their sev- 
eral relations to one another. But men are so ordered by 
outward acts, through which they communicate with one 
another. And communication of this kind pertains to the 
idea of justice, the virtue of civil society. If other virtues 
are ever enjoined in civil law, it is still under the same idea 
(Xic. Eth. v. 1). But the community for which Divine law 
ordains is that of men with God. Its precepts, therefore, 
order all those things by which man is put into his due rela- 
tions with God. But man is joined with God by his rea- 
son, which is the image of God ; and, therefore, Divine law 
gives precepts concerning all those things by which reason 



Qu. C. 3, 5.] DIVINE LAW. 141 

is well ordered — i.e., the acts of all virtues — some as com- 
mands which are essential to the order of virtue, some as 
counsels which are advantageous for the well-being of per- 
fect virtue. 

All the moral precepts of the Old Laiv are reducible to the 
Decalogue. 

The Ten Commandments are said to have come directly 
from God, and man by himself has knowledge of them as 
Divine. Either they can be known at once by simple de- 
duction from the primary universal principles, or they are 
immediately evident to faith divinely infused. Two classes 
of precepts, therefore, do not appear in the Decalogue ; sc, 
first, those which are primary and universal, which need no 
promulgation, are written in natural reason, being self- 
evident, as that man shall harm no one, etc.; and, secondly, 
those which require the diligent reflection of the wise to 
discover their harmony with right reason, for these were 
given to the people through Moses and the prophets. Yet 
each of these kinds of laws is contained in the Decalogue ; 
the first, as the principles from which their proximate con- 
clusions are derived ; the second, as deductions which the 
wise can make from the Ten Commandments. 

Note, of course, that the Fourth Commandment is at once 
ceremonial and moral. 

Why does the Decalogue contain nothing of a man's duty 
to himself? 

First, those Ten Commandments are based on love of God 
and our neighbour, and natural law respecting this has been 
obscured by sin ; but not so with self-love ; the law of 
nature is quite enough. Secondly, the Decalogue, coming 
immediately from God, contains, as we have seen above, 
those things which the minds of the people can receive as 
soon as they are heard. But every true man sees at once 
that he owes something to God and to his neighbour. But 



142 ON LAW. [Qu. c 8. 

that something is due in what belongs to himself, and in 
which at first sight he appears to be absolutely free, this is 
not so immediately apparent. Therefore precepts prohibit- 
ing acts of disorder with respect to one's self came to the 
people through their wise legislators. The same remarks 
may be applied to the Fifth Commandment. 

Tlte power of dispensation can in no way reach to the 

Decalogue. 

Dispensation, as we have Eound, (p. L36), applies to cases 
in which, if the letter of the law were observed, the inten- 
tion of the law-maker would be contradicted. But that 
intention is, primarily, the common good, and, secondly, 
the order of justice and virtue by which that good is 
attained and preserved. Therefore the precepts which 
explicitly contain these, contain the intention of the law- 
maker, and are indispensable. Dispensation i- admissible 
only in precepts which are ordained for those higher pre- 
cepts, determining them in special modes. Thus the law 
of treason is indispensable ; but certain ads which have 
been legally treasonable may in special cases be allowed, 
without prejudicing the law of treason or the intention of 
the law-maker, on account; of some great utility. 

But the Ten Commandments contain the very intention 
of God, the sovereign Legislator ; the first table contains the 
order for the general and final good, which is God; the 
second, the order to be observed among men ; viz., to give 
each his due, and to wrong no one. Such order is indis- 
pensable and immutable. But as respects their determina- 
tion and application to special acts (determining what is 
theft, murder, etc.), there may be change by Divine author- 
ity in that which is instituted by Divine authority alone 
(Divine positive law), or even by human authority, in that 
which belongs to men's jurisdiction. 



Qli. c. 9.] DIVINE LAW. 143 

Does the mode of virtuous action fall under the precept 
of law f 

Law has coactive force ; that, therefore, directly falls 
under the precept of law to which the law compels. But 
the coaction of law is through fear of its penalty. That is 
commanded for which the penalty of law is inflicted. But 
herein Divine law differs from human law. For the penal- 
ties of violated law are only inflicted on those concerning 
whom there can be judgment, because the law punishes 
after judgment. But man, the maker of human law, can 
only judge of outward acts ; God alone, the author of 
Divine law, judges the hidden motions of the will. So, 
then, in one respect, both human and Divine law consider 
the mode of virtuous action ; in another, only Divine law ; 
in another, neither human nor Divine. But the mode of 
virtuous action consists in three particulars (ISnc. Eth. 
ii. 4) : (1) The knowledge possessed by the agent. Both 
human and Divine law take this into consideration, for 
what one ignorantly does is accidental. Both human and 
Divine law judge whether there was ignorance of the fact 
on the part of the agent, and acquit or condemn accord- 
ingly. 

(2) The mode involves the willing or choosing the action 
and the purpose in choosing, the two-fold inward motion of 
will and intention. Human law does not judge of these, 
but the Divine law does ; for human law does not condemn 
of murder one who wishes to kill and does not, but Divine 
law condemns him. " He that is angry with his brother 
shall be liable to the judgment " (S. Matt. v. 22). 

(3) The third particular is the acting firmly and immov- 
ably ; and this fixity of virtuous action belongs to rooted 
habit. This is not contained in either human or Divine 
command, for neither by man nor by God is one punished 
as a transgressor who pays due honour to his parents, al- 
though he may not yet have formed the fixed habit of filial 
piety. (This habit is the end of the law, and actions are 



Ill OX LAW, [Qu. c. 10. 

commanded which may create the habit, and make men 
truly virtuous.) 

The end of the precepl is not the same with the matter 
of the precept, the latter being means to the former. 

But, you may <ay, we are commanded to "serve the 
Lord with gladness " (Ps. c. I), and "The Lord loveth a 
cheerful giver " (2 Cor. ix. 7). I answer that if one obey 
sorrowfully, he is acting unwillingly, and good will is 
pari of the Divine command. Bui there are two kinds of 
pleasure in virtuous action, one which is derived from love 
of God and of our neighbour, which love, and, therefore, 
the consequent pleasure, fall within the scope of the com- 
mand; another, which comes from habit already formed, 
which is not commanded. For an action may be pleasant 
either on account of the end Bought for, or on account of 
its agreeing with one's hab 

ious act truly sin, if it docs not 
I from char 

In other words, "Does the mode of charity fall under 
the precepl of the law ':" The act of charity may l 
sidered /"■/• 80. And this is the "first and great command- 
ment," viz., "Thou Bhalt love the Lord thy God ; " and 
. "Thon Bhalt love thy neighbour as thy- 
self." Man can lit himself to receive this gift, and having 
it. he can nse it. But whensoever one who has not charity 
does an outwardly virtuous act, he does not sin mortally in 
that, because the command that we do all good acts with 
charity (" the end of the commandment is charity/'' 1 Tim. 
i. 5) is an affirmative precept, and (like affirmative pre- 
cepts generally) does not always bind, but oidy for that 
time in which charity exists within the soul. 

Secondly, then, charity may be considered as the mode of 
action in obeying other commands. So viewed, it is not in- 
cluded in those commands. " Honour thy father/' does not 
say, ••honour him out of charity," neither does he transgress 



Qu. CTI. 1.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 145 

that command who lacks the charity, though he may be a 
transgressor of the commandment of charity, and for that 
reason may merit punishment. 

The obligation to filial honour out of charity arises from 
the duty of referring all things to God ; sc, from the law, 
" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," 

The moral precepts of the Old Law are not confined to the 
Decalogue. All of them are based on the dictates of na- 
tural reason, and would have efficacy even if they had not 
been laid down in law. In this they differ from ceremonial 
and judicial precepts, which derive all their force from the 
fact of institution. 

But there are three grades of moral precepts ; some are 
so manifest and universal that they do not need promulga- 
tion — e.g., the love of God and our neighbour, which is the 
end of the commandments — in which no sound reason can 
err. But some precepts are more determinate, whose obli- 
gation any one can see at once, and yet human judgment is 
liable sometimes to be perverted concerning them. These 
need special promulgation ; and these are the precepts of 
the Decalogue. Others, again, are not so manifest to every 
one, though thoughtf nl persons readily see their force ; and 
these were given to the people from God through Moses 
and Aaron. But these superadded moral precepts are re- 
ducible to those of the Decalogue. Thus blasphemy and 
false doctrine were superadded to the prohibition of the 
third commandment ; reverence for the aged to the fifth ; 
prohibition of hatred to the sixth ; fraud in weights and 
measures to the eighth, etc. 

§ 6. The Evangelical law. 

Is it a written law? 

That which is most powerful in it, and in which its whole 

virtue consists, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is 

given through faith in Christ. Thus 8. Paul says (Rom. 

viii. 2), " The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus 

10 



14G ON LAW. [Qu. cvi. 2, 3. 

made me free from the law of sin and of death ; " and S. 
Augustine (De Spiritu et Litt., c. 17 and 2G), "The law 
of works was written on stone tablets, but the law of faith 
on the hearts of the faithful : " and (c. 21), " What are 
the laws of God written by God Eimself in the heart, but 
the presence of the Boly Ghost ?*' (Jer. xxxi. 33). 

But, besides, the New Law contains the things which 
prepare and (it for this grace, and also whal pertains to its 
use. In these the faithful must be instructed by words 
Bpoken and written concerning whal they are to believe and 
wbat they are to do. And bo, principally, the New Law is 
a law implanted in the bouI, lex non scriptaj but, secon- 
darily, it is a written law. Thus the Gospel prepares the 
intellect through faith for the reception of the grace of the 
Holy Ghost, by manifesting the Divinity and the humanity 
of Christ. The Gospel disciplines the affections to due 
renunciation of the evil world, whereby man is made cap- 
able of the gift. And the use of spiritual grace in the 
works of Christian virtue is the subject of manifold exhor- 
tal ions in the New Testament. 

The law of nature is written on the hearts of all men, 
but here is something superadded to nature, not only indi- 
cating what is to be done but aiding in its fulfilment. 

This faith may have been implicit in those who have not 
had the New Testament, and through the faith of Christ 
man attains to the New Testament (whether or not he 
have a written Gospel). 

Justification. 

It is the law written in the soul — sc, the grace of the 
Holy Spirit — which makes the New Law a law of justifica- 
tion. It is not the written Evangelical law. For " the 
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. iii. 6). 

TJtree reasons may he assigned why the new law was not 
given from the heginning. 

(1) The impediment of sin must he first removed by 



Qu. CVIII. 1.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 147 

the redemption through Christ (S. John vii. 39 ; Roni. 
viii. 3). 

(2) The perfection of the New Law implies a preceding 
time of preparation for it. "The (Old) Law hath been our 
paedagogus to bring us unto Christ, that we might be jus- 
tified by faith. But now that faith is come, we are no 
longer under a pgedagogus " (Gal. iii. 24). 

(3) Man was left to himself under the Old Law, that 
through falling into sin he might know his weakness, and 
his need of grace (Rom. v. 20). 

But the New Laiv is to last until the end of the world. 

For nothing can be more perfect or nearer to the ulti- 
mate end than that which immediately brings us to that 
end. But this the New Law does. For the apostle says, 
" Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the 
holy place by the blood of Jesus, by the way which He 
dedicated for us, a new and living way — let us draw near" 
(Heb. x. 19). The state of men and their consequent re- 
lations to the same law may vary, and the grace of the 
Holy Spirit may be more or less perfectly possessed, but no 
fuller gift is to be looked for than the apostles possessed. 

Both the Old and the New Law had one and the same end. 

In that respect they are one law. (See Bom. iii. 30.) 
But the one is the law of children, the other of perfection, 
i.e., of charity. 

Should the Neiv Law command or prohibit any outward 
acts ? * 

It has been already pointed out that the chief feature 

* This is a most fundamental question for the student of Moral 
Theology. Lutherans dogmatized from the necessity of faith to a 
contempt of "legality;" and so, Moral Theology, at first denounced, 
when nominally revived appeared as a subjective Moral Philosophy 
with very loose sense of the obligation of an objective law revealed by 



148 ON" LAW. [Qu. cvin. 1. 

of the Now Law is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is 
manifested in faith working through love. Bui nun ob- 
tain this grace through the Son of God made Man, whose 
humanity God has filled with grace which is derivedfrom 
i 1 i in to us. "Of His fulness we all received;" "grace 
and truth came l>\ Jesus Christ." Therefore it was fitting 
thai the grace flowing from the [ncarnate Word should be 
derived for us through some outward sensible means, and 
thai from the inward grace by which the flesh is Buhdued 
to the spirit, Borne outward sensible works should be pro- 
duced. 

S », then, outward works in two ways can pertain to grace. 
In one way, after a certain manner, they may lead to grace ; 
ich are the works required by the Sacramenl a of i be New 
. Holj Eucharist, and the like. But others 
arc outward works which are produced from the impulse of 
grace. And among th tain difference is to be noted. 

I ronection w ith, or opposition to, 

the inward grace, which consists in faith working through 
i : and outward works of this kind are commanded or 
prohibited in th . rion of the fait h 

i- commanded, and denial of il is prohibited (S. Matt. x. 
other works which have not such nec- 
connection with faith working through love. And 
such works were not commanded or prohibited at the first 
institution of tl w, but were left by Christ, the 

h one who had charge of any such thing. 
And so it is free to each one to determine respecting such 
things what it i- at for him to do or to avoid, and 

to each oue who has authority over others to ordain for 
them in such things what is to be done or avoided. Hence, 
the Gospel is called a law of liberty, for the Old Law deter- 
mined many things, and left few to he freely detenu i: 
men themselves. 

God for the conduct of human life. See, for example, Lutheran treat- 
ment of the sacrament of Holy Matrimony. 



Qu. CVIII. 1.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 149 

(1) But it is objected that "The kingdom of God is 
within us " (S. Luke xvii. 21) ; and " The kingdom of God 
is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and 
joy in the Holy Ghost " (Eom. xiv. 17). Therefore, the 
New Law does not command or prohibit outward acts. 

The kingdom of God does, indeed, consist principally in 
inward acts ; but, consequently, all those things pertain to 
that kingdom without which the inward acts cannot exist. 
If the kingdom of God is inward righteousness and peace 
and spiritual joy, it follows that all outward acts which are 
opposed to righteousness and peace and spiritual joy are 
opposed also to the kingdom of God ; and, therefore, they 
are prohibited in the Gospel of the kingdom. But those 
actions which are indifferent in this respect, as eating this 
or that food, do not constitute the kingdom of God, as the 
apostle says. 

(2) Again, it may be objected that the New Law is the law 
of the Spirit, "and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there 
is liberty" (2 Cor. iii. 17). But there is no liberty where 
men are compelled to do or to avoid any outward works. 
These, therefore, do not belong to the New Law. 

But I answer that he is free who is "causa suij" he 
freely does anything who acts from himself. But what a 
man does from a habit agreeing with his nature, he does 
of himself. But if a habit should be repugnant to nature, 
the man would not act of himself, but only according to a 
supervening corruption of his nature. Because, therefore, 
the grace of the Holy Spirit is a kind of inward infused 
habit inclining us to operate rightly, it makes us freely do 
those things which harmonize with grace and avoid those 
things which are repugnant to it. 

So, then, the New Law is called a law of liberty for two 
reasons : First, because it does not constrain us to do or to 
avoid anything except those acts which are in their very 
nature either necessary or repugnant to our salvation, which 
things fall under the precept or the prohibition of the law. 



150 ON LAW. [Qu. (Mil. 3. 

Secondly, because it enables us freely to fulfil precepts or 
prohibitions of this kind, inasmuch as they are fulfilled from 
the Inward motion of grace. For these two reasons the 
New Law i.- railed the "law of perfect liberty " (S. Janus 
i. 85). 

What outward acts an commanded or prohibited in the 
X< w J. 

We have seen that only those are found in the New Law 
by which we are received into grace, or which necessarily 
pertain t<> the right use of it. And because we cannot 
obtain -rare of ourselves but only through Christ, there- 
in r«- the Bacramente by which we obtain grace were insti- 
tuted by the L IB mself, and are Bacraments of the New 

Law. (Their laws, therefore, arc an essential part of .Moral 

TheoL 

But the right use of grace is through the works of charity, 
which, indeed, as requisite for virtue, pertain to the moral 
precepts which were given in the Old Law. In this respect, 
then, the New Law had nothing to add regarding outward 
acts. But the determination of those works, so far as the 
worship of (i<>d is concerned, pertains to the ceremonial pro- 
of the law: and bo far as our neighbour is concerned, 
to the judicial precepts. And, therefore, because those 
determinations are not in themselves necessary for inward 
grace in which the New Law consists, they are not com- 
manded by it, but are left to human judgment; some to 
each individual man, but others, which pertain to the com- 
mon utility, to rulers, temporal or spiritual. So, then, the 
\ . Law commanded or prohibited no outward works, 
except sacraments and such moral precepts as are of the 
essence of virtue. 

Sacred rites in which grace is not given, and which, there- 
fore, do not of themselves pertain to the necessity of inward 
grace, the Lord left to be instituted by the faithful accord- 
ing to their judgment. 



Qu. cviii. 4.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 151 

The Sermon on the Mount contains the complete guide 
of the Christian life in its perfect ordering of the inward 
motions of the heart. 

Besides commands, the New Laiv contains some deter- 
minate counsels. 

The difference is that a precept implies necessity of ful- 
filment, but counsel is left at the option of him to whom it 
is given. It is the law of liberty which adds counsels to 
commands, not the Old Law, which was a law of bondage. 
The precepts of the New Law refer to those things which 
are necessary for the obtaining of the end — sc, eternal beat- 
itude — into which the New Law immediately introduces 
man. But counsels are of those things through which man 
can better and more expeditiously reach that end. But 
man is so placed between the things of this world and those 
spiritual goods in which his eternal beatitude consists, that 
the more he cleaves to the one, the more he recedes from 
the other, and conversely. He, then, who entirely cleaves 
to the things of this world, seeking the end of his being in 
them, making them the reason and rule of his actions, 
totally abandons spiritual goods ; and, therefore, inordina- 
tion of this kind is forbidden by absolute commands. 

But in order to arrive at that end it is not necessary to 
cast away entirely the things of this world, because man can 
use them without making them his end, and so reach eternal 
beatitude. But he will do so more expeditiously by that 
renunciation which is the Evangelical counsel. But the 
goods of this world, which are useful in human life, are 
three in number; sc, (1) Outward riches, which lead to 
the lust of the eyes ; (2) sensuous pleasures, which lead to 
the lust of the flesh ; and (3) worldly honours, which per- 
tain to the pride of life (1 Ep. S. John ii. 16). But to 
abandon these three as far as is possible pertains to the 
Evangelical counsels, as in the three-fold vow of poverty, 
celibacy, and obedience. And, furthermore, observance of 



152 OUTLAW. [Qu. cviii. 4. 

any one of them, in any particular case, pertains to counsel 
in that special case ; as when a man gi\ r es alms to the poor 
without any direct obligation to do so, he follows counsel in 
thai action. Or when for some determined time he abstains 
from sensuous pleasures in order to have more time for 
prayer, he follows counsel for that period. Or when he 
gives up his will in any particular, although he could law- 
fully haw it. he Ml<»\vs counsel in thai case — say, if he bene- 
fits his enemies when ho is not bound to do so, or passes by 
an injury for which he might justly demand compensation. 

(1) It is true thai these counsels as such are expedient for 
all. but owing to the spiritual state of some one, they may 
not be expedient for him, because his affections arc other- 
wise inclined. Accordingly, the Lord, in proposing tbe 
Evangelical counsels, always makes mention of the fitness 
of men for observing them. "If thou wilt be perfect, go 
and sell all that thon hasl " Matt. six. 21); "He thai is 
able to receive it, let him receive it" (ib. v. 12); and S. 
Paul says, "This I say Eor your profit, aol that I may cast 
a snare upon you" (L Cor. vii. 35). 

Observe, with reference to the example cited above, that 
love of enemies, as a preparation of the soul, is necessary to 
salvation, and is bo commanded : sc, that a man be ready to 
do good to his enemies, etc., when need so requires. But 
that one should go out of his way to do so, when there is no 
Bpecial need, pertains to special counsels.* 

* The remainder of the Prima Sccuntkc of the Summa, discussing 
the subject of Grace, although it has intimate bearing on Moral Theol- 
ogy, yet being equally connected with Dogmatic Theology proper, is 
relegated to that subject. 



Part II. — Theological Virtues. 



CHAPTER I. 

FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. 

§ 1. Faith. 

In order to consider rightly the virtue of faith, we must 
inquire first into its object, then into the act of faith itself 

Faith assents to nothing except as revealed by God, and 
because it has been revealed by God. Therefore it rests on 
the primal verity, on God. This is faith's " formal " part, 
the essence of faith. But if we consider the things which 
are received by faith, the " material" part, not only God's 
existence but many other things also are believed, which, 
however, do not fall under tbe assent of faith, except as 
related to God. In both ways, then, the object of faith is 
primal verity (either God Himself, or the Divine veracity in 
revelation). 

Is the object of faith things or propositions ? 

Things known are in the knower after his proper manner. 
Now the proper mode of human intelligence is through 
propositions which analyze or synthesize. So, then, the ob- 
ject of faith also can be considered in two ways ; one, on 
the side of the thing believed, and so the object of faith is 
the very thing (or being) concerned ; another, on the part 
of the believer, and so the object of his faith is some inward 
proposition of his mind. But the act of faith is not ter- 



15-4 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. I. 3, 4. 

minated in the proposition, but in the thing (or being) 
which is the object of the proposition. And thus we say, 
'•I believe in God the Father Almighty." 

Can the false be the object of faith ? 

No ; for nothing can be embraced in the faith which does 
not stand under that primal verity which is its "formal''" 
object. 

(1) Truth is the good of intelligence ; therefore all the 
virtues which perfect is. and chiefly faith, totally exclude 
the false. Eope and charity may in a certain way be de- 
ceived, bul these perfect the will, whose good is a different 
good from that of intelligence. 

(2) Human conjectures may be attached to the object of 
faith, and may err, hut this is nut error in the faith. 

Faith is " the proving of things not seen " (Heb. xi. 1). 

Faith signifies the assent of the mind to that which is 
believed. But that assent is given, first, when the mind 
is moved to it by the object itself, which is either known 
per se — sc, primary Belf-evidenl truths — or known through 
another object, the necessary inference or conclusion of sci- 
entific knowledge. But that assent is given also, secondly, 
nut because the intellect is sufficiently moved by its proper 
object, but because through some choice the mind volun- 
tarily inclines to one side rather than to the other. And if 
indeed this is done with hesitation and fear of the other side, 
it will be opinion ; but if with unhesitating certitude, it will 
be faith. But the things which, per se, move our intelli- 
gence to know them, are seen by the senses, or by the mind. 
Hence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can be 
of things seen by sense or by the intellect. A thing may be 
seen to be credible, to harmonize with the habit of spiritual 
faith, and so on ; but this is not literally seeing with the 
mind the object of faith. 



Qu. II. 1.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 155 

Can those things which are of faith be known or demon- 
strated ? 

All knowledge comes through principles known per se ; 
i.e., they are seen. And, therefore, whatever things are 
known, in some way are seen. But the same thing cannot 
at the same time, and by the same person, be known and 
believed. Still it can happen that what is seen and known 
by one, may be believed by another. ' ' Now we see through 
a glass darkly, but then face to face" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). 
What we believe, the saints see and know. The same 
thing may be true in this present state of life. But that 
which is j^roposed to all men in general to be believed, is 
in general not known ; it is simply the object of faith. 

(1) This is not the ignorance of unbelief ; but through 
the light of faith, not through demonstration, the faithful 
see what they are to believe. 

(2) As science demonstrates its conclusions, so the truth 
of the faith is argued in two ways ; one, not demonstrative 
but persuasive argument, showing that the things believed 
are not impossible ; another, deducing the articles of faith 
from the Holy Scriptures, the foundations of the faith. 

(3) Some things are believed which philosophy under- 
takes to demonstrate, as the being and unity of G-od, etc. 
But these are numbered with the articles of the faith, both 
because they are preambles of the faith, and because where 
they are not demonstratively known they must at least be 
believed.* 



What is it to believe ? 

If we say that it is thinking with assent, we shall need 
to examine our terms. What is it to think ? (1) Aiv. 
consideration of a thing by the mind may be called so ; and 

* Other articles on the object of faith, though of great Talue, are 
omitted as not essential to Moral Theology. 



156 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. II. 2. 

he who considers the things which he knows does so with 
assent to them. But this is not belief. (2) It may mean 
a consideration of some subject with inquiry into it, before 
there is perfect insight into it. This is an act of the 
deliberating intellect. Now there are acts pertaining to the 
intelligence in which, without further reflection, there is 
firm assent, as when one considers what he already knows 
or sees to be true. And there are acts of intelligence also 
in which there is a thought without linn assent, inclining 
sometimes to neither side, as in doubt; or to one side 
through Borne trilling indication, as in suspicion; or adher- 
ing to one side with fear of the opposite, as in opinion. 

But in belief there is linn adhesion to one side, and so far 

it agrees with knowledge and intellectual insighi ; and yet. 
there is not perfect knowledge through clear insight, and 
so far it agrees with doubt, suspicion, and opinion. And 

so this mental reflection with assent, is peculiar to belief. 

Bui the inquiry is not into direct demonstration of 
the things which air believed, but into the reasons for 
believing, Bay, that tiny have been spoken by God, are con- 
firmed by miracles, etc., etc. 

A- -eiu may also be said to be the act of will, because 
the mind of him that believes is determined to one propo- 
sition, m>t by reasoning but by his will. So assent as here 
used signifies the act of the intelligence, as it is determined 
by the will to one thing. (The reason why the will assents 
to what the mind dues not see. is because God has said it.) 

There are three acts of faith in relation to its object. 

For since believing pertains to the intellect as it is moved 
to assent by the will, the object of faith may be viewed either 
on the intellectual side of the act, or on the side of the will 
moving the intellect. If the first, we may consider the 
very thing believed, the " material " object of faith. This is 
God. For nothing is proposed to faith, except as it per- 
tains to God. This is " credere Deum " (believing that God 



Qu. II. 3.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 157 

is). Or we may consider why the assent is given, the 
" formal " part of the object. And this is primal verity , 
to which man adheres, on account of it assenting to what he 
believes. This is credere Deo (believing what God says). 
But we may consider, thirdly, the object of faith, as the 
reason is moved by the will. So viewed, the act of faith is 
credere in Deum (to tend to G-od as the ultimate end on 
account of whom we will to believe). 

The unbeliever, indeed, may admit that God exists ; but 
he does not believe it under those conditions which faith 
determines. 

Is it necessary to salvation to believe anything which is 
above natural reason f 

Eational nature alone has immediate relation to God. 
Its perfection requires not only what naturally belongs to 
it, but what is given to it through a certain supernatural 
participation of the Divine goodness. Hence the ultimate 
beatitude of man consists in the supernatural vision of 
God. (See page 4.) To this man can attain only as he is 
taught of God (S. John vi. 45). But this discipline is not 
instantaneous, but gradual, according to the laws of man's 
nature. But every one who is taught must believe in order 
to reach perfect knowledge. Hence if man would attain his 
perfect beatitude, he must believe his teacher, God. 

(1) The things to be believed exceed natural reason, be- 
cause the nature of man depends on a higher nature. 

(2) It is true that man cannot judge of what is proposed 
to his faith, by referring it to those primary truths through 
which we judge of all things besides. But there is no risk 
of illusion in this. For as by the natural light of reason 
man assents to principles, and as a virtuous man through 
his habit of virtue has right judgment respecting those 
things which harmonize with his virtue, so, by the light of 
faith divinely infused, man assents to those things which 
are of faith, but not to their contraries. 



158 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Ql T . I. 4, 5. 

Is if necessary to believe those things which can be proved 
by natural reason — e.g., that <io<l is one and a Spirit ? 

Yes; and for three reasons: (1) that man may more speedily 
arrive at the knowledge of Divine truth. For the science 
to which it appertains to prove that God exists and other 
such truths respecting Him. is t he last to be acquired by men, 
many other sciences being presupposed. And so man would 
arrive at the knowledge of God only at a late period of life. 

(2) There is the same necessity of belief in order that 
the knowledge of God may he more widely diffused. For 
many are too dull of understanding, or too much occupied, 
or ioo Bluggish of will to acquire this science (philosophy), 
and they would altogether he deprived of the knowledge of 
God, if it were not offered to them through faith. 

{■'>) There is the same necessity of belief in order that 

there may he certitude. For human reason is very defec- 
tive in Divine things, and even ahoul human affairs philos- 
opher- have widely differed, and many have erred. In 
order, therefore, that there might be unhesitating certitude 

respecting God, Divine tilings (even those which might he 
proved) were delivered to faith as spoken by God. 

Man is bound to I" lieve explicitly all the articles of the full h, 
and implicitly whatsoever is contained in tin 1 Holy Scriptures. 

"'He that comcth to God, must believe that lie is, and 
that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him" (Heh. 
xi. 6). For the determination of the act of any virtue to 
its proper and perse object is part of the command, like 
the act of the virtue itself. And the object of faith, per se, 
is that by which man is rendered blessed. 

But the determination of the virtuous act to things 
which are accidentally or secondarily related to its proper 
object is not commanded except under the suitable condi- 
tions of place and time. And thus man is bound implicitly 
or in preparation of soul to believe whatever the Divine 
Scriptures contain. (The argument seems to require, as 



Qu. II. 9.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 159 

qualification, the contents of Holy Scriptures as connected 
with the primary object of faith. It may not be possible 
to draw the line of division, but if, beside the Divine ele- 
ment in Holy Scriptures, there is a human element — say, 
numbers, names, and the like — the argument hardly seems 
to reach to that ; in fact, that element was probably not in 
the mind of the saint at all.) 

(1) But how can a man be bound to that which is not in 
his power ? " How shall they believe in Him of whom 
they have not heard ? " (Eom. x. 14). Man is bound to 
many things which he cannot reach without assisting grace, 
as, to love God and his neighbour. 

(2) But the good of faith consists in obedience (Rom. i. 
5), and the virtue of obedience does not require that one 
observe any determinate precepts, but it suffices that he 
have a ready mind (Ps. cxix. 60). Therefore it seems to 
suffice for faith that one have a ready mind to whatever may 
be Divinely proposed, without explicitly believing anything. 

But I answer that the virtue of obedience is properly in 
the will, and, therefore, to the act of obedience (not to the 
act of faith which is in the intellect) it suffices that there 
be a promptitude of will subject to the one who commands ; 
and this is properly and per se the object of obedience. 

Faith is a meritorious act, 
(in the sense in which we speak of virtuous acts as being 
meritorious ; see p. 42). " Through faith " the saints of old 
time " obtained promises " (Heb. xi. 33). This could not be 
if their faith had no merit.* Observe, then, that our acts ob- 
tain reward, are meritorious, in so far as they proceed from 
free-will moved by the grace of God. Hence, every human 
act which is under free-will can be meritorious if it is referred 

* The illustration shows that S. Thomas is here speaking of a holy 
life as the effect of heavenly grace, and of its worthiness to receive a 
supernatural reward. Cp. the 13th Article of Religion, and consult 
Summ. I. ii. 114. 



1G0 FAITII AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. II. 10. 

to G-od. But faith is the act of the intellect assenting to 
Divine truth at the command of the will which is moved 
by the grace of God. Therefore it can be meritorious. 

(1) Charity indeed is the principle of merit. But nature 
and faith arc precedenl to charity; nature, as the matter in 
■which charity is found ; faith ( fides informis), as a prece- 
dent disposition. But when charity is come, nature and 
faith act in virtue of that (fides formal a), and so neither 
nature nor faith can produce a meritorious act without 
charity : bul charity Bupervening, the act of faith is ren- 
dered meritorious by it. as is the act of nature and the 

natural act of free-will. 

c.') Even in knowledge something of a similar kind may 
be found. For while assent is compelled by the cogency of 
demonstration, and is neither subject to free-will nor is 
meritorious, yel the actual consideration of the thing in 
question is so subject, since it is in a man's power to con- 
sider or not to consider. And so the considering may be 
meritorious if ii be referred to the end of charity; i.e., to 
the honour of God or the good of our neighbour. 

(3) A superficial objection says that if a man assent to 
anything with faith, he either has sufficient reason leading 
him to believe, or be has not. l( he has. his faith is Dot 
meritorious, because he is not free to believe or disbelieve. 
If be has not, he -hows empty credulity. Either way there 
is do merit in the case. But I reply that be who believes 
has sufficient motive for doing so, since he is led by the 
authority of Divine doctrine confirmed by miracles, and, 
which is more, by the inward drawing of God Himself. 
Hence, faith is not credulity. But still there is none of 
the compulsion of demonstration, and merit is not taken 
away. 

Do credible arguments for the fait!', diminish the merit of 
that virtue ? 
Keason may precede the will in believing — say, when one 



Qu. III. 2.] THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH. 101 

either would not have a believing will, or not so prompt a 
one, if human reasons had not led up to faith ; and so they 
diminish the merit of faith, for we ought to believe, not 
on account of human arguments, but of Divine authority. 
(Of course, in point of time motives for believing must 
precede, if we would not fall into mere credulity. But the 
author is speaking of the cause, the reason of assent.) In 
another way reason may follow the will of him who be- 
lieves ; for when a man has a will prompt to believe, he 
loves the verity which he believes, and he reflects upon it, 
and delights in finding reasons for it. This does not de- 
tract from faith, but rather increases its merit. 

§ 3. The outward act of faith. 

Spoken words are ordained to signify what is conceived 
in the heart ; and outward confession of the faith is an 
external act of faith. 

Is it necessary to salvation ? The apostle says, "With 
the mouth confession is made unto salvation." But this 
confession as an affirmative act can fall only under an affir- 
mative precept. It is necessary to salvation after the 
manner of other affirmative commands. Now, these are of 
perpetual obligation, but not at all times {''semper, non 
ad semper "). But they bind in certain times and places 
according to due circumstances, in accordance with which 
the human act must be limited in order to make it an act of 
virtue. So, then, confession of the faith at all times and in 
every place is not essential to salvation, but confession in 
some place and time is so ; when, sc, through omission of 
this confession honour due to God would be withheld, and 
even the benefit of our neighbour criminally neglected; say, 
if one who is asked respecting his faith should keep silence, 
and so should be taken for an unbeliever, or others should 
be turned away from the faith through his silence. 

(1) But cannot our hearts cleave to Divine truth without 
speaking of what we believe ? I answer that the end of 



1G2 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. IV. 1. 

faith, as of other virtues, must be referred to charity, the 
love of God and of our neighbour. Now, when the honour 
of God or the utility of our neighbour demands this con- 
fession, a man ought not to be content to possess Divine 
trut; 
lips. 

Bui apari from any benefit to the faith or to the faithful, 
it is not laudable to proclaim one's faith if tumult among 
unbelievers ie the result. If good is reasonably hoped for, 
let the disturbance be despl 

§ 4. The virtue of faith. 

What is the virtue offaitht 

If we consider the apostle's description (Heb. xi. 1), we 

shall sec that it contains all that is essential to definition. 
" Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the proof of 
things not Been." Primal verity is the end and object of 
this theological virtue, verity not seen as yet. And so it i.s 
spoken of as "hoped for." For to see the truth is to pos- 
t. But no one hopesforthat which he already has, 
but for that which be has not. So, then, the relation of the 
act of faith to its end, which is the object of the will, is 
expressed thus: "the Bubstance of things hoped for."' 
Substance here means the beginning of a thing when all 
that follows is virtually contained in its beginning. So we 
may say that primary indemonstrable principles are the 
substance of science, because they are first in logical order, 
and virtually contain all science. This is likewise true of 
faith, because the first beginnings of the things hoped for 
are in us through the assent of faith, which virtually con- 
tains all the things hoped for. For we hope to be blessed 
in seeing face to face the truth to which we adhere through 
faith. But the relation, secondly, of the act of faith to the 
object of the intelligence, as it is object of faith, is next 
described, viz., "the proof of things not seen/' Proof is 
here taken for the effect of proof. Faith is thus distin- 



Qu. IV. 2, 3.] THE VIRTUE OF FAITH. 1G3 

guished from all other things which pertain to the mind. 
"Proof" or evidence distinguishes it from opinion, sus- 
picion, and doubt, in which there is no firm adhesion of 
the mind to anything. " Things not seen " distinguishes 
it from knowledge and understanding. And, finally, "the 
substance of things hoped for " distinguishes the virtue of 
faith, from faith in general, which is not ordained for the 
beatitude hoped for. "We say, " the things hoped for," not 
'•'the things loved," for love may be of things seen, which 
cannot be the object of faith. Note, too, that evidence 
from the proper principles of the thing makes it to be 
(inwardly) seen ; not so the proof from Divine authority 
(except in a common figure of speech). 

Faith is primarily a virtue of the speculative intellect. 

For believing is primarily an act of the intellect, because 
the object of this act is the true, which properly pertains 
to the intellect. And therefore it is necessary that faith, 
which is the proper principle of this act, be there also. To 
faith succeeds vision ; " now we see through a glass darkly, 
but then face to face." But vision is in the intellect, there- 
fore faith also is. The act of faith, indeed, as we have seen, 
proceeds from will also which moves to assent. Therefore 
both powers must be perfected by their respective habits, in 
order that the act of faith may be perfect in its kind. 

Living faith. 

The object of the will is the good, and the act of faith, as 
we have just seen, is ordained for this end. But this Divine 
good, which is the end of faith, is the proper object of char- 
ity. Therefore by charity the act of faith is perfected and 
"informed " (fides format a). Faith works through love. 

Dead faith and living faith are one so far as intellect is 
concerned ; but what distinguishes living faith is found in 
the will; i.e., the grace of charity. 

Fides formata is a virtue, for "we are justified by faith" 



164 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. IV. 8. 

(Rom. v. 1). Since believing is the act of the mind assent- 
ing to the true under the command of the will, in order 
that the act may be perfect [i.e., proceed from virtue), two 
things are required: first, that the mind infallibly tend to 
the true; next, that the will be infallibly ordered with 
t to the ultimate end on account of which that assent 
is given. Both "t' tin-'' are found in the act at fides 
formata. For, first, faith i- directed to the true, since the 
false canimt be the ohject of true faith (see page 154) ; 
mxt, charity by which faith is " informed " (rendered liv- 
ing) directs the will to the good end. 

But dead faith is not a virtue, due,' ii lacks the due per- 
fection on the part of the will. 

Why is faith iirst among virtues {in order of genera- 

•Since, in things which are to be done, the end is their 
first principle, necessarily the theological virtues, which 

have 06 their object the ultimate end, are prior to other 

virtues lit' we speak of the perfeel virtues). But the ulti- 
mate end itself must be in the intelligence before it is in 
the will, because nothing can be willed which is not previ- 
ously cognized, apprehended by the mind. Hence, since 
the ultimate end is in the will, indeed, through hope and 
love, but in the intellect through faith, t he latter is neces- 
sarily first among virtues. Per accidens, however, other 
imperfect virtues may prepare the way for faith, as humil- 
ity may remove the pride which mak 
submit itself to the verities of the faith. 

Charity is the foundation of the spiritual edifice (Col. iii. 
14), which binds all parts of it together; but thi3 does not 
make it first in order of generation. 

Is faith more certain than knowledge (scientia) and the 
other intellectual virtues ? 

Wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, the three intel- 



Qu. IV. 8.] THE VIRTUE OF FAITH. 165 

lectual virtues which concern necessary truth, resemble faith 
in this, and are thus distinguished from prudence, which 
concerns contingent truths. The question before us plainly 
regards the three first, since prudence cannot have the same 
certitude in its object. Observe, also, that the same three 
names are applied to three of the seven gifts of the Holy 
Spirit. If, now, we speak of the three intellectual virtues as 
compared with faith, certitude is of two sorts : one depend- 
ing on the cause of certitude. That is more certain which 
has the more certain cause. In this way faith is more cer- 
tain (objectively), because it rests on Divine veracity ; but 
the three intellectual virtues rest on human reason. But 
certitude may be viewed (subjectively) on the side of the 
one who has it, and so that is said to be more certain which 
the mind of man more fully attains to ; and, in this way, 
since the things of faith are above human understanding, 
but the objects of the aforesaid virtues are not, faith, on 
this side, is less certain. (Not that one adheres less firmly 
to the first, but the mind cannot rest with an intellectual in- 
tuition of the truth beyond the reach of disturbing doubt.) 
But if we speak of the gifts, faith is their principle, 
and is presupposed, which renders faith more certain than 
they. 

(1) There can be no doubt in the three intellectual vir- 
tues, as there can be in the believing soul. But then this 
doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but in our- 
selves, as understanding does not fully attain to the objects 
of faith. 

(2) Cceteris paribus, sight is more certain than hearing, 
and faith comes by hearing (Bom. x. 17). So that it might 
seem as if faith had less certainty than the intellectual vir- 
tues have. But if he from whom we hear far exceeds us in 
power of sight, then hearing may be more certain than sight. 
A " layman " in science is apt to have more certainty from 
what scientific people tell him than from his own unassisted 
observations. And so man is more certain of what he hears 



166 FAITH Axn ITS OPrOSITE VICES. [Qu. v. 3. 

from God, who cannot be deceived, than of what he sees by 
the light of his own reason (1 These, ii. 13). 

(3) Understanding is more perfect than faith, because 
through faith we arrive al understanding. But this greater 
manifestation in understanding and knowledge does not im- 
ply a more fixed adherence and certitude, because all their 
certitude as spiritual gifts proceeds from the certitude of 
faith. And, as intellectual virtues, they rest on the natural 
Light of reason, which falls short in certitude from the 
Word of God on which faith rests. 

Can he who disbelieves one article of the faith have dead 
faith {fides in/ormis) in the other articles .' 

In the heretic who rejeots one article of the faith remains 
neither living nor dead faith. The formal object of virtue 
being taken away — i.e., what makes it virtue — the virtue is 
destroyed. But the formal object of faith is primal truth 

as manifested in the Holy Scripture-;, and in the Leaching 

of the Church which proceeds from the primal verity mani- 
Boly Scriptures. Hence he who does not 
adhere to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible and 
Divine rule, has not the habit of faith, and if he hold any- 
thing which agr.es with articles of the faith, he does not 
hold it through faith, but in some other way. So a man 
may hold a scientific conclusion ; but if he have no scientific 
proof of it, it is his opinion, ami it is not science. 

But he who adheres to the teaching of the Church as to 
an infallible rule, assents to all which the Church teaches. 
But if he holds what he likes of Church teaching, and what 
he does not will to hold he does not hold, he adheres to his 
own will, not to the doctrine of the Church. Hence it is 
manifest that the heretic who pertinaciously rejects one 
article of the faith is not prepared to follow the teaching of 
the Church. If this is not pertinaciously done, be is not a 
heretic, but is merely in error. But it is manifest that the 
heretic concerning one article of the faith has not faith 



Qu. VI. 1.] THE YIKTUE OF FAITH. 167 

respecting the other articles, but only some opinion accord- 
ing to his own self-will. 

(There is only one mode of approach for all articles of 
the faith. In wilfully rejecting that mode of approach for 
one, it is virtually rejected for all.) 

He who has faith is prepared to believe explicitly all that 
is contained under it, but one may explicitly believe more 
than another. And, also, one may adhere to primal verity 
with more certitude than another, with more firmness, 
promptitude, devotion, or confidence. 

Is faith acquired, or is it infused by God? 

There are two recmisites for faith ; one, that credible 
things (things to be believed) be presented to man, in order 
that he may explicitly believe something; the other, assent 
of the believer to the things so presented. As regards the 
first, faith is necessarily from G-od, for the articles of faith 
exceed human reason, and so do not fall under man's cog- 
nition unless God reveal them ; to some immediately — e.g., 
apostles and prophets ; to others through the medium of 
preaching the Gospel (Eom. x. 15). 

But as regards assent, wo may find two causes, one out- 
ward, like miracles seen or the persuasive preaching of 
men : neither of which is sufficient, for one man believes, 
and another does not. Therefore, it is necessary to recog- 
nize another inward cause, which moves a man inwardly to 
assent to the things of faith. This cause is not man's free- 
will, as the Pelagians vainly talk, because in this assent 
man is raised above himself, and so there must be an inward 
supernatural cause moving him, which is God. 

Faith, indeed, comes by hearing, and it is voluntary, but 
the hearing is only of what is to be believed (not the cause 
of belief in it) ; and the will must be prepared by grace in 
order that it may be raised to what is above nature. (Eph. 
ii. 8): "By grace have ye been saved through faith; and 
that not of yourselves ; it is the gift of God/' 



1G8 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. X. 1. 

The effects of faith 

are, from dead faith servile fear; from living faith filial, 
reverential fear ; purification of the soul from error by dead 
faith ; from all imparity by faith informed by love. 

To the virtue of faith correspond the spiritual gifts of 
understanding and knowledge (qu's. viii. and ix.). The 
tiiM is a supernatural light which man needs in order that 
in' may penetrate further in knowing what he could not 
know by natural light. X<»t that the very same things bc- 
lieved by faith an- understood through the gift ; bul things 
connected with the faith are better understood, though im- 
perfectly, ''Mi yel enough t<> know that apparent difficulties 
are no good reason for departing from the Eaith. This gift 
\- bestowed only on those who have already received justi- 
fying grace, "gratia gratum faciens" and clearer light is 
thrown on the objYcts of faith, making more explicit what 
is beli( 

Knowledgi lond gift, because the faithful 

for perfect assent of faith to what is revealed not only 
a char insight of understanding, bul also, in order thai be 
may not err in hi- tx lief, in and right judgment, dis- 

tinguishing what is of faith from what is not. This ie not 
discursive or argumentative, hut direct and simple. This 
definition of the gift of knowledge would lead us also to 
the gift of wisdom ; but we may make the distinction that 
the latter has reference to Divine things as such ; the former 
considers human things as connected with the faith. It 
knows what is to be believed on the earthly side of heavenly 
things. 

§ 5. Infidelity, heresy, apostasy, and blasphemy 

Is unbelief a & 

There is an unbelief which is purely negative, the mere 
absence of positive faith. So viewed in those who have 
never heard of the faith, it is not sin, but rather the pen- 



Qi\ x . 2, 3.] INFIDELITY. 169 

alty of sin, because such ignorance of Divine things is the 
fruit of our first parents' sin. Such infidels, if they are 
condemned, are condemned not on account of their infi- 
delity, but because of other sins which cannot be remitted 
without faith (S. John xv. 22). 

But there is also (a privative infidelity) an infidelity of 
contradiction, by which one resists or even despises the 
hearing of faith (Isa. liii. 1). This is perfect infidelity and 
is mortal sin (S. John iii. 18). 

(1) As every sin is against nature, so, although super- 
natural faith is not in human nature, yet that the mind of 
man should not resist its inward promptings and the out- 
ward preaching of the truth is certainly natural. 

(2) If you say that no one sins in what he cannot avoid, 
and therefore unbelief is no sin, you are speaking of purely 
negative unbelief. 

(3) Infidelity proper may be traced to the capital sin of 
pride, through which a man is unwilling to subject his 
intellect to a creed as the rule of faith (and to the teaching 
of a Church composed of fallible men like himself, no 
wiser, if so wise and learned, etc.). 

Infidelity is a sin of the intellect. 

Every sin, indeed, is in the (depraved) will, which com- 
mands all the acts of sin ; for every sin is voluntary. But 
sin has also its proper and proximate principle, which elicits 
the act of sin, as gluttony and lust are found in the con- 
cupiscible soul. But dissent, like assent, is the act of the 
mind as moved by the will. Therefore unbelief, like faith, 
has the intellect for its proximate subject, but the will as 
its prime mover. Contempt of the word preached, for 
example, has its cause in the will, but the unbelief pro- 
duced is in the intellect. 

Is unbelief the greatest of sins ? 

Since the essence of all sin is aversion from God, any sin 



170 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. X. 4. 

is graver the more man through it is separated from God. 
But this is especially true of unbelief, since true knowledge 
of God is rejected ; but by falsehood respecting Him, one 
does not draw near to Him, but rather removes self from 
Him. The unbeliever's false opinion is not God at all. 
Thus it is manifest that infidelity is worse than sins which 
consist in perverse morality. It is otherwise with sins 
which are opposed to the theological virtues. (See page 

ISO.) 

(1) It does not follow that the unbelief of a heretic is 

than the immorality of a ( latholic Christian, for what 
is worse in kind may be rendered lighter by palliating cir- 
cumstances, as also the Bio of a Catholic may be aggravated 
by the circumstances of it. 

Although infidelity is wilful opposition to the faith, 
yei it may be joined with ignorance, which palliates it, 
especially when one, like Saul, the persecutor, docs not sin 
from malice ( 1 Tim. i. L3). 

(3) It is true, also, that sorer punishment falls on the 
faithful for their sins than on infidels (Heb. x. 29) ; but 
infidelity as sin may. nevertheless, deserve heavier punish- 
ment than any one sin of another kind. But the believer 
sins more gravely in any offence, cateris paribus, than the 
unbeliever, both because of his greater knowledge of the 
truth derived from the faith, and because he has received 
the sacraments of faith, which through his sin he tramples 
under foot. 

Is every action of the unbeliever sinful? 

We have seen that mortal sin takes away justifying grace 
["gratia gratum faciens") (see pages 110, 115), but it 
does not totally corrupt the good of nature. Hence, since 
infidelity is a mortal sin, the infidel has not that grace, but 
natural good still remains in him. It is plain, then, that 
infidels cannot do those meritorious works which come from 
grace, but, in some way, they may do those good actions for 



Qu. XI.] HEEESY. 171 

which nature is sufficient. It is not necessary, then, that 
they sin in whatever they may do. But whensoever any- 
thing is done from unbelief, then they sin. For as one who 
has faith can commit some sin in an act which he does not 
refer to the end of his faith, so also the infidel can do some 
good act in that which he does not refer to the end of his 
unbelief. 

Faith, indeed, directs the intention with respect to the 
supernatural end, but the light of natural reason can direct 
the intention with respect to some connatural good. 



: is it a species of infidelity 9 

He who rightly holds the Christian faith, of his own will 
assents to Christ in those things which truly pertain to His 
doctrine ; and any one can deviate from the rectitude of 
Christian faith by refusing to assent to Christ. Such an 
one has an evil will respecting the end itself. This is the 
infidelity of those who reject the Church altogether, as 
heathen and Jews. Or, in another way, one may intend 
indeed to assent to Christ, but fail in choosing those things 
in which the assent is given. Heresy is this evil choice. 
The heretic does not choose those things which are truly 
delivered by Christ, but those which his own mind suggests 
to him. Therefore heresy is a species of infidelity pertain- 
ing to those who profess the faith of Christ, but corrupt its 
dogmas. (It may be defined as "pertinacious error mani- 
festly repugnant to the faith, in him who has professed that 
faith in its verity/') 

It is counted among the works of the flesh (Gal. v. 19), 
by reason of its remote cause, which is pride, cupidity, etc., 
the desire of some wrong end. 

This evil choice may be made in what directly and prin- 
cipally pertains to the faith, as the articles of the Christian 
creed ; or indirectly and secondarily, in those things from 
which follows the corruption of any article. 

Not all differences among theologians are to be called 



172 FAITH ANI) ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XIII. 1, 2. 

heretical, because, as S. Augustine says (Ep. 43), "If any 
one defend his judgment, although it be false and per- 
verted, without pertinacious obstinacy, and seek the truth 
with careful solicitude, ready to be corrected (by it) when 
he shall have found it, by no means is he to be counted 
among heretics," because he makes no choice contradicting 
the doctrine of the Church. Differences, then, which arc 
not heretical may concern those things which will not 
affect the faith whichever way they are decided {e.g., the 
historical or scientific value of the Holy Scriptures), or 
those things which, though they are connected with the 
faith, have never been determined by the Church. 

(Articles against toleration of infidels and heretics are 
omitted. ) 

Aposli />•//. 

It is an aggravated form of infidelity, since it is a depart- 
ure from, a casting off of, the faith after it has been re- 
ceived (2 Pet ii. -.'1). 

Blasphemy: what is if ? 

Whoever denies of God anything which belongs to Him, 
or asserts respecting God that which does not belong to 
Him, derogates from the Divine goodness, for He is the 
very essence of goodness, and whatever, therefore, belongs to 
Him, pertains to His goodness. But this derogation from 
the Divine g todness may be only in the intellect, or it may 
be also accompanied by a certain detestation in the affec- 
tions (which constitutes the perfect sin of blasphemy). If 
this is found in the heart only, it is blasphemy of the 
heart ; if it is also uttered, it is blasphemy of the lips. 

It is a mortal sin, because it is repugnant to Divine char- 
ity, inasmuch as it is derogatory to the Divine goodness 
which is the object of charity. 

It may be venial sin only when one does not observe that 
he is speaking blasphemy, in sudden heat bursting out in 
words whose significance he does not consider. 



Qu. XV. l.J BLASPHEMY. 173 

But in itself it is aggravated infidelity, because a detesta- 
tion of will is directed against the Divine honour. It is 
worse than homicide, because the latter is sin against our 
neighbour, but this is directly against God. Of course, if 
we speak of injurious effects, the case may be different, 
but the gravity of sin depends more upon the perversity of 
the will than on the effects of the action. 

The " sin against the Holy Ghost " takes various forms ; 
but, in general, we may understand it as a casting off in 
contempt that which might have hindered the choice of 
evil, as hope is rejected through despair, and godly fear 
through presumption. But all these hindrances to the 
choice of evil are the effects of the Holy Ghost in us. And 
this malicious wickedness is sin against the Holy Ghost. 
There are six forms of it : (1) despair, (2) presumption, 
(3) that impenitence which implies a purpose of remaining 
impenitent, (4) obstinate adherence to sin, (5) impugning 
of known truth in order that one may more freely sin, and 
(6) envy not only of a brother's prosperity but of the grace 
of God in him. 

Spiritual blindness and dulness of heart are vices opposed 
to spiritual knowledge and understanding . 

Mental blindness is privation of the principle of mental 
vision. Now this principle is three-fold : (1) The light 
of natural reason, of which the rational sonl is never de- 
prived, although it may be hindered from its proper activ- 
ity through impediments in lower mental powers which 
the mind needs for thought. (Note this view of ordinary 
forms of insanity.) 

(2) Another principle of mental vision is an habitual 
light superadded to the natural light of reason, and this 
light indeed is sometimes taken away from the soul. This 
is penal blindness, the light of grace being taken away as 
the penalty of sin. 

(3) Another principle of mental vision is a certain men- 



174 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XV. 2, 3. 

tal principle by which a man understands other things, at 
which principle the soul can aim, and is able not to aim. 
And tins not aiming at it is due sometimes to a will spon- 
taneously turning itself away from its consideration, of 
which the Psalmist speaks (Ps. xxxvi. 3). But sometimes, 
also, this blindness is due to mental preoccupation with 
things which are loved more, and this blindness of con- 
cupiscence, like the preceding, is sin. To understand the 
truth is, indeed, in itself agreeable to every one ; but it 
may become hateful, if a man is hindered thereby from 
things which he more loves. 

Instead of absolute moral blindness, there may be a dul- 
;' moral feeling in the consideration of spiritual goods, 
and both are opposed to that gift of spiritual understand- 
ing through which man apprehends and knows spiritual 
goods, and keenly penetrates into their deepest recesses. 
And this dnlness of vision is sin just so far as it is directly 
or indirectly voluntary, as in him who, strongly affected 
towards carnal pleasures, feels disgust for spiritual things, 
or neglects them. 

These are especially the sinful fruits of fleshly sins, be- 
t he soul is most strongly drawn to that in which it 
finds the intensest pleasure, and consequently the mind is 
bled with respect to spiritual things ; while, on the 
other hand, the opposite virtues of abstinence and chastity 
especially dispose a man's soul for spiritual activity. And 
this is more or less true even of those who have a natural 
gift or an acquired habit of intellectual speculation. 



CHAPTER II. 

HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. 

§ 1. Hope. 

Why is hope a virtue f 

Virtue has already been defined in Aristotle's words, as 
"that which makes him who has it good, and renders his 
work good " (Eth. Nic, ii. 5). Therefore, wherever any 
good act of man is found, some human virtue corresponds 
thereto. But in all things which are subject to rule and 
measure, the good depends on their attaining that proper 
rule ; as we call a coat good which neither exceeds nor falls 
short of the due measure. But we have seen (see page 
80) that there is a two-fold measure of human acts, one 
proximate and homogeneous with those acts, sc, reason; 
another, supreme and transcendent, sc, God. And on this 
account every human act which attains to reason or to God 
is a good act. But the act of hope, of which we are now 
speaking, attains to God. For the object of the natural 
passion of hope is future good, difficult of attainment, yet 
possible to be had. Now, anything is possible for us either 
through our own selves or through others. But in so far as 
we hope for anything as possible to us through Divine aid, 
our hope attains to God, on whose aid it rests. And so it is 
plain that such hope is a virtue, since it makes a man's act 
good, attaining to its due rule and measure. (Define this 
theological virtue, then, as " a habit of soul, Divinely in- 
fused, through which with sure confidence we expect to 
obtain the spiritual good of eternal life by Divine aid.") 
This hope is not the natural passion (though grounded in 
that), but a spiritual habit, purely the gift of grace. 



176 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Q,V. XVII. 2, 5. 

What is the proper object of hope ? 

The apostle answers when he says (Ileb. vi. 19) that 
hope " enters into that which is within the veil." It attains 
to God, in resting on Ilis aid for the obtaining of the hoped- 
for good. Now the effect must be proportioned to its cause. 
And therefore the good which properly and principally wo 
ought to hope from God, is infinite good, since that is pro- 
portioned to the power of Him who aids us. But this good, 
is eternal life, which consists in the fruition of God Him- 
self. For not less is to be hoped from Him than He Him- 
self is, since His goodness by which He communicates 
blessing to nis creatures is not less than His infinite es- 
sence. Therefore, the proper and principal object of hope 
is eternal beatii iide. 

(1) But how can man hope for what exceeds the desire 
of his soul? (1 Cor. ii. 9). I answer I hat man at present 
cannot perfectly know what beatitude is ; but he can ap- 
prehend it under the general notion of perfect good, and so 
he can hope for it; and thus his hope '''enters into that 
which is within the veil." 

(2) But prayer interprets hope, and we can lawfully pray 
for the goods of this present life, both spiritual and tem- 
poral goods, and for deliverance from evils, which will not 
exi-t in the eternal beatitude. But whatever other good 
things we ask from God, we are bound to ask with reference 
to eternal beatitude. And so, besides its principal object, 
hope may have objects derived from this and dependent on 
it. In a similar manner Ave regarded the virtue of faith. 

Through love one may hope and desire for another as for 
himself. 

Why is hope a theological virtue? 

It is a virtue from its attaining the supreme rule of 
human actions, which it attains both as that rule is its 
primal efficient cause, on whose aid it rests ; and as that 
rule is its ultimate final cause, and it expects beatitude in 



Qu. xvii. 6, 7, 8.] HOPE. 177 

the fruition of that end. Hope's object, then, as virtue, is 
chiefly God. And in this consists the notion of theological 
virtue, that it has God for its object. (See page 69.) Hope, 
therefore, is a theological virtue. 

If other good things are expected by it, this is in relation 
to God as their ultimate end, or from God as their efficient 
cause. 

There are moral virtues also which are based on expecta- 
tion, on patient waiting, but hope's distinguishing charac- 
teristic is its expectation of Divine aid. 

God is the object of all the theological virtues, but in dif- 
ferent manner. 

Love makes man cleave to God for His own sake ; hope, 
as the source of eternal beatitude for us ; faith, as the 
source of truth. In the creed of faith you say : "I look 
for the life of the world to come," wherein the act of faith 
is manifested by the act of hope. 

If we speak of the order of theological virtues, we must 
distinguish betioeen the natural order of generation in which 
the imperfect precedes the perfect, and the {rational) order 
of perfection. 

In the first way faith precedes hope, and hope precedes 
charity. It is necessary, if one hope for anything, that it 
be presented to him as possible of attainment. Now the 
objects of hope are eternal beatitude and Divine aid. And 
each of these is proposed to us by faith, which makes known 
that we can reach eternal life, and that Divine aid for this 
has been prepared on our behalf. " He that comes to God 
must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them 
that seek after Him " (Heb. xi. 6). Hope also brings in 
charity, inasmuch as one who hopes to be rewarded by God 
is induced to love Him and keep His commandments. 

But, in the order of perfection, love is prior. Perfect 
love, which cleaves to God for His own sake, renders hope 
12 



178 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XX. 1. 

more perfect, for we hope most from those who are our 
friends. This is " spes formata," in which one hopes from 
God because He loves and is loved. 

The act of hope belongs to the " appetitive " soul, 
because it is a seeking after the good ; but it docs not per- 
tain to the sense-appetite, because the object is nut sensible 
good, but Divine good. 

Along with this virtue maybe considered the spiritual gift 
of godly fear (qu. xix.). We may fear that which is evil, 
or thai from which the evil proceeds. In the first way, 
God cannol be feared. In the second wa\ Ee can. This 
evil proceeding from God, evil secundum quid, though good 
simply, is the evil of punishment, "malum imnw" which 
is the ground of servile fear, in which one (urns to God 
through fear of His judgments. Or, with filial fear one 
ma) dread separation from G-od through his own fault, 
'• malum culpa" or, again, there may be thai worldly fear 
which the Lord prohibited as evil (S. Matt. x. 28), in 
which, through love of the world and dread of worldly loss, 
one departs from the service of God. It is filial fear which 
is the gift of the Holy Spirit, like the other spiritual gifts, 
a certain habitual perfection of the soul, by which it is 
made prompt to follow the guidance of the Holy Ghost, 
just as moral virtues render the passions prompt to follow 
reason. 



§ 2. Vices opposed to hope : despair and presumption. 

7s despair a sin ? 

It is a noteworthy remark of Aristotle's (Nic. Eth., vi. 2), 
that seeking and aversion in the will correspond to affirma- 
tion and negation in the intellect. And good and evil in 
the latter correspond Avith the true and the false in the 
former. And, therefore, every motion of desire which is 
conformed to the truth of the reason is in itself good, and 



Qu. xx. 2.] DESPAIR. 179 

every motion of desire which follows the false is in itself 
evil and sin. But the true thought of the mind concerning 
God is that from Him come our salvation and pardon for 
sinners (Ezek. xviii. 23). And the false opinion is that He 
denies pardon to the penitent, or that He does not turn sin- 
ners to Himself by justifying grace. And as hope which is 
conformed to correct estimation of God is laudable and 
virtuous, so the opposite, which is despair based on a false 
estimation of God, is vicious and a sin. 

Every mortal sin whatsoever is some kind of aversion 
from the infinite Good ; but the sins which are opposed to 
the theological virtues consist, primarily and chiefly, in this 
aversion, as hatred of God, despair and infidelity, because 
the theological virtues have God for their direct object ; 
and he that deserts God necessarily turns himself to some 
changeable good. But other sins consist principally in the 
turning to such good, and, consequently, in aversion from 
God. For the sensualist does not intend to depart from 
God, but to enjoy his pleasure ; from which follows the 
aversion from God. 

Fear of God is good ; yet indirectly evil fruit may pro- 
ceed from a good root, when one uses the good in a bad 
way, taking occasion for despair from his servile fear. 

Does despair necessarily imply infidelity ? 

The latter belongs to reason, the former to the will. But 
reason considers universals, while the will is moved to par- 
ticular things. Now, one can have a correct estimation of 
universal principles, while his estimation of particulars is 
corrupt. His general judgment necessarily proceeds to the 
desire of some particular thing through the medium of some 
particular judgment ; and hence it is that one may have a 
right faith in general, while his will fails in the particular 
thing, his estimation of that particular thing being cor- 
rupted by habit or by passion, One may rightly believe in 
the forgiveness of sins in Holy Church, yet give up to 



180 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XX. 3, 4. 

despair; sc, that in his present state there is no hope of 
pardon for him in particular. 

According to their specific character the gravest sins are 
those which are opposed to the theological virtues. 

These have God for their object ; those are direct aversion 
from God. Such sins are infidelity, hatred of God, and 
despair. In themselves the two former are even graver than 
the last. For infidelity comes from rejecting the veracity 
of God; hat nil, from a will opposed to the Divine good- 
ness; despair, from the want of hope that one will be a 

sharer in thai g Iness. The two former, therefore, are 

directly againsl God as Be is in Eimself; the last, as His 
goodness is participated by as. Bat, on our side, despair 
is more dangerous, because by hope we are recalled from 

evils, and led to seek for u r 1 : but hope being taken away, 

nun rush into unbridled vices and are held back from efforts 
for good. 

Causes of the mortal sin of despair. 

We have seen (page 175) that the object of hope is good 
difficult of attainment, but possible to be obtained through 
one's own efforts or by another's aid. Hope of beatitude, 
then, may fail in either of two ways : either that felicity is 
not regarded as such a good, or it is deemed unattainable. 
If our affections are corrupted by the love of sensual pleas- 
ures, spiritual good things are distasteful, and are not hoped 
for as difficult goods. So lust (luxuria) produces despair. 

But, on the other hand, spiritual sloth (" acedia") casts 
down the soul so that the difficult good is viewed as unat- 
tainable. So this capital sin produces despair.* 

* This mortal sin of despair caused by lust or spiritual sloth should 
bo distinguished from what may outwardly resemble it : (a) the scru- 
pulous conscience which is always finding difficulties in the way of 
salvation that cast down the mind, and tend to obscure its hope ; (b) 



Qu. xxi. 1.] PRESUMPTION - . 181 

Presumption : zvhat is its object ? 

Presumption implies unwarranted, immoderate hope. 
Now, hope is of what is possible, and that possibility refers 
either to one's own powers, or to the Divine aid. There 
are, then, two kinds of presumption : one, by which any 
one is seeking some good as possible for himself, though it 
exceed his powers ; another, by which any one is seeking 
some good as possible through the power and mercy of God, 
when it is not possible — e.g., he hopes to obtain pardon 
without repentance, or glory without deserving it. But 
this kind of presumption is a species of sin against the Holy 
Ghost, since by it is taken away or despised the aid of the 
Holy Ghost by which man is recalled from sin. 

(1) Does there seem to be greater presumption in trust- 
ing to one's own powers than in trusting to Divine power ? 
But the gravest sin is sin against God. Hence, the pre- 
sumption which inordinately rests on God is graver sin 
than that which trusts to one's own power. For it is dero- 
gating from God when one expects to obtain through His 
aid what it is unworthy of God to bestow. He sins more 
gravely who diminishes the holiness of God than he who 
exalts his own powers. 

(2) Is it objected that other sins arise from sin against 
the Holy Ghost, and that self-confidence, which is rooted 
in self-love, is the source of many sins rather than presump- 
tion respecting God's mercy ? And so, that it is the first 
kind of presumption which is sin against the Holy Ghost. 

But inordinate presumption respecting God includes self- 
love by which one inordinately desires his own good. For 
what we greatly desire we deem easy of attainment through 
others' aid, even when that is not possible. 

(3) Presumption in Divine mercy is true aversion from 



what is not infrequent in our age, incipient ' ' melancholia " taking a 
religious form, and perplexing the family and the priest, who have not 
detected the approach of insanity. 



182 HOPE AXD ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XXI. 2, 4. 

God, because it attributes to God what is unworthy of His 
holy nature. 

Briefly, as from despair one despises the Divine mercy on 
which hope rests, so from presumption one despises the 
Divine justice which punishes sinners. But both mercy 
and justice are in God. Therefore, as despair is inordinate 
aversion from God, so presumption is inordinate turning to 
Him (which is true aversion from some part of the infinite 
good. See (3) above). 

Is presumption a sin .' 

What was said with respect to sin is once more to be 
repeated ; sc. t thai every act of will which conforms to 
falsehood in the intellecl is in itself evil and a sin (page 179). 
J'-iii presumption is such an act. For as it is false that 
be penitent, or thai He does uot turn sin- 
ners to repentance, so it is false thai He grants pardon to 
those who persevere in sin, and that He glorifies those who 
from g .1 works. On which false estimation pre- 
sumption is based. Therefore it is a sin, less in its kind, 
pair is, since it is God's " property always 
to h aye mercy " and " to forgive sins " rather than to punish 
them, because of His infinite goodness ; for that belongs to 
His nature, but this to His justice according to our sins. 

Note thai this presumption is not excess of hope, hoping 
too much of God ; for it is hoping to obtain from God what 
is unworthy of His holiness, which is even hoping less from 
Him, because it is detraction from Him. 

The source of presumption is the capital sin of pride or 
vainglory. 

Self-presumption, inordinate trust in one's own powers, is 
manifestly the child of vainglory. And inordinate trust in 
the power or mercy of God comes from pride, when one 
thinks himself of so much consequence that God will not 
punish his sins, or exclude him from glory. 



Qu. xxii.] PEECEPTS OF HOPE. 183 

Precepts of hope and fear. 

Of the precepts which are found in the Holy Scriptures 
some belong to the substance of Divine law, and some are 
preambles to that law. The latter are presupposed, because, 
if they did not exist, there would be no place found for law 
(none would be subject to that law for whom it should be 
promulged). Of this nature are precepts of faith and hope, 
because by the act of faith the mind of man is led to recog- 
nize the authority of the author of the law, and by hope of 
reward man is led to obedience. But those precepts are of 
the substance of the law itself, which are given to one 
already subject to the law, and ready to obey it ; they per- 
tain to rectitude of life. But precepts of hope and faith 
were not set forth as precepts, because, if man did not 
already believe and hope, the law would be set forth in Yain. 
(Note that faith in God being presupposed, through which 
the human mind is submitted to God, commandments can 
be given concerning other things which are to be believed, 
as is apparent in the New Law of the Gospel. See qu. xvi., 
omitted above.) 

But as the precept of faith was prefixed to the proclama- 
tion of the law — sc, "I am the Lord .thy God who brought 
thee out of the land of Egypt" (Ex. xx. 2) ; and "Hear, 
Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord " (Deut. vi. 4)— so also 
the precept of hope in the first giving of the law was in the 
form of promises attached to the second and the fifth com- 
mandments. For he that promises rewards to the obedient, 
by that very thing incites them to hope. 

But when the law is once imposed, men are urged to ob- 
serve its preambles, as in Ps. lxii. 8 : "0 put your trust in 
Him alway, ye people ; pour out your hearts before Him, 
for God is our hope." 

(1) Nature sufficiently inclines to good proportioned to 
human nature, but man must be inclined to hope for super- 
natural good both by promises and by admonitions or pre- 
cepts. And yet even for that to which natural reason tends, 



184 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XXII. 2. 

precepts of Divine law are necessary for the sake of greater 
firmness in them, and because reason is apt to be clouded 
by sinful concupiscences. 

(2) Prohibition of opposite sins must of course be under- 
stood whenever the law in any manner incites to hope or 
faith. 

The same tilings may be said of fear. 

But we must remember the distinction between servile 
fear, the fear of penalties, and Glial fear which springs from 
love. The first giving of the law did not command fear, 
but it threatened penalties on the violators of law. (Sec the 
Second Commandment.) But filial fear and love are pream- 
bles to the acta which the law commands. So it was said 
(Dent. x. 12), "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy 
God require of Thee, bnl to fear the Lord thj God, to walk 
in all His ways, and to love IIim?"etc. These are the 
principles common to the whole law. And this injunction 
to fear suffices to exclude presumption (its opposite vice). 



CHAPTER III. 

CHAEITY. 

§ 1. Charity in general view. 

Wliat is charity ? 

The Lord said (8. John xv. 15), " No longer do I call you 
servants, but I have called you friends.-" This friendship is 
charity. Note the distinction between love of friendship, 
which is love of benevolence, when we so love any one that we 
wish for his good, and love of concupiscence, when we do not 
seek the good of the things loved, but seek their good for 
ourselves. Thus one may love wine, or a horse. For it is 
absurd to say that one has friendship for wine or for his 
horse (except by a sentimental personification). 

But benevolence alone is not sufficient for friendship ; a 
certain mutual affection is requisite also ; each loves the 
other (S. Johnxiv. 21 : "He that loveth Me, shall be loved 
by My Father, and I will love him "). But such mu- 
tual benevolence is founded on some fellowship. And such 
communion there is between man and God, according as 
He communicates His blessedness to us (1 Cor. i. 9). Love 
founded on this communion is charity, a certain friendship 
between man and God. 

(1) Charity is now imperfect, because although our spir- 
itual " conversation is in heaven," yet it is very imperfect. 

(2) If this definition is correct, how, then, can one have 
charity for his enemies ? I answer that friendship may ex- 
tend to any one on his own account, in which way it can reach 
only our friends. But friendship may also extend itself 
to another in respect of some other person. If one loves 



186 CHARITY. [XXIII. 2. 

another man, on account of that love he loves what pertains 
to him, as his children or servants. And the love of a friend 
can he so great, that for the sake of that friend those who 
pertain to him are loved even though they offend us or hate 
us. And after this manner the love of charity may extend 
even to enemies, whom out of charity we love in their rela- 
tions to God, to whom is chiefly directed this love of charity. 
In this way it is possible that sinners be loved. 

Ts cha rity an infused habit in the soul (or is it simply 
the operation of the Holy Ghost in and through the soul) ? 

The motion of charity docs not so proceed from the Holy 
(ihost moving the human bouI that it is only moved and is 
in no way the principle of that motion, like an inanimate 
bodj propelled by external force. For that is contrary to 
the idea of the voluntary which has its principle in itself. 
V><v it would follow that loving is not voluntary, which 
implies contradiction, since love is essentially the act of 
the will. 

In like manner, also, it cannot be said that the Holy Spirit 
moves t he « ill to love, as an instrument is moved, in which, 
although it is the principle of action, is not found the power 
to act and not to act. For so also would be taken away the 
idea of the voluntary, and the notion of merit would be ex- 
cluded, which has its ground in charity. 

But if the will is moved to love by the Holy Ghost, still it 
is necessary that thai will produce the act of love. But no 
act is perfectly produced by any active power unless it pro- 
ceed also from some "connatural " habit which is the prin- 
ciple of that action. Hence God, who moves all things to 
their due ends, has given individual things their special 
nature (forma), by which they are inclined to the ends 
pre-appointed by Him. But it is manifest that the act of 
chanty exceeds the natural power of the will. Unless, 
therefore, some thing (forma) be superadded to the natural 
power, through which it may be inclined to the act of 



Qu. XSIII. 6.] CHA3UTY 1ST GENERAL VIEW. 187 

love, that act would be more imperfect than natural acts 
and the acts of the other virtues, nor would it be easy and 
pleasurable. But this is manifestly not the case ; for there 
is no other virtue which has such an inclination to its act 
as charity has, and none which acts so pleasurably. Hence 
it is most necessary for the act of charity that there be in 
us some habit superadded to the natural power, inclining 
it to the act of charity and making it to operate promptly 
and pleasurably. 

Charity is a special virtue, one virtue in all cases. 

Let us turn back. Human acts, as we have seen, are 
good according as they are regulated by due rule and meas- 
ure. Therefore human virtue, which is the principle of all 
good acts, consists in attaining to that rule and measure, 
which, in the case of the moral virtues, is human reason, 
and, in every virtue, is G-od Himself. Hence, since charity 
attains to God because it unites us with G-od, it follows 
that it is a virtue. It is a special virtue, because, while the 
primal object of all love is the good, Divine good in itself, 
the object of beatitude is a special good : and the love of 
this, which is charity, is a special love. And it is one in 
all cases, because the end, the Divine goodness, is one. 
Love of the brethren is a special application of this one 
charity, because they are loved on account of God, who is 
the principal object of the love of charity. 

Why does S. Paul say (1 Cor. xiii. 13), " The greatest 
of these is charity " ? 

The theological virtues which consist in attaining the 
highest rule of action, which is God, because their object 
is God, are more excellent than the moral or intellectual 
virtues which consist in attaining to the rule of human 
reason. And among those theological virtues, that is chief 
which most attains to God. But faith and hope attain to 
God as from Him comes to us the knowledge of the true, or 



188 CHARITY. [Qu. xxin. 7. 

the acquiring of the good. But charity attains to God as 
He is in Himself, not as something comes to us from Him. 
Therefore it is more excellent than faith and. hope, and 
consequently than any other virtue. 

(1) But is not intellect higher than will which it directs? 
And, if so, is not faith, the virtue of intelligence, more ex- 
cellent than charity, the virtue of the will ? But I answer 
that the intellectual operation finds its completion as the 
thought is in the thinker. And the nobility of intellectual 
action is measured bj the degree of understanding. But 
the operation of will is perfected in the inclination of the 
bouI to something as its terminus. Therefore the dignity 
of that inward action depends on the thing which is its 
object. But those things which are inferior to the human 
soul are in it in a nobler manner than they exist in them- 
selves (a noteworthy proposition). Bui the things which 
are above the soul exist in a nobler way in themselves than 
they are in the soul. Therefore the knowledge of things 
below us is nobler than the Love of them (Nic. Eth., vi. 7 
and 12). But the love of things above us, and especially 
of God, is better than intellectual knowledge of them. 
Therefore charity ie more excellent than faith. 

i •.' t The object of hope and of charity is, indeed, the 
Bame. But charity implies union with that good, while 
hope implies Bome distance from it. Charity does not re- 
gard that good as difficult, as hope does. Where union is 
already accomplished, the idea of difficulty is vanished. 
Therefore charity is more perfect than hope. 

Can any trtti virtue exist without charity f 
Virtue is directed to the good. But the good is princi- 
pally the end, for the means are called good only with 
reference to the end. But there is an ultimate end and a 
proximate end ; the one universal, the other particular. 
The ultimate and principal good of man is the fruition of 
God (Ps. lxxiii. 28) — " it is good for me to draw near unto 



Qu. xxiii. 7.] CHARITY IN GENERAL VIEW. 189 

God ;" and man is directed to this by charity. But the 
secondary and particular good of man can be two-fold ; one 
which is truly good, as ordainable for the chief good which 
is the ultimate end ; but another is apparent, not true 
good, which draws one off from the final good. Speaking 
simply, then, true virtue is that which is ordained for the 
principal good of man ; and so no true virtue can exist 
without charity. 

But if virtue be considered as directed to some particular 
end, some such virtue, ordained for some particular good, 
can exist without chai'ity. But if that special good is not 
true, but only apparent, the virtue directed to that will 
not be true virtue at all, but only a false similitude of 
virtue. Thus the prudence of avaricious traders, devis- 
ing various " speculations," is not true prudence ; their 
justice, treating others fairly through fear of grave losses 
by unfair dealing, is not true justice ; and their temper- 
ance, avoiding extravagant expense, is not true temperance, 
etc. 

But if the special good be truly good — say, the preserva- 
tion of the republic or anything of that kind — there will 
be true virtue indeed, but imperfect if it is not referred to 
the final and perfect good. 

(1) But it is the property of virtue to produce a good 
act ; and yet one who has not charity may found a hospital 
or an orphan asylum. I answer that the act of a man who 
has not this supernatural charity may belong to either one 
of two kinds. His act may be connected with his want of 
charity. Even if he found an orphan asylum, he may or- 
dain it to the end of his infidelity (Girard Orphan Asylum, 
Philadelphia). Such act is always evil ; the act of the un- 
believer as such is always sin (S. Aug., Contra Julianum, 
iv. 3). 

But there can be an act of one who lacks charity, which 
does not spring from this want but from some other gift of 
God, as faith, or hope, or some natural good which is not 



190 CHARITY. [Qu. xxiv. 1, 2 

totally taken away by sin. In this way some act can be mor- 
ally good in its kind without charity, which is not perfectly 
good, because it lacks due relation to the ultimate end. 

(2) It is objected again, that charity cannot exist without 
faith ; but infidels may be faithful husbands, honest mer- 
chants, and so on. But I reply that in such case is not 
found simply perfect virtue in its kind, because the action 
is not ordained for its due end. (The man has a natural 
gift of chastity or justice, but he does not live as a child of 
God.) Charity ordains the acts of all the other virtues to 
their ultimate end. It give- their proper form to those acts. 

§ 2. Charity in subjective view. 

Charity is not an emotion of the sensitive soul, but is a 
virtue of the will. 

The object of both is the good, but in different manner. 
For the object of sense-desire is the good apprehended by 
sense, but the object of spiritual desire is the good appre- 
hended by the reason. Now the object of charity is Divine 
good, which is apprehended by reason only. Therefore the 
Bubject of charity is the human will. (Emotional love is 
ii"t. as such, the love of charity.) 

The will is rational, indeed, but reason is not the rule of 
charity ; it exceeds the rule of human reason. 

Charity is "// infused virtue. 

Charity is a certain friendship between man and God, 
founded on the communication of eternal beatitude. But 
this communication is not due to natural gifts, but is a gift 
of grace. "The free gift of God is eternal life" (Rom. vi. 
23). Hence, chanty itself exceeds our natural powers, and 
can neither be in us by nature nor acquired by natural 
powers, because natural effects do not transcend their cause. 
Charity is in us, then, through an infusion from the Holy 
Ghost, who is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. 
"The love of Christ hath been shed abroad in our hearts 



Qu. xxiv. 3-7.] CHARITY IX SUBJECTIVE VIEW. 191 

through the Holy Ghost which was given unto us " (Eom. 
v. 5). 

(1) Divine good is naturally loved hy all ; but this love 
is founded on the communication of natural goods, while 
charity springs from a supernatural communication. 

(2) God is in Himself lovely in the highest degree, inas- 
much as He is the object of beatitude. But it does not fol- 
low that He is so loved by us, because our affections are 
drawn to visible goods. 

(3) The preparation for charity on man's part is indicated 
by the apostle (1 Tim. i. 5), " Love out of a pure heart, and 
a good conscience, and faith unfeigned." 

Charity is not given according to each one's natural con- 
dition, or natural capacity, 

but according to the good pleasure of the Holy Ghost dis- 
tributing His gifts (1 Cor. xii. 4), for it exceeds human 
nature's proportions. 

Charity in this life, " charitas vim," can be increased. 

As we advance in the Christian life, we draw nearer to 
God through the affections of the soul. But charity, in 
uniting the soul to God, produces this nearness. If it could 
not be increased the progress of the Christian life would be 
stopped. Not that more things are loved, but in the in- 
tensity of its act God can be loved more. Thus it has 
greater efficacy. The subject of charity participates more 
in it. 

The act of charity may be a preparation for increase of 
charity, inasmuch as from one such act man is rendered 
more prompt to act again in the same way, and, ability in- 
creasing, he is more fervent in love, by which he seeks ad- 
vancement in this supernatural gift. 

Has "charity of the way" any assignable limit'? 

Limit may be found in the nature of the quality limited, 



192 CHAKITY. [Qu. xxiv. 8. 

or in the power of the agent which can produce no more, or 
in the capacity of the subject which is capable of no further 
perfection. But there is no limit to the increase of "char- 
ity of the way " in any such mode. For (1) it has no natural 
terminus, since it is a participation of infinite Love, which 
is the Holy Ghost; (2) the cause is of infinite influence, 
since it is God ; and (3) on the part of the subject there is 
no limit, since the more charity increases, the ability for 
greater increase grows more and more. 

Can there be perfect charity in this life? 

Certainly God cannot be loved as much as He ought to 
be loved : for the measure of that is His goodness, which is 
infinite, and He therefore is infinitely lovely. But no creat- 
ure can love Him infinitely, because created virtue is finite. 
In this way, no charity except; God'fl can be perfect. But 
on the part of the one who loves, his charity is perfect when 
he love- to the uttermost of his power, and this may be 
true in either of three ways : 

( 1 ) The whole heart of man may be actually and continually 
directed to God. This is the perfect charity of the blessed 
saints, " charitas patriae" which is not possible in this life. 
For here it is impossible, on account of the infirmity of 
human life, that we should be always thinking of God and 
be moved with love towards Him : 

(••?) Mao may direct all his desire and purpose to have 
leisure for God and heavenly tilings, setting aside all other 
pursuits except so far as present necessity requires, and that 
perfection of charity is possible in this life, although it is 
not fouud wherever charity exists : 

(3) One may habitually fix all his heart on God, so that 
he neither thinks nor wills anything which he knows to be 
contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common 
in all who have charity. 

"When the apostle said that he was not " already per- 
fect " (Phil. iii. 12), he was speaking of the "charitas 



Qu. xxiv. 10.] CHARITY IN SUBJECTIVE VIEW. 193 

patriae," but in the fifteenth verse of the same chapter he 
speaks of the perfect " charitas vice." 

S. John says, that " if we say that we have no sin, we 
deceive ourselves" (1 Ep. i. 8), but venial sins are not con- 
trary to the habit of charity, though they are so to its act. 
They are therefore repugnant to the "charitas patrice," 
not to the "charitas vice." 

Can charity be directly diminished ? 

In speaking of increase or diminution of charity, we 
must look, not at the object proper, but at the subject. 
Can it be diminished on this side ? That must be either 
through some act or through mere cessation from action. 
In the latter way virtues which are acquired by acts are 
diminished or even sometimes destroyed. (See page 59.) 
For the preservation of each thing depends on its cause. 
But the cause of acquired virtue is human acts. Those acts 
ceasing, the acquired virtue is diminished, and at length 
totally corrupted. But this has no place in charity. And 
the act ceasing, it is not on that account diminished or 
destroyed, unless there be sin in that very cessation of 
action. 

Diminution of charity, then, can be caused only by God, 
or by some sin. But God causes no defect in us except by 
way of penalty, in withdrawing His grace as the penalty for 
sin. Hence He does not diminish charity unless it be as a 
penalty which is due to sin. The sole cause of diminution, 
therefore, is sin, either effectively or by way of desert. But 
in neither way does mortal sin diminish charity ; it totally 
destroys the love of God, both effectively, because every 
mortal sin is contrary to charity, and also by way of desert, 
since he who by mortal sin acts against charity deserves 
that God withdraw charity from his soul. 

Similarly, also, charity cannot be diminished by venial 
sin, either effectively or meritoriously. ISTot effectively, 
because that venial sin does not reach to charity which con- 
18 



194 CHARITY. [Qu.xxiv.ll. 

ccrns the ultimate end, while venial sin is inordination 
respecting the means to that end. But love of the end is 
not diminished because one commits some inordination 
respecting the means, as it may happen that some infirm 
people much loving health may be guilty of some inordina- 
tion respecting the rules of diet. Likewise, also, venial 
sin does not merit diminution of charity, for when one 
fails in the less, he does not deserve to suffer loss in 
the more important. For God does not more turn Him- 
self from man, than man turns himself from Him. (Note 
that.) 

11 . i hen, who is inordinately related towards the means 
to the end, does not merit to suffer loss in charity by which 
he is ordained for the ultimate end. 

Our conclusion is that charity can in no way be directly 

diminished. Hut, indirectly, a disposition for the loss of 

it may be called its diminution, and this preparation for its 

Hies from venial sins, or even through ceasing from 

the exercise of works of charity. 

karity, once had, be lost again ? 
By charity the Holy Ghost dwells in us. So we may con- 
sider it in three lights : (1) On the side of the Holy Spirit 
moving the soul to the love of God. And from this point 
of view "charity never faileth/' by virtue of the Holy 
Ghost, who infallibly works whatever He wills. And it is 
impossible that at once the Holy Ghost should will to move 
any one to the act of charity, and that he should lose char- 
ity by sinning. 

(2) But in another way charity may be considered as it 
is in itself, and so it can produce nothing which does not 
pertain to it. Hence charity cannot sin, any more than 
fire can generate cold. 

(3) It may be considered with reference to its subject, 
who is changeable according to the liberty of his choice. 
"Char Has patriot" which fills up the whole capacity of the 



Qu. XXIV. 12.] CHAKITY IN" SUBJECTIVE VIEW. 195 

rational soul, cannot be lost. (Such a change of being in 
such a being is inconceivable.) But charity in this life, 
" charitas vice," does not so fill up the measure of the 
rational soul that every actual motion of it is directly 
referred to God ; and such charity can be lost indirectly, 
through something else occurring. The property of habit 
is that it inclines a power to its proper act, making that 
seem good which harmonizes with the habit, and that seem 
evil which is repugnant to it. For as the sense of taste 
judges of savours according to its condition, so the mind of 
man judges about the doing of anything according to its 
habitual disposition. In heaven, where God is seen as He 
is, charity cannot fail, because that which agrees with 
charity can never appear to be anything but good. But in 
this life it is not so. 

(1) " Whosoever is begotten of God cannot sin " (1 Ep. 
S. John iii. 9), so far as the power of the Holy Ghost who 
dwells in him is concerned. 

(2) The charity which can cease to love what once it 
loved is not true charity at all ; but the mutability of the 
subject of charity is another matter. 

(3) It is true that charity excludes all motives for sin, as 
self-love, or cupidity, or any such thing. But sometimes 
it happens that "charitas vice" is not in actual operation 
(though habitually present), and then may intervene some 
motive for sinning, and if consent is given to it, charity is 
lost. 

Charity is lost by any one act of mortal sin. 

One of two contraries vanishes if the other supervene. 
Now any act whatsoever of mortal sin is in its proper 
nature contrary to charity, which consists in loving God 
above all things, and in man's being totally subject to Him, 
referring all things to Him. It is of the essence of charity 
that we so love God that we will in all things to be sub- 
ject to Him, and in all things to follow the rule of His 



196 CHARITY. [Qu. xxiv. 12. 

commandmcuts. For whatever is contrary to them is 
manifestly contrary to charity, and of itself can exclude 
charity. 

If, indeed, charity were an acquired habit depending 
on the virtue of the subject of it, it would not follow that 
by one contrary act it should be destroyed. For act is 
directly contrary to act, not to habit. Continuance of the 
habit does nol require continuance of the act. Hence, from 
a supervening contrary act an acquired habit is not immedi- 
ately excluded. But charity, since it is an infused habit, 
depends on i be act ion of God who infuses it. He is like the 
sun illuminating the world. And as the light would im- 
mediately cease to pass through air it' some obstacle should 
intervene and Bhut <»U" the sun, so also charity immediately 
in the soul if any obstacle is put in the way of 
I infusingit. But it is manifest that any mortal sin, 

being contrary to the Divine commandments, is such an 
obstacle, because man chooses to prefer bis sin to the Di- 
vine friendship, which requires that we follow God's will ; 
and, consequently, by one act of mortal sin the babit of 
charity is] 

With i!. ; - agrees the Word of God, for it says that 
by mortal sin man merits eternal death — "The wages of 
sin is death" (Bom. vi. 23). But whosoever has charity 
merits eternal life. " lie that loveth Me, shall be loved 
of My Father, and I will love him, and will manifest 
Myself unto him " (S. John xiv. 21). In this manifes- 
tation is eternal life. " This is life eternal, that they 
may know Thee, the only true God, and Him whom 
Thou didst send " (S. John xvii. 3). But no one can 
at once be worthy of eternal life and of eternal death. 
Therefore it is impossible that any one have charity with 
mortal sin. 

(1) It maybe said that S. Peter in denying Christ sinned 
mortally, and yet charity was not extinct in him, but only 
asleep. But I reply that charity is lost either directly 



Qu. XXV. 1.] THE OBJECT OF CHARITY. 197 

through actual contempt, and in this way he did not lose 
it, or indirectly, when something contrary to charity is 
committed on account of some passion of concupiscence or 
fear ; and, in this way, Peter, acting against charity, lost 
it, but quickly recovered it. 

(2) Inordinate affection for created good sometimes con- 
stitutes mortal sin — sc, when it is such as directly opposes 
the Diyine will — and this inordination is directly contrary 
to charity, 

§ 3. The object of charity. 

Charity extends itself to love of our neighbour. 

" This commandment have we from God, that he who 
loves God, love his neighbour also " (1 Ep. S. John iv. 
21). It is the same specific act by which God is loved 
and that by which our neighbour is loved. For the reason 
of loving our neighbour is God, since what we ought to 
love in our neighbour is that he is in God.* 

(1) There is a fear of man on account of what is his — say, 
his cruelty ; and there is another fear of man on account of 
what is of God in him — say, his Divine office ; and such fear 
of man, like the corresponding love, is not separable from 
the fear and love of God. 

(2) A different honour, indeed, is clue to God from that 
which is due to our neighbour. But all love of charity is 
referred to the one common good ; whereas we give diverse 
honours to different individuals according to their separate 
and diverse virtues. 

(3) Hope precedes charity, and yet hope directed to man 
is blamed if that man is regarded as the author of our salva- 
tion, but not if he is viewed as the minister of God in such 
relations. 

* The Pater Noster devoutly used may be made an act of charity, 
the first part being used to express love of God, the second part imply- 
ing love of our neighbour. 



198 CHARITY. [Qu. xxv. 4, 5. 

We cannot love the brutes with the love of charity, because 
there can be no proper union of life with them, much less the 
communion "f eternal beatitude. 

But still they can be loved out of charity, as good things 
which we wish others to have ; sc, that they may be pre- 
served for the honour of God. and the utility of men. 

Ought man to love himself out of charity f 

Of course we cannot properly speak of friendship with 
one's self, but the unity of self is the type of union with 
another; the love of self is the pattern and root of love 
of another. For we have friendship for others when they 
are a sort of Becond Bell Bui we e;m speak of charity 
according to its proper idea, as principally the friendship 
of man with God, and, consequent on that, with what be- 
longs to God. Among which things is also the man who 
has charity. And so among the things which he loves out 
of charity as pertaining to God, he may love himself with 
the love of charity. 

Evil nun in the 1 ; i ~ t days will he 'Movers of themselves" 
i. iii. 1 i. but this self-love is according to our sen- 
suous nature, which is not truly loving self according to 
our rational nature and wishing for self those good things 
which pertain to the perfection of reason, which love in the 
highest degree pertains to charity. 

Our bodily nature is from God, and shares in those toorks 
by which we may arrive at the perfect fruition of God. 

Some beatitude reaches to the body ; sc, vigour of health 
and incorruption. Therefore, because the body is to be a 
participator in beatitude, it can be loved with the love of 
charity. 

When the apostle desired to be freed from " the body of 
this death" (Rom. vii. 24), and "to depart and be with 
Christ " (Phil. i. 23), he did not shrink from communion 
with his. body as respects the bodily nature. He wished to 



Qu. XXT. 6.] THE OBJECT OF CHAEITT. 199 

be free from the infection of concupiscence, which remains 
in the body, and from its corruption, which loads down the 
soul from seeing God; and so he expressly called it "the 
body of this death." 

Are sinners to be loved out of charity? 

We may consider either their nature or their sin. Ac- 
cording to the nature which they have from God they are 
capable of beatitude, on the communion in which charity 
is founded ; and, therefore, according to their nature they 
are to be loved out of charity. But their fault is opposed 
to God, and is an impediment of beatitude. Hence, ac- 
cording to their sin, by which they are adversaries of God, 
all sinners, even father and mother and nearest relatives, 
are to be hated (S. Luke xiv. 26). For sinners we ought 
to hate because they are sinners, and to love because they 
are men, capable of beatitude ; and this is the true love 
of charity, for God's sake. 

(1) David said, out of charity, "I hate them that imagine 
evil things" (Ps. cxix. 113). But hating the evil of any 
one is all one with loving his good. 

(2) But sometimes just men do not exhibit to sinners the 
works of love; on the contrary, they seem to act out of 
hatred ; as the Psalmist said (Ps. ci. 11), "I shall soon de- 
stroy all the ungodly that are in the land." But the kind 
deeds of friendship are not to be withheld from sinful neigh- 
bours as long as there is hope of their amendment, but aid 
for their recovery is to be afforded much more than for loss 
of money, since virtue has more to do with friendship than 
money has. But when they fall into the greatest malice, 
and become hopeless in their sin, then the familiarity of 
friendship is not to be exhibited to them. And so sinners 
of this kind, from whom injury to others is to be expected 
instead of their own amendment, are sometimes cut off by 
human and by Divine law. And yet this is done, not out 
of hatred for them (as human beings), but out of charity, 



200 CHARITY. [Qu. xxv. 8. 

because the public good is preferred to the life of an indi- 
vidual. And even death inflicted by just sentence may 
benefit the sinner, if he penitently expiate his fault ; or, if 
he be not converted, at least his power of sinning further 
(in that way) is taken away. 

(3) "What, then, shall we say of the imprecatory Psalms ? 
(a) They are prophetic denunciations, (b) The desire of the 
speaker is ool referred to the pnnishmenl of men as punish- 
ment, but to the justice of the One who inflicts the penalty. 
'"The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance;" 
he shall say, "Doubtless there is a God that judgcth the 
earth " (Ps. Lviii. 9). For even God Himself delights not in 
the destruction of the wicked, but in His justice, (c) The 
desire is referred to the removal of the sin, not to the pen- 
alty of it in itself. 

I l) Charity will no! make ns will what sinners will, or 
in what they rejoice in ; but its aim will be that they 
may will whai better men will, and rejoice with them. 

(5) As respects association with sinners out of charity, the 
weak will avoid it out of fear of the danger of perversion ; 
but where there is no such occasion for fear, it is laudable to 
associate with sinners for the sake of their conversion, as the 
Lord did. Association in the sin is another matter. 

7s it essential to charity that enemies be loved? 

The Lord commanded, " Love your enemies " (S. Matt, 
v. 44). Xow, love of enemies may be considered in three 
ways : (1) That they be loved as enemies ; and this is per- 
verted affection and repugnant to charity, because it is lov- 
ing the evil which is in another. (2) Love of enemies may 
be referred to their nature, in a general way, and so it is an 
essential part of charity; sc.. that one who loves God and 
his neighbour may not exclude his enemies from that all- 
embracing love. (3) Love of enemies may be considered in 
its special application to particular enemies ; sc, that one 
be moved by a special impulse of love for his individual 



Qu. XXV. 9.] THE OBJECT OF CHARITY. 201 

enemy. And that is not absolutely essential to charity, 
since it would be practically impossible that there should be 
a special impulse of love towards every individual man, 
woman, and child. And yet, as a preparation of the soul, 
this is essential to charity, namely, that we be prepared to 
love our individual enemy, if need should arise. But that, 
apart from need, man should actually fulfil this and love 
his individual enemy for God's sake, pertains to the perfec- 
tion of charity. For since out of charity our neighbour is 
loved for God's sake, the more we love God, the more we 
show love to our neighbour, no enmity impeding us from 
love ; just as, if one should love any man, he would love his 
children, even though they were personal enemies. 

Charity, indeed, does not destroy nature, and each thing 
naturally hates what is contrary to itself, as contrary to 
it. But enemies as such are contrary to us, and this we 
ought to hate in them ; it ought to displease us that they 
are enemies. But they are not opposed to us as men 
and capable of beatitude. In this regard we ought to love 
them. 

Is it necessary to salvation that one show signs and effects 
of love towards his enemy ? 

The Lord said (S. Luke vi. 27), " Do good to them that 
hate you," which precept pertains to the perfection of char- 
ity ("Be ye therefore perfect, as your Father in heaven is 
perfect'*). But that which pertains to the perfection of 
charity is not a necessary part of it. Note, then, that the 
effects and signs of charity proceed from inward love and 
are proportioned to it. Inward love of our enemy in a gen- 
eral way is an absolutely necessary part of charity, but in 
special application, only according to the preparation of the 
soul ; I mean, as above, that we must be ready to love our 
individual enemy as need may occur. The same thing is to 
be said of showing outwardly the effects and signs of love. 
There are certain signs or kind deeds of love which are 



202 CHARITY. [Qu. xxvi. 1, 2. 

exhibited to every neighbour, as when one prays for all tho 
faithful, or for all the people, or when one bestows some ben- 
efit on the whole community. Such benefits or signs of love 
must be exhibited to cuemies. This is an obligation of char- 
ity. For if they were not so exhibited, there would be a re- 
vengeful spirit (mortal sin. and against charity). But there 
are certain benefits or signs of love which one gives to special 
friends. It is not essential to salvation that such bo offered 
bo enemies, except that we must be ready to do so in case of 
need. " It' thine enemy hanger, feed him ; if he thirst, give 
him drink" (Rom. xii. 20). But that, apart from necessity, 
one exhibit benefits of this kind to his enemies, pertains to 
the perfection of charity by which one not only avoids being 
"overcome of evil," which is necessary, but also aims to 
"overcome evil with good," which belongs to perfection. 
Ee in>t "iily avoids being drawn into hatred od account of 
the injury done to him, but also through benefits he aims 
to draw his enemy into loving him. 

| 4. The order of charity. 

Charity tends towards God as the source of beatitude, 
and, therefore, there is an order in charity depending on 
the relation of other things to the first principle of this 
love, which is God. 

Is God to be loved more than our neighbour ? 

(Xote that this love is esteem, not necessarily intensity of 
love.) Every friendship chiefly regards that in which is 
chiefly found the good in whose communication the friend- 
ship is grounded. But the friendship of charity is grounded 
on the communication of beatitude which essentially is in 
God, from Him derived to all who are capable of it. God, 
therefore, is to be loved in the first place, as the cause of 
beatitude ; but our neighbour, as participating along with 
us in that beatitude so derived. And the Lord said (8. 
Luke xiv. 26), "If any man come to Me, and hate not his 



Qu. XXVI. 3.] THE OEDEE OF CHAEITY. 203 

father and mother — he cannot be My disciple/' Neigh- 
bours, then, are to be hated if they lead away from God — 
i.e., God out of cbarity is to be loved more than they. 

(1) But S. John says (1 Ep. iv. 20), "He that loveth 
not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God 
whom he hath not seen ?" Sight is the cause of love as a 
medium of acquiring it. Not that anything is lovely be- 
cause it is visible, but because through vision we are led to 
love. Not that that which is more visible is to be more 
loved, but it is the first to meet our love. So argues the 
apostle. For our neighbour is the first object which meets 
our love, and if any one love not him, it may be argued that 
he does not love God, not because his neighbour is more 
worthy of love, but because he is its first object. 

(2) Likeness is cause of love, and there is greater simili- 
tude between man and man than between man and God. 
But the latter is prior, and the cause of the former. Par- 
ticipating from God in that which our neighbour also has 
from Him, we are made like our neighbour. This, there- 
fore, is an argument for loving God the most. 

(3) But is not God loved in our neighbour ? Yes ; but 
our neighbour has not that goodness which is the ground 
of love essentially, but only by participation. (Inferior 
goodness is the reason for inferior love.) 

/Should man out of charity love God more than he loves 



We can receive two goods from God — the good of nature, 
and the good of grace. On the communication of the first 
is founded natural love, by which not only man in his 
sound, natural condition loves God above all things, but so 
does also every creature after its manner, tending to the 
common good of the whole, rather than to its own individ- 
ual good. 

Much more is this true in the love of charity, which 
is founded on the communication of the gifts of grace. 



204 CHARITY. [Qu. xxvi. 4. 

Therefore, man ought to love God, who is the common good 
of all, above himself, because beatitude is in God, as in the 
common fount, for all who can participate in it. 

(1) It may be asserted that anything is loved as being 
one's own good, and therefore self, which is the cause of 
the loving, is more Loved. And it is true that the part loves 
the good of the whole, according as that good is convenient 
for Lfcself : bnl yet it docs not refer that good of the whole 
to itself (selfishly), but it refers itself to the good of the 
whole. 

(2) Again, it may be .-aid that in loving the fruition of 
God one loves himself, Bince this is the highest good which 
one can wish for himself. But love of desire is not love of 
friendship, and towards (iud the latter is greater than the 
former, because greater is the good which lie is, than the 
good in which we can participate through eternal joys. 

Should man out of charity love himself more than he loves 
his neighbour .' 

The Lord said (S. Matt. xxii. 39), ''Thou shalt love thy 
neighbour as thyself." Love of self, then, is the exemplar, 
the pattern, of love for our neighbour. But the pattern is 
more than that which is patterned after it. Therefore, 
man should love himself more than he loves his neighbour. 
Man is said to love himself, because his spiritual nature is 
the object of his love (see page 48). And after this man- 
ner man ought to love himself the most after God. Consider 
the very idea of this love. God is loved as the source of 
good on which is founded the love of charity. But man 
loves himself out of charity, as he is a participator of that 
good, but his neighbour is loved as an associate in that good. 
But such association is the reason of love according to a cer- 
tain union in relation to God. But unity is more powerful 
than union, and that man himself participates in Divine 
good is a more potent reason for loving than that another is 
associated with him in that participation. And a further 



Qu. XXVI. 5.] THE ORDER OF CHARITY. 205 

proof that man ought to love himself more than his neigh- 
bour is that man ought not to incur any sin (even the slight- 
est venial sin) which is a hindrance to the participation of 
beatitude, in order to deliver his neighbour (or any number 
of neighbours) from sin. 

(1) A man ought to bear corporeal losses for his neigh- 
bour, but in this very thing he spiritually loves himself 
more, because this pertains to the perfection of virtue, 
which is a spiritual good. 

(2) Why, then, is it said that " Charity seeketh not her 
own"? (L Cor. xiii. 5). Because, I answer, she seeks the 
common good, preferring that to her own proper good. 

Ought man to love his neighbour more than his own 
hody ? 

That is to be more loved out of charity which has more 
fully the idea of a "lovable object." But association in 
beatitude, which is the reason for loving our neighbour, is 
a greater reason for loving than such share of beatitude 
as indirectly belongs to the body, which is the reason for 
extending the love of charity to our own body. Therefore, 
the salvation of our neighbour's soul is more to be loved 
than our own body. 

(1) Our body, indeed, is nearer to our soul than our 
neighbour is ; but as regards the participation of beatitude, 
his soul is nearer ours than our own body is. 

(2) But, it is said, each one exposes that which he loves 
less, for that which he loves more, and every man is not 
bound to expose his own body for the safety of his neigh- 
bour, for this belongs to the perfect in charity, as the Lord 
said (S. John xv. 13) : " Greater love hath no man than 
this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." But I 
answer that every one has the care of his own body, and 
every one has not the care of his neighbour's salvation, ex- 
cept in case of necessity. Therefore, it is not essential to 
charity that one offer his body for the salvation of his neigh- 



206 cnARlTT. [Qu. xxvi. G. 

bour except where he is bound to provide for it. That he 
should freely offer himself pertains to the perfection of 
charity. (Every one is bound by charity to succour his 
neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity, even with certain 
peril of death, if there be hope of benefit thereby.) 

It is plain from this that those who have the cure of souls 
are bound to run any risk of pestilence, etc., for the grave 
spiritual necessity of those under their charge. But where 
there is do official duty, charily may gain for one a double 
reward. 

Are all neighbours to be loved equally .' 

Some have said that all are to be equally loved inwardly 
out of charity according to the affection of the heart, hut 
not as regards outward effects of it ; that greater benefits 
are due to those who are nearer. But this is a mistake. 
For the inclination, whether of nature or of grace, is pro- 
portioned to the things which are to be done through it. 
We niu-i have Lntenser alTection of charity to those whom 
we ought to benefit the more. According to the affection 
of the soul on- neighbour is to he loved more than another. 
And the reason is that since there are two principles of 
low — viz., God, and the one who loves — love necessarily 
varies according to the propinquity of the one who is loved 
to one or other of these two principles. 

Again, the degree of lose is to be measured by the gravity 
of sins against love. But he sins more grievously who acts 
against the love of some neighbours than he who offends 
against others. And the Old Law says (Lev. xx. 9), " He 
that curseth father or mother shall be put to death." This 
is not commanded against all who curse others. Therefore 
we ought to love some neighbours more than others. 

(1) In one way all are to be loved equally, viz., that we 
desire eternal beatitude for all ; but equal intensity of love 
is not due to all alike. Inequality in beneficence, also, 
must be observed, because we cannot do good to all. But 



Qu. XXVI. 8.] THE OKDEE OF CHAEITT. 207 

in good-will such inequality has no place. We can wish 
equal beatitude for all, though not with equal intensity of 
love. 

(2) Some also are nearer to God through greater good- 
ness, and such are to be more loved for that reason. 

Ought we to love our relatives more than better men ? 

S. Paul seems to say so, when he says (1 Tim. v. 8), 
' ' If any provideth not for his own, and specially his own 
household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an 
infidel." Love, like every activity, takes its specific char- 
acter from its object, but its intensity from the one who 
loves. But the object of the love of charity is God ; the 
one who loves is man. Therefore the specific diversity of 
love of charity which distinguishes it from natural emotion 
depends on the loving our neighbours in relation to God; 
sc, that out of charity we will greater good for him who is 
nearer God. For although that good is one in itself, viz., 
eternal beatitude, still it has different grades in the diverse 
participation of it. And it pertains to charity to desire 
that the justice of God bear rule., <• id that the better par- 
ticipate more perfectly in beatitude 

But the intensity of the love depends on the one who 
loves, and charity more intensely desires good for those who 
are nearest than it desires greater good for better men. 

Again, out of charity I can wish that he who is conjoined 
to me by earthly bonds be better than another, and so 
attain to higher beatitude. Again, out of charity we may 
love in various ways those united to us by earthly bonds. 
For with those not so conjoined we have only the friend- 
ship of charity ; but with relatives, we have other kinds 
of friendship. But when the good on which that other 
friendship is founded is ordained to the end of charity, 
charity itself may command the act of that other friendship 
{e.g., love of man and wife). Thus the loving another be- 
cause he is a blood-relation or united otherwise, or because 



208 CHARITY. [Qu. XXVI. 8. 

he is a fellow-citizen, may be commanded by charity ; and 
so from charity both eliciting and commanding in various 
ways, we love those united to us more than better men. 

(1) But there may be grounds of hating in some manner 
those connected with us (S, Luke xiv. 2G), whereas the 
good can in no way be hated. I reply that we are not 
bidden to hate those nearest to us because of their connec- 
tion, but as they keep ns away from God ; so far they are 
enemies, uoi relatives (Mic. vii. 6). 

Bnt God loves more those who are better, and charity 
makes us mosl like to God. I answer, yes; in due propor- 
tion — \iz., thai man .-hall be -> related to what is his, as 
- related bo what is Bis. And some things charity 
may had as to will, as Buitable Eor us, which God does not 
will, because it is not holy and righteous that He should 
will them. 

(3) But by natural affection we love more those who are 
more clos fly united to US, as parents and children ; whereas 
charity i.s founded on the communion of beatitude, in which 
better men have the larger share. Yes ; but charity not 
only elicits the act of love according to the character of its 
object, but also according to the state of the one who loves. 

Should /r< loved the most ? 

It has been shown that out of charity those who are more 
united to us are to be loved more, both because they are 
loved more intensely, and because they are loved for more 
reasons. The intensity depends upon the union. And 
therefore the love of diverse persons is to be measured ac- 
cording to the diverse nature of the union ; each one is to 
be loved more in that which pertaius to the fellowship ac- 
cording to which he is loved. And love is to be compared 
with love, as fellowship is compared with fellowship. Thus, 
then, the friendship of kindred is founded on common 
origin, but that of fellow-citizens on civil communion, etc. 
And therefore in those things which pertain to nature, we 



Qu. XXVI. 11.] THE ORDER OF CHARITY. 209 

ought more to love our kindred ; but in those things which 
pertain to civil life, our fellow-citizens, etc. But if we 
compare one fellowship with another, it is evident that 
natural kinship is prior and more permanent ; but other 
unions supervene on that and can be removed. And there- 
fore love of kindred is the more lasting ; but other friend- 
ships can be more potent in that which is proper to each of 
them. 

(1) But friends are made by free choice and judgment. 
Yes ; and therefore such friendship preponderates where 
we have our choice in what we are to do along with them. 
But kinship is more stable, since it exists by nature and pre- 
vails in that which belongs to nature. "We are more bound 
to assist kindred in need than we are to aid near friends. 

(2) If spiritual children have higher claims as regards the 
communication of grace, children by nature have higher 
claims for bodily assistance. 

And note that in the Decalogue parents are named as 
the nearest by blood, and therefore the nearest in affec- 
tion. 

(Looking at love objectively, S. Thomas finds ground for 
loving a father above a child ; but subjectively— i.e., on the 
side of the one who loves — he reverses this view. Also he 
places father above mother in the order of filial love.) 

Should a man love his wife more than father or mother ? 

S. Paul (Eph. v. 28) says that husbands ought " to love 
their wives as their own bodies." But a man ought to love 
his neighbour more than his own body, and parents are near- 
est neighbours. So it might be argued that parents are to 
be loved more than wife. This needs examination. The 
degree of love depends, on the one hand, on the idea of 
the good ; on the other, on the degree of union with the one 
who loves. According to the first, parents are to be more 
loved, because the good in the parental relation is preemi- 
nent. But according to the second, the wife has the prefer- 
14 



210 CHARITY. [QU. XXVI. 11. 

ence, for husband and wife arc " one flesh " (S. Matt. xix. 
C). We conclude that the wife is to be loved more in- 
tensely, but greater reverential love is due to parents. 

But why do the Scriptures say that a man " shall leave 
father and mother" for his wife ? (Gen. ii. 24.) This 
is said of cohabitation, not of abandonment in all respects, 
for in certain respects a man's first duly is still to his 
parents. 

The word "as " in Eph. v. 28 is not an adverb of equal- 
ity, but it gives the reason for the Love of her who is most 
<■]..-■ I\ conjoined to one's Belf. 

i A similar new is adopted with respect to benefactors 
and those who receive benefits ; the latter have before them 
the good as the objeel of love : the former are more closely 
united to the object of benefaction.) 

In the Christian's fatherland God will be first in love, by 
uninterrupted action. And in that perfect conformity of 
the human will to the Divine, as regards the good which 
each wishes for each, the best will be best loved, in the 
wish that they may most perfectly enjoy the common 
beatitude. He will be regarded as nearest neighbour who 
i- nearest to God. But self will be most intensely loved, 
since each one will, first of all, direct all his powers towards 
God. And this pertains to self-love. (I do not find this 
char and satisfactory. — J. J. E.) That provision of love by 
which each one is bound to succour kindred in their need 
will cease, and bo far the inclination of charity towards 
them. But still, in the fatherland, one may love his kin- 
dred in various ways, for the causes of honourable love will 
not come to an end. But incomparably above all these 
reasons for love will be the nearness to God. Nature is not 
taken away by glory, but perfected. 

(Seven acts or effects of charity may be distinguished : 
first and chief, love ; then three internal acts, joy, peace, 
and mercy ; then three outward acts or kind deeds in general ; 
sc, "beneficence," alms-giving, and brotherly correction. 



Qu. xxvii. 2, 3, 5.] LOVE. 21 i 

The first four -will be abridged from the author's fuller 
statements.) 

§ 5. Love. 

Is love (dilectio), as the act or effect of charity, the same 
as benevolence ? 

Benevolence, as the word intimates, is the act of the will 
by which we will another's good. But this, even when 
founded in judgment, may exist without true love. Spir- 
itual love, as distinguished from the passion in the sense-ap- 
petite, implies a union of affections, so that the one who loves 
regards the one who is loved as in a certain way one with 
himself or as belonging to himself, which is not implied in 
benevolence. Love, then, includes the other, but adds to it. 

God is to be loved out of charity for Himself alone. 

That is, He is the ultimate final cause of all, and there 
is nothing beyond Him on account of which we may love 
Him. Again, His goodness is Himself, underived, and 
the exemplar and source of all goodness in other beings. 
He cannot, properly speaking, be loved on account of His 
goodness, because He is goodness. But, again, from other 
sources the love of God for Himself alone may spring up 
in the heart ; thus He may be loved because of benefits 
received or rewards promised (1 S. John iv. 19). 

How can we "love God with all our heart"? (Deut. 
vi. 5.) 

If we speak of loving God wholly, we may have one of 
three different things in mind : (1) We may mean that 
everything which pertains to God is loved ; (2) we may 
mean what is commanded above, that we love God with 
all our power of love, and ordain all things which fall 
under our power with reference to that love, both of which 
we can and ought to do ; or (3) we may refer to the object 



212 CHARITY. [QU. XXVII. 7. 

of love, and speak of loving in a manner adequate to the 
object of love. This, of course,, in this case is impossible. 
For God's goodness is infinite and infinitely lovely. There 
is no limit to that love. The more God is loved, the better 
is that love. There can be no excess in it. 

Is it more meritorious />> love an enemy than to love a 
friend? 

Remember that God is the ground <>f our loving our 
neighbour out of charity. Loving an enemy, then, and 
loving a friend, may he compared in two ways, either on 
the side of the neighbour who is loved, or on the side of the 
reason for loving him. In the first way, the love of a 
friend i~ superior because a friend is better and more united 
with us. Here is a more suitable object for love, and the 
love i< therefore better, as. also, its opposite is worse. For 
it is worse to hate a friend than to bate an enemy. Ami 
since it is better to love the bitter, and a friend is better 
than an enemy, so far it is more m. ritorious to love a friend. 

But now, on the other hand, let us consider the reason 
ring. First, we see thai some other reason than God 
may produce the love of a friend ; but the love of an 
enemy is due to God only as the reason for it. And, in the 
next place, even if we suppose that both are loved for 
sake, the love of God is stronger when it extends 
more widely, even to the loving of our enemies. So that 
is the hottest fire whose influence is felt the most widely. 
The stronger love fulfils the more difficult things. But as 
the fire acts more powerfully on the nearer objects, so 
charity more fervently loves those who are joined in bonds 
of love. In this respect the love of friends, considered in 
itself, is more fervent and is better than the love of enemies. 
Why, then, did the Lord say (S. Matt. v. 40), "If 
ye love them that love you, what reward have ye ?" I 
answer that the love of friends is there regarded in itself 
— i.e., their being loved because they are friends, which has 



Qu. xxvni.] JOY. 213 

no reward with God. And this seems to be the case 
whenever friends are so loved that enemies are not loved. 

Is it more meritorious to love our neighbour than to love 
God ? 

In such a comparison as that, we may consider each love 
in itself, and so viewed, there is no doubt that the love of 
God is more meritorious. For the reward is promised to 
that on its own account. The ultimate reward is the frui- 
tion of God, and the Lord said (S. John xiv. 21), "He 
that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, . . . and 
I will manifest Myself unto him." 

But again, in this comparison, we may, on the one hand, 
consider God as being the only object of love, and compare 
that with the love of our neighbour, which is for God's 
sake. Such love includes the love of God, while the love 
of God did not include the love of our neighbour. That 
is, perfect love of God, which extends itself to our neigh- 
bour, is compared with insufficient and imperfect love. In 
this sense, the love of our neighbour is superior. For " this 
commandment have we from God, that he who loveth God, 
love his brother also" (1 Ep. S. John iv. 21). 

But is it not easier, more natural, to love God ? And 
is not the more difficult task of loving one's neighbour 
therefore meritorious ? I reply that the good has more to 
do with virtue and merit than difficulty has. Not every 
more difficult task is more meritorious, but only when it is 
more difficult because it is better. 

§ 6. Joy. 

Spiritual joy is caused, in the first place, by the Divine 
good considered in itself ; for what we love, we rejoice in 
seeing to possess its proper good. Or, again, the joy is 
caused by the participation of that Divine good, the pres- 
ence of that which is loved in the soul. The first is bet- 
ter, and the special effect of charity. If what is loved were 



214 CHARITY. [QlJ. xxix. 

altogether absent, sorrow would be the effect of charity ; 
but there is a presence through grace, which is the cause 
of joy. The Lord said, indeed, ''blessed are they that 
mourn," etc. But this mourning for what is opposed to 
the loved good has the same ground with the joy in that 
good itself. 

The Divine good considered in itself is the cause of the 
unmingled spiritual joy of charity (Phil. iv. 4) ; but that 
joy which results from participation in that infinite good 
can be mingled with sorrow, because that participation can 
be impeded either in ourselves or in our neighbour, whom 
we love as ourself. 

The plenitude of joy cannot be looked for in this life, for 
desire always continues, seeking to draw nearer to God 
through grace. And so long as desire is not fully satisfied, 
the rest of spiritual joy in all its perfection is not attained. 

We i:.u-t qoI regard joy as a separate virtue, but as an 
act, an effect, or a fruit of charity. And it is the subject 
of Divine precept because it is an act of charity. 

£ 7. Peace. 

Peace is more than concord. It embraces that and more 
Wherever peace is found, there is concord ; but 
concord may be found where peace does not exist. For 
concord is relative to others; it means the harmony of di- 
verse wills agreeing with one consent. But the heart of 
one man also is distracted, both by the conflict of diverse 
desires (Gal. v. 17. " The flesh lusteth against the spirit"), 
and by the same desire seeking for diverse objects which 
cannot be at once possessed. But there must be inward as 
well as outward harmony to constitute that peace of which 
we now are speaking. 

Wars and dissensions are not sought for as an ultimate 
end, but as means for a more perfect peace. 

This inward and outward peace is the effect of charity ; 
for when God is loved with the whole heart, and all things 



Qu. xxx. 2.] MERCY AND PITY. 215 

are referred to Him, there is inward harmony of ail desires. 
And when our neighbour is loved as ourself, his will is 
sought for as our own. Friends will the same things. 

This outward peace does not, in this life, where there is 
imperfect knowledge of the truth, imply perfect concord of 
opinions, but only concord in the chief goods of our spirit- 
ual life. Dissension, then, in little things and in opinions, 
like that of SS. Paul and Barnabas (Acts xv.), is not repug- 
nant to the peace of charity. For opinions pertain to judg- 
ment, which precedes desire. It is the latter where the 
concord is to be sought for. Again, where there is concord 
in the chief goods, dissension respecting trifles is not contrary 
to charity, for that dissension comes from diversity of opin- 
ions, where one judges the matter of dissension to pertain 
to the good in which all agree, while the judgment of the 
other holds the contrary opinion. Such dissension is op- 
posed to the perfect peace of fatherland, not to the imper- 
fect peace of the pilgrims thither (in via). 

We must not regard peace as a separate virtue, but as the 
act, effect, or fruit of charity. And as such act it is com- 
manded by the Lord (S. Mark ix. 50). 

§ 8. Mercy and pity (misericordia). 

These are compassion for the evil which another is suf- 
fering, especially when he suffers without his own fault. 
But compassion may embrace even sinners, not as regards 
the voluntary sin, for pity concerns the involuntary evil, 
but as fault has attached to it that which is involuntary. 
So the Lord had compassion for the multitude (S. Matt. 



He that loves, regards his friend as a part of himself , and 
his friend's evil as if it were his own. 

He "rejoices with them that rejoice;" and he "weeps 
with them that weep" (Rom. xii. 15). Anger and pride 



216 CHARITY. [Qu. XXX. 3, 4. 

oppose this virtue, because the first lifts above the appre- 
hension of evil ; the other, because it leads to contempt of 
others, and to the notion that they suffer worthily. 

Is mercy a special virtue ? 

Pain at another's trouble may be a passion of the sensi- 
tive nature. But, again, it may be an emotion of the higher 
intellectual soul, as the evil of another is displeasing to us. 
And this motion of the soul can be regulated by reason, and 
so can govern the brute passion of pity. Hence, S. Au- 
gustine says (('i\. Dei, ix. :>) "that emotion of the soul is 
obedienl i>> reason when mercy is shown in such a way that 
justice is preserved, whether help is given to the needy, or 
pardon to the penitent." And since virtue consists in gov- 
erning the motions of the soul by reason, such mercy is 
consequently a virtue. 

(1) It is the sentiment of compassion in the emotional 
soul which may impede justice. 

i j i The Bentiment of vengeance and compassion are two 
contrary passions, each of them laudable in its place, the 
one pained at unworthy suffering in another, the other 
pleased at Buffering which is due, and pained at the pros- 
perity of the unworthy. 

(3) Mercy is a Bpecial virtue, because it adds a new idea — 
sc, the soitow which is compassionated. 

/.-• mercy tlte highest of virt 

In itself it is so, because it spreads abroad to others, and, 
still more, it supplies the defects of others. Hence it is 
the peculiar property of God, and in it His omnipotence is 
specially manifested. But if we look, not at the thing in 
itself, but at him who has it, mercy is not the highest vir- 
tue unless he who has it is highest, having none above him. 
For if one has a superior, it is greater and better to be united 
to that superior than to supply the defects of an inferior. 
Charity, therefore, by wbich man is joined to God is more 



Qu. xxxi. 1.] BENEFICENCE. 217 

than mercy. But mercy is chief among the virtues which 
regard our neighbour. 

(1) God "desires mercy and notsacrifi.ee" (Hos. vi. 6), 
because outward gifts and sacrifices are ordained not on His 
account, but ours and our neighbours. For He does not 
need our sacrifices, but He wills that they be offered to Him 
for the sake of our own devotion and for the benefit of our 
neighbour. Therefore mercy, which supplies the needs of 
others, is the most acceptable sacrifice, since it comes nearer 
to the benefit of our neighbour. " To do good and to com- 
municate, forget not ; for with such sacrifices God is well 
pleased" (Heb. xiii. 16). "But above all these things, 
put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness" (Col. iii. 
14). 

(2) Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as respects 
its outward manifestation ; by it we are assimilated to G-od 
in His operations, for "His mercy is over all His works," 
and the Lord says: "Be ye therefore merciful, as your 
Father is merciful" (S. Luke vi. 36); but higher is the 
inward affection of charity by which we are united to God 
and assimilated to Him. 

§ 9. Beneficence. 

How is beneficence the outivard act of charity ? 

Doing good to another may come under the idea of pay- 
ing him his due ; it is then an act of justice. It may come 
under the idea of relieving misery or defect ; it is then an 
act of mercy. But it may also come under the general idea 
of the good, and so it is an act of friendship, of charity. 
For in the act of love is included benevolence, by which we 
will good to our friend. But will accomplishes its purpose 
if it have the power to do so. Therefore, beneficence fol- 
lows from the act of love. 

But it is the act of charity from him who is in some way 
superior. Therefore, it is God's act of love towards us, not 
ours towards Him (but ours towards our brethren). 



218 CHARITY. [Qu. XXXI. 2, 3. 

"As toe have opportunity, toe must do good to all men''' 
(Gal. vi. 10). 

Beneficence proceeds from the superior to the inferior ; 
hut the grades among us arc not immutable, for men can 
suffer manifold defects, and he who is superior in one re- 
spect may be inferior in another. And, therefore, since 
the love of charity extends to all, beneficence must be pre- 
pared to extend to all according to place and season. For 
all acta of bhe virtues are limited by their due circum- 
stances. 

(1) In practice, it is not possible to do good bo all ; and 
virtue does not demand the impossible. But still there is 
no one who may not at some time, or place, or in some way, 
have a special claim on beneficence, and charity requires at 
leasl the preparation of bouI to do good when opportunity 

be itself, and the prayer of charity embraces all. 

cj i Sinners are noi excluded, for they have their claim 
as men. which is bo bo met, without Cooperating in their 
sin. 

(:>) The same remark applies to enemies of the church or 
the state. Benefits are withdrawn in order that, if possi- 
ble, they may be restrained from their fault. But in case 
of grave necessity, help is to be given under due restric- 
tions, unless, in the latter ease, they are suffering the pen- 
f just law. 

Do we oive mod beneficence to our nearest neighbours ? 

Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is 
instituted by Divine wisdom. But in that order of nature 
every natural agent diffuses its action first and most ener- 
getically to those things which are nearest to it, as the fire 
warms most what is closest to it. But the bestowing of 
benefits is an action of charity towards others, and, there- 
fore, it must be most shown to those who are most near. 
But the nearness of one man to another depends on the 
various things in which men communicate with one another 



Qu. XXXI. 3.] BENEFICENCE. 219 

— kinship, citizenship, fellowship in spiritual things, etc. 
And according to these diverse fellowships diverse benefits 
are to be dispensed, to each one that benefit which pertains 
to his relationship to us. Yet this will be varied according 
to the diversity of places, times, and other circumstances. 
For in some cases the stranger in extreme necessity has 
higher claim than even a parent who has no such need. 

(1) But the Lord said (S. Luke xiv. 12), " When thou 
makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy 
brethren, nor thy kinsmen, but bid the poor,'' etc. Yes ; 
but the Lord did not simply prohibit the inviting of friends 
or kinsmen, but the doing it for the sake of a return in 
kind, which is not charity but cupidity. Still it can happen 
that strangers have the first claim on account of greater 
need. Cwteris paribus, the nearer are to be benefited first. 
But if, in the case of two persons, one is nearer and the other 
more needy, no universal rule can determine who is first to 
be aided, because there are various degrees of propinquity 
and of need. This requires prudent judgment. 

(2) But debts are to be paid before gratuitous benefits are 
conferred ; therefore benefactors have the preference over 
neighbours (by kinship, etc.). I answer that there are two 
kinds of debt ; one, which is not to be counted among the 
goods of him who owes, but rather among the creditor's 
goods, say, if one has another's property which has been 
stolen from him, or which is a loan, or a deposit, or any- 
thing of that nature. A man has first to restore this debt, 
rather than to do good out of it to those who are connected 
with him, unless perhaps there should be grave necessity, in 
which case it would even be lawful to take another's prop- 
erty in order to relieve the immediate want. But even in 
this case the condition of each in other respects would have 
to be prudently considered, and no universal rule can be laid 
down for the infinite variety of cases. 

But there is another debt which is reckoned among the 
goods of him who owes it, due not from necessity of justice, 



220 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxii. 1. 

but from a kind of moral equity, as in the case of benefits 
freely received. But no benefactor as such is equal to parents. 
Therefore parents, in the recompensing of benefits, are to be 
preferred to all others, unless grave necessity should give 
the preponderance to the other side, or some other condition 
should do so, say, the common utility of the Church or the 
republic. But in other cases estimation is to be made of the 
benefaction and of the propinquity, and no general rule can 
be laid down which will determine each particular case. 

Note thai beneficence is not a virtue distinct from char- 
ity, but is one <>f those "inward acts of charity which are 
commanded (S. Mai t. v. 44). 

§ 10. Alms-giving. 

Is alms-giving an act of charity f 

Outward acts arc referred to thai virtue to which pertains 
the motive for those acts. But the motive for alms-giving 
is the relief of suffering and need. Ilcncc it may be defined 
as the giving to the needy, for God's sake, out of compas- 
sion. Now this motive pertains to mercy, which is the 
effect of charity. Consequently, alms-giving is an act of 
charity, through mercy. 

(1) But S. Paul said (1 Cor. xiii. 3), "Though 1 bestow 
all my goods to Eeed the poor, and have not charity, lam 
nothing,'' which implies that alms-giving is not the work 
of charity. But I reply that a thing done may be out- 
wardly a virtuous act, when the virtue itself does not exist ; 
as doing just things is an act of justice, which may be done 
out of natural temperament, or fear of consequences, or 
hope of getting some advantage (acts "materially " just). 

But in another way acts are inwardly virtuous ("forma- 
"), as it is the act of justice to do just things in the 
manner in which the just man does them — sc, promptly 
and with pleasure ; and in this way the virtuous act cannot 
exist without the virtue. To give alms, then, as an outward 
act, simply, can be without charity ; but true alms-giving 



Qu. xxxii. 2, 3.] ALMS-GIVING. 221 

— that is, for God's sake, pleasurablv, and jwomptly, and in 
all other respects as one ought to do— cannot be without 
charity. 

(2) The proper act elicited by one virtue may be attrib- 
uted to another which commands it, and ordains it to its 
own end. So the prophet Daniel presented alms-giving as a 
work of satisfaction in the penitent, saying (Dan. iv. 27), 
" Eedeem thine iniquities by showing mercy to the poor." 
And the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. xiii. 16) speaks of 
alms-giving as an act of worship towards God : " With such 
sacrifices God is well pleased." 

S. John is conclusive (1 Ep. iii. 17), " Whoso hath this 
world's goods and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth 
up his compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God 
in him ?" 

The corporal works of mercy 
are well distinguished as seven in number : to feed the hun- 
gry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to 
entertain the stranger, to relieve the prisoner, to visit the 
sick, and to bury the dead. Seven, likewise, are the spir- 
itual works of mercy; viz., to teach the ignorant, to counsel 
the doubting, to console the sorrowful, to correct the erring, 
to forgive the offender, to bear the infirmities of the weak, 
and to pray for all. 

Compare the corporal and spiritual ivories of mercy. 

In themselves the spiritual have the preeminence, for 
three reasons : (1) That which is given is a nobler gift, be- 
cause it is spiritual ; (2) it is a nobler thing to benefit the 
soul, the higher part of man ; for as a man ought first to 
provide for his own soul, so in the case of his neighbour 
whom he loves as himself ; (3) the acts themselves are 
nobler acts. But, on the other hand, there may be some 
particular case in which some corporal work of mercy is 
preferable to some spiritual act, as feeding a man who is 



222 en A KIT Y. [Qu. xxxii. 4, 5. 

dying- of famine is bettor than teaching him (preaching 
to him). So it may be with some other very needy man. 

(1) It may be true, in some cases, that there is more recom- 
pense for spiritual works of mercy, but this does not detract 
from their praise and merit, if it be not the aim. So human 
glory is nn detraction from the merit of virtue, if it was not 
the motive for action. 

(2) It is true, also, that the needy is likely to be more 
grateful for corpora] mercy, and so there is more consolation 
for him in such acts. Bui merit docs not depend on that 
in which the will of him who receives help actually rests, 
but rather on that in which he ought rationally to rest. 

Have the corporal works of mercy a spiritual effect ? 

We may consider them in time ways: (1) In their sub- 
stance; and so, of course, they have only material effect, 
in supplying the corporal needs of oar neighbour. (2) But 
we may consider also their cause, the love of God and our 
neighbour. So viewed, tiny have spiritual fruit. "Give 
alms of thy goods, and never turn thy face from any poor 
man. and then the face of the Lord shall not be turned 
away from thee" (Tob. iv. 7). (3) We may consider their 
effect ; and so they have spiritual fruit if the one who is 
succoured prays for bis benefactor. 

(1) But it is the sin of simony to try to purchase spirit- 
ual good. Yes ; but he who gives alms does not intend to 
buy heaven, because he knows that spiritual blessings are 
infinitely more valuable than his gifts; but he aims through 
charity to merit spiritual good. 

(2) The widow in the Gospel (S. Luke xxi. 1), in giving 
more according to her proportion, showed greater charity, 
from which the corporal works of mercy derive their spirit- 
ual efficacy. 

Are corporal zcorks of mercy obligatory ? 

That question is answered in the twenty-fifth chapter of 



qv. xxxn. 5.] ALMS-GIVING. 223 

the Gospel of S. Matthew. For some are punished with eter- 
nal penalty for the omission of the corporal works of mercy. 
The love of our neighbour is commanded ; therefore all 
things without which that love cannot be preserved fall 
under the precept. But it pertains to that love not only 
that we will our neighbour's good, but also that we effect 
it. " Let us not love in word and in tongue, but in deed 
and in truth " (1 Ep. S. John iii. 18). This requires 
that we aid his necessity by giving of alms. But precepts 
are given respecting the acts of virtues, and the giving of 
alms falls under command as the act is necessary to the 
virtue ; sc, as right reason requires, considering both the 
giver and the receiver. On the one side, that which is to 
be given is what is superfluous ; i.e., over and above what is 
necessary for the giver's own sustenance. And I say " su- 
perfluous," not only as respects the individual giver, that 
which he needs for his own support, but also as regards 
others of whom he has charge. And that is to be consid- 
ered as necessary for him (and for them) which is needful 
for their station in life. For each one is bound to provide 
first for himself and for those of whom he has charge, and 
afterwards out of the residue to aid the needs of others. 

And on the part of the recipient, he must have necessity, 
for otherwise there would be no reason for giving alms to 
him. But since it is not possible for any one to relieve the 
necessities of all, not every necessity falls under the precept, 
but only those where Avithout others' aid the needy cannot 
be sustained. So, then, to give alms of superfluities falls 
under the precept, and likewise to give alms in case of ex- 
treme necessity. But otherwise alms-giving is of counsel, as 
counsels are given for the attainment of higher spiritual good. 

(1) What, then, shall we say of the much talked-of 
rights of property ? Temporal goods are Divinely con- 
ferred as regards ownership. But as regards the use of 
them they are not the owner's alone, but also they belong 
to others who can be sustained out of the owner's superflui- 



224 CHARITY. [Qu. XXXII. G. 

ties. Well says S. Basil (Horn, in S. Luc. xii.), "If you 
say that your wealth is given to you by God, is He unjust 
in His distribution to us ? Why have you abundance while 
your brother is in distress, unless that you may have the 
merit uf being a good dispenser of the Divine bounty, and 
he be honoured with the prize of patience ? It is the bread 
of the hungry which you are keeping ; it is the clothing of the 
naked which you have under lock and key ; it is the money 
of the needy which you have deposited in bank, or invested 
in stocks. You injuriously keep what you are able to give." 

iJ) Another objection. Everything which falls under an 
affirmative precept obliges at some determined time, and 
thru transgression is mortal sin. Therefore, if alms-giving 
immanded, there will be some determinate time in 
which he sins mortally who does not give alms. Bui this 
does doI appear to be so : because in every case it may be 
probably judged that the needy will be otherwise relieved, 
and what is called for by way of alms may prove to be 
necessary for the owner in the future, at least. But I reply 
thai the determinate time when one sins mortally who re- 
to give aim- is the time when there is evident and 
urgent . and do one appears ready to give aid. 

And, on the part of the giver, the time is when he has 
superfluities which are not necessary for his present situa- 
tion according to his best judgment. Looking forward to 
all cases which may possibly occur in the future is contrary 
to the Divine command (S. Matt. vi. 34). The superfluous 
and the necessary must be judged according to the ordinary 
probabilities of things. 

The Fifth Commandment selects the most prominent ex- 
ample of giving aid to others in their need. 

Ought one to (jive alms out of what is necessary for him- 
self? 

The Lord said (S. Matt. xix. 21), "If thou wouldst be 
perfect, go, sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and 



Qu. xxxii. 6.] ALMS-GIVING. 225 

them shalt have treasure in heaven." This shows that what 
is necessary may be given in alms. But there are two kinds 
of necessaries : (1) Those without which life is impossible. 
Such needful things may not be given away ; say, if one has 
only what is absolutely needful for the support of his chil- 
dren and others dependent on him. To give away this is 
to destroy himself and his. A case may indeed occur where 
the safety of the Church or the state is concerned, and he 
may laudably expose himself and those belonging to him to 
peril of .death, since the common good is to be preferred 
to one's own. But (2), in another way, a thing is said to 
be necessary when without it life cannot be suitably passed 
according to the state and condition of a person and of 
others for whom he is responsible. The limit of this neces- 
sity is not marked by a distinct line. If many things are 
added, you cannot say just when the line of the necessary 
is passed ; if many things are taken away, still may remain 
all that is necessary for passing life becomingly accord- 
ing to one's proper state in it. To give alms out of these 
so-called necessities is good, and falls under counsel, not 
under precept. But it would be an inordinate act if one 
should withdraw so much from his property, in order to 
bestow it on others, that with the residue he could not 
properly fulfil the duties of his station in life. For no one 
ought to lead such a life as that would imply. 

But there are three exceptions to this statement : (1) 
When one changes his state in life, e.g., by entering on 
the "religious" life ; for then he makes himself poor for 
Christ's sake (following the counsel, " If thou wouldst be 
perfect," etc.); (2) when those things which are withdrawn 
from the conveniences of life can be made up again ; (3) 
when extreme necessity of any private person occurs, or 
grave necessity on the part of the commonwealth. For in 
these cases any one would laudably resign what is necessary 
for the decency of his state in life in order to provide for a 
greater necessity than his own. 
15 



226 charity. [nr. xxxii. 7, 8. 

May alms le given of what is unjustly acquired? 

A tliiug may be illicitly acquired in either of three ways \ 
(1) Where what is acquired is due to him from whom it lias 
been gotten, and cannot be retained by the one who lias 
possession of it, as in robbery, theft, and usury. A man is 
bound to make restitution ; he cannot give thai away in 
alms. (2) But a thing may be illicitly acquired when he 
who has gotten it hasno righl to keep it. neither ia it due 
to him from whom it has been obtained, because the one 

has taken it unjustly, and the other has unjustly given it. 

This is the case in simony, where both giver and receiver 

violate the justice of Divine law ; restitution ought not to 

Ie, but the gift should be bestowed in alms. This is 

• ; i the giving and the receiving 
are contrary to law. (3) A thing may be illicitly acquired 

when the getting is itself lawful, but that from which 

it is acquired is unlawful, as in all cases of base contract, 
"turpi ■.. a prostitute Bhamefully breaks the 

law of God, but in receiving money she does not act un- 
justly, or contrary to law. What i- in such ways illicitly 
gained may be kept, and alms given out of it. 

(1) The mammon of unrighteousness of which the Lord 
ks (S. Luke xvi. 9) is not riches unjustly acquired. 
What .-hall we Bay of the gains of gambling ? Some 
things are forbidden by Divine law ; gc., getting the money 
of those who, like minors have no power to alienate what 
oticing another to gamble, with the motive of 
cupidity in the hoar-. ag fraudulent gains; these 

call f'»r restitution, not alms-giving. But something fur- 
ther is forbidden by civil law. and wdieresuch law is extant, 
and not obsolete, restitution is obligatory, unless the one 
has lost who through cupidity enticed to gamble. lie is 
unworthy to receive ; the other cannot lawfully keep. In 
such a case they must have recourse to alms-giving. 

"Wives, children, servants, cannot give alms from what is 
not their own, without the consent, expressed or justly pre- 



Qu. XXXIII. 1.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION. 227 

sumed, of the head of the family, except in case of grave 
necessity. 

Who are first to receive alms ? 

First, those who are most closely connected with us, dis- 
cretion being used with respect to the degree of connection, 
of holiness, of utility. For to one much holier, suffering 
greater need, and more useful to the common weal, alms 
should be given in preference to the person nearer in kin- 
ship, especially if the latter is not very near by blood rela- 
tionship, and is not specially under our care, and if the 
necessity is not grave. 

" If thou hast much, give plenteously/' in proportion to 
thy meaus, hot for the superfluity of the recipient. 

§ 11. Fraternal correction. 

Is it an act of charity ? 

Sin may be viewed either as injurious to the sinner, or as 
doing harm to others who are injured or scandalized by it, 
and also as doing harm to the common good. There is, 
therefore, a two-fold correction of the delinquent ; one 
which applies a remedy to the sin as an evil in the sinner, 
and that is properly fraternal correction which is ordained 
for the amendment of the delinquent. But removing evil 
from any one is equivalent to procuring his good, which is 
a work of chanty. Hence, fraternal correction also is a 
work of charity, because by it. we repel evil from our 
brother ; sc, sin. And the removal of that is a greater 
work of charity than removing outward loss or corporal 
injury. Fraternal correction, therefore, is a nobler act of 
charity than the cure of bodily infirmity or the relieving of 
outward need. 

But there is another kind of correction which is an act 
of justice; viz., the applying a remedy for the sin as it is 
an evil against others, and especially as it is injurious to 
the common weal. 



228 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxiu. 2. 

Fraternal correction is not opposed to the " bearing one 
another's burdens " (Gal. vi. 2), but rather flows from it. 
For one supports the erring when he is not turned against 
him, but keeps such good will towards him that he tries to 
amend him. 

Fraternal correction is obligatory. 

But once more note the distinction between affirmative 
and negative commands. As the Degative prohibit the acts 
of sins, so the affirmative had bo the acts of virtues. But 
ts of -in are in themselves evil ; they cannot become 
good in any manner, time, or place. Fur in themselves 
they are joined to a bad rod. Therefore, negative laws 
bind always, on all occasions, under all circumstances. 
But the acts of virtues ought, not to be done in every man- 
ner, but with observation of those due circumstances which 
qnisite in order that the act may be a virtuous one ; 
8C. } that it be done where il onght, and when it ought, and 
in the manner it onght to be done. And because the due 
arrangement of the means depends upon the end sought 
for, in those circumstances of virtuous action is chiefly to 
be noted the end, which is the good of virtue. If, there- 
. there be any such omission of any circumstance of a 
virtuous act as totally takes away the good of virtue, this 
act is contrary to the precept. But if there be defect in 
any circumstance which does not totally annul the virtue, 
though the act may not reach the perfect good of virtue, it 
is not contrary to the precept. So fraternal correction, 
which is ordained for the amendment of a In-other, falls 
under the law (obligation) so far as it is deemed to be nec- 
for that end, but not so that the delinquent must be 
corrected in every place, and at every time.* 

* The conditions which render this act of charity obligatory are : 
(a) the sin or the near danger of sinning is certain ; (b) there is hope 
ot amendment in connection with this act of charity ; (c) no other is 
more fit to employ it ; (d) grave injury will not be done to the cor- 



Qu. xxxm. 3.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION. 229 

(1) But this, you say, proposes a task which is practically 
impossible. Yes ; man's operation cannot be efficacious 
without Divine aid, and yet we are bound to do our part, 
so far as in us lies, with hope of Divine assistance. 

(2) In one way, it may be meritoriously omitted out of 
charity, when an opportune season is waited for, or there is 
reasonable fear of making the offender worse, etc. But, 
again, its neglect is mortal sin when fear of being unpopu- 
lar or of some annoyance is preferred to fraternal charity, 
although one has reason to think that his correction will 
be a benefit to the sinner. In another way, omission of 
this is venial sin, when fear or other motive makes one more 
tardy in correcting his brother's faults, not, however, that 
he would neglect it if he were certain of doing good thereby. 

(3) It cannot be said that if fraternal correction is obli- 
gatory, it is a debt which must be paid ; and therefore, as 
in the case of any other debt, we must go around and search 
for our creditors, which in this case is impossible, because 
of the multitude of sinners, for whose correction one man is 
not sufficient. This is mistaken, because what is due to 
any determinate and fixed person must be paid, whetber it 
is corporal or spiritual good, without waiting for him to 
come to us, but having due solicitude in seeking him out. 
This is true of pecuniary debt, and of one who has special 
charge of another. He ought to seek out that other if he 
go astray. But in the case of those benefits, spiritual or 
corporal, which are not due to any certain person, but to 
all our neighbours in general, we are not bound to go 
around searching for those to whom we may pay our debt, 
but it suffices that we do so when we meet with them. 

Does fraternal correction pertain only to those who hold 
some office ? 

We have seen above that one kind of correction is an act 

rector ; (e) the correction is judged to be necessary for the amendment 
needed. 



230 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxni. 4, 5. 

of charity ; viz., that which specially tends to the amend- 
ment of an erring brother by simple admonition. Such 
correction is the duty of every one who has charity, whether 
he is in office or not. 

But there is another kind of correction, which is an act 
of justice aiming at the common good, which common 
good is sought for not only by fraternal correction, but 
sometimes by punishment, in order that others may be 
afraid and cease to do wrong. Such correction pertains to 
governors alone, whose duty it is not only to admonish, 
bnl also to correct by punishing. 

(1) Though fraternal correction pertains to all, yet those 
win) have charge of others have graver responsibility in that 
respect. 

(2) But he who has sound judgment is superior in that 
respect, and is bound to employ it in this way. 

Is any one bound to correct Ms superior .' 

"We are not now speaking of the act of justice, which 
belongs to one in office alone, bui of l he act of charity, 
which embraces all to whom charity is due, if in any one is 
found what ought t<« be corrected. But because a virtuous 
act must be restricted to the due circumstances, therefore 
in o'rrection of superiors a due mode must be employed ; 
sc, not rudeness and insolence, but mildness and respect- 
fulness il Tim. v. ]). 

How can a si finer cornet the delinquent ? 

Such correction belongs to him who has sound judgment. 
But sin does not totally destroy the good of nature, and 
sound rational judgment may still remain. But yet pre- 
vious sin puts a three-fold obstacle in the way of this cor- 
rection : (1) because preceding sin, especially if it be a 
greater one, renders a person unfit to correct the erring (S. 
Matt. vii. 3) ; (2) because of scandal, if the sin of the one 
who corrects is public ; he seems to be correcting, not out 



Qu. XXXIII. 6.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION - . 231 

of charity, but out of ostentation (S. Matt. vii. 5) ; (3) 
because of the pride of the corrector, who thinks lightly of 
his own sins and in his heart sets himself above his neigh- 
bour, judging others' sins with strict severity, as if he were 
a righteous man. "Well says S. Augustine (Semi. Dorn. in 
Monte, ii. 19), '"Let us reflect, when necessity compels us 
to reprove another, whether we have never fallen in the 
same way ; and then let us consider that we are human, 
and might have had the same fault ; or that we once were 
under its dominion even if now we are not ; and then let 
our common frailty come to mind, and pity, not hatred, 
precede that correction. But if we shall find that we, too, 
are guilty in the same way, let us not chide our brother, 
but lament with him our common sin, and not invite him 
to yield to us, but with us to avoid the common destruc- 
tion." It is plain, then, that if the sinner correct the 
erring with humility, he does not sin anew and get for him- 
self fresh condemnation, although in this way, either in his 
brother's conscience, or, at least, in his own, he may find 
himself worthy of condemnation for his past sins. 

May one give up fraternal correction through fear lest the 
erring he rendered ivorse hy it f 

That correction which is the duty of superiors is ordained 
for the common good and has coactive force. Such correc- 
tion is not to be neglected for fear of troubling him who 
is corrected, both because he must be forced, if possible, 
through punishment to desist from his iniquity, if he will 
not amend of his own accord ; and because, if he is incor- 
rigible, the common good must be provided for, the order 
of justice being preserved, and others deterred by the exam- 
ple given. 

But fraternal correction is another thing ; its end is 
amendment of the sinner, not through compulsion, but 
through simple admonition. Therefore, when it is prob- 
able that the sinner will not receive the admonition, but be 



232 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxtii. 7. 

rendered worse by it. such correction is to be avoided, for 
the mean- to an end ought to be regulated by the end itself. 
If it hinder the ei\d. it is not a good ; it does not fall under 
the precept. 

The order of fraternal correction. 

The due order is commanded by our Lord Eimself (S. 
Matt. wii:. L5) : "If thy brother sin againsl thee, go, show 
him his fault between thee and him alone. If he hear t her, 
thou basl gained thy in-other. Bui if he hear thee not, 
take wit!; thee one or two more, thai at the mouth of two 

Witnesses or three, every word may be established. And if 

he refuse to hear them, tell it unto the church." 

But we mufll distinguish between open and secret sins. 
\\ the sin is public, the remedy is nol only for the Binner 
thai he may be mad- better, but for others that they may 
nol he Bcandalized. Such open Bins are i" !»■ openly re- 
buked, as S. Paul Bays >i Tim. \. 20), "Them that sin re- 
prove in the sighl of all, that tie- L'l -I also may be in fear."' 
Bui if the sins . the Lord's command seems to 

apply to the case. For when thy brother sins againsl thee 
publicly, he .-in- nol only againsl thee, hut also againsl 
others. 

But even in bi I here is a difference. For some 

may b againsl our neighbours when they produce 

injury, whether spiritual or corporal, t/ the' community, 
as when any one Becretly deals with the' enemy in order to 
betray the nation, or when a heretic secretly tries to turn 
the faithful from the truth, lie who secretly sins in such 
a manner sins not only against you, bul also against others ; 
and it is right to proc -pen denunciation, in 

order that the injury may be stopped, unless, possibly, you 
judge that private admonition will answer the purpose. 

But some sins are wholly between man and man, the 
injury being only that of the sinner and the one sinned 
against ; and then the question is of aiding an erring 



Qu. XLIV. 1.] THE PRECEPTS OP CHARITY. 233 

brother. And as the surgeon restores to health, if he can, 
without amputation (or ought to do so), but if he cannot, 
he amputates what can be lost for the preservation of life, 
so, also, he who aims at the amendment of his brother ought 
so to do it, if possible, that his brother's good name may be 
saved. For this is useful to him, both in an earthly way, 
since he would suffer great detriment from the loss of it, 
and in a spiritual way, because the dread of infamy helps 
to keep many back from sins into which they would rush 
without restraint if their good name were lost. 

For other reasons we are bound to preserve the good 
name of our erring brother. The ill name of one becomes 
the ill name of many. When something false is reported 
of one exercising sacred functions, or some true charge is 
made public, there are many who are eager to believe the 
same of all (S. Aug., Ep. ad plebem Hippon. 77). 

And, again, the sins of one made public encourage others 
to sin ; notably, the sins of the clergy. 

But because a good conscience is of more value than a 
good name, the Lord willed that even with loss of good 
name the conscience of our brother should through public 
denunciation, if necessary, be freed from sin. It is com- 
manded, then, that secret admonition precede public de- 
nunciation. 

Even God Himself gives the sinner secret warnings (Job 
xxxiii. 15). 

§ 12. The precepts of charity. 

Wliat God requires of us is the sudject of commandment ; 
hut God requires that man love Him. 

Therefore, commandments are given respecting the acts 
of love. A precept implies a debt, something due. But 
something is due in two ways: one, per se; another, on 
account of something else. The end is what is due, per se, 
in each case, because it has, per se, the idea of the good ; 



234 CHARITY. [Qu. XLIV. 2. 

but the means are due on account of something else. Thus, 
it is the physician's duty per se to try to make a cure ; but 
it is his duty to give medicine on account of the cure. But 
the end of the spiritual life is that man may be united to 
God, which is done by charity, and all things which pertain 
to the spiritual life are ordained for this end. For all the 
virtues respecting whose acts precepts are given are or- 
dained cither to purify the heart, from the filth of passions, 
or for a good conscience respecting our actions, or for a 
right faith, as those commandments which refer to Divine 
worship : and theso three are the recpiisite conditions for 
loving God. For an impure heart is drawn away from His 
love by passions inclining to earthly things ; and a bad con- 
science makes one Bhrink from a just God through fear of 
His punishments; and a false faith draws the affections to 
that which is not God, separating from Bis truth. But as 
the end is more pneious than the means, the chief com- 
mandment regards the love which proceeds from charity. 

It might be objected that charity which is poured into 
our hearts by the Holy Ghost makes us free, for ''where 
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. iii. 17). 
Bui the obligation of commandments is not opposed to 
liberty except where the mind is averse to what is com- 
manded, as in those who obey out of fear alone, while the 
precept of love can only be fulfilled out of our own will ; 
and. therefore, it is not repugnant to liberty. 

Observe, also, that all the ten commandments are or- 
dained for the acts of love to God and our neighbour. 
Therefore, the precepts of charity (as such) are not given 
there, but are included in all. 

Hie love of God, indeed, is the end, and that to which the 
love of oar neighbour is ordain"!. 

But because all do not really see what is contained in the 
"first and great commandment/' a second is added (which 
"is like unto it") ; viz., the love of our neighbour. 



yu. XLIV. 3.] THE PJRECEPTS OF CHAKITY. 235 

And these two are sufficient. 

11 On these two commandments hang all the law and the 
prophets " (S. Matt. xxii. 40), for the love of charity is love 
of the good ; sc, either of the end, or of that which is for 
the end, of God or of our neighbour for God's sake. 

(1) No precept respecting love of self and our own body 
is needed ; but the mode of doing so — sc, in due order — is 
implied in the love of God and of our neighbour. 

(2) Other acts of charity, as joy, peace, beneficence, fol- 
low from love as their cause. And precepts respecting 
these are, therefore, included in that of love. And yet, 
since some are slow to fulfil these, explicit precepts are 
added respecting them: "Kejoice in the Lord always" 
(Phil. iv. 4) ; " Follow peace with all men " (Heb. xii. 14) ; 
(f While we have time, let us do good unto all men" (Gal. 
vi. 10). Different acts of doing good, also, are commanded 
in Holy Scripture. 

God is to be loved as the ultimate end to which all things 
are referred. Therefore, He is to be loved with the whole 
heart. The whole heart, it is true, may not be actually 
and always directed to God. This is the perfection of the 
Christian's fatherland, not of the road thither. But the 
heart is to be habitually so directed to God that it receives 
nothing which is contrary to that love ; this is the perfec- 
tion "of the road," to which venial sin is not directly con- 
tradictory; since it does not totally destroy the habit of 
charity, it does not aim at the opposite, but only impedes 
the action of charity. 

Our intellect, our desires, our outward acts, are to be 
subject to that loving will which is expressed by loving 
God "with all the heart." Therefore it is added, "and 
with all thy mind, and soul, and strength." Fully and 
perfectly the precept of the love of God will be fulfilled in 
heaven, for its end is that man be totally united with God. 
But here, not so ; yet there need be no departure from that 
end, no mortal sin. 



236 CHARITY. [Qu. xliv. 7. 

Do not say that the impossible would be commanded, if 
the precept of perfect love could not be fulfilled in this life. 
For he that runs towards the goal must know which way 
he is to run. (See S. Aug., De Perf. Justit., cap. 8.) 

The precept of love of our neighbour gives the reason for 
loving and the manner of loving. 

It gives the reason ; for others are our neighbours both 
according to the natural image of God and t In • i r capability 
of glory. Call others neighbours, call them brothers, it is 
all one. It gives the manner of loving — sc, "as thyself." 
This is nol equality, bul similitude, and that in three par- 
ticulars; first, the end ; as one loves himself (out of char- 
ity) for Cud'., sake, bo his brother is to be loved. This is 
holy tove. Next, as oue satisfies bis own will in what is 
good (or though! to be so), so he yields to his neighbour in 
good things, nol in evil. This is just love. And lastly, 
the reason for loving is that one love his neighbour not for 
his own benefit or pleasure, bul wills his neighbour's good 
as he wdls his own. This i- true love. As thus under- 
stood, even enemies are brothers of ours. 

The order of charity is part of the precept. 

Man does more to gratify him whom he loves more. And 
so, if he should love less him whom he ought to love more, 
he would be doing more to satisfy him to whom he owes 
less ; and bo would be doing injury to the other. Accord- 
ingly, the order of love is explicitly laid down in Iloly Scrip- 
ture. " With all thy heart/' places God above all things. 
■• As thyself," places thine own salvation next. " "We ought 
to lay down our lives for the brethren " (1 Ep. S. John iii. 
16), places our neighbour before our own body. ''Espe- 
cially unto the household of faith " (Gal. vi. 10), and, " If 
auv provide not for his own. and specially his own house- 
hold " (1 Tim. v. 8), places the better and those nearer to 
ourselves above other neighbours. 



Qu. XLV,, XLVI.] THE PRECEPTS OE CHARITY. 237 

S. Thomas regards the spiritual gift of wisdom as espe- 
cially correlated to charity. It is wisdom in the things of 
God, and he that has it can judge and order all his spiritual 
life by Divine rules. It is not merely speculative, but also 
eminently practical wisdom. Its seat is the intellect, but 
it springs from charity, a loving will. It is not the intel- 
lectual virtue which is acquired by our own efforts, and it 
is different from faith which assents to Divine verity ; wis- 
dom is judgment according to Divine truth. It is not the 
mere use of reason giving right judgment, but it is grounded 
on the affinity for Divine things which charity possesses 
through union with God. It is incompatible, therefore, 
with mortal sin. It is for the guidance of the spiritual life 
in what is necessary to salvation, through justifying grace, 
" gratia gratum faciens." 

The opposite sin is spiritual folly ; not any natural dul- 
ness of judgment, but that stupidity of folly in spiritual 
things which results from a Christian man's burying him- 
self in carnal pleasures. "The natural man receiveth not 
the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness 
unto him ; and he cannot know them, because they are 
spiritually judged" (1 Cor. ii. 14). This child of lust 
("luzuria") may not be directly willed, but those things 
are willed from which it is necessarily generated and born. 



CHAPTER IV. 

VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. 

§ 1. Hatred. 

Can a ini one hate God .' 

[f not, wliv did the Lord say (8. John xv. 24), "But 
now have they both seen and hated both Me and My 
Father" ? Observe, then, thai haired is a passion moved 
by something which i- apprehended. But God may be 
apprehended either in Hi- essence or in His effects. Bnt 
in His essence He is that Goodness which no being can 
hai.', bnt all must love. There are some of His effects, 
also, which cannot be in any way contrary to our will, as 
life and thought, which lie produces, and which are sought 
by all. So far <i<>d cannot be hated. But there are certain 
- of God which the inordinate will opposes, as the 
infliction of penalty and the restraint of sins by Divine law. 
And as regards the consideration of such effects, God can be 

hated. 

Hatred of God is the greatest of sins. 

For the defect in sin consists in aversion from God. (See 
page 107.) But such aversion would not be guilt if it 
were not voluntary. Guilt (" culpa "), therefore, consists 
in voluntary aversion from God. But this voluntary aver- 
sion from God is found, per se, in hatred of God, while in 
other sins it exists, as it were, by participation. For as the 
will, per se, cleaves to that which it loves, so in itself it shuns 
that which it hates. Hence, when any one hates God, his 
will, per se, is averted from God. But, in other sins — say, 



Qu. xxxiv. 3.] HATKED. 239 

in sensual sins — the will is indirectly averted from God, in- 
asmuch as it seeks inordinate pleasure, to which this aver- 
sion is annexed. Hence, hatred of God is the gravest of 
sins. 

(1) This hatred is deliberate malice, which is sin against 
the Holy Ghost. 

(2) Infidelity is a fault only as it is voluntary ; and the 
more voluntary it is, the graver is the sin. But its being 
voluntary comes from one's hating the truth which is pre- 
sented to him. Hence, it is evident that the sin in infi- 
delity springs from hatred of God, whose truth is the 
object of faith. Therefore, as the cause is more potent 
than the effect, the hatred of God is a greater sin than the 
infidelity. 

(3) It is not true that whoever hates punishment hates 
God, who is the author of it. But to rush into hatred of 
God as punisher, is hating the justice of God, which is 
the gravest of all sins. 

7s all hatred of our neighbour a sin ? 

Hatred is opposed to love ; and hatred is so far evil as 
love is good. But love is our neighbour's due according to 
what he has from God ; i.e., according to nature and grace. 
But love is not his due according to what he has from him- 
self and the devil ; sc, according to sin and defect of right- 
eousness. And therefore it is lawful to hate sin in our 
brother, and all that pertains to defect of righteousness ; 
but one cannot hate his brother's nature and grace without 
mortal sin. But this very thing, that we hate in our 
brother his fault and defect of good, pertains to love of our 
brother, for it is all one to will another's good and to hate 
his evil. Understood simply, then, hatred of our brother is 
always sin. " He that hateth his brother is in darkness " 
(1 Ep. S. John ii. 9). 

But is it not natural, and therefore right, to hate our 
enemies ? For they are opposed to us and aim at our ruin. 



240 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXIV. 4, G. 

Bat according to what they have from God, they are not 
contrary to us, and are to be loved. We ought to hate that 
they are enemies. 

As hatred of our neighbour the gravest sin against him ? 

The evil of sin against our neighbour is two-fold : one, 
the disordered will of him who sins, which is the root of 
sin ; another, the injury which is done to our neighbour. 
As regards tin- first, hatred is greater sin than outward 
injurious acts, and if the outward acts were inordinate 
without any inordination of will, they would not be sin, 
as when one ignorant lv. or in zeal for justice, kills a man. 
And if there is any Eauli ill outward sins which are com- 
mitted against our neighbour, all springs from inward ha- 
tred, l'.ut as respects the injury which is dune, nut ward 

-in- are worse than inward hatred. 

llatnd is nol counted among the capital sins, because it 
is last, i; o\ iir- ■. in the order of destruction of what is vir- 
tuous in man ; for it is mosl opposed to nature. It is most 
natural to man to love bis neighbour's good. 

Does 1ml ret spring from envyf 

Hatred <>f our neighbour is the ultimate in the progress 
of sin, in that it is opposed to the natural love of our 
neighbour. But the reason why one recedes from what is 
natural is that he aims to avoid what is naturally to be 
shunned. But naturally every animal shuns what causes 
sorrow, and seeks what gives pleasure. And as from pleas- 
ure springs love, so from sorrow springs hate. Hence, since 
envy is sorrow at another's good, it follows that that good 
is rendered hateful to us, and from envy springs hatred. 

In another way. and more indirectly, as disposing to the 
ultimate, anger may cause hatred. For anger at first seeks 
our neighbour's evil, under the notion of just vengeance ; 
but afterwards, being prolonged, a man may desire abso- 
lutely that evil, which pertains to hatred. 



Qu. XXXV. 1, 3.] SPIEITUAL SLOTH. 241 

§ 2. Spiritual sloth ("acedia "). 

This is opposed to that spiritual joy in Divine good which 
is the inward effect of charity.* 

7s spiritual sloth a sin f 

It is "a torpor of a mind which neglects to begin good 
things" (S. Aug., Ps. cvi.). But a sorrow of this kind 
respecting spiritual good is evil in itself. Even sorrow re- 
specting what is truly evil may be bad in its effects, if it so 
load down a man that he totally withdraws himself from 
good works. Spiritual sloth, therefore, is evil, both in itself 
and in its effects. And, therefore, since it belongs to the 
will, it is a sin. 

Humility, looking at one's own defects, does not exalt 
self ; but it is ingratitude if one despise the good things 
which God has given, and from such contempt follows 
spiritual sloth. 

As a special vice it wearies of the Divine good, in which 
charity rejoices. 

Is spiritual sloth a mortal sin ? 

Mortal sin destroys the spiritual life in which God dwells 
in us through charity. And that sin is mortal which in its 
own proper nature is opposed to charity. Now spiritual 
sloth is such ; for the effect of charity is joy in God ; but 
spiritual sloth is weariness of spiritual good as Divine. 

But sins which are in themselves mortal are only such 
when they attain their consummation. And the consum- 
mation of human sin, which consists in a human act, is in 
the consent of reason. Hence if the beginning of sin is in 
the sense-nature alone, and does not reach the consent of 
reason, the sin is venial on account of the imperfection 
of the act. So concupiscence is mortal or venial sin ac- 
cording as it has or has not the consent of reason. So also 

* See the suggestive essay prefixed to Canon Paget's Spirit of Dis- 
cipline, 1891. 

1(5 



242 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXVI. 1, 2. 

the motion of spiritual sloth is sometimes iu the sensuous 
nature alone, through the repugnance of the flesh against 
the spirit, and then it is venial sin. But sometimes it 
reaches the reason, which consents to flight from the 
Divine good, and feels horror of it and detestation of it, 
the flesh altogether prevailing against the spirit. This is 
manifestly mortal sin. It is a capital sin, because on ac- 
count of it many evil things are done cither to avoid the 
disagreeable efforl required by the spiritual life, or because 
the burden of this spiritual sloth produces sinful acts which 
harmonize with it. S. Gregory (Moral, x.wi. 17) names 
sis daughters of Bpiritnal sloth : (1) Despair of the end; (2) 
pusillanimity with respect to the means; (3) sluggishness 
respecting obedience to God's commands; (4) rancor at 
spiritual counsellors who urge to a better life; (5) an evil 
mind towards spiritual goods themselves; (6) a heart wearied 
with spiritual joy and wandering after corporal pleasure. 

§ 3. Envy. 

Wluit is envy / 

Another's good may be apprehended as one's own evil, 
and so there can be sorrow at it. And this in two ways : 
one, when danger of injury threatens one's self, and so one 
is saddened at another's good; as when his enemy is ex- 
alted, and bo be fears that harm maybe done to himself. 
Such Badness is nol envy, but rather the effect of fear. 
But, again, another's good may be esteemed as one's own 
evil, diminishing one's own glory or excellence; in this 
way envy is troubled at another's good. Envy, therefore, 
especially regards those goods from which glory arises, and 
in which men love to be honoured and held in high repu- 
tation. 

Is envy a sin ? 

Sadness at another's good may arise in four ways : (1) 
"When one fears injury to himself or to his good things, as 



Qu. xxxvi. 3.] ENVY. 243 

the result of such prosperity. This is not envy, and may 
exist without sin. " It may happen that without loss of 
charity, an enemy's ruin makes us glad, and again his glory 
saddens us without envy ; since we believe that by his fall 
others will well be lifted up, and in his prosperity we fear that 
many will be unjustly oppressed " (Greg., Moral, xxii. 6). 

(2) One may be saddened in consequence of another's 
good, not because he has it, but because that good is want- 
ing in ourselves. And this is properly emulation ; and if 
that emulation concerns moral goods, it is laudable. But if 
it refer to earthly goods, it may be sinful, or it may not be so. 

(3) He for whom the good happens may be unworthy of 
it. Sadness at this, indeed, cannot arise from those moral 
goods by which any one is made righteous. But it may 
spring from wealth acquired, and from other such things as 
both the worthy and the unworthy can obtain. And this 
sadness pertains to indignation (" nemesis "), and is connected 
with good habits. But such a view of earthly goods leaves 
out of sight the eternal verities. But according to the doc- 
trine of faith, the temporal goods which the unworthy ob- 
tain are distributed according to the just ordination of God, 
either for the correction of the unworthy, or for their con- 
demnation. Goods of this kind are as nothing in compar- 
ison with the future goods which are reserved for those who 
are worthy of them. Such sadness is forbidden by the 
Holy Scriptures: "Fret not thyself because of the un- 
godly, neither be thou envious against the evil doers " (Ps. 
xxxvii. 1). 

(4) One is saddened at another's good, inasmuch as 
that other exceeds himself, and this is properly envy ; and 
this is sin, grieving at what ought to cause rejoicing, sc, 
another's welfare. 

Is envy a mortal sin ? 

It is certainly a species of mortal sin. For sin gets its 
specific character from its object. Now envy, according to 



<?44 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXVII. 1. 

its object, is the opposite of charity, through which comes 
the spiritual life of the soul. " We know that we have 
passed from death to life, because we love the brethren " 
(1 Ep. S. John iii. 1-i). The object, both in envy and in 
charity, is the good of our neighbour ; for charity rejoices 
at it. but envy is saddened by it. Manifestly, then, envy is, 
in its species, a mortal sin. 

But we have seen (page 115) that in every kind of sin 
arc I'mind certain imperfect motions in the sensuous nature, 
which are venial Bins, as in homicide, the first motions of 
anger. So also in envy are found certain primal motions, 
Bometimes even in good men, which arc venial sins. 

(1) These come from the passion on which envy is 
grounded, which passion is seen even in little children. 

(*.>) The grief which the Psalmisi expressed ("nemesis") 
was at the prosperity of the unworthy (Ps. lxxiii. 3), which 
is the opposite of envy at the prosperity of the worthy. 

Envy is a capital sin. 

The child of pride is vainglory, and this begets envy. 
The daughters of envy are secret backbiting and open de- 
traction, exultation at our neighbour's adversity and efforts 
to impede his prosperity, and, last, and the culmination of 
all, hatred of our neighbour. 

£ 4. Discord and strife. 

Discord is a mortal sin. 

S. Paul (Gal. v. 20) places divisions among the works of 
the flesh, and "they which do such things shall not inherit 
the kingdom of God." Discord is opposed to concord, 
which springs from charity joining the hearts of many, 
first, in Divine good, and next, in the good of our neigh- 
bour. Therefore discord is sin. 

But discord may take away this concord, first, per se — 
i.e., according to the intention, when one knowingly dissents 
from Divine good, and his neighbour's good to which he 



Qu. XXXVII. 1.] DISCOKD AND STRIFE. 245 

ought to consent. This is mortal sin in kind, because it is 
opposed to charity, although the first motions of this dis- 
cord may be venial through their beiug imperfect acts. 
But discord may, again, destroy concord per accidens — i.e., 
without such intention, when different persons aim at some 
good which pertains to the glory of G-od or the benefit of our 
neighbour, but one judges a certain course to be good, while 
another has a contrary opinion. Then discord is, per acci- 
dens, contrary to the Divine good or the good of our neigh- 
bour. Such discord is not sin, nor contrary to charity, 
unless there be error respecting what is necessary to salva- 
tion, or undue obstinacy in one's opinion. For concord, 
which is the effect of charity, is the union of wills, not the 
union of opinions (page 215). Discord, then, is some- 
times the sin of one, when he knowingly resists the good 
which another wills ; and sometimes it is the sin of both 
parties, when each dissents from the good of the other and 
loves his own good. 

(1) But you may say that another's will is not the rule of 
yours, but only the Divine will is such. And this is true 
of that other's will considered in itself ; but when that will 
adheres to the Divine, it does become the rule for others 
also, and discord with such a will is discord with the Divine 
rule. 

(2) But S. Paul excited discord between the Pharisees and 
the Sadducees (Acts xxiii. 6). I answer that to destroy 
that good concord which charity produces is a grave sin ; 
"He that soweth discord among brethren is an abomination 
unto the Lord" (Prov. vi. 16). But to take away the evil 
concord of bad wills is laudable, and the Lord Himself said 
(S. Matt. x. 34), " I came not to send peace, but a sword." 

(3) The discord between SS. Paul and Barnabas (Acts xv. 
39) was per accidens, because each was aiming at the good, 
but to the one a certain course seemed to be good ; to the 
other, another. This was due to human imperfection, for 
the controversy did not concern what is necessaiy to salva- 



246 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. xxxvill. 1. 

tion. Even this dissension was ordained by Divine Provi- 
dence for the resulting benefit of the world. 

If discord is viewed as a departure from another's will, it 
may be called the daughter of envy ; but viewed as depend- 
ing on self-seeking, it is the child of vainglory. 

Is contention {strife) a mortal sin? 

S. Paul (Gal. v. 20) places it with discord among the 
works of the flesh which exclude any one from the king- 
dom of God ; therefore it is a mortal sin. As discord ex- 
presses contrariety of wills, so contention implies the same 
in speech. But we must look at the intention, and at the 
manner of contending. In the intention we must consider 
whether one is contending against the truth, which is 
blameworthy, oragainsl falsehood, which is laudable. And 
in the manner, we are to consider if it is suitable to the 
persons and the things; for if so, it is laudable. If, then, 
contention signify impugning the truth and an inordinate 
manner of contending, it is mortal Bin. But if it be an im- 
pugning of falsehood with proper acrimony, it is laudable. 
But if. again, it be contending against falsehood in an in- 
ordinate manner, it may be venial sin, unless perhaps the 
inordination is so great as to cause scandal of others. So 
S. Paul says of such strife (2 Tim. ii. 14), that it tends to 
" the subverting of the hearers." * 

When the disciples contended (S. Luke xxii. 24), they 
did not nn-an to impugn the truth, for each one was defend- 
ing what he thought to be true ; but their contention was 
inordinate, being about an improper object ; sc, the primacy 
of honour, for they were not yet spiritual men. Therefore 
the Lord checked their contention. 

Contention, like discord, is the daughter of vainglory. 
For pride and vainglory seek one's own superiority, which 
may be done in speech and cause strife of words. 

* S. Thomas seems to understand the " logomachy " here spoken of, 
as wordy strife rather than as strife about words. 



Qu. xxxix. 1.] SCHISM, • 24.7 

§ 5. Schism. 

Is schism a special sin ? 

It is directly and per se opposed to unity, and it is a spe- 
cial sin when one intends to separate himself from that 
unity which charity makes, which not only unites one to 
another in the spiritual bond of love, but also unites the 
whole Church in the unity of the Spirit. And, therefore, 
properly speaking, schismatics are those who spontaneously 
and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the 
Church, which is the principal unity. For the particular 
unity of Christian man with Christian man is ordained for 
the unity of the Church, as the union of member with 
member in the body is for the unity of the whole body. 
But the unity of the Church depends on two things ; first, 
the communion of the members with one another, and 
next, the subordination of all the members to the one 
Head (which is Christ), "the Head from whom all the 
body, being supplied and knit together through the joints 
and bands, increaseth with the increase of God" (Col. ii. 
19). 

(1) All sin separates man from God ; but this is not nec- 
essarily schism, since it may not be the intention of the sin- 
ner to separate himself from God, but to turn inordinately 
to temporal good. 

(2) Every sinner disobeys the precepts of the Church, 
but the schismatic does so with rebellion, since he perti- 
naciously despises those precepts and refuses to submit his 
judgment. Every sinner does not do this. 

(3) Heresy is opposed to faith, but schism per se is opposed 
to the unity of charity in the Church. Therefore, as faith 
and charity are diverse virtues, although whoever lacks faith 
lacks also charity, so schism and heresy are diverse vices, 
although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not 
conversely. And yet, as loss of charity is the road to loss 
of faith (1 Tim. i. 6), so schism is the road to heresy. 



248 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXIX. 2. 

Hence., S. Jerome well remarks that ''there is no schism 
which does not invent to itself some heresy (note this), in 
order to justify its separation from the Church" (Ep. ad 
Titum, cap. 3). 

Is sch ism a. graver sin Ikon infidelity? 

The gravity of a sin depends upon the species of the sin 
and also upon its circumstances. But the particular cir- 
cumstances are infinite in Dumber and infinitely varied. 
And bo, in comparing two sine in order to find which is the 
worse, we have to look only at their specific character. But 
this depends upon the objeel : and, therefore, that sin is the 
opposed to the greater good, as sin against 
God is worse than Bin against our neighbour. But infi- 
delityis sin againsl God Bimself as the primal verity on 
which faith rests; while schism is againsi Church unity, 
which is a derived good and less than God Bimself. So 
it is plain that the sin of infidelity is specifically graver 
than the Bin of schism, although it may happen that some 
schismatic sins more deeply than some infidel, either on 
account of greater contempt or greater peril to others' souls, 
or some such rea=on. 

(1) But schism is against the good of the multitude, 
whereas infidelity is only against the particular good of 
one. Yes ; but there is a greater good than either of 
those, which is the Divine verity, to which unbelief is op- 
posed. 

(2) But schism is a sin against charity, which is a higher 
virtue than faith, to which infidelity is opposed. Yes ; but 
charity has two objects, Divine goodness, and our neigh- 
bour's good. And schism is a sin against the good of our 
neighbour, which is less than the object of faith, viz., God 
Himself. Yet, of all the sins against our neighbour, schism 
seems to be the greatest, because it is against the spiritual 
good of the multitude. 



Qu. XL. 1.] -WARS, QUARRELS, AND SEDITION'S. 249 

Here note that schismatical clergy have the authority 
which helongs to their orders, for this sacramental power is 
conferred once for all through a consecration to that end. 

Heresy or schism does not annul it, for if they return to 
the Church they are not ordained or consecrated anew. 
(See the Novatian schism, Cone. JSTic, canon viii.) 

But this sacramental power is not lawfully used "without 
the sanction of superior authority in the Church. If, how- 
ever, it should be illicitly used, it has its ordained sacra- 
mental effect, because in sacraments man is only God's 
instrument, and the fault of the minister does not destroy 
the efficacy of what he instrumentally does. 

But authority of jurisdiction is conferred by men who 
have it, and is not indelible, like Holy Orders. Open schis- 
matics and heretics may lose by man's decree what man has 
given. 

§ 6. Wars, quarrels, and seditions. 

Is making war always a sin f 

Three requisites are demanded for a righteous war : (1) due 
authority — sc, that of the commonwealth — for it does not 
pertain to any private person to make war, since his private 
right can be prosecuted through the judgment of his supe- 
rior. And, again, to summon the people, which is neces- 
sary in war, cannot be done by a private individual. But 
as those who have charge of the commonwealth may lawfully 
defend it with the sword against internal disturbance, pun- 
ishing malefactors with death (Rom,, xiii. 4), so it belongs 
to them to defend the state from external enemies with the 
sword of war. 

(2) A just cause for war is requisite ; viz., that those who 
are attacked deserve attack for some grave fault. 

(3) There must be right intention on the part of those 
who make war ; sc, that good be promoted or evil avoided. 
But it can happen that war is declared by legitimate 



250 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XL. 1. 

authority and for a just cause, and yet the war may be un- 
rig!) teoui 3 on account of the evil intention of those who 
begin it; e.g., their eagerness to injure, their fierceness 
of revenge, their implacable mind, their lust of new do- 
minion. 

(1) But did not the Lord say (S. Matt. xxvi. 52), "All 
they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword"? 
But S. Augustine says justly (Cont. Faust, xxii. 70), "He 
takes the sword who is armed against; another's life without 
any superior or legitimate authority which orders or per- 
mits him to do so." If any private person with due au- 
thority, oi any public person through zeal for justice and 
with God's authority, use the sword, he does not him- 
self take ir. but he- employs it as entrusted to him by 
another. 

And those also who sinfully use the sword are not always 
slain with the sword, but they themselves always perish 
through their own sword, because for the sin of the sword 
they are punished everlastingly, unless they repent. 

(2) But, again, the Lord said (S. Mutt. v. 39), " Resist 
not evil ; " and in the Epistle to the Eomans we read (Rom. 
xii. 19), "Avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath.'' 
I reply that precepts of this nature (affirmative), as S. 
Augustine Bays (Serm. Dom. in Monte, i. 19), are always 
to be observed in the preparedness of the soul ; sc, a man 
must always be prepared to make no resistance, to give up 
self-defence, if there be reason for doing so. But some- 
times it is a duty to act otherwise, for the sake of the good 
of the community, or even for the sake of those against 
whom one contends. If license to work iniquity be taken 
away thereby, it is well to conquer in war. 

(3) But war is contrary to the virtue of peace. Yes ; but 
those who wage just war are aiming at lasting peace, not 
that evil peace of which the Lord said, "Think not that I 
came to send peace on the earth" (S. Matt. x. 34). 



Qr. xu.] WARS, QUARRELS, AND SEDITIONS. 251 

Is it lawful for priests and bishops to engage in ivar ? 

For the good of human society many things are necessary, 
and some are inconsistent with others, so that they cannot 
well be exercised by the same persons. And military affairs 
are most of all repugnant to those duties which belong to 
priests and bishops for two reasons ; first, they withdraw 
the mind from that Divine service for which the clergy are 
appointed ; nest, the clergy are ordained to set forth the 
sacrifice of Christ ; therefore, instead of shedding others' 
blood, they should be ready to give their own for Christ's 
sake. 

(1) It pertains indeed to prelates and priests to resist 
wolves, robbers, tyrants ; but their weapons are not carnal, 
but spiritual (2 Cor. x. 4) ; i.e., admonitions, prayers, and 
excommunications. 

(2) The clergy may spiritually aid those waging just war 
by their spiritual ministrations. They may call on others 
to undertake a just war, for engaging personally in it is not 
forbidden to them because it is wrong, but because it is 
inconsistent with their holy office. 

Promised faith must be kept, even with enemies in war ; 
but just war may call for stratagems and secret snares ; for 
such things, in such a case, are not repugnant to justice, 
nor do they spring from inordinate will. 

Are quarrels, "fightings" (rixm), always sin? 

As contention implies contradiction in words, so these 
private " fightings " imply the going to blows. It is a sort 
of private war, without public authority, and springing 
from an inordinate will. Such quarrels always imply sin. 
In him who unjustly attacks another, it is mortal sin, for 
injury wilfully done to our neighbour cannot be without 
mortal sin. 

But in him who defends himself there may be no sin 
at all, or venial sin, or mortal sin, according to his mind 
and manner in defending himself. For if he only intend 



252 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLil. 2. 

to repel injury offered, unci with, due moderation defend 
himself, the quarrel is not on his side. But if he do so 
with a vindictive mind, or one filled with hatred, or in 
undue excess, there i.s always siu ; venial, iudeed, when 
the sinful impulse is not a grave one, or the lack of mod- 
eration is not serious ; hut mortal, when he is steadily 
hent on doing serious injury to the other party. Fightings 
of this kind are the children of anger rather than of hatred. 
For the latter aims absolutely at harming an enemy; 
whether openly or secretly, matters not. But anger, the 
desire for vengeance, is ool satisfied with secretly doing 
harm, hut desires that the other party may know that he is 
suffering the consequences of his wrong-doing. And this 
is implied also in quarrels, or fightings ("rizcB"). 

Is ft dit ion it n., 

It has something in common with wars and fightings; 
hut the first are properly against external foes, nation 
arrayed against nation ; the second are the conflicts of one 
against one, or of few . : hut sedition is properly 

u th.' different parts of one people disagreeing with 
part of the state contending with another. 
And. therefore, because it is opposed to a special good — 
sc, the unity ami peace of the community — it is a special 
sin. 

Is sedition always a mortal sin? 

The unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of 
justice and the common good, and it is mortal sin in its 
kind, and so much the graver sin as the common good 
is of more importance than that private good which is 
impugned by private quarrels. But the sin of sedition 
primarily and principally belongs to those who stir up 
sedition : these sin most gravely ; hut next, those are 
involved in it who follow those disturbers of the common 
peace. But those who resist them and defend the common 



Qu. xliii. 1.] SCANDAL. 253 

good are no more seditious than those who defend them- 
selves are quarrelsome. 

The rule of tyrants is not just, because it is not ordained 
for the common good, but for the private benefit of the 
ruler himself. And, therefore, arousing the people against 
this tyrannical rule is not sedition, unless possibly when 
this tyranny is so inordinately attacked that the subject 
people suffer more detriment from the consequent distur- 
bance than they did from tyrannical rule. But it is rather 
the tyrant who is seditious, nourishing discords and sedi- 
tions among the people, in order that he may more easily 
keep them down. 

§ 7. Scandal. 

What is scandal ? 

This vice, opposed to the beneficence of charity, may be 
defined, with S. Augustine (Contra Faust, xxii. 27), as "a 
word or deed deficient in rectitude, giving occasion for the 
spiritual ruin of another.'" As one may put a stumbling- 
block in another's way, so that, if he encounter it, he is 
liable to get a fall, so, in the progress along the spiritual 
road, one by his advice, persuasion, or example may lead, 
another into sin; this is scandal. But nothing according 
to its proper nature disposes any one to spiritual ruin, 
unless it be deficient in rectitude. For that which is per- 
fectly right rather strengthens one against a fall than leads 
him to his ruin. 

Both that is defective in rectitude which is evil in itself, 
and that which has the appearance of evil ; for even if 
there be no corrupt intention in it, it may give occasion 
for another's fall. And therefore the apostle said (1 Thess. 
v. 22), "Abstain from every appearance of evil." 

The word or deed of any one can be in two ways the 
occasion for another's sin. First, per se, when the evil word 
or deed is actually intended to induce another to sin (direct, 
active scandal) ; or, even though not so intended, the action 



254 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLIII. 2. 

is of such a nature that it incites another to do wrong (in- 
direct, active scandal) ; as when one publicly sins, or does 
what has the appearance of evil. And then he who does 
anything of this kind, properly speaking, gives occasiou for 
falling. These are active scandals. 

But, secondly, per accidens some word or deed of one person 
is the cause of another's sinning, when, apart from the inten- 
tion of the one who does bhe action, and without the action 
itself having any such tendency, some one ill-disposed is by 
t hie action induced to sin, say, to envy another's goods ; and 
then he whose action is right does not give occasion, but the 
other takes it. This is passive scandal without any active 
scandal. Sometimes, then, it happens that active scandal 
is found in one and passive Bcandal in another, as when one 
induces another to commit sin. But sometimes there is 
active Bcandal without the passive, as when one by word or 
deed tries to had another into sin, and he does not consent. 
And finally there is sometimes passive scandal without 
active (the scandal of the weak through ignorance or infirm- 
ity, and the Bcandal of the Pharisee through his own mali- 
cious wicked 

Is scandal a & 

Passive scandal — i.e., the scandal in him who receives it — 
is always sin in him, since he is not, properly speaking, 
Bcandalized, unless in Borne way he fall into spiritual ruin, 
which is sin. (Note that "offence," Rom. xiv. 21, is in- 
dignation against him who sins, which can exist without 
this fall.) But passive scandal can exist without any sin on 
his part from whom the scandal proceeds, as when any one 
is scandalized by those things which another has done with 
perfect rectitude. 

Similarly, active scandal also is always sin in him who gives 
the occasion for it, because either what he does is sin, or, if 
it have only the appearance of evil, he is bound in charity 
to avoid it, since it is the duty of every one to care for his 



Ql\ xliii. 3, 4.] SCANDAL. 255 

neighbour's salvation. And so he who does not avoid occa- 
sion for scandal acts against charity. But we have seen that 
the active scandal may exist without any sin on the other 
side {e.g., one may be "offended," without himself falling). 
(1) The Lord said (S. Matt, xviii. 7), " It must needs 
be that offences (scandals) come." But this is not to be 
understood in the sense of absolute necessity. There is a 
conditional necessity of what God foreknows or has fore- 
told ; also there is a conditional necessity of that which is 
useful for some end, and scandals are useful that they 
"who are approved may be made manifest" (I Cor. xi. 19). 
Scandals are conditionally necessary, also, according to the 
condition of men who will not keep themselves from sin. 
So a physician might say, when he saw the mischievous diet 
of his patient, "He is bound to have along spell of sick- 
ness ; " meaning, if he do not change his diet. 

Active scandal per se — i.e., when one hy his word or deed 
intends to draiu another into sin — is a special sin, not that 
which is per accidens, there being no such intention {direct 
or indirect). 

For the aiming at a special end constitutes a new sin 
over and above the original sinfulness of the act in question. 
And so active scandal may be found apart from other sins, 
as when one scandalizes his neighbour by an act which is not 
sin in itself, but which has the appearance of evil. 

Is scandal a mortal sin ? 

Passive scandal may be a stumbling only, without actual 
fall ; this will be venial sin, as when one through the inordi- 
nate word or deed of another is moved in a venial manner 
only. But passive scandal may be mortal sin, as when one 
in such a case proceeds to actual mortal sin. 

But active scandal, if it be per accidens (not intended 
either directly or indirectly), may be venial sin, as when 
the thing which is done is in itself venial, or has only the 



256 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLI1I. 7. 

appearance of evil, and is committed through some light 
indiscretion. 

But sometimes it is mortal sin, whether because the act 
is in itself such, or because the salvation of our neighbour 
is made of no account, and one does not for the sake of that 
give up what he chooses to do. But if we speak of active 
scandal per se — viz., the intending to lead another into sin 
— it is mortal if the sin is such, or it' the intention is such 
in him who gives scandal ; but it may be venial if sin and 
intenl ion are such. 

In this way we may understand the Gospel (S. Malt, 
xviii. 6), andS. Paul (] Oor. viii. L2). 

Those win. perfectly adhere to God through love take no 
occasion of stumbling from others' words or deeds. Much 
less do they give reasonable occasion for active scandal to 
the weak. Through human infirmity, indeed, they may 
fall somewhat short of the perfect standard set before them, 
but the}' do nol go far away, nor so far that another can 
reasonably take occasion of Bin from their words or deeds. 

Remember, however, thai one may scandalize himself 
(Pharisaic scandal). Consider the case of S. Peter (Gal. 
ii. 1-1) ; was his sin so grave that others could be justly 
scandalized? (Or did he fall, and repent, and return to 
the measure of a perfect man ?) 

Venial sins may be found in perfect men, but they are 
chiefly those sudden motions of the passions which arc 
inward and do not give scandal. If those infirmities ap- 
pear outwardly in venial sins, those sins are so light as not 
to have in themselves power of giving scandal. 

May spiritual goods be given up on account of scandal ? 

There can be no question about active scandal. Sin can 
never be lawful. But if we speak of passive scandal, there 
may be a question as to what is to be given up lest another 
be scandalized. But among spiritual goods there are some 
which are necessary for salvation, which cannot be aban- 



Qu. XLIII. 7.J SCANDAL. 257 

cloned without mortal sin. But it is manifest that no one 
ought to commit mortal sin in order to hinder another from 
doing wrong. In the order of charity man ought to place 
his own spiritual safety higher than another's. Things, 
therefore, which are necessary to salvation may not be left 
undone for the sake of avoiding scandal. 

But in the case of spiritual goods which are not necessary 
to salvation, we should distinguish two kinds of scandal. 
For the scandal which arises from these sometimes springs 
from malice, when there are those who wish to hinder such 
spiritual goods by exciting scandals. Such were the Phar- 
isees who were scandalized at our Lord's teachings (S. Matt. 
xv. 12). This sort of scandal the Lord taught us to treat 
with contempt. 

But sometimes the scandal comes from infirmity or igno- 
rance, the scandal of the weak. On account of this, spiritual 
goods may he kept hidden or even sometimes deferred when 
there is no imminent spiritual danger in doing so, until, 
further explanation having heen given, the scandal may 
cease. But if after such explanations it still endure, it may 
possibly seem to come from malice ; if so, spiritual goods 
are not to be relinquished on account of it. 

(Note that argument may not put an end to scandal of 
the weak, however sound the argument may be. For the 
weak may be very weak in logic, or have their heads full of 
other arguments, with no room for more ; or they may be 
so hardened in old habits that arguments run off from the 
surface of their minds, unable to enter any further.) 

(1) But S. Augustine teaches that the discipline of sins may 
sometimes be passed over if there be great danger of schism 
(Contra Epist. Parmen. ii.). So a spiritual good, an act of 
justice, would be neglected on account of scandal. But I 
reply that punishment is not to be sought on its own account, 
but penalties of Church discipline are medicinal, intended 
to prevent sins, and they are so far just as they have that 
tendency. But if, through enforcing Church discipline, 
17 



258 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. xun. 7. 

manifestly more and greater sins will follow, then the inflic- 
tion of penalties will not come under the idea of justice. 
This is the case of which S. Augustine is speaking, where 
the excommunication of some will probably be followed by 
the schism of others. 

(2) But sacred truth is to be held back on account of 
scandal. " Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, nei- 
ther casi ye your pearls before swine; lest they trample 
them under their feet, and turn again and rend you" (S. 
Matt. vii. (j). I reply that sacred truth and the teaching of 
it are here to be distinguished. That truth is so necessary 
to salvation thai the contrary of it may under no circum- 
stances be taught fur fear of any scandal whatsoever which 
will follow the proclamation of the truth. Buthcwho.se 
duty ir is to teach the truth will give it according to what 
fits the times and the persons. This teaching is one of 
those spiritual works of mercy of which we shall presently 
speak. 

(3) Fraternal correction, also, is intended for the amend- 
ment of a brother, and it is a spiritual good so far as this 
can be attained. But if he be scandalized by it, it is not a 
spiritual good. Tiierefore, if such fraternal correction be 

; by through fear of scandal, a spiritual good is not 
given up. 

(4) But you may say that the giving of alms and the fol- 
lowing of spiritual counsels may sometimes be left undone 
on account of scandal. I reply that counsels or works of 
mercy are not to be left undone on account of scandal, al- 
though, for the sake of the weak, they may be concealed or 
deferred. But sometimes the observance of spiritual coun- 
sels or the works of mercy may be necessary to salvation. 
There are those who have vowed to follow the counsels of 
perfection ; there are those whose office and duty it is to 
assist the poor or to teach the ignorant ; there are cases 
occurring of extreme necessity : in all such cases the prin- 
ciple already laid down respecting what is necessary to sal- 



Qu. XLIII. 8.] SCANDAL. 259 

vation applies ; they may not be neglected through fear of 
scandal. 

(5) But ought not one to commit some trifling venial 
transgression on account of some grave scandal — say, to 
hinder another's mortal sin ? For a man ought to hinder 
the damnation of his neighbour, if he can do so without loss 
of his own soul. 

But there is contradiction in these terms. For if the 
thing may be lawfully done, it is not evil, it is not even 
venial sin; for sin can never bo rightly chosen. I grant, 
however, that it may happen that something which would 
be venial sin under other circumstances, may be no sin at 
all, those circumstances not being present. A jest is venial 
sin under certain circumstances, but if it be uttered for 
reasonable cause it is not an idle word, it is no sin. 

Are temporal goods to be given up on account of scandal? 

Observe that a distinction must be made between what is 
our own and what is entrusted to our care, if we are guard- 
ians of Church property or of the goods of the common- 
wealth (or trustees of minors, etc.). Such deposits we are 
bound to preserve, and they are not to be resigned on ac- 
count of scandal ; neither are those things which are neces- 
sary for human life to be given up. But as respects those 
things over which we have dominion, sometimes on account 
of scandal we ought to let them go by giving them up, or 
not seeking them when others have them, and sometimes 
we ought not to do any such thing. For if the scandal 
arise from the ignorance or infirmity of others (scandal of 
the weak), temporal goods are to be abandoned, or the 
scandal is to be stopped by proper admonition. 

But sometimes scandal originates in malice (the scandal 
of Pharisees). Property is not to be surrendered on account 
of those who excite such scandal, because such a course 
would be injurious to the common good, giving occasion 
for robbery to the evil-disposed ; and it would be injurious 



260 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLIII. 8. 

to the plunderers themselves, who, by keeping others' goods, 
would continue in open sin. 

(1) It is true that we ought to prefer the spiritual salva- 
tion of our neighbour to any earthly goods ; but this prin- 
ciple can only apply to scandal of the weak. 

(2) When S. Paul said: ''Destroy not with thy meat 
him for whom Christ died" (Rom. xiv. 15), he was speak- 
ing, of couth', of what is not necessary for bodily suste- 
nance; as again in 1 Cor. viii. 13: "If meat maketh my 
brother t<> Btumble, I will eat no ilesk for evermore, that I 
make not my brother to stumbL ." 

(3) Our Lord (S. Mail. v. 40) Baid : " It' any man would 
go i" law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have 
thy cloak also." And S. Paul to the same effect (1 Cor. 

. i . But this is .-.iid <»!' preparedness of soul when such 
a course is i xpedii nl ; but sometimes it is not expedient.* 

• If there is a question of positive dul vo injury to t 

to others, passive scandal may be permitted. But distinguish between 
moral precepts, including the law of nature, and purely positive law. 
The former may not !»• broken in order to avoid scandal ; the latter 
may 1"- freely suspended by the higher law of charity. 

It i- not the .-in of scandal to permit a sin in onler to hinder many 
sins ; e.g., the theft of a child or a sen 1 in order to detect 

and stop pilfering, or a marked letter or coin for a similar purpose. 

(Qu. 1. Observance of the "Sabbath," and tin- use of fermented 
drinks, a- passive scandal of the weak or the Pharisee. Sacramental 
wine rests on a dill 

Qu. i. Dances, and " low-necked " gowns 7) 



Part III. — The Cardinal Virtues. 



CHAPTER I. 

PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. 

§ 1. Prudence. 

What is prudence f 

It is a virtuous habit of the practical reason by which 
one judges rightly of the future from the past and the pres- 
ent. The prudent man considers what is to come as aiding 
or impeding what is immediately to be done. Prudence 
judges of the means for the end which is sought. Eeason 
gives this counsel ; on it follows the choice of the will. 

There may be an application of practical judgment to 
some special end, making a man prudent in that special 
way ; but prudence, taken simply, is the habit of right 
practical judgment respecting a good life. It is not wis- 
dom, for that looks to the ultimate and highest cause — i.e., 
God ; but it is wisdom in a lower sense, wisdom in human 
affairs as human. 

To prudence pertains not merely rational consideration, 
but its application to action. And since action is concerned 
with particulars, it is necessary that the prudent man know 
both the universal principles of reason, and those particu- 
lars in which he is to act. Those particulars may be in- 
finite in number, but experience reduces them to a limited 
number of general rules applicable to most cases which occur. 

This is not a question merely of observation by acute 
senses, but of memory and experience, which furnish the ma- 
terials which practical reason uses in its prudent judgments. 



262 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. xlvii. 4, 5, G, 7. 

Is prudence a virtue? 

Recall the definition, e< virtue is what makes him that 
has it good, and renders his work good.'' But the good 
may be viewed either as that wiiich in itself simply is so, or 
as that which the agent so regards. The good viewed as 
such is the object of the desires. Therefore, if there are 
any habits which give a correct rational view, without rela- 
tion to rectitude of desire, they have less of the nature of 
virtue, ordaining to what is materially good but not under 
the notion of good. But those habits which imply recti- 
tude of desire have more of the idea of virtue in them, he- 
cause they regard the good as good. Now prudence is the 
application of right reason to act inn, which is not done with- 
out right desire. Therefore prudence is not only a virtue 
in the sense in which the other intellectual virtues are 
BO, but it U a moral virtue also, ami numbered among 

them. 

It is a special virtue clearly distinguished from others In 
its object. 

A- an intellectual virtue it is distinguished from the 
others, since wisdom, knowledge, and understanding con- 
c Tn necessary things ; but this regards solely contingent 
things. So, indeed, does art; but that concerns external 
things to be made, as a house or a picture, while prudence 
is concerned with the agent and what he has to do. But it 
is distinguished from the moral virtues by its belonging to 
another power of the soul, the intellectual, not the appeti- 
tive. 

Prudence does not prescribe their end to the moral vir- 
tues. 

That belongs to the moral judgment, " synderesis ;" but 
it is the office of the former to judge what are suitable 
means for the attaining of those ends. In the government 
of the passions by moral virtues, it judges of the means by 



Qu. XLVII. 8, 9, 10, 13.] PRUDENCE. 263 

which the rational and happy mean may be attained which 
constitutes those virtues (Nic. Ethics). 

Its first act is deliberative, taking counsel, inquiring 
what means and circumstances are suitable for the end in 
view. 

Speculative reason may form a theoretical judgment of 
what should be done, along with its attendant circumstances ; 
but practical reason goes further, in prescribing and apply- 
ing to operation what has been counselled and judged. This 
is the principal act of prudence. 

Care and vigilance follow as part of the same virtue, not 
only for the private good of one, but for the good of the 
whole community. 

Can sinners have prudence ? 
There are three sorts of prudence. 

(1) Since the prudent man is he who well arranges what 
is to be done for the attainment of some good end, he who 
skilfully fits his means to some bad end has a kind of false 
prudence. Thus, we may speak of a prudent thief, who 
skilfully manages his plans for stealing and for escape from 
being found out. 

(2) There is another sort of prudence which fits, the 
means to a good end, but it is imperfect ; first, because the 
good which it takes for an end is not the common end of 
all human life. Such is the prudence of a merchant or a 
ship-captain. This is the prudence of the children of this 
world, who, in their way, may be "wiser than the children 
of light." It may be deficient in another way, when oue 
rightly counsels and rightly judges respecting what pertains 
to the whole life, but does not efficaciously prescribe action 
to himself. 

(3) But the third kind of prudence is true and perfect, 
which rightly takes counsel, judges, and prescribes how to 
attain the good end of the whole life. This sinners can- 



264 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. xlvii. 14, 15. 

not have. But the second, imperfect on account of its par- 
ticular aim, is common to good and bad. 

J 's prudence possessed by all who are in a state of grace? 

All such have charity, and with it come all other Chris- 
tian virtues ; and so it is necessary that prudence be in 
them. For no one has grace, unless he is virtuous. But 
no one can be virtuous unless he have prudence. For if 
the other virtues act not prudently in what they seek after, 
they are not entitled to the name of \ irtues. 

(1) Yet such may Beem to lark that diligent carefulness 
by which they provide well for what is to be done. Yes; 
but understand that we are speaking now of that prudence 
which concerns what is necessary to salvation, of which S. 
John Baid (1 Bp. ii. 27), "Hisanointing teacheth you con- 
cerning all things. " 

(2) But many, yon say, who have grace need to be 
guided by others' counsel. Yet they, in this very thing at 
least, know how to counsel well for themselves, in that they 

oth< T-' counsel, and distinguish the good from the 
bad. 

(3) Again, it may be objected that many young people 
are in a state of grace, and yet the young are not prudent. 
Acquired prudence, indeed, is caused by repeated action, 
and needs experience and time. And so the young cannot 
have it, either as a habit or actually. But the prudence of 
grace is an infused virtue, given even to baptized infants as 
a habit, though not in actual use. But in those who have the 
use of reason, it is actual so far as concerns what is essen- 
tial to salvation ; and through exercise of it as of the other 
virtues, increase is merited until the perfect virtue is gained. 

Prudence is not implanted in us by nature. 

We have seen that it includes a knowledge of universal 
principles and of particular things to be done to which the 
prudent man applies those universal principles. The com- 



Qu. xlvii. 16.] PRUDEXCE. 265 

mon principles of prudence, indeed, are connatural to man ; 
but other principles of a practical kind are acquired by 
experience or instruction. 

Again, as regards the particular cognition of those things 
which concern action, we must distinguish between what 
directly concerns the end, and what concerns the means to 
that end. For the right ends of human life are fixed and 
determined. Therefore, there can be a natural inclination 
towards those ends. Some have certain virtues by their 
natural disposition, by which they are inclined to right ends, 
and, consequently, have naturally right judgment respecting 
those ends. But in human affairs the means for the end 
are not determined, but are manifoldly diversified accord- 
ing to the diversity of persons and things. Hence, since 
natural inclination is always to some determined thing, 
such knowledge cannot be in man by nature, although from 
natural disposition one may be more apt for discernment 
of these means than another is. Prudence, then, is not a 
natural virtue. 

Brutes seem to have a sort of natural prudence, but they 
have determined ways of reaching the ends of their exist- 
ence ; and so all of one species act in the same way (even 
when the action has become useless as means to an end ; 
thus a beaver or a squirrel in captivity goes through the 
usual operations of his instinctive prudence). 

How is prudence lost? 

Forgetfulness applies to knowledge only. Science and 
art may be forgotten. But prudence does not consist in 
knowledge only, but also in desire, since its principal act is 
to prescribe what is to be done; i.e., to apply knowledge 
to seeking and acting. Prudence, therefore, is rather cor- 
rupted by passions than taken away directly by forgetful- 
ness. Yet this can impede the operation of the virtue, 
inasmuch as it prescribes what is to be done from some 
knowledge which may be lost through forgetfulness. 



26G PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. LIU. 1. 

" Integral " parts of prudence 
are such virtues as (a) teachableness, by which one care- 
fully, frequently, and reverently applies his mind to the 
teachings of those who have gone before him, neither neg- 
lecting them through sloth, nor contemning them through 
pride ; (b) foresight, circumspection, i.e., accurate considera- 
tion of the circumstances of action ; and (c) caution, i.e., 
careful consideration of the attendant evils and impedi- 
ments of action. 

Corresponding to the virtue of prudence is the spiritual 
gift of counsel. For human reason cannot comprehend all 
the particular and contingent events which may occur (espe- 
cially in connection with the Christian life) ; and therefore 
his prudence needs to be directed by God aiding and per- 
fecting it. 

The Decalogue contained no command respecting pru- 
dence In, mum it was concerned with the dictates of natural 
reason, and these chiefly concern the ends of human life, 
not the means for those ends. But subsequent documents 
of the Old Testament added the means to those ends, and 
the perfect Evangelical doctrine instructed man in all that 
pertains to rectitude of life. This, therefore, said (S. Matt. 
x. 1G), " Be ye wise (prudent) as serpents/' 

§ 2. Vices opposed to prudence. 

Imprudence : is it a sin ? 

The merely negative absence of prudence may exist 
without Bin; but privatively, imprudence exists when one 
lack- the prudence which he is fitted to have and ought to 
have, and this is sin by reason of the negligence through 
which he does not use efforts to obtain this virtue. 

And, again, imprudence is to be taken in contradictory 
signification, when reason is moved to acts contrary to pru- 
dence, as when right reason acts after taking counsel, and 
the imprudent spurns counsel. In this way imprudence is 
a sin according to the proper idea of prudence. For a man 



Qu. Lin. 4.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE. 267 

cannot act contrary to prudence except he turn away from 
those rules by which the prudent is guided aright. If this 
happen by aversion from Divine rules, it is mortal sin, as 
when one acts precipitately through contemning and repu- 
diating the Holy Scriptures. But if the neglect of Divine 
rules is without contempt or detriment to those things 
which are necessary to salvation, it is venial sin. 

(1) It may seem that imprudence is not voluntary, and 
therefore is not sin. And it is true that no one wills the 
deformity of imprudence ; but yet he who wills to act 
rashly, wills the imprudent act. 

(2) It is true that imprudence is born with man, and 
that the young are naturally imprudent. But this is the 
merely negative imprudence, which, however, is part of 
that lack of original righteousness which once perfected the 
whole soul, which deficiency is called original sin. 

(3) By repentance is restored infused prudence, but not 
the habit acquired by experience. But the contrary act is 
removed in which properly consists the sin. 

Various sins are contained under this, as rashness or 
temerity, inconsiderateness of judgment, inconstancy, and 
negligence. 

(1) There are steps by which prudence advances, such as 
memory of the past, consideration of the present, sagacity 
in viewing the future, reflection comparing one thing with 
another, docility towards the judgments of elders. But 
rashness leaps over all these steps, acting under the impulse 
of will or passion. It is a special form of the sin of impru- 
dence. 

(2) Inconsiderateness is another special form of this sin, 
when one fails to judge rightly because he despises those 
things from which right judgment proceeds, or neglects to 
attend to them. The Lord (S. Matt. x. 19) forbade His 
disciples to be anxious how or what they should speak, 
trusting in the Divine counsel ; but to neglect to do what 
we can, expecting Divine aid, seems to be tempting God. 



268 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [QlT. LIV. 3. 

(3) Inconstancy denotes a withdrawal from some pro- 
posed good which had been resolved upon. Such with- 
drawal has its beginning, indeed, in the desires, for no one 
changes his purpose except on account of something which 
inordinately pleases him. But this withdrawal is consum- 
mated by defect in reason, which repudiates what it had 
rightly accepted. If reason does not resist the impulse of 
passions when it can do so, the fault is due to its weakness, 
not holding firmly to the proposed good which it has con- 
ceived. Therefore the consummation of inconstancy per- 
tain-; to defeel of reason ; i.e., t<> imprudence. These three 
vices arc the daughters of lust ("litxuria"), because sen- 
sual pleasure absorbs the niiud and extinguishes the judg- 
ment of reason. 

Negligence : is it a special sin .' 

1 1 implies the lack of due care and watchfulness. But 
every defect of due acts is sin. And as that careful vigi- 
lance is a special virtue, bo its opposite is a special sin (es- 
pecially in those things which pertain to our salvation). 
The matter about which the diligence or the negligence is 
concerned may be any moral question, but the want of the 
special act of reason which is due constitutes the latter a 
special sin over and above any other which may be present 
also. 

Sins of omission pertain to the outward acts which arc 
due. and such omission is the effect of negligence, the in- 
ward Bin which pertains to imprudence. 

< 'an negligence be a mortal sin ? 

Holy Scripture seems to answer that question for us 
when it says (Prov. six. 1G), " He that is careless of his 
ways shall die." Xegligence comes from remissness of will 
which is not anxious to prescribe what it ought and in the 
way it ought. This can be mortal sin in two ways ; first, 
as respects that which is omitted through negligence; for 



Qu. LV. 3, 4, 5.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE. 269 

if this be necessary to salvation, whether it be an act or a 
circumstance of the act, there will be mortal sin. And 
again, if the will is so remiss regarding what belongs to 
God that it totally loses charity, such negligence is mortal 
sin, and this happens especially when the negligence fol- 
lows from contempt. Otherwise, if the negligence consist 
in the omission of some act or circumstance which is not 
necessary to salvation, and if this be not done through con- 
tempt, but from lack of fervour which is sometimes im- 
peded by some venial sin, then the negligence is not mortal 
but is venial. 

Craftiness : is it a special sin ? 

S. Paul says (2 Cor. iv. 2), " We have renounced the 
hidden things of shame, not walking in craftiness." That 
answers the question. Sin against prudence may have some 
resemblance to the virtue in two ways : either the efforts 
of reason may be directed to some end which is not truly 
good, but only apparent good ; or one in seeking some end, 
whether good or bad, may use, not the true paths, but 
feigned and seeming right. This is craftiness. 

(1) This is not the '• subtlety " offered to the simple by 
the Proverbs of Solomon (Prov. i. 4). 

(2) A good end does not sanctify the bad means. 

Guile (" dolus") 
pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, chiefly indeed 
by words, but also sometimes by actions. He that medi- 
tates evil, tries to find the way to fulfil his purpose, and 
usually the guileful way is au easier one than open vio- 
lence. 

Fraud 
also pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, but if we 
make any distinction between it and guile, it may be that 
fraud proper has to do with actions. 



270 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. LV. G, 7. 

Is it lawful to have solicitude respecting temporal things"? 

The Lord said (S. Matt. vi. 31), " Be not anxious, say- 
ing, What shall we eat ? or, What shall we drink ? or, Where- 
withal shall we be clothed?" Solicitude leads to anxious 
endeavour to obtain something. Where there is fear of 
failing, there is more zealous endeavour ; but where there 
is security respecting the end, there is less solicitude. So, 
then, this anxiety aboui temporal things may in three ways 
be unlawful : (1) On the side of what we are anxious about, 
if we seek temporal things as our end; (2) on the side of 
the anxiety, if it be such as to withdraw a man from those 
spiritual things which he ought chiefly to follow; ''the 
care of the world chokes the word " (S. Matt. xiii. 22) ; (:)) 
on the side of tin- needless fear, when one fears lest neces- 
saries fail him through doing whal he ought to do. This 
fear the Lord excludes by three arguments addressed to 
his timid disciple : first, that greater benefits, without any 
anxiety of his, are Divinely conferred, \iz., on soul and 
body; next, that God provides for beasl and plant without 
human labour ; and lastly, that it is ignorance of Divine 
Providence which makes an infidel, an atheist, or a heathen 
man anxious aboul this world's goods. 

(1) Man. by Divine ordinance, has the use of this world, 
hut not that he may make it the end of his life. 

(2) Man must work in order to live ; hut this is moder- 
ate! care, not superfluous anxiety. 

May in" /„■ anxious for the future? 

The Lord answers (S. Matt. vi. 34), "Be not anxious 
for the morrow." No work can be virtuous unless it he 
clothed with due circumstances, among which is the lit 
time. " There is a time to every purpose which is under 
the heaven." Each day brings with it its own proper care, 
the time to plant or the time to reap. If in the time of 
planting one is anxious about the harvest, that may be the 
superfluous care which the Lord prohibited. " Sufficient 



Qu. LV. 7.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDEHCE. 271 

unto the day is the evil thereof;" i.e., the trouble and 
care. 

This does not prohibit prudence with respect to the fu- 
ture, providing what is needed for the future, since Christ 
Himself taught us that by His example (S. John xii. 6). 

These vices of craftiness, guile, fraud, and inordinate 
anxiety are especially the daughters of avarice. 



CHAPTER II. 

JUSTICE AND I N.I I STICK. 
in. e Supplement, Chapters TV. ami V.) 

| 1. Right. 

Right [jus) is (he object of justice, for it is what is just. 

\ • it is peculiar to justice among the virtues that 
it ordains man in those things wherein he is related to 
another man. Other virtues perfect him in what belongs 
to himself; bui in jusi action, the right considers cot 
only the agent, hut also another person. For that is called 
just action in which there is a certain relative equality, as 
when work is paid for with its due wages. The just anion 
does nol necessarily regard the manner in which the thing 
is done (e.g., whether freely or not). And thus justice is 
distinguishable from other virtues. 

Because justice implies a certain equality, and we can 
recompense God by no equivalent for His bounty, properly 
speaking, justice is between man and man ; yet justice 
tends to this, that man requite His Heavenly Father as 
much as he is able, by entire subjection of his soul to God. 

Right is eitJter natural or positive right. 

One thing may be adequate to another, (I) according to 
its very nature, as when any one gives as much as he has 
received. This is natural right. (2) It may be adequate 
or commensurate according to some compact or common 
agreement, when one deems himself compensated if he 
receive so much. This may be either a private agreement 
between two individuals, or it may be by public consent, the 



Qu. lvii. 2.] RIGHT. 273 

whole people, with or without legal ordinance, agreeing 
that some one thing is adequate and commensurate to 
another. 

(1) But it might be objected that what is natural is 
immutable, and is the same among all men ; but no such 
thing is found in human affairs, because all the regulations 
of human right are defective in some cases and do not pre- 
vail everywhere. And this is true of what has an immuta- 
ble nature ; it must be always and everywhere the same. 
But man's nature is mutable, and so what is natural to man 
can sometimes be deficient. Thus it is naturally just and 
equal that what has been left in our charge be returned to 
its owner ; and if human nature were always what it should 
be, this law would be immutable. But because it some- 
times happens that the will of man is depraved, a case may 
occur in which such deposit is not to be returned ; say, if a 
madman or an enemy of the republic demand the arms 
which he has left with us. 

(2) Another objection, whose solution will help in clear- 
ing up the matter. Positive right proceeds from human 
will ; but such a thing is not necessarily just ; otherwise 
the will of man could never be unjust. I reply that the 
will of man, by the common consent of the people, can 
make something to be just where there is no natural repug- 
nance to natural justice. Positive right is concerned with 
such things. " The legally just is that which in the begin- 
ning might have been thus or thus, and it mattered not 
which. But when it is decreed, then it does matter" (Nic. 
Eth. v. 7). But if anything has in itself repugnance to 
natural right, it cannot be made just by human will ; say, 
if it be decreed lawful to steal or to commit adultery. 
"Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees" (Isa. 
x. 1). 

(3) Divine right {jus divinum) is divisible in the same 
way. It is what is promulgated by God. But that is partly 
what is naturally just, though its justice may not be seen 

18 



274 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LVIII. 1, 2, P>, 4. 

by all men ; partly what is made just by Divine institu- 
tion. 

In Divine law, accordingly, some tilings are commanded 
because they are good, and others prohibited because they 
are bad ; but some things also are good because they are 
commanded, and others bad because they are prohibited 
(a very noteworthy distinction). 

What is jus gentium f 

The law of nature {jus naturals) is what nature teaches 
all animals, as the union of male and female, and the bring- 
ing up of children (Instit. i., tit. ii.), but tho jus gentium 
is what natural reason has established among all men, which 
needs no special institution, and is found among all nations. 

The rights of a father in respect to his children, and of a 
master over his servants, are to be distinguished from sim- 
ple right. Servants and children are, as it were, a part 
of father and master {i.e., their time, work, etc., are not 
absolutely their own). As human beings, they have their 
individual rights; but as under another, justice, taken sim- 
ply, does not express what is their due, but an imperfect 
justice based on their peculiar relations to father or master. 
For the relation is not the simple relation of one person to 
another, but is based on the special relation in these cases. 

§ 2. Justice. 

Justice is a constant and perpetual will to render to every 
one his right (Instit. i., tit. i). 

Justice is a virtue which concerns our relations to others. 

Its seat is in the will. It pertains to this virtue to rec- 
tify human actions, establishing an equality in the relations 
of one to another. This rectification makes a man so far 
good and his work good, which effect ranks justice among 
the virtues. And it is a virtue of the will, not of the intel- 
lect, because it does not direct our knowledge but rectifies 



Qu. lviii. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.] JUSTICE. 275 

our action. It is not a virtue of sense-appetite, because 
that does not consider our mutual relations, nor is it capa- 
ble of being disposed to render every one bis right. 

Distinguish general justice, "legal justice," from pri- 
vate or particular justice. 

Justice ordains man in relation to others. But this may 
be in relation to another individual, or to the community of 
which he is a part. As a general virtue it orders the acts of 
all virtues for the common good, just as charity orders them 
for Divine good, and this is also a general virtue. I call 
this general justice "legal justice" because by it man is in 
harmony with law, whose function it is to direct man's 
actions for the common good. 

It is distinct from the virtues which it orders for the 
common good, because they have their immediate end, 
which is different from this higher end of the public good 
which general or legal justice gives them. 

But man also needs to be ordered in his actions towards 
other individuals ; hence there is also particular (or pri- 
vate) justice. Its special object is not the inward passions, 
which need other rectifying virtues, but those outward 
actions and those outward things by which men have inter- 
course with one another. Inward passions, in their effects 
— sc, outward operations — may extend to others, but they 
do not in themselves so extend ; this is peculiar to justice. 

Justice is not directly concerned with the passions of the 
soul. 

This we have already seen ; the subject of justice is the 
will ; its matter, the things in which we are related to one 
another. But further explanation may be given of the 
relation between justice and inward passions. Actions are 
intermediate between outward things which are the object 
of those actions and the passions from which those actions 
spring. Sometimes there may be defect in one of those 



2TC JUSTICE VXD INJUSTICE. [Qu. lviii. 12. 

without defect in the other ; as if any one take another's 
property, not with desire of getting it, but with a wish to 
do him harm ; or, conversely, if lie desire what is another 
man's, but does not will to steal it. The rectification of 
actions, therefore, so far as the outward part is concerned, 
belongs to justice ; but the rectification of those actions in 
the inward part belongs to other moral virtues which are 
concerned with the passions. Thus justice prevents steal- 
ing as being againel thai equality which is to be preserved 
in outward things; Imt liberality prevents it as it proceeds 
from immoderate lust of riches. 

It is especially legal justice, winch is ordained for the 
common good, which extends to the inward passions of the 
soul, since the good of the whole is the end of each mem- 
ber of t he whole. But even legal justice is chiefly concerned 
with the outward operations of those virtues which con- 
cern the passions, Buch actions cominir within the scope of 
law. So law may punish cowardice, intemperance, cruelty, 
etc., if they show themselves in action (Nic. Eth. v. 2). 

The proper act of justice is to render to each one what is 
his. 

Justice is /'/■>i : //ii/ i c/if among moral virtues. 

This is manifestly true of general, legal justice, because 
the common good is of more importance than the good of 
any individual. But even particular justice has the same 
preeminence for two reasons ; first, it is in the nobler part 
of the soul, the rational appetite — i.e., the will; while the 
other moral virtues belong to sense-appetite and its passions. 
And, in the second place, while those virtues have for their 
object the good of one person, justice aims also at the good 
of another. Justice ranks even above liberality ; for in 
considering the common good, the former extends to all who 
are related, while liberality does not ; and liberality which 
gives of one's own must be founded on justice which gives 
what is due. 



Qit. MX. 1, 2, 3.1 INJUSTICE. 277 

§ 3. Injustice. 

Is it a special vice ? 

There are two kinds of injustice. The first is illegal, 
opposed to legal justice. This is a special vice, for it has a 
special object ; sc, the general good which it contemns. But 
in its aim it is rather a general vice than a special one ; for 
through contempt of the general good man can be led into 
all kinds of sins ; and all vices, as repugnant to the general 
good, have the nature of injustice, are derived from it. 

The other kind of injustice is based on inequality towards 
another, when one wishes to have more of good things than 
is just — say, riches and honours ; and fewer evils — say, 
labours and losses. In this way injustice has its own special 
matter, and is a special vice opposed to private justice. 

Private injustice is opposed, indeed, indirectly to all vir- 
tues, as regards their outward acts. Thus it is opposed to 
chastity in the act of adultery, to kindness in the act. of 
homicide, etc. 

Who is an unjust man? 

Not always he who does an unjust action. For, first, if 
he did not intend to do an unjust thing, the action does 
not make him unjust per se, but per acciclens. The action 
is unjust, but it is not unjustly done ; it is not a wrong, an 
injury [adiurjfia). Secondly, the wrong may proceed from 
some passion, as anger or concupiscence ; or it may be 
deliberately done, when the wrong per se gives pleasure. 
In this latter case it proceeds from a habit. But to do an 
unjust action from intention and choice is the mark of an 
unjust man. He is called unjust who has the habit of 
injustice. But unintentionally, or from passion, one may 
do an unjust action without having a habit of injustice. 

Can any one willingly suffer wrong f 
" Scienti et volenti non fit injuria.''' A man properly 
and per se does that which he willingly does ; and he 



278 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. Lix. 3. 

properly suffers that which lie suffers contrary to his will ; 
because so far as he is willing, he is rather active than 
passive. No one, then, can, properly speaking, do a wrong 
unless lie wills it, nor suffer a wrong unless he be unwill- 
ing. But, per accidens, and according to the "material" 
pari of the action, one can unwillingly do that which is 
per se unjust, as when he ads against his intention ; or he 
can willingly suffer an injustice, as when he of his own will 
gives to another more than is due. 

(1) Y<<u may say thai one can "rob himself," so violate 
equality, and suffer injustice. But when any one of his 
own free will give- another thai which is not due, there is 
neither injustice nor inequality. For a man has property 
through his own will, and 30 there is no *• injury " when 
anything is subtracted from it according to his own will, 
either by himself or by another. 

(2) But you may say that civil law punishes nothing 
which is not unjust : and yet it deprives suicides of hon- 
orable interment. So one can willingly do injustice to 
himself. But I reply that man has a two-fold position 
in this world ; and one of these positions concerns him- 
>elf alone ; and so, if he does any harm to himself, it 
may be some other sin, as intemperance or imprudence, 
but it is not injustice. 

But also man may be considered as a part of society, or 
as the creature and image of God. And so he who kills 
himself does an injury to the state and to God. There- 
fore both Divine and human laws inflict a penalty. 

(3) Another objection. No one does an unjust thing 
unless there be some one who suffers that injustice. (The 
two are correlative.) But he may do an unjust thing to 
one who wills it, as when he sells a thing for more than it 
is worth. So it seems that one can willingly suffer injus- 
tice. But I reply that in the doing and the suffering an 
unjust thing, we may look at the "'material" part, the 
outward action considered in itself. In this respect, the 



Qu. LX. 1.] JUDGMENT. 279 

doing and the suffering are always concomitant. But again 
we may look at the will and intention, the "formal" 
part of the action. In this regard one may do an unjust 
thing intending to do such a thing, and yet the other may 
not suffer injustice because he willingly allows the action. 
(Thus, in a case of fraud in a bargain, one may pay the 
excessive price, intending to make a donation of the excess 
to the cheat.) And, conversely, one may unjustly suffer, 
because he unwillingly suffers that which is unjust ; and 
yet he who does the action will not be acting unjustly, 
because he is ignorant of the nature of what he does. 

Whoever does an unjust action is guilty of mortal sin. 

He directly violates the law of God ; his act is opposed to 
charity, through which is the life of the soul. .For every 
injury done to another is repugnant to charity which wills 
another's good. 

(1) What shall we say of ignorance ? Ignorance of the 
fact, of the circumstances, merits pardon ; but ignorance 
of the law does not excuse (the laws of justice can generally 
be known by one who wills to know them). But he who 
ignorantly does an unjust thing, does so only per accidens. 

(2) What shall we say of very trifling acts of injustice ? 
Possibly some such thing may not be, properly speaking, 
perfect injustice at all ; for it may be considered to be not 
altogether contrary to the will of him who suffers it ; as if 
any one take an apple or some such thing, when there is 
probably no harm done, nor any displeasure resulting if the 
act be known. 

§ 4. Judgment. 

Judgment is the definition or determination of what is 
just and right. 

But that any one well determine anything in virtuous 
acts proceeds from a habit of virtue ; and therefore judg- 
ment is an act of justice. It is an act of reason, indeed, 



280 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. IX. 2. 

perfected by prudence, but a fit disposition for judging 
rightly is also requisite ; and so, in what pertains to justice, 
judgment springs from the virtue of justice, as in what per- 
tains to courage it comes from that virtue. "He that is 
spiritual judgeth all tilings'' (1 Cor. ii. 15), because from 
charity he has the disposition to judge rightly all things 
according to Divine rules, through t lie gift of wisdom ; as 
the jusl man, through the virtue of prudence, pronounces 
judgment out of the rules of right. 

But the meaning of the term judgment is amplified to 
embrace righi determination in any things whatsoever, 
and in other virtues the judgment of him who is vir- 
tuous in their regard is required. But when we speak of 
justice, jndgmenl is used in its restricted and proper mean- 
ing. 

/>• it lawful to judge f 

It is plainly lawful so far as it is an act of justice. But 
this requires three things: (1) It must proceed from the 
disposition to be just and to do just actions ; otherwise ii is 
3( the rectitude of justice; it is perverse and unjust. 
(2) It musl proceed from due authority, not from judging 
in things where one has no such right ; otherwise it is 
usurped judgment. (3) Judgment must be made according 
to rational prudence. "When certitude is lacking, as when 
one judges about doubtful or secret things by some light 
conjectures, such a judgment is rash and suspicious. 
Whichever of these three requisites is lacking, the judg- 
ment is illicit and vicious. 

(1) The Lord said, indeed (8. Matt. vii. 1), "Judge 
not, that ye be not judged." But He prohibits rash judg- 
ment, or that which is not of good will, but from bitter- 
ness of spirit. 

(2) S. Paul, also, said (Rom. xiv. 4). " Who art thou that 
judgest another's" servant ? To his own master he standeth 
orfalleth;'" which seems to indicate that God is the only 



Qu. LX. 3.] JUDGMENT. 281 

judge. But judgment may be made by " the minister of 
God " (Deut. i. 17). 

(3) But the apostle seems to say, again (Rom. ii. 1), that 
it is not lawful for a sinful man to judge ; and all are sin- 
ners. And this is true when the judge's sins are open and 
similar, or greater; for great scandal arises from such judg- 
ments. But when the sins are not notorious and official 
duty requires, he can rebuke or judge with humility and 
fear. He does not thus condemn himself with new con- 
demnation, but he shows himself worthy of condemnation 
for the same or like sin. 

Is judgment from suspicion illicit ? 

Suspicion is an evil opinion of another based on light 
indications or proofs. And this arises in three ways : (1) 
He who is himself an evil-doer, conscious of his malice, 
easily forms a bad opinion of others. (2) He may be ill- 
affected towards another, and, despising or hating him, or 
being angry or envying him, he forms his opinion from 
trifling proofs, because one easily believes what he desires to 
be true. (3) Suspicion results from long experience. " The 
old are most suspicious, because they have had most expe- 
rience of others' deficiencies " (Arist. Ehet. ii. 13). The 
first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perverse 
affections ; but the third cause renders the judgment less 
that of suspicion, inasmuch as experience gives more of 
certitude. Suspicion, then, implies a certain vice, and the 
further the suspicion proceeds, the greater the sin. But 
there are three grades of suspicion : (1) A man from light 
indications begins to harbour doubt about another's good- 
ness. This may be light and venial sin, for it pertains to 
those human temptations from which life cannot be free. 
(2) One from light indications may hold for certain the 
wickedness of another. And if this be in a grave matter, 
it is mortal sin, for it implies contempt of our neighbour. 
" If we cannot avoid suspicions, since we are men, yet we 



282 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LX. 4. 

can and we ought to restrain definite and fixed judgments." 
(3) A judge out of suspicion may proceed to condemn 
another. This is directly an act of injustice, and a mortal 
sin. 

(1) It is true that in particular and contingent tilings we 
can never have absolute certainty ; but we can have that 
moral certainty which results from suitable proofs. 

(2) Suspicion, being only in the opinion of the mind, 
may Beem to be doing no injury ; but if one without suffi- 
cient can-' has a bad opinion of another, ho unduly con- 
temns Iiim ; therefore he does an injury to him. (See 1 
Tim. vi. 4.) The inward judgment, as it is related to the 
• •utuard judgment, pertains to injustice in the same way 
in which anger is related to homicide. (The one may be 
venial, the other is mortal sin.) 

Doubts respecting (mother's wickedness are to be decided 
in the more favourable »< nse ( unless we simply suspend judg- 
ment, a ml "judge not at all "). 

For we have no right to contemn or do injury to another 
without the most cogent reasons. 

(1) It may happen that he who puts the most favourable 
interpretation on others' words and actions is oftenest de- 
ceived. But it is better that one be frequently mistaken in 
having a good opinion of a bad man than that he be more 
rarely mistaken in having a bad opinion of a good man. 
For injury is done to another by this, hut not by the first 
error. 

(2) It is one thing to judge of things, and quite another 
to judge of men. For in judging about things, there is no 
good or evil done to the thing, in whatever way we may 
judge of it. It is only the good of the judge which is in 
question ; the good, if he judge rightly ; or the evil, if he 
judge falsely ; because the true is the good of reason, and 
the false is its evil. And therefore each one ought to strive 
to judge of things precisely as they are. 



Qu. LX. •"">.] JUDGMENT. 283 

But, in judging men, the good and evil is chiefly on the 
side of him who is judged, who is deemed worthy of honour 
if he receive favourable judgment, and worthy of contempt 
if he be judged unfavourably. Therefore in such judgment 
we ought to aim to judge a man to be good unless manifest 
reason for the contrary appear. And if we err in our favour- 
able judgment, the error does not pertain to the evil of 
reason, for its perfection is not found in knowledge of par- 
ticular contingent things ; but the error rather pertains to 
well-constituted affections. We are not now considering 
the application of remedies for spiritual diseases. There 
we may assume the worse condition, since the remedy 
which fits that graver disease will suit still more the lighter 
one. 

Written laws. 

These are made to set forth either natural right or positive 
right, but not both after the same manner. For written 
law contains natural right, but does not create it ; it gets 
its force, not from the law, but from nature ; whereas writ- 
ten law both contains and establishes positive right, giv- 
ing it its authority and binding force. Judgment, then, 
must be made according to such law, otherwise it would 
fall short either of natural justice or of positive justice. 

(1) Laws, indeed, are sometimes unjust. But, since law 
gives no force to natural right, it cannot take away or 
diminish the force of that right, because man's will cannot 
change nature. Therefore, if law contain anything against 
natural right, it is unjust, and creates no obligation of 
obedience. Positive law comes in where it makes no differ- 
ence as regards natural right whether the action be done 
in one way or in another. Unjust laws, so called, are prop- 
erly no laws at all, but rather corruptions of law. 

(2) No law can comprehend all particular events. In 
some cases, if the law-maker were present, he would judge 
contrary to the letter of the law. The best laws, laws per- 



884 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. IAI. 1. 

fectly just, fail to meet some cases. If they were observed 
in those cases they would he contrary to natural right. In 
such casea judgment is not to be given according to the 
letter of the law, but recourse is to be had to that equity 
which the law-maker was bound to intend. "No consid- 
eration of right or benignity of equity endures, that what 
was beneficially introduced for the good of mankind should, 
rarer interpretation, be used against the advantage of 
those who are subject to law." [fa jusl law-maker had con- 
sidered .mum! cases, he would have determined them by just 
law. (In doubtful cases, recourse is to be had to those who 
have authority to interpret, to judge, to decide.) 

Usurped judgment. 

Since judgmeni is to be given according to law, he who 
does so interprets the law in applying it to the particular 
case before him. But it belongs to the same authority 
of government to make law, and to interpret it (by prac- 
tical application i nforcing it). Therefore, as law can only 
be made by public authority, so judgment can only be 
me. And so, as it would be unjust that 
any one should compel another to observe some regulation 
which was not sanctioned by public authority, so it is also 
unjust that any one should compel another to submit to 
judgment which has not the same sanction. 

§ 5. Commutative and distributive justice ; restitution. 
Divisions of justice. 

There are two species of particular justice, commutative 
and distributive ; for justice, in this sense of the word, 
directs each individual as part of the community. Now 
part may be related to part — i.e., one individual to another; 
and commutative justice directs the relations which one 
man bears to another (as in buying and selling, and similar 
contracts). 

But another relation is that of the whole to the several 



Qu. LXI. 2, 3.] DIVISIONS OF JUSTICE. 285 

parts ; that which belongs to the whole community in its 
relations to particular persons. Distributive justice di- 
rects this relation, assigning the common goods (honours, 
rewards, etc.) according to a certain proportion in dignity 
and merits. 

In distributive justice the equality of one thing to another 
is not considered, but the proportion of things to persons; 
so that, as one person exceeds another, what is given to the 
one exceeds what is given to the other. 

This is the reason why Aristotle spoke of a geometric 
proportion in distributive justice (Nic. Eth., v. 3). For 
the equality is not that of two things, but of two ratios 
(A's merits are to A's share, as B's merits are to B's share). 

But in exchange, something is given to one person on 
account of what he has himself given. And, therefore, the 
one thing must be equal to the other, as in buying and 
selling ; and if one have more of the other's goods than is 
equal to what he has given, commutative justice requires 
him to make restitution of the excess. And so a sort of 
arithmetical equality is established. 

If we consider punishments, retributive justice, in this 
light, we shall notice that in actions and passions the con- 
dition of the persons concerned contributes to the quantity 
of the thing ; for greater injury is done when a person 
holding official station is struck than when a private person 
is so injured. 

We may examine commutative justice somewhat more in 
detail. 

Justice, as we have seen, is concerned with outward 
operations ; sc, distribution and exchange. These opera- 
tions concern some external things, or persons, or services ; 
things, as when one takes away or restores another's prop- 
erty ; persons, as when one injures another's person by 
striking or slandering him, or on the other hand pays him 



28G JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LX1I. 1. 

proper respect ; and lastly, services which may be justly 
demanded from another or rendered to him. 

In the exchanges between two persons which commutative 
justice directs, some are voluntary, some are involuntary. 
They are involuntary when one uses the property, the per- 
son, or the service of another against his consent, secretly 
through fraud, or openly through violence. Secretly one 
may take another's property, and we shall have the crime 
of theft ; or it may be done openly, which is robbery. 
Personal injustice may be directed against one's own per- 
son, or againsl those who belong to us ; it may be directly 
againsl our person, or againsl oui honour and reputation. 
The person may be secretly injured, as by treacherous 
murder — e.g., poisoning and the- like — or by open violence. 
Honour and reputation may be secretly injured by detrac- 
tion, backbiting, etc., or by public abuse, false wil 
etc. Through those belonging to us we may be injured by 

secret adultery, <»r by enticing from our service those who 
owe their work to QB. 

Voluntary exchanges are of very numerous kinds. If 
one simply transfer his property to another without any 
obligation so to do, as in a gift, it is not an act of justice, 
but of liberality. Justice implies something due, some 
kind of debt ; as in buying, selling, hiring, etc. (See, 
further, Supplement. Chapter VI.) 

Restitution is an act of commutative justice. 

To restore is to put another in possession or dominion 
of his own property, according to the equality of justice, 
whether the thing has been possessed with the owner's 
knowledge and consent, as in a loan or deposit, or without 
that knowledge and consent, as in theft and robbery. (It 
is either a returning of the thing received, or compensation 
for loss.) It is not the mere giving back of a material 
thing, which may be a donation ; it implies the obligation 
to do so, the returning what is justly another's. 



Qu. LXII. 2.] RESTITUTION. 287 

The first meaning of restitution has to do with outward 
things which remain the same, and whose dominion can be 
transferred from one to another. But a secondary signifi- 
cation of the word transfers it to actions or passions which 
concern the honour or injury, the benefit or harm of per- 
sons. The action may not remain, but its effects abide ; 
e.g., the slanderous word passes away, but the loss of a good 
name is a permanent loss, and demands restitution so far 
as that is possible. 

To restore that which has been unjustly taken away is an 
indispensable requisite of salvation. 

For only the just man can be saved, and restitution is an 
indispensable act of justice. " Sender to all their dues. 
Owe no man anything but to love one another" (Rom. 
xiii. 7, 8). 

(1) Sometimes complete restitution is impossible, as when 
a limb or even life itself has been destroyed. But where 
the equivalent cannot be returned, as in the case of the 
honour due to God or to parents, there the obligation is 
limited to what is possible. The loss of a limb cannot be 
fully recompensed, yet justice will demand pecuniary com- 
pensation or other restitution, according to the circum- 
stances of the case. 

(2) It is objected that one man may take away another's 
good name by saying what is true concerning that other ; 
and he cannot restore a good character without telling a lie. 
But there are three ways in which a good name is taken 
away : (1) When the truth is justly spoken, according to the 
due order of things, and restitution is not due ; (2) when 
the words spoken were false and unjust, and the restitution 
of a good name is bounden duty, by a frank confession of 
the error ; (3) when the truth was spoken, but unjustly, as 
when any one betrays the crime of another without due 
warrant for so doing ; and he is bound to restore the good 
name, so far as is possible, without telling a lie. One may 



288 JUSTICE AXD INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 3. 

truly say that he ought not to have spoken in such a way ; 
thai he unjustly injured the other's character ; or, if he 
cannot restore a good character which he has taken away, 
and which every man is entitled to until it is lawfully 
taken away, he is bound to make other compensation. 

(3) Sometimes what is done cannot be undone ; unjust 
insult cannot be directly repaired. Yes; hut its effects 
which remain — sc, loss of respect before men — may be 
partly repaired through special exhibition of reverence. 
This is partial restitul ion. 

(4) Suppose one hinder another from obtaining some 
good — say, a lucrative office ; it is like taking it away. Is 
he bound to make restitution ? Oftentimes that would be 
impossible. 1 answer that one might be justly kept out of 
thi- office for the honour of God, or the good of the Church 
or of tin' commonwealth, in order thai a more worthy 

i should gut that dignity. Of course, in such a case 
no restitution is called for nor any compensation. But this 
may be unjustly clone, as through hatred, desire of ven- 
geance, unjust prejudice, etc. ; and, then, if the worthy be 
hindered before it has been settled that he shall have the 
. some compensation is due according to the circum- 
stances, hut not full restitution, because there might have 
been other hindrances to getting the office besides this one. 
But if the matter have been settled, and any one for im- 
proper causes procure that the appointment be revoked, it 
is all one with his taking away the good which the other 
has, and equal restitution is obligatory, or compensation to 
the extent of his ability. 

Is it sufficient simply to restore what has been unjustly 
taken away ? 

Two things are to be considered. First, there is inequality 
as respects the thing in question, which sometimes can exist 
without injustice, as when you hire a thing which is to be 
returned with additional compensation for the use of it. 



Qu. lxii. 4, 5.] RESTITUTION. 289 

So far the remedy for the unjust taking is restitution, 
which restores equality. 

But there is, secondly, also the fault of injustice, which 
can exist without the actual taking away ; as when one in- 
tends to use violence, but does not succeed in his attempt. 
The remedy for this fault is a penalty inflicted by the 
proper judge. Therefore, before condemnation by such a 
judge one is not bound to restore more than he has re- 
ceived ; but after condemnation, he is bound to pay also 
the damages imposed. 

Is any one ever bound to restore what he has not tahen 
away ? 

Whoever causes loss to another may be said to take away 
that in which the loss is caused, whether he himself gets 
any advantage from his action or not. And, therefore, a 
man is bound to restitution as far as he has caused loss. 
(See, in Supplement, the case of the possessor in bad faith, 
chap. v. § 3.) But there are two ways of causing loss. First, 
that may be taken away which one actually has. Such loss 
is always to be restored with equal recompense. Thus, if 
any one cause loss by destroying the house of another, he 
is bound to as much as the actual damage. But, secondly, 
one may cause loss to another by preventing his obtaining 
what he was in the way of getting. Such damage is not to 
be recompensed according to equality in the thing, because 
that might be giving more than the existing state of things 
demanded. A future possibility is worth less than a pres- 
ent reality ("a bird in hand/' etc.). Some compensation, 
however, is due according to the condition of persons and 
things. Thus, if a field be injured which has been already 
sown, the indemnification is not equal to the entire crop 
expected from that field. 

Restitution is to be made to the one who has less than his 
own right through the unjust talcing away. 

But (1) the thing restored may be evidently very injuri- 



290 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 5. 

ous to the receiver or to some one else, as if a drunken 
man's revolver should be put into his hands, because it 
belongs to him. In such a case restitution is not to be 
made, because it is ordained for the benefit of him to whom 
it is made. But also he who detains another's property, 
even in such cases, has no right to appropriate it to him- 
self, but he is bound cither to preserve it in order to restore 
it at a fitting season, or else to hand it over to some one 
else for safer keeping. 

(••3) But it may be said that he who unlawfully gives any- 
thing does not deserve to receive it back ; and sometimes 
one unlawfully gives what another unlawfully receives, as 
in bribery or simony. Therefore restitution is not always 

to ]„■ made t<> the person from whom a thing has been re- 
ceived. But one -wrongfully gives anything in either of 
two ways. The giving itself may be wrong and contrary to 
law, as in giving with inteni of bribery or simony. Such 
a giver deserves to lose what he has given, lie has no 
claim for restitution ; but because he who receives docs so 
wrongfully, he ought not to keep anything for himself, 
but to devote it to charitable uses. In another way, one 
gives wrongfully, because he gives for a Avrong purpose, 
although the giving itself is not unlawful. (Query, the 
giving part of one's claim on government, when demanded 
by officials as a condition for just payment of the same?) 
A penitent prostitute would not be required to give back 
all which she had received, however shamefully and wick- 
edly. 

(3) Sometimes it is impossible to make restitution to the 
very person concerned, because he is dead, or too far re- 
moved, or is not known (as in common frauds in trade). 
As respects the unknown, if diligent inquiry give no infor- 
mation, the poor are to be the heirs of that unknown owner, 
an offering being thus made for the good of his soul. If he 
be dead, his lawful heirs take his claim for restitution. If 
he be far distant, there is ordinarily, in these days, no diffi- 



Qu. LXII. 6.] KESTITUTIOST. 291 

culty iu sending to him, or, at least, in notifying him, that 
his rightful claim is waiting bis order. 

(4) One ought first to recompense those from whom, as 
from parents, he has received the greater benefits. Such 
benefits are far more than the worth of a loan or a deposit. 
So it may be said ; but benefactors cannot be recompensed 
from others' property. If you have what is another's, that 
is first to be returned, except, perhaps, in case of extreme 
necessity of that benefactor, for " necessity knows no law." 

Is he who has received what is another's always bound to 
make restitution ? 

He who has sinned is always bound to make satisfaction 
for his sin. But restitution is a satisfaction ; therefore it is 
always obligatory. But this principle requires further ex- 
plication. "When one has received what is another's, two 
things are to be considered ; the thing received, and the act 
itself of receiving. As regards the first, one is bound to re- 
store it, as long as he has it, because what he has over and 
above what is his own ought to be taken away from him and 
given to him to whom it belongs. This is required by com- 
mutative justice. 

But the taking of the thing may have either of three con- 
ditions. For (1) sometimes it is an injury when the thing 
is taken against the will of him who has lawful dominion of 
it, as in theft and robbery. And then the taker is bound 
to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by 
reason of the injurious action, even if the thing be no longer 
in his possession. For as he who strikes another is bound 
to recompense that other for the injury, although he him- 
self have now no result from the wrong which he has done, 
so he who steals or robs is bound to recompense for the loss sus- 
tained, even if he have no benefit remaining from the wrong ; 
and, besides, he ought to be punished for the injury done. 

(2) In another way, one receives another's property for 
his own advantage without doing any injury, as when he 



202 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 7. 

hires a piano. And then lie who receives is bound to resti- 
tution not only by reason of the thing, but also of the re- 
ceiving, even if he have lost what he borrowed. For he is 
bound to recompense the one who has given him a benefit, 
which recompense would not be paid, if loss were incurred 
by the lender. 

(3) In the third way, one receives what is another's with- 
out injury, bul not for his own benefit, as when a hank 
takes charge of valuables belonging to depositors. He who 
so receives is not hound by reason of the receiving; rather 
he confers a favour by doing so; but he is bound by reason 
of the thing. Therefore, if the tiling be taken from him 
without any fault of his, he is not bound to make restitu- 
tion : but it would h>' otherwise if he should lose it through 
gross negligence.* 

M'iy those who have not taken be bound to restore? 

One is bound to make restitution not only by reason of 
the thing which belong- to another, but also by reason of 
injurious taking of it. And, therefore, whoever is the cause 
of that unjust taking is bound to make restitution, lie 
may be the cause directly or indirectly. He is directly the 
cause when he induces another to do the wrong. This direct 
cooperation may he (1) by exhorting or commanding; (2) 
by counselling ; (3) by consenting openly, or (4) by praising 
such an aet ; (5) by sheltering him who unjustly takes what 
is another's, or by giving him assistance ; (6) by participa- 
tion in the theft or robbery, or whatever the wrong may be, 
or by .-baring its fruits. 

Indirectly he is the cause of the unjust taking when he 
does not hinder it, although he can do so, and ought to do 
so, either because he (7) keeps back the command or coun- 
sel which would have prevented the wrong, or (8) because 
he withholds his aid which would have prevented it, or (9j 
because he conceals the fact. 

* See, further, Supplement, on Restitution, chap. v. £ 3. 



Qu. LXII. 7.] COOPERATION. 293 

Five out of these nine modes of cooperation require res- 
titution ; and, primarily, command, because he who gives his 
order is the first mover in the act, and he, therefore, whether 
he give his order openly or tacitly, is chiefly bound to make 
restitution ; next, consent, in the case of him without whom 
the wrong could not have been committed ; thirdly, shelter- 
ing the wrong-doer ; fourthly, participation in the act or in 
its fruits ; and lastly, not hindering when duty or office re- 
quires it. Thus the official guardians of justice are bound to 
restitution if through their negligence wrongs are multiplied. 

In the other cases enumerated restitution is not always 
obligatory, for it is not always the case that advice or appro- 
bation is the efficient cause of the wrong. If it should be 
so, however, the adviser or the applauder before the wrong 
is clone, incurs the same obligation.* 

* Formal cooperation is joining in the bad intention ; material 
cooperation is affording to another opportunity for sin, while your 
action is not conjoined to his in will and intention. Material coop- 
eration only may be given provided that (a) your act is good, or, at 
least, indifferent ; (6) your motive is good ; (c) the bad effect is compen- 
sated by immediate good (see note on scandal, page 260). But consider 
also (d) whether you cannot hinder another's sin, or are not bound in 
charity to do so ; (e) how great the sin is ; (/) the probable effect of 
your refusal upon the sinner ; (g) how near to the sin your cooperation 
will be ; (7i) what right you have to do what is in question ; (i) how 
far the sin does injury to others ; (k) is there serious loss to yourself in 
refusal ? 

(Qu. 1. Communicating those privately known to be unworthy ? 2. 
Working a distillery or other property frequently abused ? 3. Liquor 
sellers ? 4. Church lotteries ? 5. Paying part of your rightful claim 
on government to a committee on claims in order to secure the rest ? 
6. A clerk of a corporation is bidden to violate a law of the nation which 
is habitually violated by other corporations also, and he is bidden to 
withhold endamaging documents from the inspection of the court ? 7. 
Paying a legislator in order to secure the passage of a necessary bill ?) 

In general, observe that some things minister directly to sin ; in these 
intentional cooperation may be " partaking of other men's sins." But 
other things may not be directly sinful which are often abused. Herein, 
when the cooperation does not violate the law of justice as laid down 



291 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXil. 8. 

(1) It is not only ho who executes the act, but he who in 
any way is the cause of sin, who is a sinner. 

(2) He is principally bound who is principal in the act ; 
viz., first, the one who orders, and, next, the one who exe- 
cutes the command ; then the others in their turn. But if 
"in- restore to him who has suffered the loss, the others 
are released from this obligation. But those who are princi- 
pals in the act, ami have it< fruits, are bound to restore to 
the accessories, if those have made restitution. 

I'.ut if anyone give a command of this nature which is 
not executed, there is qo Buch obligation, since its object is 
principally to make righi the Loss incurred unjustly. 

It may be said that qo "tie is bound to expose himself to 
grave danger in order to preserve another's property, such 
danger as might be incurred by arresting or resisting a rob- 
ber. l»ut these are cases also which do not always demand 
restitution. It is the official guardians of the law (judges, 
military, police) on whom t he obligation rests. 

117/'// is '////' //"////'/ Id make restitution? 

As taking another's property is sin against justice, so also 

in tin' text, it may oi may not violate the law c,f charity. (Duct. 
Dubitant., IV. i. Rule ll>. 

And civil law certainly has the right to interfere and forbid what, 
otherwise lawful, is frequently abused. 

In common law criminal cooperation is participation in some way 
in the felonious design. But if counsel is given for one crime, and 
another, different in object and not merely in circumstances, is com- 
mitted, the counsellor is not responsible. An accessory after the fact is 
one who conceals the offender or aids him to escape. 

(Qu. : Suppose that he is a near relative ': Common law makes no 
exception of such a case ; does moral law ?) 

Compounding of felony is punishable by common law, and is an 
iusult to justice ; but assaults and other similar misdemeanours {e.g., 
-- may be compounded (Blackst., iv. :j3, 38, 133). 

Conspiracy, by common law (modified in the United States), is an 
agreement to commit an act injurious to health, morals, trade, com- 
merce, or law. But if there be no felony, there must be some overt 
act to constitute it a crime. 



Qu. lxii. 8.] RESTITUTION. 205 

is retaining it. For the owner is wrongfully hindered from 
its use and injury is done to him. It is not permitted to 
abide in sin for any length of time ; therefore every wrong- 
doer is bound to make immediate restitution, if he can, or 
else to ask a delay from him who can grant the use of the 
thing in question. 

(1) Affirmative precepts, it is true, do not oblige at all 
times, but this obligation is also negative : " Thou shalt not 
retain what is another's. " 

(2) No one is bound to what is impossible ; but he ought 
to ask for remission or delay respecting the obligation, either 
personally or through another who will not expose the 
unknown injurer. 

The old law of wages expresses the universal rule in this 
matter (Lev. xix. 13), "The hire of the labourer shall 
not abide with thee until the morning." 



CHAPTER III. 

SOTS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. 

§ 1. Respect of persons. 

Is it <t sin .' 

That question is answered by the Divine law (Deut. i. 
17), "Ye shall tmi respeci persons in judgment." It is 
opposed to distributive justice, whose equality requires that 
diverse benefits be given to diverse persons in proportion to 
t beir worth. But, instead <>i* merits or fitness something else 
may be considered : as, in bestowing office, wealth or relation- 
ship, or party claims, and the worthiness of the candidate 
may be totally l'H < >u i of v'u-w \ This is '• respeci of persons." 
The person may have claims of one kind when he has none 
of another kind. Consanguinity may constitute a claim 
as an heir, when it gives no claim to civil or ecclesiastical 
office. And what is respect of persons in one relation, is not 
so m another. The question is not of worthiness simply — 
say. a good moral character — hut of worthiness relatively to 
the honour bestowed. 

And since respect of persons violates the proportion which 
distributive justice requires, it is evidently a sin. 

The greater the matter in which justice is violated, the 
greater the sin. 

And since spiritual things are more precious than tem- 
poral things, respect of persons is a greater sin when Church 
offices are bestowed than it is in " politics." Yet the dis- 
tinction just made is to be remembered. For he who most 
abounds in the spiritual gifts of grace is simply and in him- 
self the most worthy ; but relative worthiness has relation 
to the common good, as in the choice of a bishop. He 



Qu. lxiv. 1.] HOMICIDE. 297 

who is less holy and less of a theologian may be able to con- 
tribute more to that common good on account of his execu- 
tive ability or power of influencing men, etc., etc. And 
since spiritual offices are ordained for the common good, it 
may be no respect of persons to prefer him who is less ad- 
vanced in a holy life to one who is more advanced. 

But if the reason for preference is not germane to the 
matter, the law of God is broken (S. James ii. 1) — " Hold 
not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, with respect of 
persons." 

What shall ive say of honour and reverence ? 

One may rightly receive these not only on account of 
some merit of his own but for another's sake, even if he 
be in himself unworthy, as magistrates and prelates, who 
represent G-od and the community over which they preside. 
So also parents and masters are to be honoured as in a cer- 
tain way participating in the dignity of Him who is Father 
and Lord of all. Old age is venerable as a sign of virtue, 
although that virtue may be absent. Eiches may be a 
mark of higher station in the community (or possibly of 
eminent talents of an honest sort) ; but if the rich man is 
honoured solely on account of his riches there is the sin of 
respect of persons (S. James ii. 1). 

The judge is corrupt who allows respect of persons to 
influence his judgment. 

§ 2. Homicide. 

Notice, first (and especially with reference to an old 
Manichean error reviving in certain quarters), that it is 
lawful to hill the brutes for food of man. 

In the natural order of things, the less perfect is for the 
use of the more "developed." * Plants are for the use of 

* This argument might be questioned, unless it could be maintained 
that carnivorous animals stand higher in the scale of being than those 
whose food is vegetable. 



298 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIV. 2. 

animals; the brutes for mail's use. And food is among the 
chief uses. Vegetable life, accordingly, is destroyed for 
the food of herbivorous animals ; and beasts, according to 
Divine ordinance (Gen. ix. :>), for the food of man. 

Brutes have not rational life, bo as to govern their own 
actions; their nature constitutes them instruments for the 
use of rational creatures, including food. 

Is capital punishment right ? 

Every pari of an organized whole is ordained for the 
good of that whole. If the health of the whole body of a 
man require the amputation of some member of it, because 
it is mortified and is corrupting the other parts of the body, 
it must be cit off. Ami each individual in society is a part 
of the whole community. Therefore, if any man through his 
crime- be dangerous to the community, corrupting its most 
vital existence, he is laudably and rightfully killed in order 
thai the common good may be saved. "A little leaven 
leaveneth the whole lump " (1 Oor. v. G). 

(1) The Lord (S. Matt. xiii. 29) commanded that the 
be spared in order that the wheat might not be in- 
jured by rooting oul the weeds. Something like this may 
happen in times of widespread anarchy or rebellion, when 
the extermination of wrong-doers will involve many inno- 
cent persons in their fate, so that they cannot be put to 
death without grave injury to the common good. Bui this 
case is an exception to the law that public safety may re- 
quire the execution of criminals. 

(2) Human justice, as far as possible, imitates the Divine ; 
and God sometimes defers His penalty of death, giving time 
for repentance, and sometimes cuts off the transgressor in 
the midst of his sin. Human justice, in like manner, cuts 
off those who are most pernicious to others, but gives them 
space for repentance, and spares others whom it may hope 
to reform, who have not injured society so gravely. 

(3) It may be true that, considered in itself, it is wrong 



Qu. lxiv. 3, 5.] HOMICIDE. 2U9 

to take human life, because we are bound to love all men, 
even sinners. But a man, naturally free and existing for 
himself in the dignity of a man, may reduce himself to 
bestial slavery (Ps. xlix. 20). A man may become worse 
and more injurious than a wild beast ; and he is as justly 
cut off from life. 

Such was the Old Law (Ex. xxii.), and such is the Gospel 
law (Rom. xiii. 4).* 

Is it right for a private person to take human life? 

To kill the malefactor is right as ordained for the preser- 
vation of the life of the community ; therefore, in every 
organized and civilized community, this office belongs ex- 
clusively to those who have the care of the common good. 

But killing a murderer or horse-thief is very useful to 
the community, and may not any man do what is useful for 
the common benefit ? I answer that he certainly may, pro- 
vided that he do harm to no one. But if this doing good 
to the community requires the doing harm to some part of 
that community, it must be through the judgment of one 
who has the charge of that community.! Lynch law in 
organized communities is an offence against the state and 
against God. 

Is suicide laiuful? 

It is mortal sin for three reasons. (1) It is unnatural, ■ 
contrary to natural self-love, and to charity, which requires 
that each one love himself as the creature and image of 
God. (2) Man belongs to the community, and in killing 

* The subject of capital punishment may call for fuller treatment 
in our day than S. Thomas Aquinas found it to require in his age. 

f The physician is guilty of mortal sin if he be confederate in pro- 
ducing abortion. (Qu. : Suppose that he judge this to be the only 
means of saving the mother's life ? Suppose that for this end he de- 
stroy an unborn child at parturition ?) 



300 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIV. 5. 

himself he inflicts an injury on the community of which 
he is a part. (3) Life is a gift from God, and subject to 
His power only, whose are the issues of life and death. 
Therefore he that deprives himself of life sins against God. 

(1) In one way it is a sin against charity, but in relation 
to the community and to God it is a sin against justice. 

C.'i Even a malefactor is not judge or executioner in his 
own case. 

(3) Perhaps tin- most plausible argument for suicide in 
certain cases is thai .^ince it is lawful to incur a less danger 
in order to avoid a greater one, one's own death may be a 
less evil than misery or disgrace, and be rightly chosen in- 
stead of the worse coudition. But I answer that free-will 
makes man master of himself, and lie can lawfully dispose 

of himself so far as those things are concerned which are 
ruled 1>\ his tree choice. But the passage from this life to 
a better one is doI subjeci to hie tree-will but to Divine 
power. So it is not lawful for a man to kill himself in 
order to go to Paradise. Similarly, also, it is not lawful to 
commit Baicide in order to escape the miseries of this pres- 
ent life, for its last and greatest evil is the death of such a 
being as man is. Suicide is choosing a greater evil in order 
ape a less one. (This argument, taken singly, hardly 
seems to reach the case of shortening incurable sufferings.) 
Likewise it is not lawful to kill one's self on account of sin 
committed, both because he cuts short his time for repent- 
ance, and because he is not judge in bis own case of the 
penalty to be inflicted for his sin. 

In like manner, it is wrong for a woman to kill herself in 
order to escape violation. For she ought not herself to 
commit the greatest crime in order to avoid another's crime. 
It is the mind, not the body, which can be polluted. 

Again, one may not kill himself to escape temptations, 
for we may not do evil that good may come or evil he 
avoided. And, further, this apprehended evil is an uncer- 
tain one, for God is able to preserve in the hour of trial. 



Qu. LXIY. 6, 7.] HOMICIDE. 301 

Judge and jury must proceed according to evidence, even 
if they have private information that the evidence is false. 

If they find the innocent guilty of a capital offence, it is 
not they who kill the innocent, but those who bear false 
witness against him. The private information is to be used 
in another quarter (sc, the executive). 

The sheriff and the executioner are simply the ministers 
of justice, and if there be no manifest injustice in the sen- 
tence, their private knowledge does not affect the question 
of their duty. It is not they who kill the innocent if he 
suffer by a regular sentence of law. 

Is it lawful to kill another in self-defence ? 

An act may have two effects, one of which is intended, 
the other being aside from the intention. But moral acts 
get their specific character from the intention of the agent. 
Now, from the act of self-defence two effects may follow ; 
viz., the preservation of one's own life and the killing of 
the assailant. An act of this nature, if its aim be the pres- 
ervation of life, is not illicit, because self-preservation is 
nature's first law. But such an act, with good intention, 
may become illicit if it be not proportionate to the end 
(exceeding that end in any manner, or deviating from it). 
Therefore, it is wrong if any one in self-defence use greater 
violence than is absolutely necessary. One is not bound to 
neglect a moderate defence in order to avoid the killing of 
another, for a man is more bound to preserve his own life 
than that of another man. But it is illicit to intend to kill 
another without public authority. With that authority a 
man may refer his act to the public good and intend to kill, 
as soldiers do in time of war. 

When the apostle (Rom. xii. 19) says, "Avenge not your- 
selves, but give place unto wrath," he prohibits that defence 
which has the motive of revenge, as the shooting a burglar 
while escaping. 



302 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXVI. 1, 2. 

Accidental homicide. 

What is casual is neither intended nor voluntary. And 
because every sin is voluntary, casual actions as such arc 
ins. 

But it may happen thai wli.it i> not actually and per se 
willed or intended, i- bo />< r accidens, because whatever re- 
moves hindrances is in thai wayacauseof the consequences. 
Eence, he who does qoI remove those things from which 
homicide results, when he oughl to remove them, incurs in 
some manner the guilt of voluntary homicide. This may 
happen either when one is engaged in illicit acts which ho 
oughl to avoid, or when, being lawfully employed, he does 
no! use due diligence. In either case, if from his action 
the death of a man result, he docs not escape the guilt of 
homicide. Bui it is otherwise if he be engaged in lawful 
business and use due precautions. Accidental death is not 
imputable to him.* 

§ 3. Theft and robbery. 

The natural right of property. 

ThePsali '. i. 0), '-'Thou hast put all things 

in subjection under his feet;" i.e., man's feet. Man's 
ownership <<\' external things is a law of nature. But those 
tiling- may \w viewed, Brat, as regards their own nature; 
and this i- not subject to human power hut only to the 
Divine. But also we may consider the use of things, and 
bo man has natural dominion over them, because through 
reason and will he can use them for his own benefit as if 
they were created for him. And this natural dominion 
over other creatures., which belongs to him as endowed with 
reason in which is found the image of God in man, is set 
forth in the very creation of man (Gen. i. 26). 

But this dominion goes further ; it is the right of indi- 
vidual personal property — that is to say, first, man has the 
right to manage and dispose of outward things, his personal 
* See further, Supplement, Sixth Commandment, chap. iii. 



Qu. lxvi. 3.] THEFT AND ROBBERY. 303 

possessions. This power is necessary in the proper conduct 
of human life, for three reasons : (1) Every one is more 
solicitous in managing what belongs to himself alone than 
in that which belongs to everybody, because, shunning 
needless labour, he leaves to another that which is every- 
body's business ; (2) human affairs go on more orderly when 
each has his own business to manage, while there must be 
confusion if every one indiscriminately attend to every- 
thing; (3) in this way greater harmony is likely to be pre- 
served when each knows what is his and what he has to do 
with it. 

In the second place, this dominion gives the power to use 
external things. In this respect man has no right to treat 
them as if they were exclusively for himself alone ; he is 
bound to use them as the common possession of all, being 
ready to communicate them for others' necessity (1 Tim. 
vi. 18). 

(1) Communists say that by the law of nature all things 
are common, and that "property is robbery." But I deny 
that natural right dictates that all tilings be held in com- 
mon, and that nothing shall be held by any one as his prop- 
erty. But I grant that any existing distinction of posses- 
sions does not rest on the law of nature, for it is a matter 
of human arrangement ; it rests on positive law. Property 
is not contrary to natural right, but things are divided as 
they are now distributed according to what is superadded to 
the law of nature (sc, according to jus gentium). 

(2) The rich man does not act wrongfully in keeping 
what in the beginning was common to all, if he also share 
with others in the fruits of his possessions ; but he sins if 
without distinction he exclude others from the use of them. 

What is theft ? 

It is the secret taking of what is another's. The unjust 
keeping of what is another's is an injury of the same kind, 
and to be included in the same general title. 



304 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxvi. 5, 6. 

Both theft and robbery imply involuntary loss ; but in 
the one the loser is ignorant of the act of taking, in the 
other he loses through violence. 

Is theft always a sin .' 

It is so, first, because of its opposition to justice which 
renders to every man his due, his own. And, secondly, it 
is a sin because of the sinful guile or fraud which the thief 
emplo 

What Bhall We say of "lie who finds what is not his own, 

and secretly takes possession of it ? [s he a thief? What 
is found may never have had ao owner, as uncut gems and 
pearls ; or it may have been lost so long that no claimant of 
the property can be found. Then it naturally belongs to 
the finder, unless civil law limit bis righl ; but it is lim- 
ited onlj after judicial sentence. 

Again, the finder may sincerely believe thai the thing has 
been abandoned by its recent owner ; he is no thief if he 
keep it alur due inquiry. Otherwise the keeping is un- 
doubtedly theft. 

/* theft mortal sin ? 

The apostle (1 Cor. vi. 10) says that thieves shall not 
'• inherit the kingdom of God." Theft is opposed to char- 
ity, because it does harm to our neighbour, and if it were 
universal human society would perish. As contrary to char- 
ity in which is the spiritual life of the soul, it i3 mortal sin. 

What is to be said of stealing trifling things ? They may, 
possibly, be so trifling that if the owner knew of the act he 
would not think that it did him injury, and he who takes 
can presume that his doing so is not against the owner's 
will. So far there may be no mortal sin ; but if he have the 
intention of stealing and doing harm to his neighbour, the 
theft of even little things is mortal sin. So is even consent 
to the thought of doing so.* 

* See, further, Supplement, chap. v. § 2. 



Qu. lxvi. 7, 8.J THEFT AND ROBBERY. 305 

Is it right to take another's property in case of extreme 
necessity f 

Human law cannot derogate from natural or Divine right. 
Now, according to the natural order instituted by Divine 
Providence, the things of this world are ordained for the 
supply of man's necessities, and the division and appro- 
priation of things, which are based on human law, cannot 
hinder man's necessities from being relieved in this way. 
Therefore what some have in superabundance, by natural 
right is due to the support of the needy. "It is the bread 
of the hungry which thou keepest ; the clothing of the 
naked which thou shuttest up ; the redemption of the mis- 
erable is the money which thou usest in ' speculation ' " (S. 
Ambros., Serm. 64, De Temp.). 

But because the needy are many, and all cannot be assisted 
by the same things, the dispensing of such things is en- 
trusted to the owner of property that he may do his share 
in relieving want. 

If, however, there be urgent and extreme necessity (peril 
of life), then one may rightly relieve his need from an- 
other's goods without waiting for the owner's permission, 
and this is not robbery or theft. Such necessity makes to 
be his own what he immediately needs to save his life. And 
in case of similar necessity on the part of his neighbour 
which he himself is unable to relieve, he may do the same 
for his brother. (Restitution, however, must be made when 
that necessity is passed.) 

Robbery. 

This implies violence and compulsion through which an- 
other's property is taken from him. But in society no 
private individual has this right, but only public authority ; 
therefore whoever, acting as a private citizen, takes another's 
goods by violence is a robber. Executive authority is the 
guardian of justice, and can use violence and coactive force 
only according to the prescriptions of justice in fighting 
20 



30G SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. Lxvu. 2. 

against public enemies, or punishing malefactors. What is 
taken through such violence is not robbery, since it is not 
contrary to justice. But unjust taking 1>\ those who use 
public authority and so pervert it, is robbery, and the wrong- 
doer is bound to make restitution like any other thief or 
robber. 

In war, fighting for plunder and lawless depredation are 
common forms of robbery which demand restitution. 

Why is robbery a graver sin {and more severely punished) 
Hum theftt 

First, because there is more of the involuntary in the 
former on the pan of bim who is deprived of hie own ; and, 
secondly, there is noi only the loss of goods, but great prob- 
ability of personal disgrace or injury (and natural conse- 
quences add to the gravity of a crime). 

§ 4. Injustice in legal proceedings.* 

Is if right for a judge to act contrary to what he privately 
knows .' 

II with pnblic authority and acts officially; 

ore be musl judge by what, he officially knows, not by 
his private information. He follows public laws, Divine or 
human, as the ease may he. against which he can admit no 
arguments. But in the special case before him he has testi- 
mony of various kinds, which is the sole ground of judg- 
ment. His private knowledge will guide him in searching 
more strictly the evidence, and perhaps indicate where addi- 
tional evidence is to be found; but his final decision can 
rightly rest only on the testimony officially laid before him. 

God alone judges with proper authority ; human judges 
have only delegated power, and are bound to restrict them- 
selves to its limits. 

* A large part of the author's discussion of questions bearing on this 
topic i> suited to a different state of society from ours, and is therefore 
omitted. 



LXYIII. 1, 3.] INJUSTICE IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 307 

Is a man bound to bring crimes of which he has knowledge 
before the cognizance of the proper tribunal ? 

There is this difference between fraternal denunciation, of 
which we have spoken above (page 227), and accusation, that 
in the former the amendment of a brother is the aim, but in 
the latter the punishment of crime. But the penalties of 
this present life are not sought for on their own account, 
because in this world is not the final retribution ; but they 
are medicinal, contributing either to the amendment of the 
criminal, or to the good of the commonwealth, whose good 
order is sought for in the punishment; of criminals. There- 
fore, if the crime were such as tended to the public detri- 
ment, a man is bound to make accusation of the criminal, 
if he have sufficient proof of the offence. And this detri- 
ment may be either bodily or spiritual. But if the sin be 
doing no injury to state or Church, as the case may be, 
or if there be not sufficient proof of the crime, there is no 
obligation of bringing accusation, for no one is bound to 
that which he cannot carry through in due manner. 

This principle applies to laymen in their relations to the 
priesthood, and to priests in their relation to their bishop, 
if all be done out of charity. 

Friendship is no bar to duty in this respect. To reveal 
secrets and cause evil to a friend is against fidelity, but not 
if they be revealed on account of the common good, which 
is to be preferred to any private good. Therefore no secret 
maybe kept (even though secrecy has been promised) to the 
injury of the community. Besides, that is not altogether 
secret which can be proved by sufficient testimony. 

But injustice may insinuate itself into accusation in the 
form of malicious calumny imputing crime falsely, or as pre- 
varication, when the nominal accuser fraudulently attempts 
to impede the course of justice ; or as tergiversation, when 
he totally desists from what he has begun (being frightened 
or bought off). 



308 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIX. 1, 8, 4. 

May the criminal accused 'plead not guilty f 
(Here S. Thomas has in view the criminal process of most 
European, especially southern, countries. The accused is 
bound in justice to answer truthfully all questions lawfully 
asked, or, at least, not to tell a lie. But he may refuse 
to answer, or appeal to another court. But under Anglo- 
Saxon institution.-, the plea of '"'not guilty" is, no doubt, 
uuderstood to be the demand for the production of evidence 
in the case, a demand which every accused person may 
rightly make. ) 

//• is //"/ bound f'i confess his guilt 
before a human courl : In- may defend himself by concealing 
fart- in all proper ways, using no guile, fraud, or lies, bo- 
cause his public condemnation can justly occur only under 
due process of human law and clear evidence. lie is not 
bound to give any assistance in this.* 

I ' lawful for one who is condemned to death to resist if 
he fin t 

8. Paul says (Bom. xiii. 2), " He that resisteth the power, 
withstandeth the ordinance of God ; and they that withstand 
shall receive to themselves judgment ; " therefore he seems 
But distinction must be made between just and 
unjust condemnation. The latter is akin to the violence 
of robbers, and may be resisted unless grave scandal is to he 
avoided, or serious disturbance is feared. But it is quite 
otherwise if the sentence of condemnation is a jut one. 

(1) It is true that nature inclines every one to make 
resistance in such a case, but reason and conscience are 

* By parity of reasoning, his advocate in court can defend one 
whom he knows to be guilty, because that is doing injustice to no one; 
and the question is not of sin, but of legal crime. (Qu. : In civil cases, 
may he advocate an unjust claim? The cases are not parallel, and he 
is certainly bound to discourage needless or injurious litigation.,) 



Qu. LXX. 1.] INJUSTICE IX LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 309 

given to man that he may govern his nature. Not every 
kind of defence is lawful. 

(2) No one is bound to do that whence death may follow, 
but merely to submit to the just sentence of the law. He 
is not bound to remain in prison if a way of escape is open ; 
but he may not resist the authority which executes the sen- 
tence of the law. 

Is a man bound to be a witness in court f 

His testimony may be demanded by an authority which, 
in matters of justice, he is bound to obey. Doubtless he is 
then bound to bear witness in those things in which accord- 
ing to rightful order he is required to give testimony. Such 
a case is one of manifest wrong — i.e., a wrong which can be 
jjroved — and one which public infamy has preceded. But 
if his testimony be demanded in other cases — say, secret 
crime, or one where there is no public infamy — he is not 
bound to testify. Even if the truth be not brought to light, 
it may be that no one incurs any special loss in consequence. 

But, demanded or not demanded, his testimony may be 
needed to liberate a man from unjust penalty, loss, or in- 
famy ; then charity requires him to testify. And even if 
his witness be not required, he is bound to do what in him 
lies to bring the truth before some one who can be of service 
to the accused. 

What shall we say of things confidentially communicated 
to any one ? 

What is heard in confession can in no case be revealed, 
either in court or under any other circumstances. The 
priest knows it, not as he is a man, but as he is the minister 
of God. This bond is greater than any commandment of men. 

But with respect to things otherwise confidentially com- 
municated, a distinction must be made. For there are 
things which a man is bound to make known as soon as 
they come to his knowledge, such as corrupt the spiritual 



310 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxi. 8. 

or corporal well-being of the community, or work grave loss 
to some person. Such things a man is bound to divulge by 
testimony or denunciation; and no secret or confidential 
communication can excuse from this obligation, because it 
pertains to the fidelity which we owe. as part of charity, 
to the community and to our brother who is injured. 

But other things arc privately known (as by legal coun- 
sellors, physicians, etc.) which no command of a superior 
can warrant our revealing ; because keeping faith is a law 
of nature, and nothing can be commanded by man which is 
contrary to natural right. 

/s bearing fa ' \lways mortal sin f 

False wines- has :; three-fold depravity; first, from the 

accompanying perjury, which is always mortal sin ; next, 
from the violation of justice, which is mortal in its kind, 
like any other injustice, and bo says the commandment, 
"Thou shalt not hear false witness against thy neighbour f 
and. lastly, from the falsehood contained, for every lie is a 
sin. In this last respeel the false witness may possibly be a 
Bin which is not mortal (the false witness being thoughtlessly 
given, harming no one, and not intended to do so). 

Of course one may not f c< rtain knowledge 

that of which he is not certain. But from failure of mem- 
ory one may think himself certain of that which is false, 
and if he have ased due care he dor-; not mortally sin in 
ng it. He does not intentionally hear false witness, 
but it is accidental and contrary to what he intended. But 
if he afterwards discover the falsity of his testimony, he is 
bound to retract it if he can do so without serious loss; 
otherwise he is bound to make compensation for any loss 
incurred through his false witness. 

Does a ? iwyer sin who defends a cause which /><■ knows to 

he Unjust .' 

It is illicit to cooperate with another in doing evil, 



Ql\ lxxii. 1.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 311 

whether by counselling him, or aiding him, or consenting 
in any manner. The apostle (Kom. i. 3g) specifies it as 
an added sin, "knowing the ordinance of God, that they 
which do such things are worthy of death, they not only do 
the same, but also consent with those that practise them." 
i\ow, a lawyer gives aid and counsel to him whose cause he 
undertakes (the argument evidently applies only to civil 
cases, not criminal ones), and he is bound to make restitu- 
tion of any loss which the opposite party unjustly incurs. 
(But a case may be doubtful, and, his client being informed 
of the uncertainty, the lawyer may go on with the case. 
Criminal cases evidently stand on a different basis ; for just 
condemnation can only be that which is legally established. 
Not the actual guilt, but the proof of that guilt, is the 
question before the criminal court.) 

The lawyer may possibly show his skill by winning in 
a bad case, as a physician shows his skill by curing a des- 
perate disease. But the two are not parallel, for the lawyer 
unjustly injures the opposing side. 

If, in the course of the trial, he discover that he has no 
case, he is not bound to assist the opposite side by betray- 
ing what is confidentially communicated to him, but he 
ought to withdraw or try to effect a compromise. 

§ 5. Injurious words. 

Contumely. 

One man may dishonour another by depriving him of 
some excellence for which he is duly honoured, which is 
done by such deeds as have been discussed above (pages 297 
ff.). But, also, he may bring forward to his notice and 
that of others what dishonours that other, and this is con- 
tumely. It properly consists in such injurious words, but 
the same thing also may be effected by equivalent actions. 
In tjiis way injurious loss may be produced ; viz., injury to 
honour or that respect which is due from others. There- 
fore the contumely is greater which is spoken in the pres- 



312 SIN'S OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxii. 2. 

ence of many ; but even if it be uttered to the one insulted 
alone, it may be.an injustice regarding the respect which is 

llllC 

Insults and taunts are offences of the same kind, for all 
call attention to some defect in detriment of honour. But 
while contumely refers to mental defects, insult may apply 
to bodily defects. If one injuriously call another hump- 
backed, ii may be insult; if he call the other a thief, it is 
contumely, also; while taunt.- may refer to station, as pov- 
erty or servitude; e.g., if one injuriously remind another 
that he Was aided by public charity. 

Is contumely or insult ,i mortal sin f 

The Lord said (S. Matt. v. ■.»■.>;.•• Whosoever shall say to his 
brother. Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire," which is 
the due of mortal sin only. Words are more than sounds ; bhey 
s aifical ive sounds, and t heir meaning proceeds from the 
mind and heart. Therefore, in sins of words we must; espe- 
cially consider the intention. Insult or contumely properly 
consists in the intention to derogate from the due honour 
of another; and this is no less a mortal sin than theft or 
robbery. (•' Who steals my purse," etc.). But if one has 
spoken insulting or contumelious words, not with a view 
to dishonour, but for correction or something of that kind, 
it is not, properly Bpeaking, formal insult or contumely, 
even though the words will bear that construction (" materi- 
ally"); and this may be venial sin or no sin at all. But 
discretion and caution are necessary, because the reproach 
may be so severe as injuriously to affect the honour of him 
against whom it is uttered, and then a man may sin mortally 
even though he did not intend to dishonour his brother ; 
just as criminal negligence may cause serious bodily injury 
and make one responsible for the consequences. 

(The satisfaction which penitence requires, is special and 
public signs of honour and respect.) 

(1) Even reproaches in joke may be vicious, if they tend 



Qu. lxxii. 3.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 313 

to the same result and "hurt the feelings" of the one so 
insulted. 

(2) The Lord's example, when He said, "0 fools, and 
slow of heart to believe" (S. Luke xxiv. 25), shows that 
reproaches for the sake of discipline or correction are 
admissible under the due limitations demanded by our own 
imperfection. 

(3) Since these sins depend upon the mind of the speaker, 
they may be venial, when the reproach is a trifling one and 
not greatly dishonouring a brother, uttered from some lev- 
ity of mind or angry haste, without any fixed purpose of 
robbing another of due respect and honour. (Notice here 
the violent words of many of the lowest class in the com- 
munity, especially of angry women reviling one another 
without any serious intention.) 

Should one endure contumely uttered against Mm ? 

The same patience is required in what is spoken against 
us as in what is done against us. But the precepts of 
patience refer to the preparation of soul. One is not always 
bound actually to follow the letter of the Sermon on the 
Mount ; for the Lord who said, " Whosoever smiteth thee 
on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," did not do 
this when He rebuked the smiter and said, "Why smitest 
thou Me ? " Contumelious words and injurious actions are 
to be treated in the same way. We are bound to have a 
mind ready to bear reproaches and insults if ifc be expedient 
so to do. But sometimes it is inexpedient, and the insult 
should be repelled, either for the good of the insulter him- 
self, that his impudence may be repressed and that he may 
not try the same course with others, or for the good of 
others, that our influence over them be not hindered by 
the contumely uttered against us and- apparently with our 
consent. 

(1) It may be an obligation of charity, not the lust for 
private honour, which moderately represses the insulter. 



314 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxiii. 1, 2. 

Hence the two opposite proverbs (Prov. xxvi. 4, 5), 
" Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also 
be like unto him. Answer a i'ool according to his folly, 
lest he be wise in his own conceits." 

(2) One ought not to tolerate insult offered to another ; 
his repressing it is more likely to proceed from charity to his 
brother; and there is certainly no lust of his own honour. 

Contumely is one of the fruits of immoderate anger. 

Detraction. 

As contumely corresponds to robbery, so detraction to 
theft. For the one is open injury through words, the 

other is secret injury of the same kind. Honour is not 
directly attacked, bul a L r ""d name is taken away, since 
those who hear form a bad opinion of him who suffers 
detraction. The end is different then, as well as the means 
employed. But the two may be united, as when one 
openly but falsely accusi a another of a crime, or truly, but 
still pnblicly, charges thai which i secret. 

The Bpecial distinction, then, is that while contumely is 
said to a man's face, detraction is uttered when he is absent 
and ignorant of it, whether it be utti red before many or to 
one alone. 

It is not necessarily diminishing the truth, but it is low- 
ering another's good name. This can be done directly or 
indirectly ; directly, in four ways, by imputing what is 
false, by exaggerating what is true, by exposing what is 
tied, by imputing bad intention to what is rightly 
done; indirectly, by denying another's good action, by 
maliciously keeping silence, by diminishing the merit of 
his action, or approving it in such a way as to have the 
same effect. 

Is detraction a mortal sin ? 

In Rom. i. 30 backbiters are placed among those who 
are worthy of spiritual death. And the taking away any 



Qu. lxxiii. 4.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 315 

person's good name is gravest injury, because in this life 
there is nothing more precious, and the loss of it hinders a 
man from well doing his work in life. Therefore detraction 
is per se a mortal sin. 

But .sometimes it happens that words are spoken which 
are injurious to some one's character, when not this but 
something else is intended. This is not " formal " detrac- 
tion (which consists in the evil intention), though it is 
outwardly (" materially " ) such. And if the words spoken 
are uttered for some necessary good, the due conditions 
being observed, it is not detraction nor sin at all. These 
conditions are : (1) No more is revealed nor to any more 
persons than is necessary for avoiding the evil or attaining 
the good ; (2) the revelation will probably have a good 
result ; (3) it is done with good intention ; (4) the good 
sought for or the evil to be averted is of serious consequence. 

Detraction is naturally the child of envy. 

Is it grave sin to listen approvingly to detraction? 

It is sin to consent to another's sin (Rom. i. 32) ; and 
this is done either directly or indirectly ; directly, when 
one leads another into sin, or takes pleasure in it ; indi- 
rectly, when one does not oppose it, being able to do so ; 
not through taking pleasure in the sin, but through fear of 
man. 

So if any one listen to detraction without opposition, he 
seems to consent to the detractor, and becomes a participator 
in his sin. But if he induce any one to be guilty of detrac- 
tion, or take pleasure in it because he hates the one injured 
by the detraction, he sins no less than the detractor, and 
sometimes more than he ; more, when he sins against char- 
ity in the sin of scandal towards the detractor, as well as 
against justice towards the one defamed. 

But if the sin does not please him, and he is silent 
through fear or negligence or diffidence, he sins indeed, 
but much less than the detractor, and in general venially. 



310 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxv. 

But sometimes even this may be mortal sin, when official 
duty requires the correction of the detractor, or grave 
danger results from the keeping silence, or when the Eear 
of man is itself ;i mortal sin. 

The detractor may be saying what is true ; he cannot he 
resisted by denial of the facts, hut either he can be charged 
with his bid of detract ion, or, at least, it can be shown to be 
offensive to the listener, by expressive silence, by leaving 
him, or by changing the subject of conversation. 

The " make-bate " (susurro) uses the same means with 
the detractor ; bnl his objeel isadifferenl one, for he aims 
by his malicious whisperings to break up friendships, and 
therefore he selects such seeming evil things to say as may 
tea 1 i" this end. This tale-bearing is even a graver sin 
than detraction or calumny, because the injury done to our 
neighbour is the measure of the sin againsl him, and a friend 
is the most precious of outward tilings. 

I>< ft -<i <>ll. 

king at another is intended to put him to shame. 
The different end mark- a Bpecial Bin, different from those 
just described. This "laughing to scorn " is directed at 

some evil, some defect. But a great evil is not treated 
jestingly, but seriously. Hence, if any such thing is made' 
subject of derision, it is treated as a small thing in its kind, 
small in itself, or relatively to the person. But when any 
one turns the evil or the defect of another into ridicule, 
becanse it is in itself trifling, the sin is venial. But this 
derision may imply contempt of the person ; sc, that his 
evil is of no more consequence than a child's or a fool's. 
This great contempt and dishonour constitute a graver 
mortal sin than contumely. Gravest of all is mocking at 
what belongs to God in any special way. In the second 
place stands the sin of deriding parents, who are entitled to 
the highest earthly reverence. "The eye that mocketh at 



Qu. lxxti.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 317 

his father . . . the ravens of the valley shall pick it 
out, and the young eagles shall eat it" (Prov. xxx. 17). 
Next in order comes derision of the just, since honour is 
the reward of virtue, and such derision hinders others 
from imitating the virtuous actions of the one derided. 

Cursing. 

Malediction is speaking evil of another. Consider, there- 
fore, the three modes of speaking it ; and, first, simple 
enunciation of evil, which has been already considered in 
its various forms. There remain, then, commanding and 
wishing evil, respecting which observe that what may be 
done, may be wished ; and, conversely, what may be law- 
fully wished, may lawfully be done. If any one command 
or wish another's evil as evil, intending that evil, it is the 
sin of cursing, properly speaking. But if any one command 
or wish the evil of another as a good, it is not a sin, it 
is not cursing. Now this good may be justice, and so 
a judge lawfully utters his malediction on him whom he 
sentences for crime, the Church anathematizes heretics, 
and the prophets in Holy Scripture imprecate evil on sin- 
ners, conforming their will to the Divine justice, although 
imprecations of this kind may be understood as declara- 
tory. 

Or, again, this good which justifies the wishing of evil 
may be utility, as when one wishes that a sinner may suf- 
fer some of the consequences of his ill-doing, in order that 
he may be made better, or at least cease from harming 
others. 

(1) The apostle (Rom. xii. 14) said, " Bless, and curse 
not ; " but cursing proper, i.e., with evil intention, is what 
he prohibited. 

(2) It may be said that man cannot know the mind of 
another, nor whether he is cursed by G-od ; therefore be 
ought only to pray for all. But the sinner's heart is 
revealed by some manifest sin, for which penalty is to be 



318 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXV1I. 1. 

inflicted by the command which speaks evil against him. 
And in like manner, although it cannot be known whom God 
will curse with final reprobation, it can be known whom 
He is cursing for the guilt of a present flagrant crime. 

Is it mortal sin to curse another f 

To command or wish evil to another, which is cursing 
him, is in itself a violation of charity which requires us to 
will our neighbour's good, and therefore it is mortal sin; 
and so much the graver as the person cursed is entitled to 
more 1<>\<- and respect. •• Every one thai curseth his father 
or his mother Bhall Burely be put to death" (Lev. xx. 9). 
Bui the words ottered may he venial sin, cither on account 
of the insignificant evil which is wished, or because the 
words are ottered in jesl or thoughtlessness or sudden sur- 
Por sins of words chiefly depend on the inward 
affection of the soul 

s; 6. Frauds in trade. : 

Is if lawful t" sell a. thing for more than if is worth? 

The great law of the Gospel is, f< "Whatsoever ye would 
that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto 
them " (S. Matt. vii. 12). This answers the question; for 
no one wishes a thing to be sold to himself for more than it 
is worth. To employ fraud in order that a thing may be 
sold for more than a just price, is altogether sin because 
our neighbour is deceived to his loss. But if there be no 
fraud, then we may speak first of buying and selling as 
they are in themselves. They are instituted for the com- 
mon benefit of both parties to the contract ; each needing 
or desiring what the other has. But what is undertaken 
for the common benefit ought not to burden one side more 
than the other ; the contract should he equal. But the 
quantity of those things which serve man's physical needs 

* See Supplement, Chajjter on Contracts. 



Qu. LXXVII. 1.] FRAUDS IN TRADE. 319 

is measured by the price, for which purpose civilized na- 
tions have used coined money. And therefore if the price 
exceed the value of the thing, or the value exceed the price, 
just ecpiality is destroyed. Therefore, to sell a thing for 
more than it is worth, or to pay for it less than it is worth, 
is in itself unjust and illicit. 

But we may speak of buying and selling as accidentally 
they turn to the benefit of one and the detriment of another. 
For example, one much needs to have a thing and the other 
is hurt if he go without it. In such a case the just price 
will depend not only on the thing itself but on the loss to 
the seller. And so he can lawfully sell for more than the 
market price, though he may ask no more than the thing 
is worth to himself. But if the thing be greatly needed by 
the buyer, and he who sells incur no special loss by the 
sale, the latter is not warranted in going above the highest 
market price, because the benefit derived by the other does 
not depend upon the seller, but on the condition of the 
buyer. Of his own accord the buyer may choose to give 
some bounty in such a case, but the seller has no right to 
trade in another's special need. 

(1) Civil law may tolerate and recognize such unjust bar- 
gains as we have been speaking of, because laws are made 
for a multitude of unjust dealers. Therefore human law 
cannot prohibit everything which is contrary to virtue ; it 
suffices that it prohibit what destroys intercourse. Other 
things it may allow, not as approving them, but simply 
as not finding it expedient to punish them. Buying too 
cheaply and selling too dearly may escape punishment or 
restitution if there be no fraud in the contract or the excess 
be not too outrageous. But Divine law leaves no injustice 
unpunished. Before that tribunal all inequality of justice 
is condemned, and he who has gained too much is bound 
to recompense him who has suffered loss, if the loss be a 
notable one. And I add this because the just price of 
things is not exactly determined, but depends on fluctuat- 



320 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxvii. 2. 

ing opinion, so that a moderate addition or subtraction may 
not destroy a just equality. 

(2) It is a very common desire, that of selling dear and 
buying cheap. But its being general does not show it to 
be natural, for vice is common to many who follow the 
broad way of sin. 

Defects in the thing sold render the sale illicit and un- 
just. 

Defeol is (1) in the substantial character of the thing. 
If the Beller know it, he is guilty of fraud in the sale, the 
sale is plainly illicit. The contracl between the parties is 
null through defect of consent.* 

(2) Defect is in the quantity as measured, and if any ono 
knowingly use deficient weights or measures, be is guilty 
of fraud, and the sale ie illicit. Of such injustice the Lord 
said (Dent. xxv. 16), "All that do such things, even all 
thai '1" unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord 
thy God." 

(3) Defect, again, is in the quality of what is sold, as in 
selling an unsound animal for one sound in all essential 

■;-. If knowingly done it is fraud, and illicit. In 
till such cases the injustice done demands restitution. 

But if the seller he ignorant of the defect, his action, 
indeed, is not sinful injustice (since the evil intention is 
absent, it is a "material," not a "formal," injustice); hut 
he is bound, if damages are demanded, to recompense the 
buyer for his loss (unless the sale is at the buyer's risk). 

What has been said of the seller is equally true of the 
buyer. The seller may be ignorant of the substantial char- 
acter of what he is selling — e.g., selling a real diamond 
under the impression that it is only paste. If the buyer 
know the fact, he acts unjustly in his getting possession of 
the valuable thing and is bound to make restitution. The 

* See, further. Supplement, Contracts, chap, vi.; 2. 



Qu. LXXVII. 3.] FRAUDS IN TRADE. 321 

same principle applies to defect in quality or quantity ; e.g., 
stealing a long ride on the railway,, with a ticket for a 
shorter distance. 



Is the seller bound to disclose the defects of the thing 

There are two moral principles which govern the answer 
to this question : first, it is always unjust to afford another 
man occasion of danger or loss ; secondly, it is not neces- 
sary that a man always give aid or counsel for the benefit 
of whatsoever person he has dealings with. (This may he 
an act of charity, but we are now considering what justice 
demands.) This is an obligation in some determined cases ; 
e.g., when you are responsible for the other's action, he 
being under your charge, or when the other needs assist- 
ance and he can get it from no other. But the seller, in 
offering a defective thing for sale, if its defect be of such a 
nature as to cause loss or danger, violates the first law 
of natural justice just indicated. He gives occasion for 
loss if he subtract nothing from the price of the inferior 
article but demand full value for it. He gives occasion 
for danger if the defect hinder or render unsafe the use of 
the thing, as in selling a saddle-horse that shies, or adul- 
terated medicines or food. If such defects are not manifest 
to the buyer, and the seller does not disclose them, the sale 
is illicit and fraudulent, and the seller is bound to make 
compensation for the loss. 

But if the defect can be readily discovered by a buyer 
using ordinary precaution, as when the horse sold is blind in 
one eye, or when the defect makes the article useless to the 
seller, but others may have use for it, and if the seller duly 
reduce the price demanded, he is not bound to call atten- 
tion to the defect, because the buyer might then demand 
too great a reduction in the price. So the seller may guard 
himself against loss by keeping silence respecting defects. 

(1) Suppose that you say that the buyer is not under 
compulsion ; the thing is submitted to his judgment, and 



322 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXV1I. 4. 

the other is not bound to supply him with judgment for his 
bargain. But there can be no judgment where a thing is 
not manifest. One judges according to what he knows. 
So there is an essential difference between manifest defects 
and those which cannot be detected by ordinary observa- 
tion. If the seller does not call attention to the latter, the 
thing is not sufficiently presented to the buyer's judgment. 

(2) But why should any one stand in his own light, 
impede Ids own business ? It is not necessary to make pub- 

lic proclamati if faults and keep off buyers ; but natural 

justice requires that in pointing out the good qualities 
of what he ofEers for sale, be also indicate hidden defects 
which may cause loss or danger to another. Even so, he is 
nol bound to thrust moral advice on everyone whom be 
encounters ; bu I if his own art- bhreaten moral danger to 
others unless be tell the truth concerning them, he is bound 
to give proper explanation of them. 

(3) But a man may have private information that the 
article for which he is demanding a high price will shortly 
be cheaper because a large supply is coming on the market ; 
and yet he is perfectly just in demanding that high price, 
without giving others information which would lower the 
price. What, then, is the difference between that case, 
and the one which we are now considering ? I answer that 
it is precisely the difference between the present and the 
future. The existing defect makes the present value of the 
thing less than its apparent value. In the other case, the 
value is going to be lower ; but in just contracts de prmenti, 
the question is of the market value for the day, not of some 
coming day, unless the bargain be explicitly in ''futures." 
This being true, the buyer also may have private knowledge 
that prices are shortly to go up ; he is not bound to publish 
that information. 



what makes it just to buy cheap and sell dear? 
The mere lust for gain is criminally base, knowing no 



Qu. lxxix. 3.] OMISION. 323 

honorable or necessary terminus, but stretching out ad infin- 
itum to a vicious end. But gain, which is the object of bid- 
ing and selling, has in itself no such vicious end, for it may 
be merely the means for necessary or virtuous ends, as the 
support of a family or the doing good to the community. 
Moderate gains of trade so sought for, not as an end but as 
the rewards of labour, are certainly lawful and honourable. 
(The author seems to overlook the service which is done to 
the community by bringing the producer and the consumer 
into relations of mutual service. This benefit is conferred 
by ''middlemen," by wholesale and retail trade, which is 
certainly entitled in justice to its fair profits. 

The author's discussion of usury is omitted. His argu- 
ment concerns the lawfulness of profit for the use of money, 
and he regards the prohibition of such "usury" among the 
Israelites as a universal law against what is simply unnatural 
and evil. The lawfulness of demanding compensation for 
loss on the part of the lender is only glanced at ; compensa- 
tion for the risk of losing the loan is left out of view.) 

§ 7. Omission. 

Bins of omission. 

As transgression, implying contempt of negative com- 
mands, is a special sin, so is omission, as implying contempt 
of affirmative commands. It implies neglect not of every 
good, but of that good which is due. But the good viewed 
as a debt, pertains to justice. Hence, in the way in which 
justice is a special virtue, omission is a special sin, distinct 
from the sins which are opposed to the other virtues ; it is 
the neglect of that good which justice commands. 

Omission is sometimes involuntary, as when one has lost 
what he is bound to restore, or when a priest is hindered 
from fulfilling his duties. But omission proper is only 
of that due good to which one is bound. Now, no one 
is bound to the impossible, nor is there sin of omission in 
not doing what one is unable to do. (The sin of omission 



324 SIKTS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXIX. 8. 

consists in not willing, not saying, not doing what one is 
bound to will, to say, to do, having the requisite power 
thereto.) 

When does this sin of omission "begin f 

Is one sinning all the time in which he is not doing what 
is obligatory ? The sin of omission is opposed to affirmative 
precepts, which command the good. But such precepts do 
not bind at all time- bo far as action is concerned, but at 
a determined time, place, etc. And at that time the sin 
begins. At thai time, il is true, he may be anabletoact, 
and if thai inability be Dot his fault he does not neglect 
whal is due. But if that inability proceed from previous 
fault — say. negligence in taking care of what he is bound to 
restore— thai negligence is the cause of the sin of omission ; 
but this latter Bin begins, cot with the negligence, but with 
the determined time Eor restoring, or whatever the neglected 
duty may be. But the omission is voluntary, since itscause- 
is so : therefore it is a sin. 



CHAPTER IV. 

KELIGI0N AND VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 

§ 1. Introduction. 

In a very general sense every virtue contains the idea of 
what is due to Divine or human law. 

So viewed, justice embraces them all. But, as a special 
virtue, it regards the good as what is due to our neighbour, 
as general justice is concerned with what is due to the com- 
munity or to God. In both of these, avoiding the evil and 
doing the good are integral parts. In doing the good, in 
acting justly, equality in relations is established as far as is 
possible. In shunning the evil, in avoiding injustice, such 
equality is preserved. 

Virtues annexed to justice. 

Since justice is relative to another, all virtues which 
imply such relation may be connected with it ; yet they may 
fall short of the perfect idea of virtue as it is found in the 
chief virtue of this class, which is justice, the giving to 
others what is due and the full equivalent of what is due. 
Other virtues may give what is due without giving all that 
is due. (1) First, all that man can render to God is due, 
but he cannot render as much as he ought. Religion, theu, 
is a virtue annexed to justice. 

(2) Parents cannot be recompensed fully for what they 
have done. Filial piety is an imperfect form of justice. 

(3) Man cannot recompense virtue as it deserves. Out- 
ward respect and honour (" observantia ") is an imperfect 
form of justice. 



32G RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI. 1, 2. 

But virtues annexed to justice may full short of it, also, as 
regards the idea of what is due. .Morally duo is what one 
owes according to the propriety of virtue. It may be so 
necessary that without it an honourable life cannot be pre- 
served. On the part of the one who owes this obligation, 
the duty is that he show himself in words and deeds such 
as he is in reality. (4) Truthfulness is annexed to justice. 

Or, on the part of the one to whom the debt is due, one 
recompenses another for the kindness which he has shown, 
(.".) b\ gratitude in word and deed. Or, (6) in the case of 
ill which lias beni d<>n.' (of course, with those due motives 
which have been heretofore pointed out), proper vengeance 
i- a \ irtne annexed to jusl . . 

Bui this deW of virtue, which ought to be paid, may con- 
tribute to an honourable life withoiii being essential to it. 
Such virtu-- are (1 liberality, affability, and the like, in 

which the idea of debt almost vanishes. 

§ 2. Religion. 
117 'onf 

It is a virtue by which man renders to his God due hom- 
a:_ r <\ worship, honour, and reverence. Giving any one his 
due is a virtuous act, and if it proceed from a corresponding 
habit, marks a virtuous man. Manifestly, then, the defini- 
tion of virtue heretofore given applies to religion. 

(1) Whal 8. J (i. 37) does not conilict with 

this. For religion produces acts of two kinds; some are 
its proper and immediate acts elicited by it, through which 
man is ordered with respect to God only, as sacrilice, ado- 
ration, and the like ; but it has other acts which it produces 
through the virtues which it directs as means to its end, 
which end is homage to Almighty God. Such acts are " vis- 
iting the fatherless and the widows in their affliction," acts 
elicited by mercy, and " keeping self unspotted from the 
world," an act commanded by religion, but elicited by tem- 
perance or some such virtue. 



Qu. LXXXI. 3, 4, 5.] EELIGIOlsr. 327 

(2) We owe one another service in the Church of G-od 
(Gal. v. 13), but God's dominion and right is infinitely 
exalted, and the service which is due to Him ("latria") is 
preeminent and distinct from any other. 

(3) Men may have a claim to marks of honour (" with my 
body I thee worship "), but the honour clue to God is special 
and distinct, "■ Eusebeia " or " Theosebeia." 

This virtue gives reverence to one God as the Creator, 
Governor, Father of all men. 

It has various outward acts, but they are all reducible to 
those Divine honours which are paid from reverence for 
His infinite excellence, or that service which is due from 
God's subject creatures ; but these two are the one act of 
reverential homage. 

Eeligion is a special virtue, because of the special good 
for which it is ordained ; viz., paying due and peculiar hon- 
our to God. 

Every virtuous act is a sacrifice, so far as it is ordained 
for reverential homage to God. But so it is commanded by 
the special virtue of religion. All things, says the apostle 
(1 Cor. x. 31), are to be done to the "glory of God." But 
the same remark applies ; such acts are religious, not relig- 
ion, because they pertain to it, not as elicited, but as com- 
manded by that reverential homage which is religion. 

Is religion a theological virtue ? 

Worship of God springing from reverential homage is a 
dictate of natural reason ; it is natural religion. What posi- 
tive Divine or human law has done is merely to determine it 
in this way or that way. (This fact itself shows that religion 
is not a theological virtue ; but the author thoroughly ex- 
amines the ground of denial.) Theological virtues have 
God for their direct object. He is the object of faith, of 
hope, of love. But He is the end of religious acts, not their 
direct object or " matter ; " their matter is worship ; for 



328 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI. 6, 7. 

due worship is offered — say. sacrificial offerings — outof rev- 
erence for I rod. 

"By faith, hope, and charity " (S. Aug.. Enohir. 3) whioh 
have God as their proper object. God is worshipped, because 
i hey command acts of religion as things ordained to I he end 
of i hose \ irtues. 

Religion, as ^~<- have Been, is a pari of the moral virtue of 
justice. 

Religion is preeminent among the moral virtues, 
because, while all those virtues have God for their end, it. 
comes nearer to thai end than the others do, producing 
what is directly and immediately ordained for the Divine 

honour. 

ill The praise of virtue consists in the good will, nol in 
the power of doing much. Religion cannot pay all thai ie 
due, bul thai is no derogation from the supreme rank of 

this moral virtue. 

(2) God, it is true, needs nothing from us; but it is in 
those things which are bestowed on others for their benefit 
that gifts to the more needy arc the more laudable, because 
they are more useful. Bul nothing is offered to (Jod for 
Hi.- benefit, hut for Eis glory and our own good. 

/) es ■ ligion require outward acts f 

We offer reverence and honour to God, no! on Eis account, 
since we can add nothing to His glory, but on our own 
account. The perfection of our own soul is found in this 
subjection. But the human soul needs, in order that it 
may he united to God, the guidance and assistance of sen- 
sible things. Therefore in Divine worship it is neci 
to employ outward, bodily acts, in order that by them, as 
by signs of the inward act, the soul may be lifted up in 
its spiritual acts by which it is joined to God. There- 
fore religion has inward acts as chief, and a3, per se, its 



Qu. lxxxii. 1, 2.] DEVOTION" AND PRATER. 329 

own ; but outward acts as secondary and ordained for the 
other. 

Therefore Christ said (S. John iy. 24), "God is a spirit, 
and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and 
truth." 

The outw r ard corporal acts may be similar to those which 
are presented out of respect to men (bowing or kneeling, 
etc.), but they are only needful signs of inward and spiritual 
actions. 

Is religion the same as the virtue of holiness ? 

Holiness is attributed to those things which are applied to 
Divine worship, so that not only men but churches and sacred 
vessels are said to be sanctified by being so applied. Now, 
inward purification is necessary in order that the mind may 
be elevated to God, because the soul is defiled by cleaving 
to lower things ; sanctity is that virtue "without which no 
man shall see the Lord " (Heb. xii. 14). Since, then, holi- 
ness is that by which the mind of man directs itself and its 
actions to God, it does not differ from religion in essence 
but only in our conception of it. For religion offers to God 
due service in that which pertains to Divine worship, as 
sacrifices, oblations, and the like ; but holiness refers to 
God not only these but the acts of the other virtues, or fits 
man for Divine worship. 

§ 3. Devotion and prayer. 

Devotion is a special act of religion, being the act of a 
will prepared to do promptlij what belongs to the service of 
God. 

It is the same virtue which does the thing and has the 
prompt will to do it. Charity is the root from which 
spring both religion and devotion. It is meditation on the 
Divine bounty and benefits and the consideration of our own 
needs which is a special cause of devotion. 



330 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXm. 1-S. 

Prayer is an act of reason moved by a loving will, in 
which God is asked for what is fitting for Him to grant. 

It tends to the end of charity, which is to be united with 
God, both because this is the chief object of prayer (Ps. 
xxvii. -1). and because he thai makes an] petition must 
approach bim of whom be asks it. Prayer, then, implies 
an uplifting of the soul to God. 

Is prayer a proper act of religion ' 

Thai ii is an acl of religion is evident, Cor it pertains to 
thai to offer reverence and honour to God, and all things 
by which Buch reverence is manifested belong to religion. 
Bnl in prayer such reverence is manifested in subjection 
and acknowledgment thai God is the author of all good 
for tin.- Bupply <>f human need. All good desires fall under 
the precepi of charity, but the asking under the precepi of 
religion. "Ask, ami it .-hall be given you" (8. Matt. \ii. 
In asking, the bouI, subjecting itself, makes nidation 
of itself, which is Car above all outward and corporal obla- 
and Bacrifii 

And prayer is fitting, no withstanding the three-fold error 
of ami. 'in and modern heathen : (1) It is vain to pray if 
human affairs are nol ruled by Divine Providence; (2) 
prayer - • I •- if Bome physical necessity control all 
- : (3) prayer is superstition if it suppose that Divine 
Providence is variable, and thai God's good will can be 
N te the familiar but profane objection <>'.' the 
day.) 

In maintaining the usefulness of prayer, we neither 
impose necessity on human affairs subjected to Divine Prov- 
idence, nor deem the Divine good pleasure to be mutable. 
Divine Providence not only orders effects, bul also from what 
causes and in what order they shall come. But among 
those causes are human acts; and men must do certain 
things, not that they may change the Divine will, but that 
by their acts they may fultil the order appointed by God for 



Qu. lxxxiii. 5.] DEVOTION" AND PRAYER. 331 

the accomplishment of certain results. "We do not pray in 
order that we may change our Father, but in order to ask 
what God has arranged to be fulfilled through prayer. 
" Men by asking merit to receive what G-od arranged to give 
before the world was made" (S. Greg.). 

(1) We do not pray that we may inform God of what we 
need : "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need 
of all these things " (S. Matt. vi. 32) ; but we pray in order 
that we ourselves may consider that in our needs we are to 
seek Diviue aid. 

(2) God, unasked, wills to give us many things from His 
own boundless liberality ; but that He wills to give us some 
things when we ask, is for our own benefit; sc., that we 
may go to our Father with confidence, and that we may 
recognize Him to be the author of all good. 

In prayer ought we to make any special petition? 

There are things which a man can use well or ill, which 
may prove mischievous for himself ; but there are also good 
things which a man cannot use so, and these are asked for 
absolutely. 

(1) It is true that "we know not how to pray as we 
ought" (Rom. viii. 26) ; but it is also true that the " Spirit 
helpeth our infirmity," inspiring us with holy desires, that 
we may rightly ask. 

(2) In making determined petitions one may seem to be 
trying to incline another's will towards his own, whereas 
our aim should be, not that God should will what we will, 
but rather that we should will what He wills. But in ask- 
ing what pertains to our salvation (however special the peti- 
tion maybe), we do conform our will to His who "willeth 
that all men should be saved" (1 Tim. ii. 4). 

And, finally, our Lord Himself taught His disciples, 
in the " Lord's Prayer," to make determined and special 
petitions. 



332 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI1I. 6, 7. 

/ man in his prayer to ask for earthly things? 

Agar Baid (Prov. \\\. 8), "Feed me with the food thai 

is needful forme;" and S. Augustine says (Ep. ad Prob. 

•• It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to 

desire." lint temporal things may be lawf ally desired, ool 

indeed as an end, bul as means t<> an end, by which we are 

aided in seeking beatitude, since by them the corpora] Life 

ined ami tin;, can serve tin' acts of virtue. 

(I) The i. 3. M 33), " Seek ye Bret the 

kingdom of God ami His riirii i * •• »u - 1 1. -~ . ami all these things 

shall be added nnto you." They cannot lawfully hold the 

chief place, hut are to have a subsidiary one ; t he true riohes 

are to I"- sough! a our chief g 1 ; these as needful for our 

earthly life. 

\ all care for such things is prohibited iS. Man. 
\ i. 25 |, but inordinate am 
(3) When the soul s.i k - earthly goods as its res', ii is 
1 to their level ; hut when it prays for them in their 
relation to its beatitude, it is uplifted to that ami to God. 

th They are not asked for unconditionally, hut in rela- 
tion to something else; that is. as they are expedient for 
■ Ivation. 

Intercession is a form of prayer ; we ought to pray for 
others. 

For charity requires that we desire others' good (S. Jas. 

v. 16) ; and what we ought to desire we ought to pray for. 
• Bay, "My Father," hut "Our Father:" nor do 
"Give me," but "Give u<." ''The Lord of unity 
was unwilling that each should merely pray separated}- for 
himself He willed that one should pray for all, since in 
His one Person lie bore the burden of all" S. Cyprian., De 
Orat. Domin.). 

Prayer for another may not always be granted, even when 
it is faithful and persevering and for things pertaining to 
salvation, because of obstacle.- which that other puts in the 



Qu. LXXXIII. 8.] DEVOTION" AND PRAYER. 333 

way of an answer ; but nevertheless such prayer, spring- 
ing from charity, is meritorious like any other work of 
charity. 

Prayer is to be made for the just, that they may persevere 
and go forward ; for sinners, that they may turn and be 
saved (1 Ep. S. John v. 16). We know not who the repro- 
bate are, therefore prayer is to be made for all sinners (1 
Tim. ii. 1). 

We ought to pray for our enemies (S. Matt. v. 44). 

Prayer for others is a work of charity : as, therefore, we 
are bound to love our enemies, so are we bound to pray for 
them. But hew we are bound to love our enemies has been 
already considered (see page 200). We are to love their 
nature, not their sin. We are not commanded to give 
them special love, except in the preparation of a soul ready 
to love an enemy with special love and to help him in neces- 
sity or if he ask pardon. More than this is love's perfec- 
tion, not its indispensable obligation. The like obligation 
applies to our prayers ; enemies are not to be excluded. 
But that we pray specially for them, when not in necessity 
or other peculiar circumstances, is a work of perfection, 
not of absolute obligation. 

(1) Holy Scriptures, indeed, contain many imprecations 
against enemies, as in Psalm xl. 14, and many others. But 
these imprecations are to be understood, first, as prophetic 
denunciations ; secondly, as temporal chastisements for the 
correction of sinners ; next, as directed against the kingdom 
of sin, not against particular sinners, that by the correction 
of men sins may be destroyed ; and, lastly, as conforming 
the will of man to Divine justice. (We may add that Chris- 
tians speak the Psalms in the name of their Lord against 
His enemies. ) 

So the martyred saints beneath the altar in heaven say, 
"How long, Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and 
avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth ?" (Rev. 



33-4 RELIGION' AND OPrOSED VICES. [Q.F. LXXXIII. 12. 

vi. 10). But they pray for the overthrow of the kingdom 
of sin and rejoice at the work of Divine justice. 

(2) It may be said that men's prayers should not contra- 
dict their actions, and it is lawful to fight against enemies, 
for wars arc sometimes lawful. But the object of just war 
is to put down evil, and this brings good to enemies as well 
as to others. So prayer and action need not contradict one 
another. 

Should prayer be rural f 

Prayer is either private or public, i.e., the prayer of the 

faithful ] pie of God offered for them by the ministers of 

the Ohnrch. This should be known by all the people for 
whom it is offered, which cannot be if it is not vocal. So 
the < Ihnrch orders respeci ing it. 

I'.ut the private prayer of an individual for himself or for 
(•tiers oeed nol be vocal. Set the voice is added to such 
prayer for three reasons ; first, ontward signs of devotion, 
.sueh as spoken words are, may excite the inward devotion 
by which the soul is uplifted to God. But if the soul 
stracted by these outward signs, whatever they may 
be, or be hindered in any manner, they are to be discon- 
tinued ; and this is especially true of those who are suffi- 
ciently prepared for devotion without these outward signs 
of it. 

Secondly, vocal prayer is added to inward prayer as pay- 
ing what is due ; 8&, that man serve God with all that ho 
has from God — i.e., not only with his mind but with his 
body (Hos. xiv. 2). 

Thirdly, the warm affections of the soul break forth in 
audible language. 

Vocal prayer is not uttered to inform God of what He is 
ignorant, but to raise the mind to God. It is not wrong to 
be "seen of men" (S. Matt. vi. G), but to pray outwardly 
in order that we mav be seen of men. 



Qu. iaxxiii. 13.] PRAYEE. 335 

Must prayer he with fixed attention? 

This question chiefly concerns vocal prayer. If we speak 
of necessity in this matter, it signifies either that by which 
the end is better reached, or that without which the end is 
not reached at all. For the first, attention (undistracted) 
is absolutely necessary. But there are three effects of 
prayer. The first, which is merit, is common to all acts 
which are "informed" by charity. And for this effect it 
is not necessarily required that there be fixed attention 
throughout the prayer, but the first actual attention with 
which one began his prayer renders the whole efficacious in 
this way (this is virtual attention ; one began with hearty 
desire to pray, but was unwillingly distracted). The second 
effect of prayer is peculiar to it ; viz., the obtaining a 
petition ; and the first intention, which God chiefly regards, 
suffices for this effect also. But if the first intention to 
pray is absent, there is merely the empty form of outward 
prayer ; it is neither meritorious, nor does it obtain any 
answer from God. 

The third effect of prayer which it directly produces is a 
spiritual refreshment of the soul ; and for this actual atten- 
tion is necessary. 

The sense of the words may be attended to, or the mind 
may be fixed on God and the thing prayed for ; and this 
latter is in the highest degree necessary. 

(1) They that worship God "must worship Him in 
spirit and in truth " (S. John iv. 24). But they do this 
who begin their prayer from the prompting of the Holy 
Spirit, even if, through infirmity, their mind afterwards 
wander. 

(2) Through infirmity of nature, the mind cannot long 
be lifted up on high ; its own heavy load drags it down. 

(3) If any one purposely wander in mind during prayer 
he mocks God ; he sins, and loses the fruit of prayer. But 
unintentional distractions do not take away the first and 
second fruits of prayer. 



33G RELIGION ASH OPPOSED VICES. [Qu.LXXXm.l4 

Continual prayer. 

The Lord said, " Men ought always to pray, and not to 
faint" (S. Luke xviii. 1 ) ; and S. l'aul said, " Pray without 
ceasing" (1 Thess. v. 17). The cause of prayer is the 
desire which Bprings from charity, which desire ought to 
be continually in as, either actually <>r virtually, for this 
desire virtually abides in all thin::- which we do from the 
motive of charity. Bui we ought to do all things to the 
glory of God (1 Cor. x. 31). In this way we ought always 
to pray. 

Bui prayer considered in itself cannot he continual, for 
there are other duties in life; "therefore, at certain inter- 
vals of time we call npon God in words also, thai I >y those 
Bigns of inward devotion we may admonish ourselves, dis- 
cover how far we have advanced in thai desire, and excite. 
yes more zealously to increase it " (S. Aug., ad Pro- 
bam, Ep. 130). But the (juantity of a thing should he pro- 
portioned to the end. Prayer, then, should last as long as it 

is useful to excite the fervour of inward desire. But when 
• this measure, so thai it cannot, las! without 
weariness, it should not he protracted. This principle 
applies also to public and common prayer as compared with 
the devotion of the people. (Well worthy, I think, to he 
noted.) 

(1) Christ said that the heathen " think that they shall 
be heard for their much speaking ■" (8. Matt. \i. 7). But 
•• it is not much speaking to pray a long time. For much 
speech is one thing, enduring affection is another. The 
Lord Himself continued all night in prayer, giving us an 
example of protracted devotion. Much speaking is using 
superfluous words ; but much praying is entreating Him to 
whom we pray with long and devout uplifting of the soul " 
(S. Aug., Joe. (MS). 

(2) The Lord did not give His prayer as the only form, 
but to show us what things we are to desire and ask for. 

To pray without ceasing is to persevere in the appointed 



Qu. lxxxiii. 15.] PRATER. 337 

times for vocal prayer, and to have its effects remaining in 
a more devout soul. 

Is prayer a meritorious work ? 

It is so inasmuch as it proceeds from the root of charity, 
whose proper object is eternal good, for whose fruition char- 
ity fits us. Prayer comes from charity through religion, 
whose act is prayer, along with other virtues which are 
requisite for a good prayer; viz., humility and faith. Re- 
ligion offers the prayer, charity gives the desire of what is 
prayed for. Faith is necessary, for we must believe that 
we shall obtain what we ask for. Humility is necessary, 
for we must recognize our need. But prayer is efficacious 
from the grace of God, who also leads us to pray. 

(1) But does not prayer precede grace, since the Lord 
says (S. Luke xi. 13), " Your heavenly Father will give the 
Holy Spirit to them that ask Him " ? Yes ; but prayer 
without justifying grace is not meritorious ; neither is any 
other virtuous act. And yet the prayer which asks for this 
grace proceeds from some grace, since that very prayer is 
the gift of God. 

(2) But if prayer is meritorious at all, it seems to merit 
to be heard. But oftentimes it is not heard, as we notice in 
S. PauFs case. I answer that the merit of prayer may apply 
to a different thing from that which is asked for. For 
merit is chiefly the fitness for beatitude, but many other 
things are prayed for. If, then, that thing which is asked 
for is not serviceable for that beatitude, it is not merited. 
Sometimes it is neither necessary to salvation nor mani- 
festly contrary to it ; and then, though the prayer may 
merit eternal life, it does not merit to obtain the petition. 
" Mercifully it may be heard, and mercifully it may be re- 
jected. What is useful for the sick man, the physician 
knows better than he" (S. Aug.). S. Paul was not heard, 
because it was not expedient that he should be heard. 

But if that which is asked for pertain to the soul's life, 
22 



338 RELIGION AXn OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. i.xxxiv. 1. 

it is merited not only by prayer but by other works of 
charity. Undoubtedly the petition is granted, but at a fit- 
ting time, which granting can be hindered if one does not 
persevere in prayer. 

Hut since man cannot merit eternal life by his worthiness, 
nor be worthy of the things which pertain to eternal lib 1 , 
he is nol always heard in praying for another. There are 
then four conditions, which concurring, one always obtains 
his petition — .«•., th.at he ask Eor himself, what is necessary 
t<> salvation, devoutly (i.e., with faith, hope, love, humility, 
and attention) and perseveringly. 

Do si n if r< i r> r obtain anything from God /"/ prayt r .' 
'Idie publican in the Gospel did not saj in vain, " <Jod be 
merciful t" me a .-inner." For two things arc to be con- 
I in tie- sinner, his nature which God love.-, and the 
sin which God hates. If, then, he ask anything as a sin- 
ner— i.e., according to sinful desire— he is not heard in 
■ mi times he is hoard for vengeance, w hen 
allowed t" rush .-till further into -ins. But God, out, 

of pure mercy, hears the prayer of tie- .-inner proceeding 
from BUCh good desire- a- may remain in him, provided 
that the four conditions above mentioned be found in that 
prayer. 

| 4. Outward acts of Divine worship : Adoration, sacrifices, 
and oblations. 

" Thou slw.lt worship the Lord thy God" (&. Matt. 
iv. 10). 

Adoration is reverential homage, an act of religion due 
to God preeminently on account of His infinite excellence, 
in which other beiugs can only participate at infinite dis- 
tance. Outward signs of inward reverence are due to su- 
periors, but sacrifice can be offered to God only. King 
David lawfully accepted such "worship " from Nathan the 
prophet (1 Kings i. 23), but the angel of the Apocalypse 



Qc. LXXXV. 1.] OUTWARD ACTS OF WORSHIP. 339 

refused it from S. John (Rev. xxii. 8), excluding occasion 
for idolatry. 

Does adoration imply a corporeal act ? 

Because we are of two-fold nature, we offer to God a two- 
fold adoration : the spiritual homage of inward devotion, 
and the outward, of lowly bodily abasement before Him. 
The latter is for the former ; viz., that by outward signs of 
humility our inward affections may be the more subjected 
to God. 

This is " worship in spirit/' if it proceed from spiritual 
devotion, and has that for its end. 

Corporeal adoration implies a determined place where it is 
offered to God. 

Inward devotion apprehends God as not limited to any 
place. But the bended knee in sign of human weakness, 
or prostration in sign of our nothingness in the sight of 
God, requires a determined place. 

A place is consecrated for the use of man, not on God's 
account. It is for the adoring worshipper, first, that he 
may be the more devout ; next, because of the sacred 
objects, sacramental and other, which are there contained ; 
and lastly, because of the promise, " Where two or three 
are gathered in My name, there am I in the midst of them." 

Sacrifice. — Is offering sacrifice a part of the law of 
nature f 

Natural reason indicates to man his dependence on an- 
other, because of the defects which he feels in himself, 
in which he needs to be aided and directed by another. 
That other is what all name God. And natural reason 
also dictates to man that he, after his manner, exhibit 
honour and subjection to what is above him. But the 
fitting manner is for him to use sensible signs. Therefore 
it is from natural reason that man employs sensible things, 
offering them to God in sign of due honour and subjection. 



340 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXV. 3, 8. 

But this is sacrifice. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is 

part of the law of nature. 

Men differ widely in what they offer. Hut there arc 
_- which in i heir general principle are part of the 

law of nature, while their particular application depends 

upon positive law. Thus it is a law «>r nature thai male- 
factors be punished; but the kind of punishmenl depends 
upon positive law, human or Divine. So, also, sacrifioe in 
general is a law of nature. l>ui its determination belongs to 
human or 1 divine institution. 

■ / to God only. 
For il is offered as a saored symbol. What is outwardly 
offered signifies the inward spiritual sacrifice, in which the 
bouI offers itself to God (" The sacrifice of God is a broken 
spirit,"' I's. li. l'.'i. for outward acts of religion are or- 
dained f"r the in Bui the soul offers itself for a 
sacrifice to God as its Creator, and the only source of its 
beatitude. Therefore, as we are to offer to God alone the 
spiritual sacrific >ught to offer to Bim alone its 

outward 8j mbol. 

7' .."'■'. act of religion. 

i\ is praia worthy only as done out of reverence for God. 
Other virtu - • maybe intended for the Bame end, as 
g aim-, or patiently enduring affliction, hut sacrifi- 
cial acts arc for tin- end alone. Man's good is three-fold, 
and each may he offered to God, and in a general way is 
then called a sacrifice. First, there is the good of the soul, 
which is offered to God in the inward sacrifice of devotion 
and prayer. This is the principal sacrifice. But next there 
is the good of man's body, which is offered to God in mar- 
tyrdom, abstinence, continence. And it is said (Bom. xii. 
1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice. " And, third, 
there is the good of external things, which are directly a 
sacrifice when we offer them to God, and they are iudi- 



Qu. LXSXVI. 1.] OUTWARD ACTS OF WORSHIP. 341 

rectly a sacrifice when we communicate them for God's 
sake. " With such sacrifices God is well pleased " (Heb. 
xiii. 16). 

Every sacrifice is an oblation, an offering to God ; but 
not every oblation is a sacrifice, because the latter signifies 
also that some religious change is made in the oblation ; 
thus, animals were killed and burned, and bread is blessed, 
broken, and eaten. First fruits are oblations because they 
are offered ; they are not sacrifices, properly speaking, 
because no further action follows. 

Are all bound to offer sacrifice 9 

What is the law of nature obliges all, and this is part of 
the law of nature ; therefore all are bound in some way to 
offer sacrifice. All owe the inward sacrifice of presenting to 
God a devout and humble spirit. But the outward sacrifice, 
as we have just seen, is of two kinds ; one which is laud- 
able only because some outward thing is offered in token 
of subjection to God. Those who are under revealed law, 
whether the Old Law or the new Gospel law, are bound to 
offer certain sacrifices according to the commandment given 
to them. But those who were not under the law revealed, 
were bound to do certain outward things for the Divine 
honour, according to the fitting customs of their place and 
nation. 

The other outward sacrifice is when outward acts of other 
virtues are undertaken as marks of homage to God, and 
some of these are bound upon all. 

Priests, indeed, offer those sacrifices which are especially 
instituted for Divine worship, not only for themselves but 
also for others ; but there are other sacrifices which each 
one can offer for himself. 

Oblations. —As a general term the word applies to all things 
which are offered in Divine worship. 

If the offering is converted into a sacred thing, at that 



342 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXVIII. 1. 

time to be consumed, it is both sacrifice and oblation. But 
if it remain to be employed in Divine worship, or for the 
use of the ministers of the sanctuary, it is an oblation and 
not a sacrifice. Such offerings must be voluntary ; but they 
may also be obligatory, as Church rates, or subscriptions 
and gifts bequeathed fco bhe Church, or offerings for the 
support of i he clergy, etc. 

Gifts to the poor arc not, strictly speaking, oblations 
unless they are first offered to God through lie priest (Hob. 
v. 1). 

These oblations may be consecrated and set apart, as 
sacred vessels and vestments are, for the service of God. 
Then they cannot be turned to common uses; but other- 
i.-\ may be dispensed by the clergy. (See the Offer- 
tory rubric.) 

command (Prov. Hi. 9), u Honour the Lord with thy 
substance," ipplies to all things justly possessed. 

Things unjustly acquired and possessed cannot be made 
an oblatioD to God. Accidentally, even that which is law- 
fully | annot be so used; say, if doing so tend to 
the injury of another, as a son's offering what his father 
needs, or any offering which causes scandal, etc. 

The imposing of tithes, while it rests on the law of 
nature, belongs to the positive law of the Church, which 
has authority in this regard. (But the subject is here omit- 
ted as not directly applicable to our circumstances.) 

^ 5. Vows. 

A vow implies a certain obligation to do or leave undone 
anything. 

Obligation between man and man is created by a prom- 
ise, a rational promise, made through outward signs of 
it, as spoken or written words. But a promise may be 
made to God in the thoughts of the heart, although the 



Qu. lxxxviii. 2.] VOWS. 343 

outward signs of it may stir one up to its fulfilment, or call 
others to witness it. 

But a true promise proceeds from the deliberate purpose 
of a will which intends to bind itself. So, then, a vow re- 
quires three things : first, deliberation ; next, purpose of 
the will; and thirdly, a promise, to which may be super- 
added the words of the lips and the witness of other men. 

The Divine law of vows 
is given in Deut. xxiii. 21 : "When thou shalt vow a vow 
unto the Lord thy God, a free-will offering which thou hast 
promised with thy mouth, thou shalt not be slack to pay it ; 
for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee ; and it 
would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it 
shall be no sin in thee." It would be a vain promise if any 
one should promise that which would not be accepted. 
Therefore nothing illicit, nothing indifferent, may be made 
the subject of a vow, but only some act of virtue. But be- 
cause a vow implies a voluntary promise, nothing which is 
absolutely necessary to be or not to be can be the subject of 
a vow. 

But that which is not absolutely necessary, but is so only 
on account of the end sought for, as that which is neces- 
sary for salvation, may be vowed because it is voluntary. 
But that virtuous act which is not necessary to salvation is 
altogether voluntary, and is most peculiarly the subject of 
a vow. It is some greater good which is vowed. 

(1) The vow of baptism (renewed in confirmation) is vol- 
untary ; so far it justly takes the name of a vow ; but it is 
not a vow in the narrower sense just explained. 

(2) Jepbtha's vow, in itself considered, had a good object, 
but an unlooked-for event made it evil, and it was not to 
be observed, for what is evil cannot be the subject of a 
vow. 

(3) Ascetic practices like vigils and fasting are acceptable 
only as they are virtuous, which is when they are adopted 



■M4 RELIC4I0X AX1) OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXVIII. 3, 4. 

with due judgment to restrain concupiscence without injur- 
ing the body. So far they may be vowed. So the apostle 
(Rom. xii. 1), after he had said, ''Present your bodies," 
etc., added, "which is your reasonable service." Such 
vows are better observed or set aside under advice of su- 
periors : inn if it cannot be had, and greal and manifest 
injury is felt, one ought not to keep such a vow. (This is 
not omitted, fchougli there is reason to suspect that it is 
little applicable to a luxurious and easy-going age.) But 
• iik-li are made respecting vain and useless things are 
rather to be laughed ;it than observed. 

Every run-, when m<i<ir, is obligatory. 

"Pay thai which thou vowest. Better is it thai thou 

BQOUlde8! QOl vow, than that thou shouldest VOW and not 

pay." is God'fl law (Eccles. v. -1). Man owes the highest 

fidelity to God, both because of His Lordship, and because 
of benefits received. Ami keeping vows is a part of that 
fidelity. 

Objection may be made that man needs what we may 
promise, while God needs nothing from us ; and yet a mere 
promise mad'' to another is not obligatory in law, because 
it only expresses a purpose which may change. Much less, 
then, does a simple promise of what is not obligatory before 
( rod bind a man's conscience. 

But in conscience a man is bound by his promise to an- 
other man, according to the law of nature ; although, for 
expediency's sake, other conditions are required by civil 
law. And although God needs not our good things, our 
highest obligation is to Him. 

If any one has vowed that which proves impossible to be 
fulfilled, he ought to do what in him lies towards its ful- 
filment, as having a ready will. 

Is it expedient to voir anything f 

Holy Scripture says (Ps. lxxvi. 11), " Vow, and pay unto 



Qu. lxxxviii. 5.] VOWS. 345 

the Lord your God." A promise made to God is not for 
His benefit, but for our own. And by our vow we fix our 
will immovably on that which it is expedient to do. There- 
fore it is expedient to vow. (Per contra, Luther, De Lib- 
ertate Christiana.) 

(1) This does not conflict with Christian liberty ; for as 
the not being able to sin does not diminish liberty, so the 
necessity of a will fixed on good does not detract from lib- 
erty. Such is the necessity of a vow — "happy necessity 
which compels to better things" (S. Aug., Ep. 127, ad Ar- 
ment. et Paulin.). 

(2) Some one may say that there is risk of breaking the 
vow, and one ought not to incur such risk. But when the 
danger springs from any action itself, then that action is 
not expedient, as the crossing a river on a very rotten plank. 
But if the risk is in a man's ceasing from that action, then 
the deed on that account does not cease to be expedient, as 
it may be expedient to mount a horse, although there is a 
possibility of getting a fall in consequence thereof. Other- 
wise it would be necessary to cease from all good actions, 
because they may possibly have some risk connected with 
them. But the danger to him who vows lawfully is not 
from the vow, but from his fault in changing his mind and 
transgressing his vow. 

A vow is an act of vj or ship or religion. 

Every virtuous act may be made an act of religion by 
being offered to God, by being ordained to the service of 
God. And a vow is a promise made to God, an ordaining 
of that which is promised for Him to whom the promise 
is made. Eor example, fasting or continence may be 
virtuous acts, but when any such thing is promised to 
God, it becomes an act of religion, like prayer or offering 
sacrifice. 

The promise may be made to man, also, as to the bishop 
in ordination, but the vow is made to God alone. 



34G RELIGION AXD OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. lxxxviii. 8. 

It may be more laudable to do some virtuous act with a 
vow than without a vow. 

There are throe reasons for this : (1) First, to vow is an 
act of Divine worship, and the act of the lower virtue is 
better and more meritorious when it is commanded by the 
higher virtue, as the act of faith or hope is better if it pro- 
ceed from charity. The act of abstinence, or whatever it 
be, becomes a kind of sacrifice to God. 

(2) Secondly, he who vows and does anything, more 
fully Bubjeetfl himself to God than by tin 1 simple act of 
doing it, because he binds himself to do nothing different 
from w hat he has promised. 

(3) Lastly, by the vow his will is more immovably fixed 
toward- the good, not only with respect to one particular 
act but for all the future. 

Wi may distinguish solemn vows from simple vows, 
because the former arc accompanied by some spiritual 
benediction or consecration, as in the case of Holy Orders, 
or the entering Bome religious order, or, in a different way, 
in the nuptial benediction. 

This is not merely the question of public celebration, a 
sort of human solemnity; it is a spiritual and Divine so- 
lemnity, no matter how few are present at it, because God 
is the bestower of the spiritual benediction or consecration, 
although man is the minister of it (Num. vi. 27). 

May those who are under the power of others be hindered 
from taking a vow ? 

Xo one can by promise bind himself to that which is in 
another's power. Bat whoever is subject to another, has no 
authority to do what he will in that respect wherein he is 
subject. Therefore he cannot bind himself in those things 
without hi-- superior's consent (Num. xxx. 3). 

It may seem that the obligation by which any one is 
subjected to man is less than that of a vow made to God. 



Qu. Lxxxvin. 10.] vows. 347 

But the promise made to Him must be virtuous, and it is 
contrary to virtue that man offer to G-od what is another's. 
It is not a true vow at all, except under the condition thab 
he who has authority in the matter make no objection. 
(Thus parents can annul the vows of their children until 
they come of age. But see, further, Supplement on Holy 
Matrimony, chap. xi. § 3.) 

The Church has poiver of dispensation. 

Dispensation from vows is like the release from keeping 
some law which, though made for the general good, may 
prove in some special case to be not good, and the law-mak- 
ing power may dispense with the observance of the law in 
that case. 

So in the case of a vow made for what is in itself and in 
general good, it may happen that the thing vowed proves 
to be evil in that particular case, or useless, or a hindrance 
to some greater good, which is contrary to the very idea of 
a vow. Therefore it is necessary that some authority in 
such a case determine that the vow is not to be kept. This 
is dispensation. 

(1) In the case of human law, it is not decreed that the 
law should not be obeyed, which would be contrary to the 
law of nature and to Divine command, but that the law 
does not apply to the case in question. So, also, the author- 
ity of a superior may determine that what was vowed is not 
suitable matter for a vow. The bishop, in such a case, 
does not dispense with natural or Divine law, but he deter- 
mines that which could not be fully foreseen in advance. 

(2) Such a dispensation is not contrary to the fidelity 
which is due to G-od, because such fidelity does not imply 
that man, having ignorantly vowed, shall do what is evil, 
useless, or a hindrance of greater good. 

A bishop cannot annul a solemn consecration, so that 
that which is solemnly blessed and vowed to God loses its 
sanctification. Holy Orders cannot be so annulled. But 



348 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. Lxxxix. 1, 2. 

for cause the bishop may inhibit the fulfilling of the vow 
of Orders ; i.e., deprive of the right to execute its func- 
tions. 

§ 6. On oaths. * 

Human testimony is requisite in particular contingent 
fads which cannot be direct/// and infallibly known by de- 
monstrative proof . 

But this testimony is deficient through lack of veracity 
in the witness, and defective knowledge of the future, "l" 
the secrets of the heart, etc. NTow, in the oath God is 
called to witm --. He who cannol lie cor be deceived. 

This testimony may be of the pas! or the present; it is 
then an assertory oath, as in courts of law. It may be in- 
tended to confirm the future ; it is then a promissory oath, 
as the oath at taking office. In quoting Holy Scripture 
»ny already given by God is used; but in the oath 
II - implored t>> give testimony, to manifest the truth, as 
by punishing the Wax {imprecatory oath). 

An oaths lawful .' 

Holy Scripture - vs, "Thou 3hali swear by His Name" 
(Dent. vi. 13). A thing may be in itself good, and yet turn 
to evil in his case who uses it ill. And the oath is in itself 
lawful and good, as will appear both from its origin and 
from its end. The oath is introduced because men believe 
that Grod has infallible veracity and universal foresight and 
knowledge of all things. Its end is to justify men, and 
put a stop to controversies. " The oath is linal for confir- 
mation " (Heb. vi. 1G). 

But it may be turned to ill, in being used without need 
and without due caution. For he seems to have little rev- 
erence for God who invokes His attestation in a trifling 

* For a fuller and thorough treatment of the subject, see Bishop 
Sanderson, De Juramento. 



Qu. LXXXIX. 3, 4, 5.] ON OATHS. 349 

cause, and such as he would hardly venture to call a man 
of standing to witness. Besides, there is great danger of 
perjury in such cases. 

The Lord said, " Swear not at all " (S. Matt. v. 34) ; 
but the example of S. Paul shows us how those words are 
to be understood ; viz., that we avoid forming the evil habit 
of swearing lightly and on trivial occasions. S. Paul's 
oaths in his Epistles are for confirmation of truth delib- 
erately committed to writing (S. Aug., De Mendacio, 
c. 5). 

What are the conditions for a lawful oath ? 

An oath is lawful if it be lawfully used^ but this good 
use of it requires, first, that one swear, not lightly, but dis- 
creetly and from a necessary cause. Judgment (i.e., dis- 
cretion) is the first condition of a lawful oath. Next, 
what is confirmed by the oath must not be false nor any 
unlawful thing. Veracity is the second condition of a law- 
ful oath. Lastly, justice is the third condition ; what is 
confirmed must be licit. A rash oath lacks discretion ; a 
false oath, veracity ; an iniquitous or illicit oath lacks jus- 
tice (Jer. iv. 2). 

Is the oath an act of religion or Divine worship ? 

He who swears invokes the Divine testimony to confirm 
what he says ; and his oath contains a profession that Grod 
is all powerful, of indefectible veracity and perfect omnis- 
cience. This is an act of reverence, and therefore it is 
an act of religion or worship. The object of the testi- 
mony is some human affair, but the testimony invoked is 
Divine. 

The earthly aim may be to certify something before men, 
but with this goes the aim of offering reverence and honour 
to God. 

The oath is not sought for its own sake, but as an aid in 
human defect or infirmity, a sort of necessary medicine, 



350 RELIGION" AXD OPPOSED VICES. [Qc lxxxix. 7. 

because man disbelieves the witness of his fellow-man. 
Such things, necessary on account of the imperfections 
of this lifu, arc unduly used if they are needlessly em- 
ployed. 

An oath differs from a vow, because what is confirmed by 
the oath does not on that account become an act of religion, 
whereas the vow makes the action (fasting, continence, 
etc.) such. 

Has an oath obligatory force t 

The question is of the force of promissory oaths. In 
an assertory oath, the obligation does not concern the 
thing which baj been or is, bat the acl itself of taking 
the oath; on,- .-wears thai which is or has been true. But 
in the promissory oath, the obligation concerns the thing 
which has been confirmed by an oath. One is hound to 

make that true which he has sworn ; otherwise his oat li 

lack- the essential condition of veracity. But if the oath 
cannot possibly be kept, it lacks discretion or judgment; 
unless, perhaps, it was possible to keep it when made, but 
it has been rendered impossible by some unforeseen event ; 

as when 01 that he will pay a certain sum of 

money, which has afterwards been .-tolen from him. Then 
ins to be excused from doing what he has sworn. 
although he is bound to do what in him lies to fullil bis 
prom:- . 

But if the fulfilment is possible, indeed, but ought not 
to be done, either because it is evil per se, or is a serious 
impediment to the good, then the oath lacks justice, and 
therefore the oath is not to be kept when it is sin, or a 
serious hindrance to good. (It was sin to take such an 
oath ; it is an added sin to keep it.) 

"Whoever, then, swears that he will do a thing, is obliged 
to do it, that truth may be kept, provided that judgment 
and justice are also present (Num. xxx. 2). 

(1) The promise has veracity, if it express the present 



Ql\ lxxxis. 7.] ON" OATHS. 351 

purpose ; but the oath invokes the Divine attestation to a 
fixed and unchangeable purpose. 

(2) An oath may tend to evil in two ways ; in one way, 
because it had from the beginning an evil result, either be- 
cause the thing sworn is evil in itself, or because it is an 
impediment to some greater good. Such oaths are illicit 
from the beginning, but differently. For if one swear 
that lie will do some sin, he sins in swearing, and 'he sins 
in keeping the oath. But if he swear that he will not 
do some better good, which, however, he is not bound to 
do, he sins in swearing by opposing the Holy Spirit, who 
is the inspirer of every good purpose ; but he does not sin 
in keeping his oath, although he would do better if he did 
not keep it. 

An oath may have a bad result in another way, on account 
of some unforeseen event, as was the case with Herod's oath, 
who swore to give his daughter whatever she asked for. 
This oath might have been lawful at first, the due condi- 
tion being understood, viz., that she should ask for what 
it was right to give ; but the fulfilment of the oath was 
illicit. 

(3) Suppose that one takes alawful oath under compul- 
sion. There is a two-fold obligation to be considered ; one 
to the man who receives the promise — such obligation is an- 
nulled by the force employed ; he does not deserve that the 
promise to him be kept. But there is another obligation to 
God, the fulfilling what has been promised in His name. 
Conscience is not released from that obligation (unless the 
force destroyed all rational power of action). "We ought 
rather to endure temporal loss than break an oath. But 
one may seek release in court, or denounce to authority even 
if secrecy have been sworn respecting the force employed ; 
for such an oath tends to a worse result, being against 
public justice. 

(4) Suppose a difference of understanding of the meaning 
of the oath between the two concerned in it. If this come 



352 RELIGION AXI) OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXIX. 9. 

from the fraud of Mm who takes the oath, he is bound to 
keep it according to the sound understanding of it on the 
part of the one who receives it. Bui if there have been no 
guile, the oath must be understood according to the inten- 
tion of the one who takes it. 

Can any human authority dispense from keeping an 

nail, .' 

We have 9een thai the necessity of dispensation in the 
( :' laws or vows arises Erom the fact thai what i in 
itself or in general virtuous and useful may. through Bome 
particular circumstances, become immoral and injurious, 
and bo cannot be €11 objeel for either law or vow. Bui the 
same principle applies to oaths. If the thing be immoral, 
it is repugnani to thai justice which is an essential condi- 
tion of a licil oath : if it be injurious, it is repugnant to that 
judgmenl or discretion which is also requisite. And since 
a man is not the best judge in hie own case, and has no 
authority to be judge, by parity of reasoning ii follows that 
the power of dispensal led, and is to be found in 

the Church, which has n ived authority to loose as well as 

to bind (S. Matt, xviii. L8). 

(1) Bui veracity is required equally in promissory as in 
ry oaths; ami no power of dispensation can permil an 
oath contrary to truth respecting the pasl or the present; 
therefore no power can permit that anyone make that to he 
false which he lias promised with an oath respecting the 
future. 

I answer that the power of dispensation cannot extend 
to Divine commands, cannot allow anything to be done 
contrary to what has been sworn. But that authority may 
decide that what was included in the oath is no longer 
such, as being unfit matter for an oath. The object of the 
assertory oath, being past or present, is immutable ; and as 
there is no power to dispense from the veracity of the oath 
itself, there is no power of dispensation at all. But the ob- 



Qu. xcni. 1.] SUPEESTITION". 353 

ject of the promissory oath is something in the future which 
is variable, and may become immoral or injurious, and con- 
sequently unfit matter for an oath, Such an object may 
come under the power of dispensation. 

(2) A man may promise with an oath what is for another's 
benefit. That other can release him from his obligation. 
But in another way one may promise another what pertains 
to the honour of G-od, or the benefit of the community (as 
the promise made to the bishop in ordination). The prom- 
ise is chiefly made to God ; he who receives it cannot release 
it (unless he have power of dispensation). 

Since the oath is for confirmation of veracity, and implies 
some doubt, it seems to be decent that the priesthood should 
not ordinarily take such an oath in temporal affairs. (Let 
him claim his privilege in courts of law, etc.) 

§ 7. Superstition. 

(The greater part of the author's discussion of topics 
under this head is adapted to a different state of society 
from ours. What seems to be of special and permanent 
value will be briefly indicated.) 

Superstition is a vice opposed to true religion in its ex- 
cess ; not that it offers to God in worship more than re- 
ligion does, but it gives Divine homage to what it ought 
not, or in a manner it ought not. 

Pernicious worship may possibly he offered to the true 
God. 

Thus a lie is most pernicious in what pertains to religion. 
But it is a lie if any one express outwardly by signs, as in 
religious worship, what is contrary to the truth. This is a 
pernicious worship, and it may occur in two ways : First, 
as respects the thing signified, which may be discordant 
from the signification of Christian worship. Thus it would 
now be pernicious to use those ceremonies of the Old Law by 
which Gospel mysteries were prefigured. (And sitting at 
23 



35-4 RELIGION .VXD OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. xeiv. 

the reception of the Holy Eucharist was, not many ages 
ago, made a symbol of unbelief in the Lord's Real Presence 
therein.) 

In another way, falsity in outward worship may directly 
concern the worshipped especially in public worship which 
is presented by ministers in the name of the whole Church. 
For as it is fraud to claim authority for action where none 
has been given, bo he is guilty of falsity who in the name of 
< hnrch offers worship to God contraryto what has been 
with Divine authority established by the Church, or is cus- 
toinarv in the Church (so far as custom has the force of 
positive law). They that worship God must worship Bim 
nol only in .-pint but "in truth." (A warning against 
lawlessness in the Church.) 

thing be superfluous in Divine worship? 

Certainly not, if we speak merely of quantity; for man 
can do nothing which is not less than he owe.- to God. But, 
something may be superfluous in not being proportioned 
to the end. The end of Divine worship is that man may 
glorify God, ami Bubject himself to God both in body ami in 
spirit And, therefore, whatever a man does which pertains 
to the glory of God and the subjection of his soul, and of 
his body also, according to the ordinances of God and the 
Church and the customs of those with whom he li 
not, superfluous. But if there be anything which does not 
come under any one of these heads, it is to be deemed super- 
fluous and superstitious, as consisting only in outward ob- 
servances which have nothing to do with inward worship. 
'•The kingdom of God is within you," condemns those 
superstitious persons who give their chief attention to out- 
ward ceremonies. 

Idolairij. 

It is a species of superstition which gives Divine honour 
where it is not due. As in idolatry it is offered to some 



Qu. xciv. 2, 3.] SUPERSTITION". 355 

creature of God through sensible signs — say, sacrifices, etc. 
— so, also, the creature worshipped may be represented by 
some sensible form, which is called au idol (Rom. i. 23). 

Idolatry is a mortal sin, 
whether it be giving the outward or the inward worship, 
a sin condemned by the Second Commandment. All supe- 
riors are to be revered, but not all with the same reverence. 
Special marks of reverence are due to Almighty God ; viz., 
Divine adoration (" latria "). " Outward sacrifices are signs 
of the inward sacrifice, as spoken words are signs of things. 
"Wherefore, as in prayer and praise we direct our words to 
Him to whom we offer in our hearts the reality which we 
signify with our lips, so in sacrifice we know that we are 
to offer the visible j)art to none save to Him before whom 
we present in our hearts the invisible sacrifice, the offering 
of ourselves " (S. Aug., Civ. Dei, x. 19). 

In the temple under the Old Law, and in the Church 
to-day, images or pictures are not introduced that Divine 
homage may be paid to them, but for the sake of what they 
signify ; that faith may be made more real and strength- 
ened in the minds of the beholders. 

Idolatry is in its own nature the gravest of sins. 

The gravest rebellion in a commonwealth is setting up 
another in place of the lawful ruler. So, while sins against 
God are the greatest of all sins, the worst of those sins 
seems to be the paying Divine honours to any creature, 
which, so far as it goes, is setting up another in place of 
God. 

But the gravity of sin depends also upon the sinner's 
inward state; for sins of malice are far worse than sins of 
ignorance. And so the heretic who with eyes open corrupts 
the faith which he has once received, may be worse than 
the ignorant idolater. 



350 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. xevn. 

Attempts at divination, through " clairvoyance " or other- 
wise, are not uncommon sins. 

The future may be foreseen through its causes, and if 
those causes have necessary and invariable effects, thus,' 
effects may be foretold with absolute certainty, as in the 
prediction of eclipses. Ami certain events are so generally 
followed by others thai the firsi may be reasonable ground 
Eor prediction, as in the ease of medical diagnosis. But 
there are other causes, like the free-will of man. which arc 
uoi determined bo one accessary result, and their effects can 
licted bj God only, who in His eternity sees in one 
vision what we eall past, present, and future. And if any 
one presume to have this knowledge of future contingencies, 
he manifestly usurps whal belongs bo God alone. This is 

the siu of divination. it maybe from the temptation of 
devils, who try to seduce the minds of men by such idle 
Bearch into the unknown l'ut are. 

The end Bought may be idle curiosity, hut the means 
used belong to evil Buperstition. (See [sa. viii. L9.) 

| 8. Irreligiou ; viz., Tempting God, perjury, sacrilege, and 
simony. 

We are imw to consider vices opposed to religion, which 
spring from contempt or irreverence towards God and holy 
things. 

T> mptii g 

We try another by our words, in order to ascertain 
whether he knows what we ask or is able or willing to do it. 
We try another by our actions to prove his judgment, will, 
or power. We try him openly, professing our purpose, or 
secretly, as the Pharisees tempted Christ (S. Matt. xxii.). 
So man tempts God sometimes in words, sometimes in 
deeds. 

One would be expressly tempting God in His prayers if 
he should ask anything in order to make experiment of 



Qu. XCVIII.] PERJURY. 357 

God's love, power, or Knowledge (as in the "prayer-test" 
proposed by Professor Tyndall). Constructively he does the 
same who asks what is of no other use than such a test. 

In his deeds one expressly tempts God when, by what he 
does, he intends to make trial of his God ; constructively 
he may be doing the same thing by his words. 

When, therefore, on account of some necessary or useful 
end one commits himself in his petitions or in his actions 
to the Divine aid, he does not tempt God. But apart from 
such occasions the commandment is, ' ' Thou shalt not tempt 
the Lord thy God " (S. Matt. iv. 7). 

Tempting God, then, is a sin. 

For no one tries experiments on that of which he is cer- 
tain. Every trial proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, 
either in him who makes the trial, as when he wishes to find 
out the qualities of a thing, or in others, as when he tries an 
experiment to show something to those others. In this lat- 
ter way God is said to tempt us. But ignorance or doubt of 
what pertains to God's perfection is a sin. Tempting God, 
then, in order to know His power, is a sin. But it is not 
tempting God when one desires to show to others the great- 
ness of God, for some just necessity or pious utility. For 
so the apostles (Acts iv. 30) prayed, and asked God that 
"signs and wonders might be done through the name of 
Jesus/' for the conversion of unbelievers. 

Since tempting God is a direct act of irreverence in doubt- 
ing of His excellency, it is directly opposed to religion. 

Perjury. 

This in assertory oaths is falsity ; but if a man swears what 
he believes to be true, though it is in reality false, his act is 
perjury (material perjury), but he is not a perjurer (formal 
perjury). This of assertory oaths ; but an imperfect kind 
of perjury may be found also in promissory oaths, when they 
lack justice. For in swearing an illicit thing, he incurs 



358 RELIGION AN T D OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. XCVHI. 

falsity, because he is under obligation to do the contrary 
of his oath. And if he swear indiscreetly, he incurs the 
danger of being false to bis oath. 

Every act of perjury is a sin against religion, for it is a 
sign of irrevereuce towards God that he is invoked to attest 
a lie. This implies either that God does not know the 
truth, or thai he is willing to attest a falsehood. 

(1) lie who swears that he will do an unlawful action 
commit- imperfeel perjury in the act of swearing, on account 
of the lack of justice : but there is no perjury in not doing 
what he bas sworn to do, because the thing was not the 
proper objeel of an oath. (There need be no perplexity in 
such a ease. The sin was in swearing ; it would bean added 
sin to fullil the oath.) 

i.'i In like manner, he who swears that he will not do 
some good action which he ought to do, sins in the lack of 
judgment But he is not perjured if he do that action, for 
what he swore to could not be lit object of an oath. 

(3) So, again, if one swear that be will do another's will, 
obey another's commands, the due conditions are implied; 
ac. s that the command be lawful, virtuous, and not intoler- 
ably difficult to execute. Otherwise there is no perjury in 
violating the oath. 

(4) But may not some change occurring after the oath is 
taken release from its obligation ? Xew members join the 
society which has taken an oath; are they bound by it? 
New statutes are made in an institution. Does the former 
oath which has been taken respecting old statutes bind one 
to observe the new ? To the first case I answer that the 
oath is a personal action, and does not bind him who has 
not taken it. But if any one enter a society and share 
its advantages, he is bound to submit to its burdens, or 
else to leave it at once. To the last question I reply that 
the oath does not bind one to keep new laws for all future 
time, but the member of the institution is bound by the co- 
active force of its laws so long as he remains in it. 



Qu. c. 1.] SIMONY. 359 

Perjury is mortal sin, 
both because it directly violates the express command of 
God (Lev. xix. 12), and because it implies contempt of Him. 

Even he who swears jestingly is guilty of irreverence 
towards God. But he who swears falsely through " lapsus 
Ungues" if he be fully conscious of his act, is not excused 
from contempt of God ; but if the action were inadvertent, 
there was no intention of taking an oath, and no perjury. 

Sacrilege. 

"What is set apart for Divine service is sacred ; reverence 
for it is referable to God, whose it is in special manner. 
Irreverent treatment of it is doing injury to God ; it is 
sacrilege. 

It has its own special deformity, in violating sacred things ; 
it is therefore a special sin, opposed to religion, which rev- 
erences what belongs to God. 

Sacrilege differs as what is sacred differs. There are con- 
secrated persons, consecrated places, and consecrated things. 
The greater the sanctity violated, the greater is the sacrilege. 
Violation of sacred persons is graver than violation of sacred 
places, for the place was made sacred for man, not man for 
the place. 

Similarly, in the third kind of sacrilege, that against 
things, most sacred are the sacraments by which man is sanc- 
tified ; gravest, therefore, is sacrilege respecting the Holy 
Eucharist, the sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood. 
Next comes sacrilege respecting the holy vessels of the sacra- 
ments ; then what pertains to the ornaments of the Church 
and the vestments of its ministers ; then sacrilege respect- 
ing what is offered to God for the support of the ministers 
of the altar. Whoever sins against any of these falls into 
the crime of sacrilege. 

Simony is a sin. 

Spiritual things cannot be bought and sold. First, they 



3G0 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. LQu. C. 2. 

cannot be compensated by any earthly price. And S. Peter 
condemned the depravity of Simon in its very root when 
he said. " Thy money perish with thee ; because thou hast 
thought that the gift of God cau be purchased with money" 
(Acta viii. 20). Secondly, no one can sell what is not his 
own. The clergy are not owners of spiritual things, I > u t . 
only dispensers of them, "stewards of the mysteries of 
(i >d " (i Cor. iv. 1). Thirdly. Belling is repugnant to the 
origin of spiritual things, which come from the free grace 
of God. "Freely ye have received, freely give" (S. Matt, 
x. 8). Therefore simony, or buying and selling sonic spir- 
itual thing, is the Bin of irreverence towards God and Divine 
things. 

When simony ie defined as the deliberate buying or sell- 
ing some spiritual thing, or what i- annexed to such a 
thing, understand by bnying or selling any contract which 
is not gratuitous. 

Is 'i always unlawful to givt and to receive money for 
the sacramt 

The sacraments of the Gospel are preeminently spiritual 
-. inasmuch as they are the means of spiritual grace 
value cannot be estimated in money ; and it is against 
their nature that they should not be given gratuitously. 
But they ;;: I by the ministers of the Church, who 

must be supported by the people ; so the apostle says (1 Cor. 
ix. 13), '•Know ye not that they who minister abont sacred 
things eat of the things of the temple, and they' which wait 
the altar have their portion with the altar ?" There- 
fore to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacra- 
is the crime of simony, which no custom can excuse, 
because custom cannot violate natural or Divine law, and 
simony is forbidden by both of them. And by money is 
to be understood anything whose value can be estimated in 
money. 

But to receive money for the support of those who min- 



Qu. c. 3.] SIMONY. 3G1 

ister Christ's sacraments is not simony nor any sin. For it 
is not taken as pay, but as a necessary stipend. 

It is better to go without the sacraments than to sin by 
purchasing them. 

The same remark applies to Holy Matrimony. The bless- 
ing of the Church cannot be purchased. If the priest 
merely solemnized the civil contract, he might be paid for 
doing so. 

Is it lawful to give and to receive money for other spir- 
itual ministrations ? 

As the sacraments are called spiritual because they con- 
fer spiritual grace, so certain other things are called so be- 
cause they either proceed from spiritual grace or dispose 
man for it. 

Yet these require the ministry of men, who must be sup- 
ported by those who receive these benefits (1 Cor. ix. 7). 
To sell or buy acts of this nature is simoniacal. But to 
give and receive something for the support of those who 
minister in these spiritual things, according to the ordi- 
nance of the Church and approved custom, is lawful, if the 
simoniacal intention be not there, and if the demand be 
not made on those unwilling to contribute, by withholding 
those spiritual ministrations. For this would be a kind of 
selling. But when spiritual ministrations have been already 
freely bestowed, it is lawful to demand, from those who are 
able but unwilling to give, the appointed and customary 
offering for clerical support (say, the pew rent). 

The case of the physician or lawyer is not the same. He 
who has any science does not get with it the obligation to 
use it for every one alike, as do the ministers of spiritual 
things. The former may receive pay, not as selling their 
science, but in exchange for their labours. But if they 
were bound by the obligation of their office to give their 
services, as in the case of a hospital physician, etc., they 
would grievously sin in selling their services. 



3G2 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. c. 4. 

Some things are so annexed to spiritualities as to depend 
upon them, as the benefice of a rector, which can only he held 
bij a <■!, rgyman. 

The sale of such things would be understood as the sale 
of spiritual things, and is unlawful. 

But other things are annexed to the spiritnal as being 
ordained for them, as the righl of presentation to a living, 
or the Bacred vesselB (not yel consecrated and used) which 
are prepared for sacramental use. Such things precede the 
spiritual in order of time, and may be sold, but not as 
annexed to I he spiritual. 

In case of need for the Ohurch or the poor, even the con- 
Becrated vesselfi may be broken and Bold for their value as 
precious metals. 

There is another form of simony, when spiritual things — 
Bay, office in the Church -are given as a reward for personal 
Bervice, or, in response to a request, in order to obtain some 
temporal advantage. Whai can be estimated in pecuniary 
value is equivalent to money, when Bimony is in question. 

Nepotism is a sin in these matters, hut it is not simony, 
unless some temporal advantage is in some way expected. 



CHAPTER V. 

DUTIES TOWAEDS OTHERS, DEPENDING ON JUSTICE, AND 
THEIE OPPOSITE VICES. 

§ 1. Piety, reverence, and honour. 

What is piety towards men f 

Man becomes a debtor towards others in various degrees 
and manners, according to their diverse excellence and the 
diverse benefits which he receives from them. In both God 
holds the highest place, as infinitely excellent and as the 
first principle of our being and of our direction in life. 

But, in the second place, as the source of our being and 
the orderers of our life, stand our parents and our country. 
Next to God, then, Ave owe service to our parents and our 
country. 

But in this service due to parents is included that of our 
near relatives who are descended from the same parental 
stock. And in the service of our country is implied that 
of our fellow-citizens and of all friends of our country. 
(Patriotism is a part of piety towards man.) 

The word "piety" is often applied to the service which 
we owe to God, who is the Father of us all. But the 
greater includes the less, and now we use the term in the 
more restricted sense. 

Works of mercy, also, are sometimes called pious works 
for a similar reason, being part of our service towards God. 

It is filial piety to provide for the support of parents. 

For the Lord, in rebuking the Pharisees (S. Matt. xv. 5), 
taught us that this is part of the honour due to those who 
are the source of our being. 



304 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CI. 8, 4. 

Some fchinga are due to parents and fellow-citizens as 
Buch : Borne thin-- are due in special circumstances. To a 
father, as father, are due reverence and dutiful conduct. 
Bui he may be sick ; then provision must be made for his 
infirmity. He may be poor; then his children our him 
support, and all Bnoh things arc included in dutiful oon- 
duot. This is part of the law of nature, as well as of t In- 
civil coda 

1 Common Law is to the Bame effect. "The child is 
equally compellable, if of Bufficienl ability, to maintain and 
provide for a wicked and unnatural progenitor, as for one 
who has shown the greatest tenderness and parental piety" 
(Blackst., i. p. '• 

Why, then, does S. Paul Bay (2 ('or. lii. 11). "The chil- 

dren ought n"t to laj up for the parents, bul the parents 

for the childre:; L86 the father i-- bound to this 

. since children are his natural successors. But the 

child is not bound to lay up for a parent whom in the 

of nature he will survive. Tic case before as, how- 
ex. r, is tb it, not fut tire, need. 

Piety lias its special object ; sc, parents and country, 

and t these, under the Bpecial idea of 

paying duty and those who are the Bources and 

Ives. 

Therefore piety is a special virtue, a special manifestation 
of charity. 

May the duties of filial piety be neglected on account of 

religious <!■■ 

The Pharisees were sternly rebuked by Christ (S. Matt. 

xv.) for putting religion in the place of natural piety. 
Both are virtues, and cannot contradict one another, nor 
can the act of one exclude the act of the other. 

The act of every virtue is limited by due circumstances, 
and if these are neglected, the act will he vicious, not virtu- 



Qu. CI. 4. J PIETY, REVERENCE, AXD HONOUR. 365 

cms. Now piety exhibits duty and service to parents accord- 
ing to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that 
parents should be set above God. If, then, the service of 
parents withdraw us from the service of God, it will not be 
filial piety if we persist in that service against G-od (who is 
the source of the filial obligation). In such a case, God 
must come first. But if dutiful conduct towards parents 
does not totally withdraw us from Gfod's service, this con- 
duct is required by piety, and we may not neglect it on 
account of religion. 

There are, indeed, words of the Gospel, liable to be mis- 
understood, which seem to justify neglect of parents on 
account of religion. Thus, the Lord said (S. Luke xiv. 26), 
"If any one come unto Me, and hate not his father and 
mother, ... he cannot be My disciple." And, again, 
it seems to be said in praise of SS. James and John, that 
" they straightway left the boat and their father and followed 
Him." So it was said of Levi of old (Deut. xxxiii. 9), that 
he "said of his father and mother, I have not seen him." 
And to the man who said (S. Matt. viii. 22), " Suffer me 
first to go and bury my father," the Lord replied, " Let the 
dead bury their dead, but go thou and preach the kingdom 
of God." This pertains to religion; but burying a father 
is a work of filial piety. Therefore, piety gave way to relig- 
ion. 

But as for the first quotation, parents who are adversa- 
ries towards God are to be fled from as if they were hated. 
If they try to induce us to sin, or to withdraw us from God's 
service, we do right to desert them. So the Levites ignored 
their kinsmen when the question arose of punishing idola- 
ters according to God's command. SS. James and John 
left their father and followed the Lord, not because he 
tempted them to sin, but because they judged that he did 
not need them at that time for his support. 

There were others who could bury a father, but the Lord, 
who knows all hearts, called the son from many evils which 



DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [QlT. OH. 1, 2. 

would probably follow his father's death (S. Ohrys., Horn. 
wviii. in Matt. I. 

We call God ••our Father the very things which 

filial piety shows to tan lily parents are referred to God, 
as other w>ni< of mercy which are done to our neighbours 
are offered to Bim; and the King will say, "Inasmuch as 
ye did il unto the leasl of these My brethren, ye did it unto 
Me" (S. Matt. rxv. I 

I repeat, if our service is ssary to earthly 

parents that they cannot be duly supported witboul it, 
and they do not induce us to anything against God, we 
ought nol them for the sake of religion. But 

in u -i rin in order to fulfil those duties to them, 
or even if without our assistance they can be did;. 

.. it is lawful to leave those filial duties at the call <f 
n. 

■■'/. . a form of piety, 
by which due worship and honour are rendered to those who 
■' dignity. 
As an earthly father participates towards ue in theuni- 
i another « ho shar< b in a father's 
ur education and training, isa quasi father, ami 
claims upon us. But a person in authority 
participates in the Divine rule after his earthly manner, as 
civil rukrs. commanders in the army and navy, teachers in 
their school, etc It is piety which gives worship and hon- 
our i "your worship," • rence ") to such dignil 
Their official excellent itles them to honour ; 
their authority entitles them to that worship which consists 
in dutiful service, their lawful orders being obeyed, and 
their benefits repaid in some manner. 

There is a legal observance which is due to those who 
have authority over ourselves ; but there is also a moral 
observance, which is due to official superiority, even if we 
are not subject to it. 



Qu. CHI. 1, 2.] PIETY, REVERENCE, AND HONOUR. 307 

Honour implies outward testimony to another's excel- 
lence. 

Before G-od the testimony of the heart suffices, hut 
towards men such testimony can he given only by outward 
signs, as words, or gestures, or offering of gifts, or erecting 
statues. Honour, then, consists in corporeal signs. It is 
not the same as reverence, which may be either the cause of 
the honour shown, or the end of the honour, when one is 
honoured in order that others may reverence him. Praise 
which consists in words is included in honour, although 
honour is also of wider extent, being not only rendered for 
what is intended for some end, but also for those best 
things which are the very end itself. Glory is the result of 
praise and honour. 

Honour is due to any one only on the ground of some excel- 
lence or superiority . 

It is not necessary that he who is honoured be in all ways, 
or even in any way, superior to the one who honours him, 
because he may be superior to certain others, or have some 
special excellence in some special particular. Vicious supe- 
riors may be honoured, not as superior in virtue, but because 
of their dignity as ministers of God ; in them, also, the 
whole community over which they preside is honoured. 
The apostle said (Rom. xii. 10), "In honour preferring one 
another ;" and, again (1 S. Pet. ii. 17), "Honour all men," 
for in every one may be something for which he is accounted 
superior to another ; "in lowliness of mind each counting 
other better than himself" (Phil. ii. 3). Service, homage 
("dulia"), is due to those who have dominion over others 
as a kind of participation in the Divine dominion which 
demands Divine service. Taken in its wider sense, this 
service or homage, or dulia, is of various kinds, as of ser- 
vants towards their master, of soldiers to their officers, of 
scholars to their teachers, etc. 



368 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CIV. 1, 2. 

§ 2. Obedience and disobedience. 
Is a man err/- bound to obey another man f 
God commands, "Obey them that have the rule over 
you, and submit yourselves " (Heb. xiii. 17). In the natural 
order Divinely instituted there arc lower and higher ranks, 
some whose place it is to command through reason and 
will, others whose place it is to obey. Xo necessity com- 
pels as irrational creatures are driven ; the obedience is 
Freely rendered by deliberate choice of it. 

(1) The Divine will is the primal rule of action regulating 
all human wills, bul to that Divine will one human will and 
judgment approaches nearer than another in the Divinely 
instituted order. Be who has right to command becomes a 
secondary rule for him who obeys. 

(2) It might be objected that the more services are gratu- 
itous, the more acceptable they are. [f, then, man is bound 
by obligation to obey others in doing certain good things, 
his obedience detracts from the merit of his good deed and 
renders it less acceptable. 

But •■gratuitous" bas two meanings. On the part of the 
il means that which one is not obliged to do ; on the 
part of the worker it means that he acts with free choice. 
Hut the deed becomes virtuous, laudable, and meritorious 
chiefly as it proceeds from free-will. And, therefore, al- 
though obedience is an obligation, yet if it is rendered by a 
prompt and ready will, its merit is not diminished on this 
account, especially before God, who views the heart as well 
as the outward work-. 

Obedience is in itself a special virtue, having as its special 
object the command of a lawful superior, tacit or express, 
according to that Divine order which is appointed in this 
world. 

So it is specially commanded (Titus iii. 1), "Put them 
in mind to be in subjection to rulers, to authorities, to be 



Qu. CIV. 3.J OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE. 3G9 

obedient." The will of a superior, however known, is a 
tacit precept, and when, by obeying, an express precept is 
anticipated, tbe obedience seems to be more prompt and 
free. 

(1) There may be other reasons for doing the thing com- 
manded ; it may be an act of some other virtue, although 
not all the acts of virtue are objects of command (some are 
counsels of perfection). But some things also are objects 
of command which would not be evil if they were not pro- 
hibited (as police regulations, or the observance of certain 
days of abstinence). Thus, disobedience is evidently a spe- 
cial sin in contempt of lawful command. 

(2) This moral virtue, which is a part of justice, like 
every other virtue requires a ready will for its proper ob- 
ject, but not for that which is repugnant to the will. Now 
the proper object of obedience is the command proceeding 
from another's will. But if that which is commanded be 
willed for its own sake, as happens in what is agreeable to 
one's wishes, it may not seem to be done for the sake of the 
command, but from one's own independent choice. 

But when that which is commanded, considered in it- 
self, is repugnant to our own will because it is disagreeable, 
then the command is manifestly the ground of the action. 
Therefore S. Gregory said (Moral., lib. ult. c. 10), " Obedi- 
ence in pleasant things, which has something of its own in 
it, is either no obedience, or at least is less." 

But this applies to outward manifestations. For, accord- 
ing to the judgment of God, who searches the heart, obedi- 
ence which has ' f something of its own" may be none the 
less laudable, if the promptly obedient will none the less 
sincerely aim at fulfilling the precept. 

Is obedience chief among virtues 9 

As sin consists in man's despising God and adhering to 
changeable goods, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in 
making God our end. Greater, then, are the theological 

24 



DUTIES rOWARDS OTHERS. [QtJ. OTV. B. 

virtues by which the bouI cleaves t i <io,i than the moral 
virtues by which Bome earthly thing is rejected in order thai 
the soul may cleave to God, because the end is greater than 
the means to that end. 

I'.i ■ among moral virtues any one of them is greater as it 

reater thing for this end. Bui there are three 

kinds "f earthly goods which maybe given up for God's 

Bake : earthly g Is (as in liberality) and bodily goods (as 

in temp ranee) : but bighesl are the goods <>f the soul, and 
r will, through which all ol her 
goods arc used. Therefore, in itself obedience is more laud- 
able, in its giving up nvill, than any other moral 
virtue. II 3. < (loc. cit. ). " Obedience is 
than the Bacrifioe of outward things, because this 
may offer the flesh of another, bul obedience sacrifices our 
own will." Hem any kind are accepted 

i as meritorious in His re done 

through this mol to Hie ill. For if I 

my body to be burned in martyrdom, or bestow all my 

to feed the poor, unless I ordain this for the fulfill- 
ing <>f the Divine will, I am nothing. Charity cannol 
without obedience, and without charity all my work- are 
empty of title to reward. •• He thai saith, I know God, 
and keepeth nol His commandments, is a liar and the truth 

in him. B keepeth His word, in him yerily 

hath the love of God Eected " 1 1 Ep. S. John ii. 1). 

Why tli'l Samuel Bay 1 1 Sam. rv. 22 . " To ob 
than sacrifice," which is a 

moral virtues? I answer that obedience in a.11 its species 
springs a superior which oiler.- him 

worship and honour. As it proceeds from reverence for 

- who hold high office, it is contained in observance. 
As it comes from reverence for parents, it belongs to piety. 
But as it proceeds from reverence towards God, it is a part 
of religion, and pertain- to devotion, which is the chief act 
of religion. In this aspect of it. to obey is more laudable 



Qu. CIV. 5, 6.] OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE. 371 

than to offer sacrifice ; to offer our own will than to immo- 
late the flesh of a victim. 

Are those subject to authority bound to obey their supe- 
riors in all things 9 

Holy Scripture says (Acts v. 29), " We ought to obey 
God rather than men." And sometimes the commands of 
those who have authority are against the will of God. 
Therefore obedience is not due in all things. For two rea- 
sons the inferior may not be bound always to obey his su- 
perior. First, a higher power may give an opposite com- 
mand ; and secondly, the superior may pretend to command 
where he has no authority to do so. The better part of a 
man comes under no earthly dominion ; in the inward 
actions of the will man is bound to obey no one but God. 
Man may be subject to man in what he has to do through 
bodily action, but in what pertains to his body itself God is 
the only Lord. For all are created equal in what pertains 
to the support of life, the creation of a family. Hence ser- 
vants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children 
their parents, in contracting matrimony, or choosing celi- 
bacy. 

But in what pertains to the ordering of life's actions the 
subject is bound by his superior's commands within the 
limits of his authority, as the soldier to his officer in mili- 
tary affairs, the servant to his master in servile works, the 
son to his father in life's discipline and domestic affairs. 

This, doubtless, is the meaning of what the apostle said 
(Col. iii. 20), " Children, obey your parents in all things ;" 
i.e., all things within the scope of parental right. 

In reasonable doubt we must stand by authority, for 
" melior est conditio possidentis''' 

Christians are bound to obey the secular power. 
" Be subject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's 
sake ; whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto gov- 



372 DITTIES TOWABDS OTHERS. [Qu. CV. 

em ore, as Bent by him" (l S. I'm. ii. 13). For the faith 
of chri-t is the wry foundation of justice; and by thai 
faith the order of justice is not taken away, but rather 
established. Hut the order of justice requires that the 

r obey the Buperior, otherwise human Bociety could 
not continue. 
(1) lint are nol "the children fre< "? Y ; through 

the gra< f Christ, free from the spiritual bondage of sin. 

But thai '-' not liberate from corporeal defects, or 

from earthly rul< 

B ii 8. I' I • - ■• dead to the law *' (Rom. \ii. I), 
and human law account than the Divine law of 

Old Tef 5 - : but that < Md Law was a fig- 

ure of the V .', T< stament, and so came to an end when 
the truth appeared. The oof similar in human 

law. 

But] ' bound to obev robbers : and many a 

Btate is founded in usurpation >r robbery, and many a ruler 

•ijust as tfa V • : but obedience is due 

so far as justice requires, and no farther. No one is bound 

- irped power i until, al era) acci ptance 

- of legitimacy), or unjust commands, 

except accidentally, to avoid scandal or danger to self <<r 

That i.s. is it contrary to charity, which is the soul's life ? 
Charity is love of God and our neighbour. But charity 
towards God demands that we keep Eis commandments. 
Therefore disobedience to Divine precepts is mortal sin. 
But among Divine pr the command to obey those 

in authority. Therefore disobedience of this kind is also 
mortal sin. "He that resasteth the power, withstands h 
the ordinance of God" (Rom. xiii. 2). And Rom. i. 30 
- disobedience to parents in the same category. But 
when anything is done contrary to the precept, yet not 



Qu. CVI. 1, 2.] GRATITUDE. 373 

through contempt of it, the disobedient act pertains to 
some other sin (" formally"), and may be a venial one. 

(1) Disobedience is the child of vainglory, which may 
be a sin not mortal. Yet since venial sin is a disposition 
to mortal transgression, vainglory may produce what is 
infinitely worse than itself. 

(2) ISTo one is obliged to impossibilities ; and if the su- 
perior lay so many burdens on those under him that they 
cannot be endured, the "material" act of disobedience is 



§ 3. Gratitude, ingratitude, and vengeance. 

Gratitude is a special virtue ivhich returns thanks and 
recompense to benefactors. 

The greater, indeed, contains the less ; so that gratitude 
to God is part of religion, and gratitude to parents is part 
of piety, and gratitude to superiors from whom come public 
benefits is part of observance ; but there are also other bene- 
factors from whom some particular and private benefits are 
received, and gratitude is due to them also. 

Proportional return for favours received, if viewed as a 
debt, pertains to commutative justice. But gratitude is the 
return which is made as due to moral indebtedness alone, 
which debt one pays of his own accord. 

The penitent owes most gratitude to God. 

" To whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little " (S. 
Luke vii. 47). But where there is greater favour shown, 
there greater thanks are due. The grace may be greater in 
amount. So viewed, the innocent owes greater thanks, 
other things being equal, because he has received from 
G-od in larger measure and in longer continuance. But the 
grace is greater also when it is given from more abounding 
love. From this point of view it is the penitent who owes 
most thankful love, because he has received from more 
abounding love. For when he was worthy of death he 



374 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CVI. 3. 

received the gift of grace. So his gift is comparatively 
greater, just as a small gift to the pour is relatively greater 
than ;i large gift to the rich. 

Natural order requires that gratitude be rendered In every 
l< nefactor. 

But whal it' Favours be conferred with delay and insult, 
or marks of dissatisfaction ? li is the sign of a good mind 
to attend more to the good than to the evil. If any one has 
conferred a benefit in an unsuitable manner, thanks are still 

due, though gratitude requires less because the favour is 

less. 

Suppose that one confers a favour on another for his own 

advantag I. Seueca meet the difficulty (De Benefic. \i. 
1 1 may confer a benefit for his own sake, or for 

mir-. or for both hi- and ours. And there is a wide differ- 
ence between tie-- Ee who merely looks after himself, 
and benefits as because otherwise he cannot benefit himself, 

to me like one who provides fodder for his sheep. 
ulv admitted me to fellowship with himself, 
if he have thought of us both, I am not only unjust but an- 
il if 1 am not glad that what has benefited me has 
also benefited him. It is the height of malignity to deny a 
benefit unless it has put the giver to inconvenience. '* 

Are we bound to thank a servant for favours reo ived 
from him ? Let Seneca answer again (lib. iii. c. 2) : "As 
long as a Bervant does his ordinary duty, it is his service ; 
when he does more, he puts himself in a friend's place, and 
confers a benefit/' Be has a moral claim for grateful acts. 
in, it may be said that no one is bound to do what he 
cannot do honourably and usefully ; hut a benefactor may 
be in such prosperous circumstances that recompense is use- 
- : or he may become so vicious that recompense would 
be unbecoming ; or he who is benefited is poor, and unable 
to make return. 

But the poor is not ungrateful if he do what he can. 



Qn. cvi. 4, 5.] GRATITUDE. 375 

And since the benefaction consists more in the affection of 
the heart than in its outward result, the recompense also is 
principally the gratitude of the soul. Eeverence and hon- 
our can be given, no matter how prosperous a benefactor 
may be. 

But even if a benefactor have fallen into vicious habits, 
still recompense must be made according to his condition ; 
e.g., by using efforts to recall him if possible to a better 
life. But if his wickedness be incurable, he is differently 
affected from what he was before, and recompense is there- 
fore no longer due, except in grateful recollection of what is 
past. 

Lastly, suppose that requital of favours received is useless 
or injurious to the recipient. Recompense chiefly depends 
on the affection of the heart, and is outwardly to be made 
in that way which seems to be most useful. And if after- 
wards through his negligence it turn to his own loss, that is 
not to be imputed to our gratitude in making the return. 

The inward gratitude is to be offered at once ; the out- 
ward return, at the most opportune season. Undue haste 
in returning gift for gift does not seem to be virtuous rec- 
ompense, but unwillingness to be indebted for a favour. 

Acts of gratitude are clue according to a benefactor 's good 
will, not merely according to the favour conferred. 

As the requital of a benefit pertains to justice and is a 
kind of legal debt, recompense considers the quantity of the 
thing bestowed. But gratitude regards the benefit as freely 
given. Therefore it considers more the intention than the 
actual effect. 

It is true that God only sees the benefactor's heart ; but 
signs of good will are visible, as the prompt and cheerful 
action of a friend who assists us. 

The requital, therefore, is after the same pattern, not 
measuring quid pro quo, but rather exceeding the favour 
received. 



3TG DUTIES TOWARDS OTIIEKS. [QlT. CVII. 1, 3. 

Ingratitude. — Ingratitude is always a sin, counted with 
other sins of the last days (2 Tim. Hi. 2). 

Fur gratitude is a moral obligation which virtue requires 
and ] 

(1) Gratitude is for benefits; bul lie who helps another 
in sin does not confers benefit, but rather does an injury. 
To him no thanks air due, unless perhaps for his good will 
if he have been himself deceived and have thought that 
lie was aiding in tin- good. And then the reeompense is 
not the aiding him in sin; for this would not be paying 
him in good return hut in evil, which i- contrary to grati- 
tude. 

(2) Inability excuses no our from gratitude, because that 
debl is paid by a grateful will. But forgetfnlness pertains to 
ingratitude ; not. indeed, that which proceeds from natural 
defect of memory, which is not subject to the will, hut that 
which is dm- to Degligence. 

(3) 5Tou maj 3ay, he does not appear to sin who is unwill- 
ing t" be under obligation to another: ami S. Paul says 

"Owe no man anything, save to love one 
another.*' But the debi of gratitude i derived from the 
debt of love, from which no one Bhould wish to he released. 
If any one our this debt unwillingly, that Beems to be due 
to defect of Love toward- his benefactor. 

Ingratitude i^ a special .-in. because it is opposed to the 
special virtue of gratitude, in various grades of sin. First 
is not returning benefits : worse is dissembling, not praising 
for the kind ived : worst is want of grateful recog- 

nition, through negligence or any other such cause. These 
seem to be negative ; but there is also the positive ingrati- 
tude, first, of returning evil for good ; next, of scoffing at 
the benefit ; and third, of calling it an injury. 

It is sometimes, indeed, venial sin, being imperfect in its 
kind ; but it is also sometimes mortal 

The debt of gratitude is one which is freely paid when one 



Qu. CVHI. 1.] YENTtEAXCE. 377 

is not bound to do so. This may happen to be neglected 
through mere carelessness. 

But, on the other hand, there may be inward contempt 
(which is lack of charity) ; or a benefactor may stand in 
need of help ; ingratitude under such and similar circum- 
stances is mortal sin. This negative ingratitude and the 
positive under like conditions are perfected sin, and there- 
fore mortal. 

Venial ingratitude is not contrary to the habit of charity ; 
it is neglect of one of its acts. 

Vengeance {vindicatio) : is it laiuful ? 

It is not per se evil and illicit. For no such thing can be 
attributed to God, as in S. Luke xviii. 7, "Shall not God 
avenge His elect which cry to Him day and night ? . . . 
I say unto you that He will avenge them speedily." Ven- 
geance inflicts some penal evil on the offender. Therefore 
we must consider the animus of him that takes vengeance. 
For if his intention be directed chiefly to the evil which he 
causes, and rests there, his action is altogether unlawful (it is 
revenge) ; for delighting in another's evil pertains to hate, 
is opposed to charity which requires us to love all men. 

Nor is any one excusable in aiming at the evil of him who 
has unjustly caused evil. One is not permitted to hate the 
man who hates him, for we ought not to sin against another 
because he has first sinned against us. This is to be "over- 
come of evil," which S. Paul prohibits (Rom. xii. 21). But 
if the aim of him who takes vengeance be primarily some 
good which is to be reached by the punishment of the sin- 
ner, as his amendment, or at least the checking of him and 
the quiet of others, the preservation of justice and the hon- 
our of God, vengeance, under due conditions and circum- 
stances, may be lawful. 

(1) But is not this usurping what belongs to God ? He 
says (Rom. xii. 19), "Vengeance belongeth unto Me; I 
will recompense." I answer that he who, according to his 



378 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CVIII. 1. 

office, inflicts vengeance, does not usurp what is God's, but 
uses the power Divinely conferred upon him. " He is a min- 
ister of God ; an avenger for wrath to him that doetli evil" 
(Rom. xiii. 4). But if he does any such thing apart from 
tlu' order Divinely instituted, he does usurp what belongs 
to God. and therefore be sins. 

c.' i Tin' <-vil are tolerated by the good, who patiently en- 
dure injuries done to themselves, so far as they ought to do 
Hut they do in -t tolerate injuries done to their neigh- 
boars and to God. 

(3) The law of the Gospel is. indeed, a law of love, and 

therefore vengeance is nol a terror to those who do right 

with love in their souls, and these alone are properly under 

ispel law. But those who are not moved to the good 

by mean- of chanty may be nominally in the Church, hut 
they are not of it, and cannot claim the Gospel law of love. 

(4) Hut oughl we not to Learn from the example of Christ 
do( to revenge our injuries, but magnanimously to endure 
them? Y< - : so far a- the injury pertains to one's own 
person, if it be beei SO to d... Bui the injury done some- 
times extends t" Bociety and t>> God. Ami then it may, 
under due conditions, he avenged, and ought to he avenged. 
Klijah and Eli.-ha followed the law of righteousness in what 
they did, though the injuries done were primarily directed 
against them-.! ■ 

(5) What shall we say of the .-in of a multitude, as in 
lynch law executed by a mob ? Their -in is more injurious 
than that of one only. Yet vengeance is not to he taken 
for it. A whole diocese cannot he excommunicated for the 
.-in of the great majority of its members. " Let both grow 
together until the harvest," lest the wheat be rooted up 
(S. Matt. xiii. 30). 

I answer that when the whole people sins, vengeance may 
visit that people, as it does in many a just war ; see also the 
story of the golden calf, in Ex. xxxii. But if the correction 
of the multitude who follow a few leaders is to be hoped for, 



Qu. cviii. 3, 4.] VENGEANCE. 379 

vengeance may select the chief offenders, as in Num. xxv. 
4. But if offenders and. innocent are so mingled that there 
is no distinguishing of the one from the other, severity may 
be unwise. So with respect to rulers. Their sin is to be 
tolerated, if it cannot be punished without great scandal 
among the people, unless the temporal or spiritual injury 
is of more account than the scandal which is to be feared. 
(A very serviceable rule concerning evil and scandal in the 
Church.) 

Observe that the natural inclination to remove what is 
injurious is in all animals, including man. And in us it is 
a certain aptitude for a special virtue, which special virtue 
proper vengeance is. 

Are penal statutes on the whole just and expedient f 
Vengeance restraining the evil is lawful and virtuous. 
Now there are those who have little or no love for virtue, 
who are so restrained through fear of losing what they 
value more than what they gain by doing wrong. Fear 
does restrain sin. Therefore proper vengeance consists in 
taking away what men most value. This is life, liberty, 
and outward goods. The proper penalties, therefore, are 
capital punishment, flogging, imprisonment, exile, loss, 
ignominy. 

(1) The Lord forbade the tares to be rooted up, when 
that would endanger the wheat. But sometimes the bad 
can be sent out of this world, not only without danger to 
better men, but even for the great advantage of the latter. 

(2) All mortal sins are worthy of eternal death, according 
to the Divine judgment. But the penalties of this present 
life are rather medicinal ; and therefore only those offences 
deserve capital punishment which are the most harmful to 
other men. 

Is vengeance to light on those who sin involuntarily ? 
Penalty is due only to sin. But all sin is voluntary ; 



380 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. OIX, 

therefore involuntary transgression is aol to be followed by 
vengeance. 

But this applies to vengeance as such. By penalty is re- 
paired the violation of justice, due equality is restored ; he 
who has Binned by unduly following his own will, suffers 
something contrary to his will. But penalty may he con- 
sidered also ae medicinal ; it may aid the healing of past 
wound-, preserve from future one-, promote some good. 
So viewed, punishment sometimes cornea on one without 
lit, bul m»t without cause 

This medicinal punishment, as such, never takes away a 
greater good for the sake of lesser good ; bul the less maj be 
losi for the sake of helping the greater. Thus one may lose 

earthly goods without his fault for the sake of spiritual 

humiliation or probation. This is Divine visitation. But 
do one is punished with the loss of spiritual goods except 
through hie own fault. 

§ 4. Veracity and vices opposed to it. 
Veracity is a special virtue by which our outward words 
and actions are duly made signs of the thoughts of our 

It is a part of justice ; Dot that there is herein any question 
of legal obligation, but there is a moral debt which we owe 

to others. (They have a right not to he deceived by us.) 

man ie made for society, is " ial animal," 

law of nature that each owes to other that without 
which society cannot he preserved. But mi n cannot live 
bly and securely with one another, unless they trust 
one another's words and actions as signs of their thoughts. 
Therefore veracity is a moral debt which we owe to one an- 
other. 

In affirmation one may, without deceit, fall short of the 
whole truth, as when one does not manifest the whole good 
that is in himself, his knowledge, holiness, or something 
else of that nature. This does not prejudice the truth, for 



Qu. ex.] VERACITY AXD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 381 

the less is contained in the greater (2 Cor. xii. 6). But 
negation is different ; for to deny that one possesses what is 
really in him, is falsity. 

Lying. 

A moral act takes its character as such from its direct 
object and from its end as the object of the will. Veracity 
and lying consist in voluntary manifestation of thought 
through external signs. And the object of the manifesta- 
tion is the true or the false. But the intention of the evil 
will is two-fold : first, to enunciate the false, and, next, the 
effect of that ; viz., to deceive another. 

If, then, those three concur, a falsehood enunciated, the 
will to enunciate what is false, and the intention to deceive, 
then we have (1) actual, "material" falsity ; (2) moral, " for- 
mal " falsity, and (3) effectual falsity in the wish to deceive. 

But falsehood proper depends on the second of these, and 
a falsehood is that enunciation which is contrary to the mind 
of the enunciator. 

If any one, therefore, enunciates what is false, believing it 
to be true, it is a " material" falsehood, but not formally, 
morally such, because the falsity is contrary to the intention 
of the ennnciator, and the assertion falls short of the perfect 
idea of a falsehood. 

But if any one utter what is formally false — i.e., having a 
will to enunciate falsehood — what he says may be actually 
true, but, as voluntary and moral, his act has falsity per se 
and truth accidentally ; it is a falsehood. The same prin- 
ciples apply to falsity in action. 

That any one intend to deceive another, as the effect of his 
enunciation, is not included in the definition of falsehood 
(menclacium), for so would be excluded falsehoods uttered 
in joke, where there is no intention of deceiving. But this 
intention goes to make up the perfection of falsehood.* 

* The English language, and the English-speaking races, so far as 
their language expresses their moral thought, seem to stand on a higher 



382 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CX. 2. 

ILnr are falsehoods (mendacia) divided? 
Falsehood may transcend the truth, in exaggeration or 
boasting; it may fall short of the truth, in what we will 
call " irony." 

But as a fault or sin. we may divide falsehood according 
to the end aimed at, which aggravates or diminishes the 
fault. (1) Another's harm may be intended; this is an 
injurious falsehood (mendacium perniciosum); (2) some 
benefil or the removal of Borne harm may be aimed at ; this 
rviceable falsehood, a ••white lie" (mendacium officio- 
3 ii may be uttered .-imply to give pleasure, as in 
facetious falsehoods, compliments, flattery, etc. (mendacium 
are at least of a less grave character. 
jtine's divisions (De Mend. c. 14) with reference 
to the end sough! for are more completo : (1) Falsehood 
I, in the doctrines of religion; (2) against man 
with the intention of injuring some one. and not of benefit- 
ay one ; (3) with intention of injuring some one for 
another's benefit. These are forms of injurious falsehood. 
■ in the mere desire of deceiving, or Baying 
what is false, which come from the habitual liar. 

hoods which hurt no one. and are uttered for the 
at ion of property ; (6) for the saving of life ; (7) for 
the preservation of chastity. These three belong to ser- 
ial Lastly come falsehoods uttered in 
iompliments, flattering remarks. 
They belong to the third class mentioned ab 

plane than the Latin language, and the nations using its derivatives. 
For oar two words, "falsehood" and " lie," express moral differences 
which are lost or blended in m ndaemm. The lie, as we use the word, 
seems to imply the intention to deceive : and to call a man a liar is the 
gravest insult, because we impute an evil intention which we can only 
infer. But the falsehood may be uttered without that intention, 
through ignorance, or carelessness, or in joke. Falsehood, therefore, 
seems to come nearer than the stronger word, "lie," to ''mendacium," 
as the term is used by S. Thomas Aquinas. 



Qu. ex. 3.] VERACITY AND VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 383 

Is every falsehood a sin ? 

Falsehood is evil in itself, being contrary to the law of 
nature ; for signs are naturally so connected with things 
signified that it is unnatural and wrong to signify what one 
has not in his mind. "He that uttereth lies shall not 
escape"" (Prov. xix. 5). 

(1) Are examples of falsehood in Holy Scripture ever 
spoken of therein with commendation ? For example, the 
midwives in Egypt told a downright lie with intention to 
deceive (Ex. i. 21). But they had their reward with G-od, 
not for their lie, but for their godly fear and benevolence. 
Examples of perfect virtue may be found in Holy Scripture ; 
but some are commended there (as Jael, the wife of Heber 
the Kenite), not for perfect virtue, but for a virtuous dis- 
position, which was sullied with many imperfections. (Yet, 
to the best of her knowledge, Jael was on the Lord's side 
against the enemies of the Lord's elected people.) 

(2) It may be said that a less evil is to be chosen in order 
to avoid a greater one ; and there is less harm done in gen- 
erating a false impression in the mind of another than in 
killing or being killed. Therefore it is lawful to lie in order 
to keep one man from homicide, and to save another from 
death. But the lie is sin not merely from the harm done 
to a neighbour, but from its own violation of God's order. 
" Speak ye truth each one with his neighbour ; for we are 
members one of another" (Eph. iv. 25). And it is not per- 
mitted to use any illicit violation of Divine order in order to 
hinder the doing of injury. So it is not permitted to steal 
in order to have something to give away. Therefore, it is 
not lawful to tell a lie in order to liberate another from some 
peril. But it is lawful prudently to keep back the truth. 

(3) It may be said, also, that it is a falsehood if one does 
not fulfil what he has promised ; but not all promises are 
to be fulfilled ; evil ones should be violated, and, therefore, 
not every falsehood is a sin. But he who promises anything 
with the intention of keeping his promise does not tell a 



38-4 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CX. 4. 

falsehood, for he does not speak contrary to what he has in 
his heart. If he does not do what he has promised, he 
seems to he acting faithlessly in changing his mind. But 
he is excusable, first, if he have promised what is manifestly 
unlawful ; he sinned in promising, he docs well in changing 
his purpose. Next, he is excusable if the condition of per- 
sons and things be altered. A man is bound to do what he 
has promised provided thai all importanl conditions remain 
unchanged. Otherwise, he was neither false in promising, 
L8e he promised what he had in his mind, the due 
conditions being understood; nor is he faithless in not 
doing what he promised, because those conditions no longer 
exist 

(4) Compliments, and other mendacia jocosa, have the 
nature of falsehood as acts, for there is the will to utter 
what is known to be false; but there may be no intention 
to deceive, and no actual deception may be produced. 

■ ry falsehood a mortal sin / 
Mortal sin is properly what is opposed to charity whereby 
the bouI lives in union with God. But a falsehood maybe 
opposed to charity in three way-: (1) First, in itself, as 
signifying whal is untrue. If this regard Divine things, it 
is opposed to the love of God, whose truth is hiddeu or cor- 
rupted by such a falsehood. This is not only opposed to 
charity, but to faith and religion, and this falsehood is, 
therefore, most grave, and is mortal. But if the false 
expression concern that whose knowledge pertains to man's 
good — e.g., to the perfection of knowledge and instruction 
concerning the moral life — such a falsehood, causing loss to 
one's neighbour through false opinion, is opposed to love 
of our neighbour, and is mortal sin. But if the false opin- 
ion thus produced concern something which is indifferent, 
where it matters not whether it be known or not, then a 
neighbour suffers no loss from such a falsehood ; e.g., if one 
were deceived in small, contingent particulars with which he 



Qr. ex. 4.] VERACITY AXD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 385 

had do concern. Such a falsehood, viewed in itself, is not 
a mortal sin. 

(2) By reason of the end aimed at a falsehood may be 
opposed to charity, as when what is said is intended to do 
injury to God's honour, or other attribute of His, which is 
contrary to religion and is always mortal sin ; or when it is 
intended to injure our neighbour's property, person, or good 
name ; and this, also, like any wilful injury of another, is 
mortal sin. By merely intending to do what is mortal sin, 
one sins mortally. But if the end aimed at be not con- 
trary to charity, the falsehood will not, so viewed, be mortal 
sin, as is apparent in complimentary remarks, and some 
"white lies" which are intended for some benefit to a 
friend. (This does not imply that they are no sin, but that 
they are not that deadly sin which destroys the spiritual life.) 

(3) Accidentally, even such a lesser sin may be contrary 
to charity by reason of the scandal given to others, or some 
resulting harm which will make even a "white lie" to 
become mortal sin. 

(1) But the Psalmist says (Ps. v. 6), " Thou shalt destroy 
them that speak lies." This, no doubt, is said of those who 
are injuring others by their falsehoods. 

(2) Is not every kind of falsehood prohibited by the Ninth 
Commandment ? Since all the precepts of the Decalogue 
are reducible to the love of God and our neighbour, false- 
hood is so far against the Ninth Commandment as it is con- 
trary to charity. Hence, " bearing false witness against our 
neighbour " is explicitly named. 

(3) But it is to be remembered that venial sin is iniquity, 
being against just equity ; therefore S. Augustine says (De 
Doctr. Christ, i. 36), " Every one who utters a falsehood 
violates confidence ; for he certainly wishes that another 
whom he tries to deceive have confidence in him, which 
confidence he violates. But every violator of trust is in- 
iquitous." (So the apostle, Eph. iv. 25. And note that 
the argument applies with force to beneficial lies {mend. 

25 



386 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXI. 1, 2, 4. 

ojjiciosa), which are violations of fidelity, if not directly of 
charity.) 

Simulation and hypocrisy. — All simulation is sinful. 

For we have seen that veracity is the virtue by which one 
presents himself outwardly through external signs such as 
lie inwardly is. But these signs are not only words but 
actions al-o. As, then, it is opposed to the virtue of verac- 
ity that one express in words what is not in his heart, it, is 
equally so t" make use of outward things or actions for the 
same purpose. This simulation is an acted falsehood. And 
since every falsehood is a .-in, every simulation is a sin (un- 
der tie- same conditions). 

A- it i> not falsehood to be lawfully silent respecting what 
actually exists, BO it is not simulation to fail to signify in 
other manners than by words what actually is. Thus it is 

let the sin of simulation to conceal a .-in, for fear of scandal 
given to others 

AU hypocrisy is simulation, 

hut not all simulation is hypocrisy, but only that which sim- 
ulates another*.- person, as when the .-inner pretends that 

he i- a ju.-t man. lie wear- a mask, as the name hypocrite 
indicates. 

But it may ho objected that the hypocrites of the Gospel 
when they were giving alms showed outwardly what they 
were inwardly doing (S. Matt. vi. 2). I answer that the 
outward action naturally signifies the intention. When, 
therefore, in good works which naturally pertain to G-od's 
service, any one does not seek to please God, but to please 
men, he feigns a right intention which he does not po 

Is hypocrisy always mortal sin ? 

The hypocrite of the Gospel is a mortal sinner, for he 
has two vices, defect of sanctity, and simulation of it ; and 
his aim is both these vices : that is, he does not care to be 



Qu. cxil. 1, 2.] VERACITY AJKTD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 387 

holy, but only seeks to appear such. This is mortal sin ; for 
no one is totally deprived of holiness except through mortal 
sin. But if he who conceals his sin, and therefore inten- 
tionally feigns a holiness which he does not possess, be called 
a hypocrite, his sin indeed may be mortal, but the act of 
simulation is not an added mortal sin. 

This you may see from considering the end aimed at. If 
the simulation be opposed to the love of God or one's neigh- 
bour, say, that the end is to spread heresy abroad, or to get 
office in the Church when one is unfit for it, or money, or 
reputation, as the end of the hypocrisy, any of these or the 
like makes the sin evidently mortal. 

But if the feigning were out of pure vanity {e.g., delight- 
ing in the clerical garb without reference to the sanctity 
which it symbolizes and requires), sinful as it is, it may pos- 
sibly not destroy totally the love of God in the soul ; that 
is, it may be venial sin. 

Boasting ("jactafitia"), and its opposite vice (" ironia"), 
self-depreciation. 

There are two kinds of boasting, or extolling one's self in 
words. One may speak of himself not, indeed, above what 
he is in truth, but above men's opinion of him, which sort 
of boasting the apostle disclaims in 2 Cor. xii. 6. But in 
another way one may extol himself above what he truly is, 
and this is more properly boasting, and is manifestly a vice 
opposed to truth. 

Perhaps its most frequent cause is the arrogance of pride, 
elevating one inwardly above his measure, and finding out- 
ward expression in boastful words, although personal vanity 
may produce the same result. Its end is vainglory or worldly 
gain. 

Is it mortal sin f 

As a form of falsehood it is sometimes directed against 
the glory of God, like the boasting of the Prince of Tyre 
(Ezek. xxviii. 2). Sometimes it is opposed to love of our 



388 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxtv. 

neighbour, like the Pharisee's boasting in S. Luke xviii. 
11, "God, I thank Thee that I am not as the rest of 
men," etc. These arc mortal sins (Ps. xii. 3). 

But sometimes one boasts out of idle vanity, neither 
against God nor againsi his neighbour : this is sinful, but it 
may be venial sin. But, again, we may consider its cause, 
as pride, lust of gain, or vainglory ; and if its cause he deadly 
sin. go will be the boasting from that cause. The lust of 
gain may lead to boasts for the purpose of deceiving and 

causing loss. This is deadly Bin. 

And, again, the vanity which produces it may set one's 

Belf* above God's love, or lead bo contempt of Divine com- 
mands. This will make i h< • apparently harmless boasting 

a deadly eviL 

depreciation ( " ironia "i. 
There are two kinds of this also. One may be truly vera- 
cious, while he Is reticent respecting the better things which 

he knows to be in himself, but discloses the faults which he 
knows that he has. This in itself is not Bin, though the 
circumstances may make ir Buch. 

But, also, one may decline from truth in asserting some 
vile thing of himself which he does not recognize to he in 
him, or denying some good thing which he perceives that 
he possesses. This is the sin which, for lack of a better 
word, I have called •• ironia." 

It is no excuse for this sin that we are avoiding the oppo- 
site sin of self-exaltation, or pride. 

§ 5. Affability and liberality, with their opposite vices.* 

I mean by affability that courtesy or friendliness by which 

* Note here and throughout this work that a moral deterioration in 
the English language is found in the use of the term " vice'." Origi- 
nally it was any habit of sin, and the word is so used throughout this 
manual of Moral Theology. But popular use has lowered the word, 
morally speaking, to any habit supposed in any way whatsoever to be 
injurious ; say. the " vice " of using tobacco. 



Qu. CSV.] AFFABILITY AXD LIBERALITY. 389 

a man becomingly orders his intercourse with other men in 
words and deeds. It is a special virtue of outward conduct 
even towards strangers. 

It is a part of justice, or a virtue annexed to justice, for 
though there is here no question of a debt of legal obliga- 
tion, there is a moral obligation on the part of a virtuous 
man to treat others in a becoming way. 

Since man is by nature " a social animal,'' it is a law of 
nature not only that he preserve fidelity in his relations to 
his fellows, but that he take all pains to make his fellowship 
a source of pleasure to others ; for pleasure as well as ve- 
racity is essential to human intercourse. The exception is 
when for some good cause it is necessary to produce bene- 
ficially the opposite feeling in men with whom we have to 
do ; say, when some good is to be accomplished or some evil 
avoided by blame, etc. 

Adulation. 

One may attempt on all occasions to use flattering words, 
either for his own profit, or simply for the purpose of giving 
pleasure to another. The motive or other circumstances 
will determine whether or not the praising others is a sin. 
One may wish to console in trouble by giving pleasure, or to 
help another's progress in good ; and, other due conditions 
being observed, this may pertain to the virtue of friendli- 
ness. But it will be the vice of adulation if one praise 
another for that which is not laudable, or is, perhaps, posi- 
tively wrong ; or if by doing so he incite to vainglory ; or 
if his flattery aim at some personal advantage for him- 
self. 

Flattery is sometimes a mortal sin, 
and sometimes a sin not so deadly. It is mortal when- 
ever it is contrary to charity, as when what is sinful is 
praised ; for this is contrary both to the love of God and 
to the love of our neighbour. Again, it is mortal by reason 



300 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxvn. 

of the intention ; as when one flatters another in order to 
injure him fraudulently either in body or in soul. Again, 
adulation may give to another occasion to sin even without 
any such direct intention. And then it will be necessary 
to consider whether the occasion was actually given, or 
merely taken, and also what kind of injury resulted. The 
question is like that of scandal, which has already been con- 
sidered (page 254). 

But if one, simply oul of an eagerness to give pleasure to 
oth.r-. use flattering language, or even if its object be to 
avoid some evil, or to obtain Borne needed good, the adula- 
tion is not against charity, and the sin will .-land on the 
Bame footing with other falsehoods of similar character. 

Unfriendliness, captiousness, moroseness (" litigium"). 
Contradicting others may be due to discord, when one 
refuses t.. assent to what another 3aye on account of a want 

of charity towards him. But. again, one may contradict 
another from a general mo hich bas no hesitation 

in making • disagreeable. This is opposed to that 

virtue which we have named affability. 

This form «>f contentiousness is, in itself, a graver sin 
than flattery, although the injurious motive may make 
adulation a more sinful thing. That which is baser in 
human actions is not always the graver sin. For the glory 
of man is his reason; and therefore carnal sins, by which 
the flesh gets lordship son, are more degrading than 

spiritual Bins ; although these are graver, because there is 
more contempt of God in them. Similarly, sins which 
have guile in them are baser, although open sins may some- 
time- contain more contempt of God. So it happens that 
guileful adulation seems to be baser, although quarrelsome- 
ness seems to be graver. 

Liberality. 

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well the things 



Qu. cxvu. 5.] AFFABILITY AND LIBERALITY. 391 

of this world which are granted to us for the support of our 
earthly life. 

(1) Natural inclination, indeed, leads each one to pro- 
vide for himself rather than for others. But this is not 
contrary to the virtue of liberality, because a very little 
suffices for one person, and also the liberal man does not so 
provide for others that he neglects himself and those be- 
longing to him. He uses money, and whatever can be 
measured by money, not as throwing it away in prodigal 
fashion, but judiciously securing, first, provision for his 
own support and for what is needful for executing his vir- 
tuous works. 

(2) The prodigal is not to be regarded as a liberal man, 
because he does not follow the dictates of right reason as 
virtue does. And, on the other hand, the virtuous poor 
may be liberal, because the virtue does not consist in a 
multitude of gifts, but in the virtuous affection of the 
giver (Nic. Eth. iv. 1). 

Those passions which are concerned with money or its 
equivalent are the immediate subject of liberality, as love 
of riches, desire for them, pleasure in them, sorrow at part- 
ing with them. Liberality hinders any inordinate affection 
for money from preventing the due use of it. But this due 
use is two-fold ; first, for the owner's expenses ; next, for 
others through gifts to them. The liberal man is free in 
his expenditure, free in convenient gifts. 

But, of course, the virtue is far greater which leads to 
the giving than that which leads to the expending. 

Liberality is not, properly speaking, apart of justice, be- 
cause the latter returns to another ivhat is his ; but liberal- 
ity bestows ivhat is its own. 

Yet there is a certain relation between them ; first, 
because they are both primarily relative to another ; and 
secondly, because they are both concerned with external 
things. 



392 DUTIES TOWABDS OTHEBS. [Qu. CXVIU. 1, 

Liberality, also, is not concerned with legal debt as jus- 
tice is, but it recognizes a moral obligation. 

Beneficence and pity also give, but their giving proceeds 
from Borne special affection towards its object, and there- 
- nil giving pertains to charity or friendship. But 
liberal giving is dm- to n special affection with regard to 
money which is neither inordinately desired nor loved. 
!! ■ the giving is not only to friends or to the suffer- 
ing. 

Is liberality chief among virtm 

py virtue ie directed to some good ; and the greater 
the good, the greater the virtue. But primarily and per se 
liberality directs the bouI with respeel to the possession and 
the use of money. This places it below such virtu 

ranee, which govern bodily concupiscences and pleas- 
: and below courage and justice, which are ordained 
for the common good; and -till more hi low those virtues 
which are ordained for Divine good. This is the order: 
first, Divine good ; then, the common good ; then, private 
good of soul, of body, and, lastly, private good in outward 

thing<. 

lint liberality may !>«■ directed to any or to all of these, 
and bo it will have a secondary excellence as useful for 
many things. 

God, indi . • . th to all men liberally, and upbraid- 
eth noi '" I S. • ' us. i. 5) : but this Divine giving comes from 
Divine love, not from such mode of regarding external 
o our definition of liberality in man. 

Avarice : is if a sin ? 

God's Word says (Heb. xiii. 5), " Be ye free from the 
love of money ; content with such things as ye have." In 
everything the good requires a due measure, and evil comes 
from going beyond or falling short of that measure. This 
applies to all things which exist for a certain end ; they 



Qu. cxviii. 1.] AVARICE. 393 

must be commensurate with that end, as medicine with 
reference to recovery of health. 

But outward goods are things useful for some end ; and 
therefore, necessarily, the good of man, so far as they are 
concerned, consists in a certain measure, a man seeking to 
have them so far as they are necessary for his life according 
to his condition in the world. 

Therefore there is sin in going beyond or falling short of 
this measure, when, namely, one beyond or within the due 
mode wishes to acquire or to keep outward riches. Avarice 
is immoderate love of possession. Therefore it is a sin. 

(1) The desire of external things is natural to man, but 
as means to an end. It is therefore free from sin so far as 
it falls under a rule derived from its end. But avarice ex- 
ceeds this rule. 

(2) But is it sin against G-od, against self, or against our 
neighbour ? It may be against all three ; for it implies 
disordination outward or inward. The getting or the keep- 
ing of riches may be directly sin against our neighbour, 
when one man superabounds in wealth through the poverty 
of many others. 

Or, again, the lust of riches, immoderate love of them 
or pleasure in them, is a sin of man against himself, be- 
cause his inward affections are disordered. 

And avarice, like any other mortal sin, is against God, 
inasmuch as man for the sake of temporal good despises the 
eternal good. 

(3) It is true that the old, on account of failing powers, 
do naturally seek the aid of external things, like any other 
needy persons (Nic. Eth. iv. 1) ; but natural inclinations 
are to be governed by reason, and the aged are not free 
from sin if they exceed reason's due measure. 

The special sin is the inordinate seeking of a special 
good ; sc, riches as numbered among the goods useful to 
man (Eom. i. 29). 

Avarice may be opposed to justice in the getting and 



394 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. i ■win. 5. 

keeping riches against the rights of others ; but when we 
consider the inward affection, the immoderate lust for 
riches, even apart from any wish to plunder from others, 
there is the sin of avarice plainly opposed to liberality. It 
neglects not the legal debt of justice, but the moral debt of 

Is avarice always mortal sin? 

When opposed to justice it ia mortal Bin, for it involves 
unjustly taking or keeping whal i- another's. But, like 
thefl i 304), the imperfection of the act may make 

it venial. 

But, as opposed t'> liberality, avarice implies inordinate 
love of riches. And if this so increase that it is set above 
charity. 30 that through love of riches one docs not fear to 
acl againsl the love of God and his neighbour, avarice is 

mortal .-in ( RoUL i. 29 i. 

But if tin- inordinate love keep within this, SO that it is 
not preferred to Divine love, and one ia not willing to do 
anything _ G-od or his neighbour for the sake of riches, 

avarice is venial Bin. 

lust of riches darkens the soul whenever it excludes 
the light of charity. 

I '/rice the [i' 

Evi ry sin, because it is evil, consists in some corruption 
or privation of some good ; but, as it is voluntary, it con- 
! the desire of some good. So the relative gravity of 
sins may be viewed in two ways ; first, a- regards the good 
which is despised or corrupted ; the greater that good, the 
graver is the sin. In this way the sin which is against God 
is the greatest of all sins ; next to that, the sin against the 
person of man ; after that, sin respecting outward things 
which are intended for man's service, among which sins is 
avarice. 

But, in another way, the grade of sins may be viewed ac- 



Qu. cxviit. 6, 7, 8.] AVARICE. 395 

cording to the good to which human appetite is inordinately 
subject. The less that good, the more shameful is the sin. 
But external goods are the lowest that man can obtain ; less 
than corporeal goods, which, again, are less than the good of 
the soul, which is exceeded by Divine good. Thus viewed, 
avarice has the greatest deformity. But since the corrup- 
tion or privation of good is the essence, the "formal part" 
of sin, and since the conversion to transitory good is the 
" material part/' the gravity of sins depends rather on the 
first than on the second. Therefore avarice is not simply 
the greatest of all sins. 

Yet avarice has its own special danger ; sc, that it is most 
difficult to be eradicated from the soul, always increasing 
with increasing age and need of outward help. 

Avarice is a spiritual, not a carnal, sin. 

Sins are rooted in the affections or passions of the soul, 
and they are consummated in its pleasures and pains. Some 
of these pleasures are carnal, some are spiritual ; and those 
are called fleshly sins which are completed in fleshly pleas- 
ures ; those are spiritual sins which are completed in spirit- 
ual pleasures resulting from apprehension of the mind. And 
such a sin is avarice. 

It has a material object, indeed, but the pleasure is not 
corporeal but mental. The sin, however, may be said to 
have an intermediate place between purely spiritual sins, 
like pride, and purely fleshly sins, like lust or gluttony. 

Avarice is a capital sin. 

Sins are so called which, being viewed as an end, originate 
other vices. Now the end most of all sought for is felicity, 
which riches promise in offering what is sufficient for all 
needs. As all pleasures can be purchased, or seem purchas- 
able, money virtually appears to contain them all, and so 
its possession seems to be the height of felicity, and so orig- 
inate — 



300 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxix. 2. 

The daughters of avarice ; viz., treachery, fraud, deceit- 
ful words, perjury, restlessness of soul, violence, hardness of 
heart. 



Prodigality. 

Prodigality is the vice which is opposite to avarice. The 
avaricious loves riches to excess, but the prodigal lacks due 
care for what is an earthly means to a well-ordered life. 
The prodigal goes to excess in giving, but falls short of duty 
in getting ami preserving, while the avaricious, on the con- 
trary, fails in giving, but goes to excess in getting and in 
keeping. 

Tie' prodigal son (S. Luke xv. 13), " wasted his sub- 
stance in riotous living." And so prodigality may seem to 
be opposed to a temperate and continent manner of life. 
And this is most frequently the case. But prodigality as 
such may be directed to other evil ends, or it may he the 
mere indifference t<> riches which leads to wasting them. 
So it is directly opposed to avarice. 

Is prodigality << 

Virtue is corrupted by defect as well as by excess. And 
although the apostle 'Said that the inordinate "love of money 
is the root of all evils" (1 Tim. vi. 10), that does not imply 
that all evils always spring from avarice, but that there is 
no evil which does not sometimes originate in that capital 
sin. Even prodigality sometimes originates there, as when 
one prodigally wastes many things in order to win the favour 
of others, and to get a larger return. 

When the apostle (1 Tim. vi. 17) said, " Charge them 
that are rich in this present world, that they be ready to 
distribute," he spoke of giving according to duty, which is 
precisely what the prodigal does not. Prodigality is not 
liberality. For the excess of the former is not a question of 
mere quantity in giving, but rather of going beyond duty 



Qu. CXX.] EQUITY. 397 

and propriety. The liberal sometimes gives more than the 
prodigal, if it be necessary to make large gifts. 

Prodigality, considered in itself, is not so grave a sin as 
avarice. For, first, it is not so far away from the virtue of 
liberality, which also freely gives. Secondly, the prodigal 
is useful to many by giving to them ; the avaricious is use- 
ful to none, not even to himself. And, lastly, prodigality, 
as such, is far more easily cured, both by advancing age, 
by losing what has been wasted, and by the easy transi- 
tion from this vice to liberality; whereas avarice is rarely 
cured. 

Both of them sin against others and against themselves. 
The prodigal sins against himself in wasting what is useful 
to himself, and against others in consuming what ought to 
be properly dispensed for the needy. And this is conspicu- 
ously true of the clergy, if they expend on themselves in 
luxuries or in pleasures what ought to be bestowed for the 
needy and for the Church. 

The avaricious also sins against his neighbour and against 
himself ; but while the prodigal may do good to some one, 
the avaricious benefits neither others nor himself, because he 
does not dare to use his goods even for his own benefit. 

§ 6. Equity ("epicheia"). 

Human acts, concerning which laws are promulgated, can 
vary infinitely ; and therefore it is not possible that any rule 
of law should be instituted fitted to all cases which may 
occur. Legislators are obliged to fit their laws to what gen- 
erally occurs, but in some cases keeping to the letter of the 
law would be contrary to the equality of justice, and to the 
common good which is the aim of the law. Thus, law decrees 
that deposits shall be returned to their owner, because this 
is ordinarily just. But it may be injurious ; e.g., an insane 
person may demand a revolver which he has left with you, 
or a rebel may demand what he intends to use against the 
people. In such cases it is evil to follow the letter of the 



398 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXXII. 1. 

law, and it is right to do what the law intended and the 
common good demands. This is the virtue of equity. 

(1) This is not judging the law instead of judging by it. 
For he judges the law who says that it is not a good law. 
But lie who says that the law does not apply in the particular 
case in question, judges of that case. 

(2) In doubt concerning the meaning of the law, the in- 
terpretation of the law-makers or of the court having juris- 
diction must stand. But where the case is plain there is no 
need of interpreting, bul only of applying. 

Equity is a part of justice viewed in its widest significa- 
tion ; but it is a " higher law," directive of legal justice. 

8. Thomas Aquinas regards the Spiritual gift of "godli- 
ness," or "pietas," as perfective of natural religion. As the 
other Spiritual gifts are habitual dispositions of the soul mak- 
ing us prompt to be moved by the Holy Ghost, so this gift 
produces a filial disposition bowards Q-od. "Ye received the 
spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father" (Bom. 
viii. 15). To worship God as Creator and Lord belongs to 
religion ; but to draw near to God as our Father in heaven 
is through the inspiring gift of the Holy Ghost. 

Nor this alone ; for the same gift prompts to honour all 
thai belongs in special manner to the Father. It honours 
the saints; it listens with reverence to the Holy Scriptures ; 
it succours the needy as children of the same Father. 

§ 7. The precepts of justice : the Ten Commandments. 

The Decalogue contains the primal principles of law, to 
which natural reason at once assents as most manifest prin- 
ciples. The first four commandments refer to the acts of 
religion as the highest part of justice ; the fifth to piety, 
which stands next to religion ; the others to justice in 
general as applied to our equals. 

(1) The law aims at making all men virtuous, but it be- 
gins with manifest obligations of duty. 



Qu. CXXII. 2, 3.] THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE. 399 

(2) The judicial precepts of the Old Law are determina- 
tions of its moral precepts towards our neighbour, as its 
ceremonial precepts are of the moral precepts towards God. 

(3) The Ten Commandments have charity as their end 
(1 Tim. i. 5) ; but they directly command just acts.* 

The First and Second Commandments. 

Why do they begin the Decalogue ? Since the law's aim 
is to make good men, consider the order of the process. It 
must begin with the will ; but the goodness of that depends 
upon its end ; and God is that ultimate end. And, first of 
all, impediments must be removed out of the way of true 
religion, and the chief impediment is the worship of false 
gods — "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon " (S. Matt. vi. 
24). When those impediments are removed by negative 
precepts, then can come the positive law of religion in the 
Fourth Commandment. 

TJie Tliird Commandment. 

Not only superstition is an impediment to true religion 
which must be removed out of the way. Irreligion, defect 
of reverence by which God is despised, is an impediment. 
Superstition has substituted some other object in place of 
God. But irreligion, professing to receive Him, robs Him 
of His due honour. 

(1) Not every assumption of the Holy Name is forbidden, 

* Our author, following S. Augustine, as the Roman and Lutheran 
communions of modern times also do, places three commandments in 
the first table, uniting into one the first and second, as the English 
and American Church divide them. Polytheism and idolatry are thus 
prohibited in one commandment. And there are good ethical reasons 
for this arrangement according to the author's system. Superstition is 
prohibited in all its forms in the First, irreligion in all its forms in 
the Second, Commandment. The reasons for separating polytheism 
from idolatry need not here be stated. Let it suffice to note that 
idolatry, not polytheism, is one of the special dangers of a superstitious 
part of the Christian Church itself. Throughout this manual the com- 
mandments are numbered as the Anglican Church numbers them. 



400 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXXII. 4. 

but false oaths, whether assertory or promissory, false vows, 
etc. 

(2) Not only swearing falsely is taking God's name in vain, 
but also swearing truly, without judgment, in levity, etc. 

(3) The more common sins are specified ; and vain swear- 
ing is more common than blasphemy, though the latter is 
equally prohibited. 

The Fourth Commandment 

The impediments to true religion having been removed, 
then comes the precepl of true religion which worships 
God. And as inward worship i- presented to us in Holy 
Scripture under corporeal similitudes, so the outward wor- 
ship of God is presented through some sensible sign of it. 
Man is led to the inward worship of prayer and devotion by 

the inward guidant f the Holy Ghosl ; but the precept of 

the law is given concerning outward worship in its sensible 
sign, a Bigo of the common benefit of the Creation, winch 
ended on the day of rest. 

(1) Literally taken, the precept is partly moral, partly 
ceremonial. Ir is moral in requiring that man set aside 
some part of his life for Divine tilings. The natural 
reasou which sets aside some time for recreation, etc., also 
demands some time for spiritual refection. So far the 
Fourth Commandment is moral. 

But in determining a particular time as a sign of the 
Creation, it is ceremonial. It is ceremonial also in its alle- 
gorical signification, pointing to Christ's Sabbath rest in 
the new tomb. It is ceremonial also in its moral signifi- 
cation of the soul's rest in God. As moral, not as cere- 
monial, this commandment takes its place in the Decalogue. 

(2) Distinguish the end, the having time for Divine ser- 
vice, and the rest from servile work. The service of God 
was not servile work ; therefore circumcision (S. John vii. 
23), and the priests' and Levites' work, on the Sabbath were 
not prohibited (S. Matt. xii. 5). 



Qu. CXXII. 5.] THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE. 401 

But other works are contrary to the observance of the 
Sabbath inasmuch as they impede our attending to Divine 
things. 

There are also corporal works not pertaining to God's ser- 
vice which are not properly servile, because they are com- 
mon to all, both servants and masters. Thus every one, 
servant or not, is bound to provide in necessary things not 
only for himself but for his neighbour, especially what con- 
cerns the support of life or the avoiding of great loss (Deut. 
xxii. 1 ; S. John vii. 23 ; S. Matt. xii. 2). 

(3) The observance of the Lord's Day under the Gospel 
law takes the place of the Sabbath, not by force of the pre- 
cept of the Old Law, but by the authority of the Church 
and Christian custom. The Lord's Day is not figurative 
like the Sabbath. No such strict prohibition of work, 
therefore, belongs to it. Cooking food was prohibited ; it 
is now allowed, etc. And needful dispensation, even in 
what is prohibited by the Church, is more readily obtained 
under the Gospel's easy burden.* 

Tlie Fifth Commandment. 

The end of the Decalogue is love of God and our neigh- 
bour. But among neighbours parents hold the highest 
place. Therefore this commandment heads the second 
table ; but since parents are the source of our being, it 
holds close affinity with the first table, and some — e.g., Jo- 
sephus and Philo — have placed it there. 

(1) Parents take the precedence of other relatives and of 
our country. Nevertheless, in this precept is understood 
whatever pertains to rendering due honour to others accord- 
ing to their rightful claim. 

(2) Eeverential honour is due to parents as such in every 
case ; but there are special duties in special cases, like sup- 
port in time of need, which are implied in the general law. 

* See, further, Supplement, chap. iii. page 511. 



402 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxxn. 6. 

The last five commandments. 

These pertain to justice in general, which gives all indif- 
ferently their due. 

(1) Why are they all negative ? Why is there no affirma- 
tive precept? Man is always and universally bound to do 
no harm to anyone; and so the commandments prohibit 
it. But positive duties to our neighbours vary with person, 
time, place, etc.; therefore they do not appear in these uni- 
versal laws. 

(•.') Are there not many other injuries beside homicide, 
adultery, theft, and false witness? Why are oDly these 
specified? These are chief in their respective classes, and 
the others are reducible bo these. Thus, all injury to the 
person of our neighbour is included in homicide, as tho 
chief injury; wrongful deeds <A' lust against others, and 
especially against those connected with us, are included in 
adultery : injurious actions towards others' property are em- 
braced in theft ; and, finally, injurious words, detractions, 
blasphemies, and the like, are prohibited along with false 
witni - . 

(3) In the Tenth Commandment, which prohibits concu- 
piscence, are not included the first motions of it, which 
spring from our fallen, Bensuous nature ; but the consent of 
the will is forbidden, consent whether to the deed or to the 
pleasure of it. 

(4) Concupiscence leading to theft or adultery is expressly 
prohibited, and not that (wrath, etc.) which leads to homi- 
cide, because that in itself does not present itself as a desir- 
able or useful thing, like adultery or theft.* 

* See, further, Supplement, chap. iii. page 514. 



CHAPTER VI. 

COURAGE AND FORTITUDE : THEIR ALLIED VIRTUES, AND 
THEIR OPPOSING VICES. 

(If I were to follow the example of modern ethical writers I should 
omit almost all which our author finds needful to say of that group of 
manly virtues of which courage and fortitude are chief. Whewell, for 
example, in his Elements of Morality, merely finds a place for the 
names in his list of private virtues. Effeminacy or sentimentality may 
admire courage in some military chief. But that courage is an essential 
virtue in the soldier of the Cross ; that the world is to be defied even unto 
death ; that hardship and the persecution of calumny and neglect, with 
attendant poverty and contempt, are the virtues of the saints of God — 
these are the hard lessons to be learned in the school of our Lord Jesus 
Christ. He that follows the Divine Master must learn of Him not 
only His long-suffering, but the steadfast courage with which He went 
up to Jerusalem, knowing that He was going to His cross. I will abridge 
our author's discussions, but omit little more than those counsels of 
perfection which may be found in this part of the Summa. — -J. J. E.) . 

§ 1. Courage and fortitude (fortitudo). 

Are these virtues f 

" Virtue makes him that possesses it good, and renders 
his work good." But the good of man is a life according to 
right reason. Virtue, therefore, is in agreement with rea- 
son. 

(1) Eeason itself is rectified by the intellectual virtues ; 

(2) this right reason is applied to human affairs by justice ; 

(3) impediments to this rectitude in human relations are 
removed. 

But there are two impediments to right reason's work ; 
one, when pleasure attracts in an opposite direction, which 
impediment is removed by temperance and its allied virtues ; 



404 COURAGE AND FORTITUDE. [Qu. cxxm. 1. 

another, when the will is repelled from following right rea- 
son by the difficulties which present themselves. To resist 
these difficulties requires fortitude of mind. Manifestly, 
then, this is a virtue, inasmuch as it leads one to a life 
according to reason. 

(1) Weakness of body (2 Cor. xii. 9) is courageously 
borne by a patient soul, and patience is one of the allied 
virtues, a pari of fortitude; while a man's recognizing his 
own natural weakness pertains to that perfection of the 
Christian life which is called humility. 

(2) The doing courageous acts docs not always indicate 
the virtuous habit One may encounter difficulties like a 
courageous man when he does nol perceive the greatness of 
the peril ; or when he is confident because he lias previously 
escaped ; or when he trusts to his acquired ari or skill ; or 
he maybe impelled by some passion like anger or sorrow ; 
or he may be in quest of some temporal advantage, honour, 
pleasure, or lucre ; or he may be driven to act courageously 
through fear of punishment, disgrace, or loss (Nic. Eth. iii. 
7,8). 

(3) Some arc so physically constituted that they have a 
natural disposition (physical courage) towards this virtue of 
the bouL And this is true also of other virtues ; e.g., tem- 
perance or continence. 

All virtue- require a fixed purpose ; but courage, as a 
special virtue, signifies firmness in enduring and repelling 
grave dangers in which it is most difficult to retain that 
fixed purpose. The special object, then, of this special vir- 
tue is grave perils and great labours. 

These are the remoter object ; the more immediate 
object is fear and excess of rashness. For fear shrinks 
from evil which is difficult to resist or overcome, and so 
withdraws the will from following right reason. But also 
such difficulties must be judiciously encountered in order 
that they may be utterly destroyed. Courage must govern 
not only natural fear but also excessive rashness. 



Qu. cxsili. 4, 6.J COURAGE AND FORTITUDE. 405 

lite fear of death. 

It is necessary to hold firmly by rational good against 
every evil whatsoever, because no corporeal good can equal 
that good ; and courage, therefore, most of all braces the 
will against the greatest evils, among which none is more 
terrible than death ; for this strips a man of all the earthly 
goods which he may desire. The Lord, therefore, in for- 
bidding fear, selected the dread of death, saying, " Be not 
afraid of them which kill the body, but are not able to kill 
the soul" (S. Matt. x. 28). 

This is not merely the courage of the soldier in battle ; 
it is the courage of the just judge, or of the priest, or of any 
private man who does not shrink from peril of death while 
holding by the right ; as when the priest, the sister, or any 
Christian man allows no fear of infection to hinder his duty 
to the sick, or goes on a dangerous journey because some 
pious work calls thereto. 

This is the courage of martyrs who in faith courageously 
fight a good fight (Heb. si. 34). 

Fortitude in enduring is greater than courage in attack- 
ing. 

For it is more difficult to repress fears than to govern 
excessive rashness. The danger itself aids the latter virtue, 
while it increases the difficulty of the former. 

To endure is more difficult than to attack, first, because 
the attack which calls for your fortitude seems to be made 
by the stronger, while in attacking with courage it seems to 
be implied that you are the stronger; and, again, he who en- 
dures with fortitude feels the peril imminent, while he who 
attacks has it in the future ; and, lastly, fortitude implies 
protracted effort of soul, while the courageous attack may 
be a sudden movement, a transient impulse. 

This endurance, therefore, has its special beatitude (S. 
Matt. v. 10). 



40G COL'KAGE AND FORTITUDE. [Qu. CXX1V. 

The object aimed at by the courageous man is not honour, 
pleasure, or lucre. 

His immediate end is to express his virtuous habit in his 
act; i.e., to do the right thing, the courageous act, as the 
out ward expression of his courage ; the ultimate eud is 
beatitude or < rod. 

He may not find pleasure in his act, though he prefers it 
to all pains or sorrows. These he may sensibly feel, but his 
soul is lifted above them. 

II hae Eon seen and prepared himself fur the hour of 
conflict, though it may come suddenly, and its very sudden- 
ness prove th«-' strength of his courage. 

Well-governed anger, anger subject to his reason and used 
a.- his instrument, may sustain him. 

Fortitude is a cardinal virtue. 

it has in high degree that needful mark of virtue, 
firmness in action, and the more so because its object, afflict- 
. il, has the greatest tendency to make one fall or draw 
back from following right reason. 

Martyrdom. 

The firmly standing in truth and righteousness against 
the attacks of persecutors oven unto death, the fortitude 
which patiently endures pains unjustly inflicted, is the 
highest act of tins virtue (S. Matt. v. 10). 

The Faith is often the end of the martyr's testimony, 
but it is fortitude which strengthens him to bear witness. 
Charity is the first motive, the commanding virtue, which 
alone gives the act its worth, though fortitude is the virtue 
which immediately elicits the act. It is not the mere 
endurance until death which makes the martyr's action 
laudable ; it is the perfect charity manifested thereby, over- 
coming the strongest natural passion, the love of life. 

Observe, also, that all virtuous acts, as referred to God, are 
protestations of the faith CS. Jas. ii. 18), and may be causes 



Qu. CXXV. 1, 3.] COWARDICE AND EASHNESS. 407 

of martyrdom. Thus, S. John Baptist was a martyr, 
though he suffered death for reproving an adulterer. And 
not only does he who suffers for the faith suffer as a Chris- 
tian, but he who testifies to the faith by his Christ-like life, 
imitating Christ in holy deeds and in avoiding sin (Rom. 
viii. 9). 

So, for example, he is a martyr who chooses to suffer 
rather than to tell a lie. 

§ 2. Cowardice and rashness. 

Is fear a sin? 

We may be speaking of a passion or emotion of the soul : 
and none of these as such are either good or bad, laudable 
or blameworthy. But the good in human acts requires a 
due order, and violation of that order is sin. That due 
order demands that the passions be governed by right rea- 
son ; and reason dictates that some things be shunned and 
others sought for, and some of these things more than 
others. When, therefore, the ungoverned soul flees those 
things which reason commands us to endure while we are 
aiming at what is more to be sought, the fear is inordinate 
and sinful. But if the soul dread and shun what ought 
to be dreaded and shunned, there is in that fear no inordi- 
nation or sin. It would be simply unnatural not to fear 
earthquake, fire, or flood ; reason, itself, dictates that these 
be shunned, and anything else which cannot be resisted, and 
from enduring which no good result can be expected. 

Is fear ever mortal sin ? 

We have seen that it is sin when it shuns what right 
reason forbids our shunning. But this inordination may 
be in the sensuous nature alone, without consent of the 
will ; and this will be venial sin, or no sin at all. 

But sometimes this inordination reaches the will, when 
with free choice something is shunned contrary to the dic- 
tate of right reason. This may be venial, but it may also 



408 COURAGE AND FORTITUDE. [Qu. cxxv. 4. 

be that mortal cowardice of which the Apocalypse speaks 
(Bev. xxi. 8): "But for the fearful, . . . their part 
shall be in the lake that burnetii with fire and brimstone; 
which is the second death." 

Does fear excuse from sin .' 

Pear is so Ear sin as it is against the order of reason. 
Bui reason judges thai some evils are more to be avoided 
than others arc Therefore, if any one in shunning the 
greater evils does doI avoid the less, he does not sin. Thus, 
corporal death is more to be dreaded than the loss of money ; 
and if one through Eear of deatb should promise or give 
something to bandits, he would be excused from sin ; but not 
bo if, without legitimate cause, his cowardice should lead him 
to pass over the good and bestow gifts on the unworthy. 

For if any one, through fear, shunning the evils which 
arc less bo !"• feared according to reason, fall into the evils 
which are more to be dreaded, be cannol be totally excused 
from sin. because Buch fear is inordinate. 

Evils of the soul are more to he feared than those of the 
body, and those of the body more than external evils. 
Therefore, if any one incur evils of bis soul — i.e., sins — in 
order to avoid bodily evils, as blows, or death itself, or if he 
endure bodily ills in order to avoid the loss of money, be 
is not totally excused from sin. 

5 ' in a certain way his sin is diminished, because what 
i.~ done through fear is less voluntary ; for it imposes a kind 
of uccessity on a man. 

''Such actions as these arc of a mixed character. One, 
under the influence of fear, does the action voluntarily, for 
he moves himself ; but, abstractedly, the action is perhaps 
involuntary, for no person "would choose anything of the 
kind for its own sake ; e.g., the throwing goods overheard in 
a storm. In such acts as these men are sometimes even 
praised when they undergo anything painful for the sake of 
great and honourable consequences. ; but pardon is bestowed 



Qu. CXXVII.] COWARDICE AND RASHNESS. 409 

when a man does Avhat he ought not to do, owing to causes 
which are too strong for human nature, the pressure of 
which no one could support " (Nic. Eth. iii. 1). 

But, to avoid misunderstanding, it should be observed 
that in the opposite extreme from cowardice, and equally 
opposed to virtuous fortitude, although the acts may some- 
times resemble it, is that senseless indifference to danger 
which does not fear what ought to be feared. "A wise 
man feareth and departeth from evil ; but the fool beareth 
himself insolently and is confident " (Pro v. xiv. 16). 

It is natural to love life and all that is ordained for its 
well being; and, in due mode — i.e., not making these the 
end, but using them for the ultimate end — it is lawful and 
right. 

Earthly goods are to be despised, and their loss is not to 
be feared, so far as they impede the love and fear of G-od ; 
but the case is otherwise so far as they are instruments in 
God's service. 

No one is wholly bereft of this natural self-love. Even 
the cowardly suicide, out of self-love, seeks to free himself, 
from present distresses. A defect, then, in this natural 
fear of what ought to be feared, arises either from want of 
due love fop what God has bestowed, or from pride, self- 
confidence, and contempt of others, or from senseless stu- 
pidity of soul (possibly the bravery of the prize-fighter) ; 
and either way it is vicious, although possibly due to that 
invincible ignorance which will excuse it. 

Rashness (audacia). 

Natural boldness, quick in action, governed by reason 
which has first taken counsel, based on judicious self-con- 
fidence, shows us a passion of the soul in virtuous operation. 
But the excess of that passion, its emancipation from reason's 
rule, is a sin opposed to Christian courage or fortitude. 

Aristotle shrewdly notices that while the rash wish to 



410 COURAGE AXD FORTITUDE. [Qu. CXXVIII. 

imitate the courageous man, most of them are at once bold 
and cowardly, for their self-confidence does not bear up 
under terrible circumstances (Nic. Eth. iii. 7). 

What are the virtues allied to courage and fortitude ? 

We have seen thai the acts of these virtues are two-fold; 
actively encountering difficulties, and patiently enduring 
adverse circumstances. Now, for such action four things 
arc requisite : (1) ( Ireal dobs of soul, a hold confidence ready 
Eor the encounter, the virtue of magnanimity,' (2) (a spe- 
cial virtue of the rich and powerful), a largeness of action 
which prevents the falling short in execution of what has 
been boldly undertaken, the virtue of magnificence. The 
extreme perils which called for courage arc ool here in 
question, bul the lessor difficulties of noble actions. 

Fortitude requires, first, thai the soul be not utterly 
coal down in Borrow through the difficulty of imminent 
evils, and tin.- is the virtue of patience; and (4) that 
through the protracted endurance of difficulties the soul be 
not wearied out and give up its efforts; this virtue is perse- 
verance. "Let us run with patience the race that is set 
before us; . . . consider Him thai hath endured such 
gainsaying of .-inner-, that ye wax nut weary, fainting in 
your ,-oul- "' ( Beb. xii. ".' |. 

.i 3. Magnanimity, and its opposite vices, presumption, 
ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity. 

(There are virtues which are the special glory of the 
great, the rich, the powerful. And so long as human so- 
ciety lasts, such men must be found in it, even in a democ- 
racy like these United States. Men are worthy of honour 
whose lives are illumined by these virtues : they are a curse 
to the land which gives them greatness, power, or wealth, 
if they are degraded by the opposite vices. 

Magnanimity and magnificence are the two virtues of the 
few. The many can have them only in preparedness of 



Qu. cxxix. 6.] MAGNANIMITY. 411 

soul, not in actual exertion. Following Aristotle, our au- 
thor makes much of these virtues. It does not seem best 
for me to omit them. — J. J. E.) 

Magnanimity 
is that greatness of soul which strives to do things worthy 
of honour, not, however, as esteeming human honour itself 
as of great price. But, still more, this greatness of soul 
strives for things worthy of great honour. It is not unduly 
lifted up at receiving great honours, but rather looks down 
upon them. It is the worthiness to be honoured which is 
the aim. And this greatness of soul is a virtue, because 
it is the rational use of these great human goods. 

Magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one an- 
other. (How perfectly are they blended in the great apostle, 
S. Paul !) The magnanimous man thinks highly of the 
gifts of God which he has received, and aims at great use 
of them. He says with S. Paul, "I can do all things 
through Christ strengthening me." 

But humility may cause him to think lowly of himself, 
when he considers his defects. 

Similarly, also, the magnanimous man may take a low view 
of others as they fail of the gifts of God through their own 
fault, for he does not value others so highly as to do any- 
thing unbecoming for the sake of their favour or honour. 
But in his humility he may honour others, and esteem su- 
periors so far as the gifts of God appear in them. " In his 
eyes a reprobate is despised ; but he honoureth them that 
fear the Lord " (Ps. xv. 4) . 

Firm confidence is found in the magnanimous man. 

The theological virtue of hope leads him to put his con- 
fident trust in God's lielp. This confidence of the great 
soul is in himself as uplifted by God. (Note again S. 
Paul's words quoted above.) 

The maonanimons is also secure in soul. As confidence 



412 COURAGE AMI FORTITUDE. [Qu. cxxxi. 

implies a certain strength of hope, so security implies a 
perfect freedom and rest from fear. 

Wealth is the instrument which the great soul uses for 
great deeds ; but he does not think it to be a great thing ; 
therefore he is not lifted up if he have wealth, nor is he 
greatly cast down at losing it. 

Presumption. 

I do not now mean by the word tint spiritual presump- 
tion which is a -in directly against God (page 182), but 
thai bid against natural order which consists in assuming to 
do what is beyond one*-; powers. It is not this sin to " for- 
get those things which arc behind, stretching forward to 
the things which are before " ( Phil. iii. 13) ; for what is not 
now possible in actual doing, may be potentially in the soul 
and may be reached by virtuous progn 

It is not presumptuous to aim at effecting some good 
work, though it would be so if our confidence did not rest 
on 1 >ivine aid (2 Oor. iii. •">). 

Ambition. 

This is the inordinate love of honour among men. Re- 
member that honour implies a certain reverence exhibited 

to any one for a testimony of his superiority or excellence. 
X iw man has not this from himself ; it is the gift of God ; 
therefore the chief honour is due to Ilim. Also it is to be 
remembered that this gift of God is bestowed for the benefit 
of other men. Thus, then, the love of honour is inordinate, 
first, when one seeks testimony of an excellence which he 
does not possess ; next, when he desires honour for himself 
without referring it to God ; and, lastly, when he makes his 
glory his end without referring it to others' benefit. Such 
ambition is always a sin. 

Honour is not the reward of virtue as if that reward were 
itself a virtuous thing which ought to be sought for as an 
end. The value of the reward lies in what it testifies to on 
the part of others who have no greater reward to give. 



Qu. cxxxn. 1.] VAINGLORY. 413 

Ambition in its excessive love of honour goes beyond true 
greatness of soul, as presumption does in undertaking what 
is beyond its strength. 

Vainglory : is it a sin ? 

Glory properly signifies the conspicuous manifestation of 
some one as distinguished for what is honourable among 
men, whether that be some corporeal or some spiritual good. 
But, taken more widely, glory consists not merely in the 
opinion of the world in general, but even of a few, or of a 
single individual, or even of one's self alone when he con- 
siders his own peculiar good as worthy of praise. 

But that any one know and approve his own good is 
not sin. So in 1 Cor. ii. 12, " We received, not the spirit 
of the world, but the Spirit which is of God ; that we might 
know the things which are freely given to us by God." 

Neither is it sin that any one wishes his good works to be 
approved of men. "Let your light so shine before men," 
etc. (S. Matt. v. 16). The desire of glory, therefore, in 
itself expresses nothing vicious. 

The desire of vainglory is another thing. Glory may be 
vain, (1) when the glory is sought in that which is perish- 
able (Jer. ix. 23) ; (2) when it is sought from the uncer- 
tain judgment of man (S. John v. 44) ; (3) when the love 
of glory is not referred to its due end ; viz., the honour of 
God or the good of our neighbour. 

(1) God seeks His own glory, not for His own sake, but 
for ours. And in like manner man may seek his own 
glory for the benefit of others, " that men may see his good 
works, and glorify his Father which is in heaven." 

(2) It might be said that the love of glory excites men to, 
worthy deeds, and that the Holy Scriptures themselves 
promise glory as the reward of good works (Rom. ii. 10). 
But glory before God is not vainglory. " He that glorieth, 
let him glory in the Lord ; for not he that commendeth 
himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth " (2 



414 COURAGE AND FORTITUDE. [Qu. CXXXII. 2, & 

Cor. x. 18). It is certainly true that some are provoked to 
virtuous acts from the love of human glory, as they may be 
from the desire for money or any other earthly good. But 
that man is not a truly virtuous man who does virtuous acts 
for the sake of human glory (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei. v. 12). 

(3) To seek laudable fame is not sin, provided that it 
is not sought for on its own account. For it contributes 
nothing to man's perfection. It may be sought for so far 
as it is in some way useful; cither (1) that God may be 
glorified among men: or (".') that others may imitate a 
good example: or (3) that the man himself, knowing by 
the testimony of others the good that is in him, may be 
zealous to persevere in it and go <>n to better things. So it 
is laudable to have a care for a good name and to provide 
things honourable in the Bight of God and man. This is 
not vainly delighting in the praise of men (S. John xii.43). 

True magnanimity use> honour and glory in quite an- 
other fashion. Honour, power, riches are little things in 
the righl of it. It cares more to be than to seem, more for 
truth than for Opinion. A small thing frith it is the praise 
of men. 

Vainglory, on the other hand, is contentions for small 
things because il esteems them to be of great consequence. 

Is vainglory a mortal sin? 

I answer that the sin of vainglory considered in itself 
does not seem to be contrary to charity so far as the love of 
our neighbour is concerned. But it may be contrary to the 
love of God in two ways. First, one may glory falsely. 
•• What hast thou that thou didst not receive ? But if thou 
didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not 
received it ?" (1 Cor. iv. 7). Or one may set the earthly 
good in which he glories above God. " Let not the wise 
man -lory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory 
in his might ; let not the rich man glory in his riches ; but 
let him that glorieth, glory in this that he knoweth Me " 



Qu. cxxxn. 4.] VAINGLORY. 415 

(Jer. ix. 23). Or one may prefer the testimony of men to 
the testimony of God, as the Pharisees did (S. John xii. 43). 

These regard the object of the vainglory. 

But, again, on the part of the one who glories vainly, he 
may refer his intention to glory as the ultimate end, doing 
even virtuous acts for that, and in order to obtain it not 
avoiding to do what is against God (S. John v. 44). 

But if the love of human glory, although it be vain, be 
not repugnant to charity in either of these two ways, it may 
be venial sin. 

But the Lord said (S. Matt. vi. 1), "Take heed that 
ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of 
them, else ye have no reward with your Father which is in 
heaven ; " and nothing excludes from the eternal reward 
except mortal sin. Yes ; a virtuous act has no merit as 
regards eternal life if it be done for vainglory, even if that 
vainglory be not mortal sin ; for no one by sinning is ren- 
dered fit for eternal life. But when one absolutely loses 
the eternal reward on account of vainglory, and not only 
as regards a single action, then it is mortal sin. 

Eemember, however, that vainglory is in the highest 
degree dangerous and injurious, not only on account of its 
gravity, but also because it is a preparation for grave sins, 
rendering a man presumptuous and self-confident ; and so, 
little by little, he loses the inward gifts of Grod. 

Is vainglory a capital vicef 

Some place pride among the capital sins, and these per- 
sons omit vainglory from the list. But pride may be called 
the queen of all vices, and then vainglory, which immedi- 
ately springs from it, must be regarded as a capital vice ; 
for from the inordinate desire of glory among men arise a 
numerous throng of vices. 

Observe that it is not necessary that a capital vice should 
be a mortal sin ; for this can arise from venial transgression, 
inasmuch as the latter prepares the way for the former. 



41G COUEAGE AND FORTITUDE. [QtJ. cxxxiu. 

What are the children of vainglory? Those vices which 
are naturally ordained for its end, which end is the man- 
ifestation of one's own superiority. (1) A man may aim at 
this directly in his words; this is vain boasting; or (2) he 
may aim at it in his deeds, which, if they are true and 
greatly admired, may produce the sin of ostentation (or pre- 
sumptio novitatum); (3) thedeedsmay bea false manifesta- 
tion, and so the third child of vainglory is hypocrisy; (4) 
one may indirectly try to show his superiority in mind by 
his unwillingness to receive a better judgment, which is the 
sin of obstinacy; or (.5) bis will may be in view when he 
will not give it up for the sake of harmony with others, and 
this child is discord ; or (6) the superiority may be implied 
m speech, when one clamorously disputes with others; the 
sixth child of rainglorj is contention ; and (7) lastly, vain- 
glory may produce an unwillingness to carry out a superi- 
or's command ; this child ie called disobedience. 

Pusillanimity. 

Everything which is contrary to the law of nature i- sin. 
Bui as through presumption one exceeds the proportion of 
his powers, Btriving after greater things than he hae capac- 
ity fur. bo the pusillanimous, in bis 3eeming humility, which 
is not humility at all. refusi a to aim at what is commen- 
surate with his powers. This rs unnatural, and a sin like 
presumption. Accordingly, in the Gospel the servant who 
buried in the earth the money which he had received from 
his master, out of pusillanimous fear shirking his responsi- 
bility for it, was punished at his master's return. This vice 
may arise even from pride, when one rests on his own judg- 
ment of what he is lit for or capable of. Contrast with this 
self-willed pusillanimity the true humility of Moses (Ex. iii.j, 
and Jeremiah (Jer. i.). Divinely called to holy work, they 
considered the insufficiency of their human weakness, and 
so held back. But pertinacious refusal would have been 
pusillanimous pride. 



Qu. CXXXIV.] MAGNIFICENCE AND ITS OPPOSING VICES. 417 

§ 4. Magnificence, and its opposing vices, meanness and 
wasteful extravagance. 

(Following the Nicornachean Ethics, our author gives a 
special place to the virtues and the vices of the rich. I give 
only a brief outline of his thought. — J. J. E. ) 

Magnificence 
aims to produce great works at large expense for the 
Church, for the commonwealth, for charitable purposes (as 
hospitals, orphanages, etc.). The magnificent man does not 
chiefly aim at great expense in personal outlay ; not that he 
does not seek his own good, but because that is something- 
small in comparison, as his magnanimous spirit views it. 
But when some great occasion or permanent result is in 
question, as a wedding or a suitable residence, he may show 
his magnificence in a more personal way. 

He is liberal, though every liberal man is not magnifi- 
cent, because he may not have the means for being so. He 
is such, however, in his habit of mind. 

Magnificence is a special virtue, a species of magnanimity, 
its special object being what is great in size, value, dignity. 
Its great works are for great ends ; first, of course, the hon- 
our of God ; then, the good of man. Such great works 
imply large outlays and oppose the inordinate love of money. 

Like fortitude, magnificence overcomes difficulties, not 
those of personal perils but those of large expenditure. But 
it is not the great expense which the virtue aims at, it is the 
greatness of the work. 

Meanness and extravagance are the opposite vices (the 
special vices of the rich). The mean rich man, with his 
little soul, aims at mean expense, and, consecmentiy, at 
small results. His sin consists in withholding what is ration- 
ally due to the greatness of the work presented to him. 

The vice at the opposite extreme consists in senseless 
extravagance out of all proportion to the importance of the 
16 



418 COURAGE A.TSD FORTITL'DE. [Qa. ( xxxvi. 1, 3. 

work in hand, out of ostentation and vainglory, or some 
other sinful motive. 

^ 5. Patience and perseverance, with the opposing vices. 

Is patience a virtue ? 

Moral virtues are ordained for good, preserving the good 
of reason against the assaults of the passions. But sorrow 
lias its place among those passions. "The sorrow of the 
world worketh death " (2 Cor. vii. 10). It is needful, then, 
to have .-Miir virtue through which the good of reason may 
be preserved against sorrow, lest reason give up to it. This 
virtue is patience. By it we bear evil with equanimity; 
i.e., with no disturbance from sorrow which might make 

us abandon the g 1 through which we may arrive at still 

better things (S. Am:.. I>e Patientia, c 2). The patient man 
will rather bear evil in not committing it than commit it by 
not bearing it. 

( 'an patience be had without the grace of God? 

•• Desiri a have power to produce toleration of labours and 
pains : and no our voluntarily bears what produces suffer- 
ing except for that which gives him pleasure" (8. Aug., De 
Patientia, c. -4). Therefore, thai good on account of which 
one is willing to suffer evils is more willed and loved than 
the good whose privation produces the [tain which we pa- 
tiently endure. But that any one prefer the good of grace 
to all natural goods from whose loss pain can be caused, is 
due to charity which loves God above all things. Hence, it 
is manifest that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, 
which S. Paul says (1 Cor. xiii. 4) '-suffereth long." But 
it is manifest that charity cannot be had except through 
grace (Rom. v. 5); therefore, patience cannot be had with- 
out the help of grace. 

(1) But some, through their own native strength, pa- 
tientlv endure ills on account of some evil without the aid 



Qu. cxxxvr. 3.] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 419 

of grace; "men endure many labours and pains for what 
they viciously love" (S. Aug., loc. cit.). But it is much 
more rational and natural to bear evils on account of the 
good, which is being truly patient. Therefore it seems that 
grace is not needed. I answer that rational inclination 
would prevail in man if his nature were uncorrupted. But 
in this corrupted nature of ours the inclination of concu- 
piscence prevails. And so man is more prone to endure ills 
for the goods in which concupiscence delights in the present 
hour than to bear ills for future goods which are rationally 
sought for. Yet this latter is true patience. 

(2) You may say again that some who are not in a state 
of grace abhor the evils of vices more than corporeal evils. 
Some noble heathen have endured the greatest tortures 
rather than to betray their country or commit some other 
disgraceful deed. But this is being truly patient. Yes ; 
but the good of political virtue is commensurate with human 
nature, and our will can aim at it without the help of justi- 
fying grace, though not without G-od's assistance. But the 
good of grace is supernatural, and man cannot aim at that 
by virtue of his own nature. 

(3) You may argue, again, that some for the sake of re- 
covering bodily health willingly suffer gravest pains ; but 
that the salvation of the soul is not less desirable than bodily 
health ; therefore for it, also, one can patiently bear many 
evils without the aid of Divine grace. But the toleration 
of evils which one sustains for the sake of bodily health 
comes from the natural love of one's own body. The 
patience which proceeds from supernatural love is very 
different. 

Patience is a virtue annexed to fortitude ; for both en- 
dure with equanimity the evils which come from without. 
But it is quite consistent with both these virtues that, when 
there is need, he be attacked who produces these evils. 
The patient man may be also courageous. "To be patient 
under one's own injuries is laudable, but to endure injuries 



420 COURAGE AXI) FORTITUDE. [Qu. csxxvil. 1. 

directed against God is impious." "The precepts of pa- 
tience are not contrary to the welfare of the commonwealth 
for whose preservation conflict against its enemies is carried 
on" (S. Aug., Ep. ad Marcell., 138). 

Long-suffering {longa n imitas) . 

This I define as the virtue of one who aims at what is 
long deferred. Like magnanimity, it is based on hope of 
good. But like patience, it endures presenl evils in view of 
future good, only the delay makes thai endurance still more 
difficult. Also, "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick " 
(Prov. \iii. 12); i.e., it produces sorrow which requires 
patience to sustain and constancy to continue the execution 
• 1 work. Long-suffering and constancy, therefore, 
are included La patience. 

Those who en- from infirmity rather than from fixed pur- 
pose are endured with long-suffering; this only is unen- 
durable, that they long persevere in evil; but those who 
with pertinacious mind exult in their faults, sinning 
through pride, may be endured with patience. 

/\ perseverance a special virtue ? 

Virtuous work has goodness and difficulty not only from 
the nature of the act itself, but also from the length of 
time required. Therefore, to persist long in any good 
until it reaches its consummation pertains to a special 
virtue. 

(1) S. Augustine says (De Persever. c. i.), " No one can 
be said to have perseverance while he lives ; he must perse- 
vere until death. 7 ' But we must notice that the same word 
is used for a virtue and for its act. But one may have a 
habit of virtue who is not exercising its act. And some- 
times one who has the habit begins indeed its exercise, but 
does not complete it. So a builder may begin a house and 
leave it unfinished. The word perseverance, then, is some- 
times used for the habit by which one chooses to persevere, 



Qu. CXXXVII. 3, 4] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 421 

and sometimes for the act by which one actually perseveres. 
And sometimes one who has the habit chooses indeed to 
persevere and begins to act accordingly, enduring for a time, 
but does not complete the act, because he does not perse- 
vere until the end. But there are two ends, the end of the 
work, and the end of life. Perseverance per se requires 
that one continue to the end of his virtuous work, as the 
soldier perseveres to the end of the conflict, and the mag- 
nificent to the end of his great work. 

But there are certain virtues whose acts ought to endure 
throughout our whole life ; such are faith, hope, and char- 
ity, which regard the ultimate end of our whole human 
life. In these chief virtues the act of perseverance is not 
consummated until the end of life. In this view S. Augus- 
tine uses the word for the consummated act. 

(2) But is not immovable persistence required for every 
virtue ? Yes ; for that is included in the definition of vir- 
tue ; it is a "quality with difficulty changed." But perse- 
verance aims at this as its special end, making this virtue a 
special one. 

It is a secondary virtue annexed to fortitude, sustaining 
the difficulty which comes from prolonged good work, and 
governing the passions of fear, of fatigue, or of failure 
through prolonged effort. 

Constancy 
has the same end ; but while the difficulty which persever- 
ance overcomes arises from the mere length of the act, 
constancy persists in good against other outward impedi- 
ments. 

Perseverance requires the aid of Divine grace. 

The virtuous habit needs the gift of habitual grace, as 
the other infused virtues do. But the actual perseverance 
enduring until death needs also the gratuitous aid of God, 
preserving man in good until the end of life. For free-will 



422 COURAGE AXD FORTITUDE. [Qu. cxxxvin. 

in itself is changeable, and this changeablencss is not re- 
moved from it by habitual grace in this present life. And 
thus, though free-will may choose the good, even when re- 
newed by grace it has not power to remain immovable in 
good. Choice may be in out power, but not execution of 
what we choose. 

The virtue of perseverance inclines to steadfastness ; but, 
like any other habil which one uses when he wills, it is not 
necessary thai he who has the habil use it immovably until 
death. (This requires sustaining grace.) 

But some persevere in sinful works, which are sometimes 
more difficult than virtuous action. This is true; but man 
by himself can fall into sin ; but be cannot rise again with- 
out the aid of grace. The very falling into sin, accord- 
ingly, make- bun persevere in it. unless he be liberated by 
the grace of God. Bui his doing some good thing does not. 
make him persevere in good, because In- i.- still able to sin ; 
we ueed to be "furthered by God's continual help." 

Weakness of spirit {mollities). 

This i< feebly withdrawing from good on account of its 
difficulties which are found intolerable. Bui a thing is not 
judged weak which yields to great ami overpowering force; 
nor is that man reputed weak who yields in like manner. 
What I am now speaking of is not the yielding to fear of 
perils, nor even the giving up to violent desires ; for, prop- 
erly speaking, he is weak of spirit who gives up the good 
on account of regret for absent pleasures. (This is a kind 
of effeminacy or self-indulgence. Nic. Eth. vii. 7.) 

It is due to two causes. One is habit ; for when any 
one is accustomed to self-indulgence in pleasures, it is 
harder to bear their absence. Another cause is natural 
constitution, for some are born with an effeminate dispo- 
sition. 

The pleasure-loving cannot endure the labours Avhich 
impede their enjoyment. This is another form of the same 



Qu. cxxxvin.] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 423 

sin ; or, again, excessive devotion to recreations, shrinking 
from bard works and laborious days. 

Tbe opposite vice is obstinacy or pertinacity, out of 
vainglory persisting in one's own opinion beyond rational 
measure ; or inordinately persisting in one course of con- 
duct through all difficulties (proud of being "consistent"). 



CHAPTER VII. 

TEMPERANCE: ITS ALLIED VIBTUES AMI TIIEIll OPPOSITE 
VICES. 
§ 1. Temperance. 

Is f, mperance <> virtue ? 

Human virtue is ili.it which inclines us to what is accord- 
ing to reason. Now temperance means a rational govern- 
menl of certain desires and pleasures ; it is plainly, there- 
fore, a \ irtue. 

(1) It might be objected, indeed, thai no virtue is op- 
1 to natural inclination, because there is in man a natu- 
ral aptitude for virtue, while temperance holds one hack 
from natural pleasures. 

Bui nature inclines to that which is suitable for each 
creature; ami man, accordingly, desires that gratification 
which is suitable to his nature But man as man is ra- 
tional, and consequently the pleasures which arc suited to 
his nature are those which are according to reason. Tem- 
perance does not withhold him from these, and so it does 
not oppose the inclination of human nature, hut rather har- 
monizes with it. What it does oppose is the inclination of 
bestial nature which is not subject to reason. 

(2) Again, it has been said that all the virtues are con- 
nected with one another; hut some seem to he temperate 
who lack other virtues ; they may be miserly, or cowardly, 
etc. 

But the perfect virtue of temperance cannot exist with- 
out prudence, the common ground of all the moral virtues, 
which every vicious man lacks. Those, then, who have not' 
the other virtues, but are slaves to their opposite vices, have 



Qu. CXLI. 2, 3.] TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. 425 

not the virtue of temperance, even if they lead temperate 
lives out of natural disposition or acquired habit. Such 
imperfect virtue lacks that rational ground which consti- 
tutes the perfect virtue. 

(3) To every virtue corresponds some spiritual gift ; what 
gift corresponds to temperance, if it be a virtue ? I answer, 
godly fear, by which one is restrained from sinful carnal 
pleasures. " My flesh trembleth for fear of Thee " (Ps. 
cxix. 120). 

Is temperance a special virtue 9 

The word may be used for that general moderation which 
right reason imposes on all human operations and passions, 
which is common to all moral virtues, drawing away from all 
those things which allure appetite contrary to reason. But 
in a more limited sense we now employ the word for a special 
virtue which has its special object ; viz., those desires and 
pleasures which most allure man from the rignt path, the 
rule of reason, and the Divine law. The beauty of virtue 
is especially attributed to temperance for two reasons ; first, 
because it consists in a well-governed and suitable proportion 
of things which is the very idea of beauty ; but also because 
those things which temperance restrains in man are the low- 
est part of his nature, the bestial part. By these a man is 
most debased, and temperance is comely and honourable in 
repelling that baseness. 

Temperance is concerned with sensuous concupiscences, 
their attendant pleasures, and the sorroio for the aose?ice of 



We have already seen that moral virtues defend reason 
against repugnant passions. But the motion of the passions 
is two-fold ; one, in seeking sensible and corporeal goods ; 
the other, in avoiding sensible and corporeal evils. The first 
is chiefly repugnant to reason through immoderation ; for 
sensible and corporeal goods in themselves are not repugnant 



42G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPrOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLI. 6. 

to reason, but rather serve it as instruments which reason 
uses to attain its proper end ; but they are repugnant when 
sense-appetite aims at them in an irrational manner. Here, 
then, is the office of moral virtues; sc, to govern those 
passions which seek after the good. This is the field of 
temperance, including the sorrows which arise from the ab- 
. ence of I hose pleasures. 

But if we consider the desires and pleasures of the senses, 
we find a wide difference among them. Some belong to 
the means Eor preserving the life of the individual or that 
of the race. These concern the senses of touch and taste. 
The desires and the pleasures of these senses arc the most 
vehement, and tempera nee is the \ irtue which governs them. 
Sight, bearing, even smell, belong to a higher sphere, and 
serve nobler purposes. In the brute, indeed, these higher 
- are the mere auxiliaries of the tonch and taste. And 
so far temperance in man may, consequently, direct them. 
But their proper pleasures are not connected with the pres- 
ervation of human life, and do not fall under the control of 
temperance in its restricted .sense. 

Spiritual pleasures, also, are in their own nature greater 
than corporeal pleasures ; but not being perceived by sense, 
they do not so vehemently affect sense-appetite, and do not, 
as spiritual pleasures, need to be restrained in the same way. 
Restraint is required only when they hinder another higher 
and more obligatory pleasure. 

TJie rule of temperance is based on the necessities of this 
prest at lit'-. 

Mural virtue is good in its following the order of reason. 
But this order of reason chiefly consists in its ordering for 
the end ; and the end itself is the rule for the means. Now 
all the pleasures of touch and taste have for their end some 
necessity of life. And, therefore, temperance takes this 
necessity as the rule of the pleasures which it uses, employ- 
ing those pleasures as the needs of life require. 



Qu. CXLI. 7.] TEMPERANCE. 427 

(1) But it may be objected that if corporeal necessity were 
the rule of temperance, whoever should gratify himself with 
any pleasure beyond the absolute necessity of nature, which 
is contented with very little, would exceed the rule, and sin. 

But necessity must be understood in its wider significa- 
tion. That is absolutely necessary without which a thing 
cannot in any way exist ; as food is necessary for an animal. 
But that also is necessary without which a tiling cannot 
suitably exist. And temperance has in view this kind of 
necessity as well as the first. " The temperate man feels 
moderate and proper desire for all those pleasant things 
which conduce to health or a sound habit of body " (Nic. 
Eth. iii. 11). 

But of those things which are not necessary in this second 
way some are impediments to health or good condition, and 
these the temperate uses in no manner, for that would be a 
sin against temperance. But there are others which are not 
such impediments, and these he uses moderately according 
to time and place, and conformity to those with whom he 
associates. 

(2) But it might be objected again that if bodily needs 
were the rule of temperance, whoever should employ any 
pleasure on account of bodily need, say, for the sake of 
health, would be free from sin, for no one attaining to the 
rule is sinning ; but that this is manifestly untrue. But it has 
been said that temperance views necessity according to what 
is convenient for life. Now this depends not only on what is 
fitting for the body, but also on fitness according to station 
and means of living and other outward things, and still more 
it depends on what is honourably fitting. " The temperate 
man feels the same desire for those other pleasures which do 
not hinder health, etc., which are not contrary to the hon- 
ourable nor beyond his means" (Nic. Eth., loc. cit.). 

Why is temperance called a cardinal virtue ? 

The moderation which is requisite in every virtue is espe- 



428 TEMPBEANCB AXH ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [QtT. cm.ii. 

cially laudable in the pleasures of touch and taste, both 
because such pleasures are more natural to us and therefore 
more difficult to restrain, and because their objects are more 
necessary in this present life. This fact entitles temperance 
bo a place amoDg the principal virtues. Bui in the scale of 
virtues it does Qoi rank as high as justice or fortitude, be- 
cause it is primarily Belf -regarding, and virtues are higher 
which have a higher object than our individual self. 

Insensibility, or false asceticism {insensibilitas). 

Everything which is contrary to natural order is vicious. 
r.ui oature has attached pleasure to those operations which 
are necessary for human life (or its well-being). Therefore 
natural order requires thai man use those pleasures bo faras 
--an for human conservation, whether of the individ- 
ual or of the species. If any one, therefore, should so slum 
pleasure as to avoid those things which are necessary for 
nature's preservation, he would Bin by his repugnance to the 
natural order. 

And yet from such pleasures it is sometimes laudable or 
even necessary to abstain in order to attain some end. 
Thus, for the sake of bodily health Borne abstain from some 
pleasures of eating and drinking, or from venereal pleae 
and. again, on account of some work undertaken, as athletes 
aud soldiers. In like manner, penitents for their souls' 
health use as a kind of diet abstinence from pleasures; 
and men who wish to have time for contemplation and for 
Divine things must withdraw from carnal desires. None of 
these are involved in the vice of insensibility or false asceti- 
cism, because they follow right reason. 

So Daniel in the heathen court abstained from pleasures 
of sense, not abhorring them on their own account as evil 
in themselves, but for a laudable end. 

Because man cannot use his reason without employing his 
sensuous faculties, which require a bodily organ, man must 
support his body in order to use his reason. But the body 



Qu. cxlii. 2.] INTEMPERANCE. 429 

is sustained through pleasurable operations ; and, therefore, 
the good of reason cannot exist in man if he abstain from 
all pleasures. This necessity is more or less according as 
the act of reason more or less requires the corporeal virtue. 
Therefore men who have undertaken spiritual contempla- 
tion and the labour of transmitting spiritual good to other 
men may laudably abstain from many pleasures from which 
those whose office is different laudably do not abstain. 

Intemperance.* 

Why does Aristotle (JSTic. Eth. iii. 12) call it a " childish " 
vice ? He does not mean that children are peculiarly sub- 
ject to intemperance, but he uses figurative language. In- 
temperance is the sin of excessive concupiscence, which is 
like a child in three respects : (1) Like a child, concupis- 
cence seeks what is base. Beautiful and goodly is what is 
ordained according to reason ; but, like the child, concupis- 
cence does not listen to reason. (2) If the child be left to 
his own will, he grows self-willed ; so concupiscence if sat- 
isfied increases in strength. '* While lust is served, habit is 
formed ; and while habit is not resisted, necessity is pro- 
duced " (S. Aug., Confess, viii. 5). (3) The child's amend- 
ment is brought about by coercion. " Withhold not cor- 
rection from the child. . . . Thou shalt beat him with 
the rod, and shalt deliver his soul from hell'' (Prov. xxiii. 
13). So by resisting concupiscence we bring it down to 
due limits. 

It may be said that children have only natural concupis- 
cences, in which (if Aristotle is correct, iii. 11) comparatively 
"few err, and only in excess." But " natural " here means 
what nature requires for its preservation, in the desire of 
which there is no sin except in excess. But other things in 
which sin more abounds are incitements of concupiscence 
which men have devised, as delicately prepared foods and 
the ornaments of the female sex. 

* Here used, as temperance is above, in its widest signification. 



430 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qr. CXLII. 3, 4. 

Intemperance is a graver sin than cowardice. 

For the latter is impelled by the necessity of preserving 
life, while the former is concerned with pleasures not so nec- 
essary, and most largely with tho.se which are invented and 
not strictly natural. 

And, again, grave fears and sorrows stupefy the mind, 
which pleasure dors not. Also, what is done through fear is 
not absolutely voluntary, having an exterior impulse ; while 
what is done for the sake of pleasure is simply voluntary. 
The individual pleasurable thing is chosen by the intem- 
perate, although he would not choose intemperance in 
general. 

And, again, it is easier to employ remedies against intem- 
perance than againsl cowardice; for the pleasures with 
which the former is concerned are life-long, and the temper- 
ate man ran exerl himself in the practice of his virtue; at 
all seasons, which ie not true of the other. 

77/'- sin of intemperance is most <lisgraceful (expro- 
babile). 

Reproach is opposed to honour and glory. Honour is due 
to exeellencc and reproach to intemperance, because it is 
most repugnant to the dignity of man, tending to bring him 
dowu to the level of the brutes who share the same pleas- 
ures. 

And, again, it is repugnant to that glory and beauty of the 
rational man which comes from his reason, and which intem- 
perate pleasures obscure and defile. 

(1) There are graver sins than intemperance, but carnal 
vices are of greater infamy because of their baseness. 

(2) Sins of intemperance are the most common, since 
they are concerned with the most universal desires and uses 
of human life. And so men may be less ashamed of them 
{e.g., than of cowardice) ; but though custom may dimin- 
ish the baseness and the infamy in the opinion of men, it 
does not change the nature of these vices. 



Qu. CXLIII.] TEMPEEANCE. 431 

(3) There are vices even more worthy of reproach than 
intemperance, which are most unnatural, and therefore 
most disgraceful. 

How is temperance to be divided ? 

(1) There are two conditions which must concur in order 
that the act of virtue be completely exercised ; these con- 
ditions are : (a) the sense of shame (verecundia), through 
which one shuns the baseness which is contrary to temper- 
ance ; and (b) the sense of the honourable, the becoming, 
through which one loves the beauty of temperance (partes 
integrates). 

(2) The species of temperance are : (a) abstinence respect- 
ing food, and (b) sobriety respecting drink. Respecting the 
pleasure of procreation there is (c) chastity ; and as regards 
attendant pleasures, such as kisses, touches, and embraces, 
there is (d) modesty. 

(3) There are secondary virtues which observe a similar 
limit with temperance in subordinate matter, where the lim- 
itation is not so difficult (partes potentiales). Like tem- 
perance, they put a bridle on appetite, first in the inward 
motions of the soul, next in the outward movements and 
actions of the body, and, lastly, in outward things. 

As regards the first, the will is apt to be excited by the 
impulse of passion, and (e) continence, self-restraint (con- 
tinentia), restrains this impulse ; and though one suffer 
those immoderate concupiscences, still the will is not over- 
come by them. 

Again, another inward motion is that of hope and rash- 
ness, which is governed or restrained by (/) humility. And 
the third motion is that of anger tending to vengeance, 
which is governed by (g) mildness or clemency (mansue- 
tudo). 

As regards the second, (h) a modest and decent demeanour 
governs and restrains the corporeal movements and actions, 
discerning what is to be done and what is to be left undone, 



432 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. cxliii. 1, 2. 

how it is to be done, and how intercourse with others is to 
be conducted. 

And as regards the third, (/) a judicious economy (par- 
citas) checks superfluities, and (/•) simplicity of living (sim- 
plicitas) avoids too great delicacy of epicureanism and fas- 
tidiousness. 

| 2. The sense of shame (verecundia). 

It is a fear of what is base, 
the object of reproach. But lie who is perfect according 
to virtuous habit does not view any such thing as possible 
and difficult to avoid : neither does he actually do any base 
thing from which he may dread reproach. Hence, properly 
speaking, the Bense of Bhame is Dot a virtue. But it is a 
laudable passion, and the term virtue is popularly extended 
to everything which is good and laudable in human acts or 
passions. 

The habits of virtue are "accompanied I >y deliberate 
preference" (Nic. Eth. ii. 6) ; but the sense of shame is not 
a habit, but a passion or emotion; and its action is not 
from choice but from emotional impulse. It is not ra- 
tional : it is, perhaps, 3een in some of the higher brutes. 

It has more to do with temperance than with any other 
cardinal virtue, not as a passion, for it is a species of fear, 
but as its inciting cause is what is base (which temperance 
restrains). 

But if the sense of shame implies a laudable act, do not 
many such acts form a virtuous habit ? Yes ; of an acquired 
virtue through which shameful acts are avoided, but not a 
habit of feeling shame. From that habit of acquired virtue 
one is in such condition that he would be more ashamed if 
there were cause for shame (which there is not). 

'Hie object of shame is blame or reproach. 
TTe have seen that shame is the fear of what is base. But 
there is a two-fold turpitude ; one, of vice, the deformity of 



Qi\ CXLIII. 2.] THE SENSE OF SHAME. 433 

a voluntary act. This is not the direct object of shame, for 
fear is of an evil difficult to avoid, and what is voluntary 
does not come under this description. 

But there is another turpitude, as it were, a penal turpi- 
tude, consisting in the blame of others, as glory consists in 
their honouring us. This blame is viewed as evil difficult 
to avoid, and therefore shame or the fear of turpitude pri- 
marily regards blame or reproach. And as blame is properly 
due to vice, consequently and indirectly shame applies to 
vicious turpitude. 

Hence, "men are less ashamed of defects which do not 
come from their own fault." 

But shame may have two effects ; either one may cease to 
do vicious acts on account of the fear of blame, or in the 
vicious things which he does he may avoid jmblic notice. 

(1) But sometimes those who are doing nothing base 
suffer disgrace. "For Thy sake have I suffered reproof; 
shame hath covered my face" (Ps. lxix. 7). I answer that 
shame properly regards disgrace according as it is due to 
fault, to voluntary defect. But the reproaches which are 
laid upon one on account of virtue are despised by the 
virtuous man. So the apostles '"rejoiced that they were 
counted worthy to suffer dishonour for the Name" (Acts v. 
41). 

But from imperfection of virtue it may happen that one 
is ashamed of reproaches which he receives on account of 
virtue ; whereas, growing in virtue., he learns to contemn 
outward goods and evils. So the Lord said to the right- 
eous, " Fear ye not the reproach of man, neither be ye dis- 
mayed at their reviiings " (Isa. li. 7 ; 2 Tim. i. 8). 

(2) But men are ashamed also of what is no sin. I an- 
swer that as honour, although it is not truly due to anything 
except virtue, yet is bestowed on any superiority, so, also, 
reproach, although it is properly due to fault only, yet, in 
men ; s opinion, is applied to any defect. And, therefore, 
men are ashamed of poverty, or low birth, or servitude, etc. 



434 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLIII. 4. 

(3) But sometimes men are ashamed of doing virtuous 
acts (S. Luke ix. 26). No ; not considered in themselves, 
but per accidens, owing to men's opinion of them, or 
to the wish to avoid appearance of presumption or hypoc- 
risy. 

(4) But if shame were properly of base acts, u man should 
be more ashamed of the baser acts, which is not the case. 
Men may he ashamed of light offences and glory in the 
graves! Ps. lii. 1). But sometimes it happens that graver 
sins arc i he less shameful, either because there is less turpi- 
tude in them, as spiritual sins are more grave and less shame- 
ful than carnal Bins; or because there is more temporal 
good connected with them. So a man is more ashamed of 
cowardice than <>l* rashness, and more ashamed of theft than 
of robbery (in Italy, perhaps; hardly in the United States, 
where defalcations may be condoned so readily), on account 
dt some appearance of power in them. 

Can shame be fmi ad i n a in turf nous men? 

That any evil be not feared may happen from two causes, 
either because it is not esteemed as evil, or because one docs 
not think it possible that it should reach himself, or that it 
is difficult to avoid. So shame may be absent from any one 
for two reasons; he may not regard his vices as things to 
blush at. and, in this way, men hardened in sin have no shame 
— they rather glory in their sins. But, again, one may not 
apprehend turpitude as possible for himself, or as not easy 
to avoid ; and in this way the aged and the virtuous are 
not shamefaced. But vet they are so disposed that if there 
should be in them anything disgraceful they would be 
ashamed of it. 

Shame, then, is specially found in those who occupy a 
sort of middle position, who have some love of good, but 
are not secure against vice. 

(1) But are not virtuous men ashamed of the appearance, 
at least, of evils which are not truly in them ? The virtu- 



Qu. cxlvi. 1.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 435 

ous man avoids the appearance of evil, for to do so is part 
of God's law (1 Thess. v. 22). 

(2) But shame is the fear of disgrace, and virtuous men 
may be dishonoured by being falsely defamed, or unworthily 
reproached ; therefore they may feel shame at such things. 
Yes ; the emotion of shame may, like that of any other pas- 
sion, anticipate reason ; but that gets its supremacy, and the 
virtuous man contemns infamies and reproaches which he does 
not deserve, having the "testimony of a good conscience." 

§ 3. Abstinence, fasting. 

Is abstinence a virtue? 

The word taken simply may mean deprivation of food, 
and so it expresses neither virtue nor a virtuous act, but 
something morally indifferent. But, again, it may mean 
such a voluntary deprivation regulated by reason for good 
ends ; e.g., conformity to those with whom one lives, or the 
demands of health. 

(1) "The kingdom of God," indeed, "is not meat and 
drink" (Rom. xiv. 17). "Meat will not commend us to 
God ; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse ; nor if we 
eat, are we the better" (1 Cor. viii. 8). 

But either of these, if it rationally spring from faith and 
God's love, does pertain to the kingdom of God. 

(2) But is not this rather a matter of dietetic science than 
of moral virtue ? Yes ; if you think simply of the bodily 
health. But if you consider the inward affections in rela- 
tion to a rational good, the governing of the appetite for 
food pertains to the virtue of abstinence ; and S. Augustine 
well says (Qusest. Evang. ii. 11), "Virtue is not concerned 
with what one eats, or how much he eats, provided that he 
does so in conformity with those with whom he associates, 
and the demands of his own health. But virtue is con- 
cerned with the readiness and serenity of mind with which 
he goes without those things, whenever it is fitting or need- 
ful to do so." 



436 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVII. 1. 

(3) But it is said that impatience and pride are fostered 
by abstinence; can one virtue injure another? No; those 
vicious acts come from irrational abstinence. Right reason 
makes one abstain as he ought; sc, with cheerfulness of 
spirit and for good reason, sc, for God's glory, not for one's 
own. 

Abstinence is a special virtue, because the special pleas- 
ures of the table naturally tend to withdraw man from 
rational good, both because those pleasures are great and 
because they are connected with the most pressing needs 
of life. 

Is fasting mi act of virtual 

An acl is virtuous which is ordained through reason to 
some honourable good.. Such the act of fasting may be. 
1 1 ) 1 1 is done to repress fleshlv concupiscences (2 Cor. vi. 5); 
(2) it is doue thai the mind may In- more freely elevated to 
contemplate t he mosl exalted things ( 1 ►an. x. 3); (3) it is done 
as a "satisfaction "' for sins, as the Lord commands, saying 
(Joel ii. 12), "Turn ye unto Me with all your heart, and 
with fasting,'' etc. "Fasting purifies the soul, uplifts the 
mind, subjects the flesh to the spirit, makes the heart con- 
trite and humble, disperses the clouds of concupiscence, ex- 
tinguishes the fires of lusts, kindle- the true light of chas- 
tity" (S. Aug.. Serm. De Orat. et Jejun., 230 De Temp.). 

(1) If fasting is a virtuous act, why is it not always ac- 
ceptable with God ? (Isa. Iviii. 3). Because an act which in 
its kind is virtuous may become vicious from some of its 
attendant circumstances. So it is found in Isaiah's proph- 
ecy just referred to : "'Behold, in the day of your fast ye 
find your own pleasure, ... ye fast for strife and 
contention," etc. 

(2) This is not a question of quantity of food, as such, 
but of right reason. And reason judges that, for special 
cause, one may take less food than he ordinarily does ; e.g., 
to avoid sickness, to accomplish more expeditiously some 



Qa. cxlvii. 3.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 437 

undertaking, and much rather to avoid spiritual evils and 
to attain spiritual goods. 

But right reason does not subtract so much food that 
nature cannot be 'preserved. " It makes no difference 
whether you destroy yourself in a long or in a short time, 
because he offers a sacrifice from robbery who immoderately 
afflicts his body by too great lack of food or sleep" (S. 
Jerome). In like manner, right reason does not subtract 
so much food that a man is rendered incapable of doing 
the work set before him in life. S. Jerome, therefore, says 
again, "A rational man loses worthiness (dignitas) who 
prefers fasting to charity, or vigils to the integrity of his 



If, then, we use the word " abstinence " for the virtue 
under discussion, fasting is the act of that virtue. " Fast- 
ing from sin" is a figure of speech, meaning the abstaining 
from all injurious things, among which sins are included. 

Is fasting commanded? Is it an obligation? 

As the state has power to lay down statutes determinative 
of the law of nature in what concerns the common earthly 
utility, so the Church has power to lay down laws which 
pertain to the common benefit of the faithful in spiritual 
goods. 

Now, fasting is useful to restrain and remove sin, and to 
raise the mind to spiritual things. And each one is bound 
by natural reason to use fasting so far as it is needful to him 
for these purposes. Fasting, in general, then, falls under 
the precepts of the law of nature. But the determination 
of the time and mode of fasting according to what is con- 
venient and useful for Christian people falls under the pre- 
cepts of positive law laid down by the Church. 

(1) But if fasting is obligatory according to law, must 
it not everywhere and always be equally observed by all ? 
Understand that fasting, in itself, is not desirable but it 
is medicinal or penal ; it is rendered eligible by its being 



438 TEMPERANCE AN'l) ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. I xi.vn. 4. 

useful to sonic other end. Therefore, absolutely considered, 
it is not obligatory, but it is so for each one who needs such 
a remedy. Men in genera] do need it—'- In many things wo 
all -nimble (S. Jas. iii. 2); and. "the flesh lusteth against 
the spirit" (G-al. \. 17) — and, therefore, it was fitting that 
the Church decree 3ome fasts bo be observed by all, not as 
commanding thai which is superfluous, but as determining 
in a Bpecial way what is necessary in general. 

('.') But whoever transgresses against a commandment is 
guilty of mortal sin: if , then, fa-ting be commauded, do 
nol all who break a fas! incur the loss of salvation ? Thus 
a great suare Beeras to be sel for human feet. I answer that 
precepts sei forth as general statutes do nol bind all in the 
same manner, but as the end requires wlneli the law-giver 
has in mind, [f any one, in breaking the statute, contemn 
bis authority, or hinder the end which thai law-giver has 
in new, he Bins mortally. But if from some reasonable 
cause he does nol observe the statute, especially when the 
law-giver, if he were present, would not enforce it, such 
transgression is nol mortal sin. Not all who do not keep 
the fasts of the Church sin mortally. Such persons may 
e\en, in good faith, think that they have sufficient cause for 
nol observiug the fast when such is not the case. Then 
there is no mortal sin, no intention of breaking the law of 
t he < 'hurch. 

(3) Church laws respecting fasting are not contrary to 
Christian liberty bur rather in its favour by impeding the 
servitude of sin (Gal. v. 13). 

Are all, then, bound to keep the fasts of the Church? 

General laws are propounded according to the needs of 
the people as a whole. But if any special case arise which 
is repugnant to the observance of the law, the legislator 
does not intend to lay obligation in that case. 

Discretion, however, is to be used. For if the case be 
perfectly evident, a man may lawfully at once set aside the 



Qu. cxlvii. 4.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 439 

observance of the statute in his case, especially if supported 
by custom, or if it be not possible to have ready recourse to 
authority in the question. 

But if the case be doubtful he ought to refer it to a supe- 
rior who has power of dispensation. This general principle 
applies to fasts instituted by the Church, to which all are 
obliged unless some special impediment exist. 

(1) But the precepts of the Church are of obligation like 
those of God; for the Gospel says, "He that heareth you 
heareth Me" (S. Luke x. 16), and all are bound to keep the 
commands of God ; therefore, all are bound to observe the 
fasts instituted by the Church. I reply that the command- 
ments of God are those of natural law which, in themselves, 
are necessary to salvation. But positive Church laws are 
of things not per se necessary to salvation, but only as or- 
dained by the Church. And, therefore, there can be im- 
pediments — weakness, necessity, greater good incompatible 
with fasting — on account of which some persons are excused 
from fasting. 

(2) What shall we say of children ? In them, most of 
all (we may add, in the aged, also), there is evidently good 
reason for not fasting. Their feebleness makes them need 
to take food more frequently than older persons, though 
little at a time. Besides, they are growing, and need more 
food on that account. As long, then, as they are growing, 
they are not bound to observe the Church fasts. Still, it is 
convenient that even at that age they be exercised in self- 
denial suited to their tender years, which can be done with- 
out injury to health, if not rather beneficially. 

(3) What shall we say of labourers and travellers ? Are 
not spiritual things, such as the spiritual benefit of fasting, 
to be preferred to the temporal profits of bodily labour ? 
Are not necessary things, like the statutes of the Church, to 
be preferred to unnecessary things, like travelling for pleas- 
ure, for profit, or even for spiritual ends ? I answer that 
here we must make a distinction. If the travel or labour 



440 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qc cxlvii. 5. 

can be conveniently deferred or decreased without detriment 
to bodily health and what is required for the preservation of 
the bodily and spiritual life, the fasts of the Church are not 
to be omitted. But if there be need of making the journey 
immediately, and of taking food accordingly, or if exhaust- 
ing bodily labour be imperative, whether for corporeal sup- 
port or for something essential to spiritual life (e.g., long 
journeys with many sermons and addresses), and with these 
the lasts of the Church cannot be observed, a man is not 
bound to fast, because it does not seem to have been the in- 
tention of the church in appointing them that through this 
other pious and more necessary things should be hindered. 
1 ma, however, that in such cases recourse should ho 

had to the dispensation of authority, unless where custom 
has already settled the matter. For the silence of those in 
an; horny seems to give consent. 

(Note thai the author, familiar with a mild climate, takes 
no accounl of such an inclement winter as that of the North- 
ern United States and Canada. In a Lent when the ther- 

] neter is below the zero of Fahrenheit, ami may vary 

thirty or forty degrees in an hour, the rules which would 
suit Italy would he evidently out of place according to that 
"righi reason" which is called "common sense." Absti- 
nence from flesh on the coast of Labrador might require a 
supply of canned vegetables !— J. J. E.) 

Days and seasons of fasting. 

The author only notices Lent, the ember-days, and the 
vigils of certain feasts. The American Church omits all 
vigils, but, like some parts of the Latin Church, add- the 
rogation days, and, like the whole Latin Church, all Fri- 
days in the year, unless Christmas should fall on one of 
them, which one is an exception. The fast of Lent, says 
S. Thomas Aquinas, besides its general purpose of purify- 
ing the soul from sin and lifting it up to God in devotion, 
has special relation to preparing the faithful for a devout 



Qu. CXLVII. 5.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 441 

Easter. The ember-days are based on the Lord's own ex- 
ample (S. Luke vi.), and are primarily for those who confer 
and those who receive Holy Orders, but secondarily for the 
people in whose behalf Holy Orders are conferred. 

Our rubric, indeed, names only two fasts, sc, Ash 
Wednesday and Good Friday, but calls all the others men- 
tioned " days of fasting," and indicates one of the objects 
of fasting ; sc, " abstinence suited to extraordinary acts and 
exercises of devotion/' Abstinence seems to be used, not 
as S. Thomas Aquinas employs it, for the virtue of which 
fasting is a manifestation, but as a modified form of fasting 
itself. Its connection with penitence is implied, not clearly 
expressed. 

But certainly it should not be overlooked that the Amer- 
ican Church claims her right to make positive laws having 
Divine sanction and binding conscience, an authority as 
explicitly asserted as by any civil government or any other 
part of the Catholic Church. " The Church requires such 
a measure of abstinence," etc. 

Our author gives three articles to the rules of fasting 
as they existed in the Western Church of his age ; sc, one 
meal only each day, at about three P.M., with abstinence 
from flesh, eggs, milk, and its products. Wine and spiritu- 
ous drinks are not included in the prohibition (" potus non 
solvit jejuniwm"), on the ground that the stimulus is tran- 
sitory, while the solid food prohibited, in addition to its nu- 
tritive qualities, is more stimulating to animal desires than 
other food is. 

It is evident that these rules of fasting are widely differ- 
ent from those of the early Church, and are not those of 
the Latin Church to-day. And I name the Latin Church, 
because the Anglican Church lays .down no positive law 
beyond the general statement that she requires such a meas- 
ure of abstinence as is more especially suited to extraor- 
dinary acts and exercises of devotion. 

First, then, as regards the time for ending the fast. The 



442 TEMPEKANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVII. 5. 

hour for the breakfast, "dejeuner," being in the author's 
age near noon, as is still common in Latin countries, with 
some coffee or chocolate and a light solid addition, "not 
exceeding four ounces on days of fasting/' and the hour for 
breaking the fast on days of fasting being about three p.m., 
the special fast would be about three hours in duration. 
This, with our habits, would bring the principal meal of the 
day on or a little before noon. 

Such was the rule of the Western Church in the middle 
ages ; one meal only in twenty-four hours. S. Thomas 
Aquinas knows nothing of an allowed "collation," or half 
meal, in the evening, unless it exchange with the other, and 
become a light breakfast at noon, with a full dinner in the 
evening. 

Little need be added concerning the kind of food on days 
of abstinence. The object of Church fasts being in part to 
repress carnal concupiscences, whenever the Church has 
laid down express rules, those articles of food have been 
partially or altogether interdicted which are most pleas- 
ant and most stimulating. There is more superfluous nu- 
triment in a dinner of flesh meat than in an equal quan- 
tity of fish ; other things being equal, the former is 
more agreeable, although very delicate dishes may in this 
regard evade the intention of the law while its letter is 
observed. 

On the same grounds, it is a more rigid abstinence to 
refrain from eggs, milk, and its products. If such stricter 
abstinence be observed at all, it belongs to Lent as a time 
of more rigid fasting. 

So far we may follow in our author's steps. Of stimulat- 
ing condiments and superfluous luxuries on the table he 
says nothing. 

Finally, in the absence of explicit law, it is evident that 
episcopal or pastoral counsel is the only guide in addition 
to a Christian man's sober judgment. 



Qu. cxlviii. 1, 2.] GLUTTONY. 443 

§ 4. Gluttony, sobriety, ebriety. 

Is gluttony (gula) a sin ? 

It is the inordinate appetite of eating and drinking. 
Now, that appetite is inordinate which departs from that 
rational order in which the good of moral virtue consists. 
Anything is sin which is contrary to virtue ; therefore glut- 
tony is a sin. 

(1) The Lord said (S. Matt. xv. 11), "Not that which 
entereth into the mouth, defileth a man ; " i.e., food accord- 
ing to its own substance and nature has no spiritual influ- 
ence. But inordinate concupiscence of food and drink 
does spiritually defile a man. 

(2) But no one sins in what lie cannot avoid ; and "who 
is there who does not take some food beyond the limits of 
necessity?" (S. Aug., Confess, x. 31). But understand 
that the vice of gluttony does not consist in the quantity 
of food which is taken, but in a concupiscence not regulated 
by reason. And, therefore, if any one exceed in quantity of 
food or drink, not through concupiscence but through mis- 
taken judgment, that is not due to gluttony but to igno- 
rance. Gluttony is found when the pleasures of the table 
lead one consciously to exceed his proper limit. 

(3) But the first motion of sin partakes of the nature of 
sin, while there is no sin at all in hunger and thirst. Yes ; 
but man has two kinds of appetites ; one which belong to 
his "vegetative" soul, in which there cannot be virtue or 
vice, because they are not subject to reason. Such appe- 
tites are hunger and thirst. 

But there are other appetites which belong to the sensu- 
ous nature, and the first beginnings of inordination in these 
"have the nature of sin." (See the 9th Anglican "Ar- 
ticle of Eeligion.") 

Is gluttony a mortal sin ? 
, The order of reason in regulating concupiscence admits 
of a two-fold view. Either it regulates the means to the 



444 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVIII. 3. 

end when they are not duly proportioned to that end, or it 
looks to the end itself when concupiscence turns a man 
away from his due end. 

If, then, the inordinate desire in the form of gluttony 
turn one away from the ultimate end, gluttony is a mortal 
sin (S. Luke xxi. 34 ; Eom. xiii. 13 ; Gal. v. 21). This 
happens when a man is so addicted to the pleasures of the 
table as his end ("his god is his belly") that he despises 
God, being ready to act against God's commandments in 
order to obtain his gratifications. 

But if the inordinate concupiscence only concern the 
means to an end — namely, that one too much desires the 
pleasures of the table, but still would do nothing against 
God's law on this account — it is venial sin.* 

(1) Not all mortal sins are directly against the Deca- 
logue, but only those which contain injustice. 

(2) Gluttony, in turning one away from the ultimate end 
of man, is contrary to charity. This makes it mortal sin. 

Is gluttony the greatest of sins ? 

(Be careful to note that the word in popular use is lim- 
ited to one very gross manifestation of this sin. In Moral 
Theology Ave look, also, at the more refined sins of society, 
all " revelling and drunkenness," all epicurean sensuality. 
See the next article. ) The gravity of a sin depends upon 
three considerations : first, and principally, the subject 
matter (materia) of the sin. From this point of view sins 
respecting Divine things are the greatest sins. And the 
vice of gluttony is not the greatest, for it concerns things 
which belong to bodily sustenance. But next is to be con- 
sidered the one who sins : and in this regard the sin of 



* Gluttony and intemperance, then, are mortal sins when they are 
injurious to the health of body or soul, when they prevent the fulfil- 
ment of duties and obligations. Observe that, as producing physical 
diseases, the remedy is physical as well as spiritual. 



Qu. cxlviii. 4-6.] GLUTTONY. 445 

count of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the 
difficulty of distinguishing and controlling what is fitting 
in such matters. Thirdly, we are to consider the resulting 
effects. And in this respect gluttony is a very grave sin, 
inasmuch as it is the parent of various mortal sins — e.g., 
lust, proud boastings, contentions, quarrels, etc. 

(1) The penalties of this sin are many and great, either 
on account of its cause, as in the expulsion from Paradise, 
or by reason of the sins which follow from it. 

(2) A man injures himself by this sin ; but this is acci- 
dental so far as he is concerned. He does not intend to in- 
jure himself, but to gratify his appetite; and yet the sin is 
aggravated by tbe injurious consequences, which could be 
foreseen. 

Diverse circumstances distinguish diverse species of this 
sin. Inordinate concupiscence may be marked by the kind 
of food, an epicurean searcb for dainties, or over nicety in 
their preparation, or excess in their quantity; or, again, in 
the very act of taking food, the unseasonable time, or the 
eagerness, which does not proceed from hunger, but from 
this sin. 

Gluttojiy is a capital sin. 

Let it be remembered that from a capital vice other vices 
spring having it for their final cause, inasmuch as it is an 
end greatly sought for, and hence from desire of it men are 
excited to sin in manifold ways. ISTow, an end is greatly 
desired which promises some sort of felicity, as pleasure 
does. And as the pleasures of touch and taste are the chief 
sensual pleasures, the vice of gluttony takes its place (with 
lust) among the capital sins. Food, indeed, is naturally 
sought for as means to an end — sc, the preservation of 
human life — and a large part of human labour is devoted 
to this necessary end. But the sin of gluttony is directed 
to the pleasures of food rather than to food in itself. 

But a capital sin, which has an end in the highest degree 



44G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE YICES. [Qu. CL. 1. 

sought for, does not necessarily take the highest place in the 
catalogue of sins. Its children are five — foolish gladness, 
scurrility, filthiness, gabbling words, dulness of mind. 

Sobriety. 

In a general sense the word is applied to various matters 
(as in Tit. ii. 12), but, used more strictly, it applies to the 
well-governed use of drinks whose excess can intoxicate. 
And it is a special virtue, because it removes a special im- 
pediment to reason. 

Is the use of wine altogether unlawful ? 

The apostle implies a negative in what he says to Timothy 
(1 Tim. v. 23), " Be no longer a drinker of water, but use a 
little wine/' etc. No food or drink is in itself unlawful, ac- 
cording to the Lord's words (S. Matt. xv. 11), " Not that 
which entereth into the mouth defileth a man." Still, per 
accidens, drinking wine can become unlawful ; sometimes 
from the condition of the drinker, if wine easily injure him, 
or he have made a vow not to touch it ; sometimes from the 
manner of using it, when it is taken immoderately ; and 
sometimes with reference to other men (especially in many 
parts of the United States), if they are scandalized by its 
use (Eom. xiv. 21). 

When the apostle says (Tit. ii. 6), "Young men likewise 
exhort to be sober-minded,"' he intimates that the young 
have special need of this virtue for the restraining of con- 
cupiscences. But when he commands the aged men to be 
temperate (Tit. ii. 2), and says (1 Tim. iii. 3) that a bishop 
must be temperate and sober-minded, he intimates that they 
have special need of a clear head and of restraining what 
impedes the use of reason. 

Ebriety. — Is drunkenness a sin? 

It may mean the penal defect brought about through 
excess in intoxicating drinks which take away the use of 



Qu. cl. 2.] EBRIETY. 447 

reason ; or " ebriety " may mean the act by which any one 
puts himself in such a condition, which may happen in more 
than one way. From inexperience of the strength of the 
drink, ebriety may happen without any fault on the part of 
him who uses it, especially if there have been no negligence 
on his part. Thus Noah may have become intoxicated 
through inexperience in the strength of wine. 

But, again, inebriation may be a species of gluttony, aris- 
ing from inordinate concupiscence as well as the use of the 
wine. This is a sin, for there are two species of gluttony, 
revelling and drunkenness. 

The resulting defect is involuntary, for no one wishes to 
be drunk ; but the immoderate use of intoxicating drink, in 
which consists the sin, is voluntary. 

What shall we say of him who offers wine to another ? 
He may be ignorant of the condition of his neighbour, un- 
aware of any evil result ; certainly he does no wrong act. 
But if he does know this, both are sinning, the one in offer- 
ing as the other in taking what produces the evil result. 

Is ebriety a mortal sin ? 

If one be ignorant of the strength of the drink, and that 
what he takes is immoderate, there is no sin at all. Or he 
may notice that the quantity is great, immoderate, but not 
suppose that its strength will affect him ; then ebriety may 
be venial sin. Or, again, both circumstances may be observed 
— sc, the immoderation and the strength — and yet one may 
choose rather to be intoxicated than to abstain from drink- 
ing. Such a one is properly an inebriate, because mortal sins 
get their character from the intention. Such inebriation is 
mortal sin, because a man willingly and knowingly deprives 
himself of the use of reason by which he may do good works 
and decline from sin. It is mortal sin to commit one's self 
consciously to the peril of sinning mortally. 

(Qu. : May one submit to his physician, who designs to 
produce this result as beneficial in dangerous sickness ?) 



448 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CL. 3, 4. 

Is ebriety the gravest of sins ? 

The greater the good which is taken away by any evil, 
the greater is that evil. But it is manifest that Divine good 
is greater than human good. Therefore sins which are 
directly against God, are graver than intoxication, which is 
directly opposed to the good of human reason. 

(1) S. Ohrysostom says that nothing is such a friend to 
the devil as ebriety and lasciviousness ; but this is true not 
because they are graver than other sins, but because they are 
most common, men being prone to them through concupis- 
cences which originate in their nature. 

(2) But a thing is called sin because it excludes the good 
of reason, which is what ebriety does in the highest degree. 
But the evil is greater in what is contrary to reason than in 
what temporarily takes away its use. For the use of reason 
which inebriation takes away may be either good or bad ; 
but the good of virtues which is taken away by what is con- 
trary to reason is always good. 

Does intoxication excuse from sin? 

Distinguish once more between the resulting evil and the 
preceding act. So far as the resulting defect which hin- 
ders the use of reason is concerned, ebriety excuses from sin, 
because through ignorance it causes the involuntary. 

And, again, we must make a distinction as regards the 
preceding act. For if the inebriation followed from it with- 
out sin (say, altogether inadvertently, involuntarily, as may 
have been the case with Lot), then the resulting sin is en- 
tirely exculpated. 

But if the preceding act (the taking intoxicating drink) 
was culpable, then the resulting sin is not wholly excusable, 
because it is rendered voluntary by the preceding voluntary 
act, and inasmuch as the sin is the consequence of being 
engaged in au illicit act. 

But the resulting sin is diminished in guilt, as the vol- 
untary is diminished. 



Qu. CLI. 1, 2.] CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 449 

(1) But the inebriate may be twice punished ; i.e., heavily 
punished once for the crime of drunkenness, and again for 
the injury done when he is drunk. And the public utility 
which requires the repression of injuries may justly be very 
strict in this matter. 

(2) We are not making one sin an excuse for another ; 
but the loss of reason and self-control, the resulting defect, 
is viewed as partial excuse. 

(3) Concupiscence is no excuse for sin, because it does 
not totally hinder the use of reason, as intoxication does ; 
and yet passion may diminish sin, because sins of infirmity 
are less than sins of malice. 



§ 5. Chastity, modesty, virginity. 
_ Is chastity a virtue ? 

Since chastity signifies the government of the concupis- 
cence of venereal pleasures according to the dictates of right 
reason, it is manifestly a special virtue, having its special 
subject. So it is opposed to the vice of lust. It governs 
the body, indeed, but its immediate subject is the inward 
motions of special concupiscences. The body may be vio- 
lated by violence, but if the soul remain inviolate, the 
violence of another's lust cannot take away even the sanc- 
tity of the body (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei, i. 18). 

The bodily purity of an unbeliever is not truly the per- 
fect virtue of chastity, for it is not referred to its due end ; 
and virtues are distinguished from vices, not by their acts 
but by their ends. " One is not truly virtuous unless he be 
righteous ; and he is not truly righteous unless he live by 
faith"' (S. Aug., Contra Julian, v. 3). 

But the word chastity, like its correlative, "fornication,"' 
has in Scripture use a wider and metaphorical signification. 
For in the union of the soul with certain things there are 
pleasures which may be admitted or resisted or restrained. 
(See 2 Cor. xi. 2, and Jer. iii. 1.) 
28 



450 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLII. 2. 

We have considered temperance as applicable to all pleas- 
urable desires of the senses of touch and taste. Abstinence 
was one species of temperance, referring to the pleasures of 
the table, the actions by which the individual is preserved. 
Now we have another species of temperance, relating to the 
actions by which the human race is preserved. 

Modesty 
applies not only to the acts which chastity governs, but to 
any signs of them, as immodest looks, kisses, embraces. 
Modesty, then, is not a distinct virtue, but a certain circum- 
stance of the virtue of chastity. (Every chaste person is also 
modest.) Shame has reference to every base act, but most 
of all to those which have most turpitude as least under 
reason's control. Thus shame and reproach reach their 
climax in the sphere of modesty. 

Virginal chastity 
is not so much bodily purity as the fixed purpose of the 
soul to abstain perpetually from venereal pleasures. The 
" material" part is the sensible pleasures which are re- 
nounced; the "formal" part is the purpose of the mind 
(which purpose is the essence of any moral act). 

If, then, those pleasures are experienced contrary to the 
consent of the mind and its fixed purpose, through violence, 
or in sleep, or from infirmity of nature, the essence of vir- 
ginity is not lost, because such pollution does not happen 
through lewdness, which virginity excludes. 

Is virginity illicit ? 

In human acts, that is vicious which is against right rea- 
son. But this demands that one use the means for any end 
in such measure as agrees with that end. Now, man's good 
is three-fold ; first, outward things, like riches; next, cor- 
poreal goods ; and, lastly, spiritual goods, among which those 
of the contemplative life are superior to those of the active 



Qu. CLII. 2.J CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 451 

life (Nic. Eth. x. 7), as the Lord said (S. Luke x. 43), 
" Mary hath chosen the good part/' 

Of these goods the outward are ordained for the service of 
the body ; and those of the body for the soul ; and those of 
the active life for the contemplative life. 

Eight reason, then, uses each of these in its proper place. 
Hence if any one abstain from possessing anything which it 
would be otherwise a good to possess in order that he may 
provide for his bodily health or attend to the contemplation 
of the truth, this is not vicious, but is according to right 
reason. 

In like manner, if any one abstain from corporeal pleasures 
in order that he may more freely contemplate the truth, he 
follows right reason. But for this purpose holy virginity 
abstains from all venereal pleasures, in order that it may 
give itself with less distraction to Divine contemplation ; for 
the apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 34), " She that is unmarried is 
careful for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both 
in body and in spirit ; but she that is married is careful for 
the things of the world, how she may please her husband." 

No sin can lawfully be counselled, But virginity is coun- 
selled (1 Cor. vii. 25). Therefore -it is not illicit. 

(1) But is not everything which is contrary to nature's 
laws illicit ? And is not the law of nature promulgated in 
Gen. i. 28, viz., "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish 
the earth " ? And, therefore, as he would sin who should 
abstain from all food to his own injury, does not he sin who 
violates this command, against the good of the race ? 

I answer that an obligation may be due in either of two 
ways ; either it must be fulfilled by each one, and can be 
omitted by none without sin ; or it may be due from the 
people as a whole, and then each one of that multitude is 
not bound to such fulfilment. For many things are neces- 
sary for the people as a whole which no one of them is 
sufficient for, but which are in part accomplished by one, 
in part by another. 



452 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLII. 3. 

The precept of the law of nature concerning eating must 
necessarily be obeyed by every one. But the precept con- 
cerning the continuation of the human race regards the 
multitude, which needs not only this, but also spiritual ad- 
vancement. Therefore the continuance of the race is suffi- 
ciently provided for by the great mass of the community 
who are married ; but the glory and beauty and salvation of 
the race may be promoted by those who, abstaining from 
marriage, have more leisure for the contemplation of Divine 
things. Thus in an army some guard the camp, some carry 
standards, some use the rifle, some look after the wounded 
— all these things are due for the whole and from the whole, 
but they cannot be fulfilled by one. 

(2) But is not this going to extremes — sc, instead of 
moderating pleasures, abstaining from them altogether ? It 
would be so if it were done contrary to right reason, as by 
one abhorring pleasures in themselves, an unnatural savage. 
But we are not considering such an abstinence. 

Is virginity a virtue f 

Its essence is the purpose spoken of above, and that pur- 
pose is rendered laudable by the end ; sc, the having leisure 
for Divine things. Virginity, therefore, is a virtue, and a 
special one having its own material part. It is related to 
chastity as magnificence is to liberality ; the one more gen- 
eral, the other of rarer obligation, but of special excellence. 

We have seen (see page 73) that he who has one virtue 
has all, which seems to present a difficulty ; sc, that none 
but virgins can enter the kingdom of heaven. This, of 
course, is only apparent difficulty, for the connection of 
virtues does not depend upon their outward ("material") 
part but on their inward essence ("formal part") ; they are 
united in charity or prudence. A virtuous man may have 
opportunity for the exercise of one virtue who has not for 
another, as the poor can practise temperance but not mag- 
nificence. So the virtuous man may be prepared in mind 



Qu. CLIX. 4, 5.] CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 453 

for the virginal state if it were permitted to him, even as 
one in prosperity is prepared to bear adversities with equa- 
nimity ; and without this preparation of mind no one can 
be a virtuous man. 

Penitence does not undo the consequences of sin. If the 
magnificent man have wasted his goods, penitence will not 
restore them. So he who has violated his purpose of vir- 
ginity by yielding to fleshly pleasures can never be as though 
he had not sinned ; but penitence may restore the broken 
purpose, the essence of the virtue. 

If virginity mean a pious and rational jiurpose of remain- 
ing unwedded — a virtuous purpose — it is evident that it can- 
not be lost without sin. 

Is virginity a higher state than conjugal continence f 

The apostle (1 Cor. vii. 33, seq.) makes virginity a matter 
of counsel as being a greater good ; and this with reason, 
both because divine good is higher than human good, and 
the good of the soul is preferable to corporeal good 5 and be- 
cause the good of the contemplative life is preferable to that 
of the active life. 

Now, religious virginity is ordained for the good of the 
soul in a contemplative life, " caring for the things of the 
Lord •" while marriage is ordained, first, for earthly good, 
the increase of the human race, and, next, for the active 
life, because the wedded pair must necessarily be "careful 
for the things of the world." 

Although virginity is in itself better than conjugal con- 
tinence, yet the wedded may be better than the virgin, both 
in the prepared mind, and in other superior saintliness. 

Is virginity the highest of virtues f 

It is so in its kind ; i.e., as respects chastity, it is superior 
to that of widows or of the married. But absolutely it is 
not so. For the end always excels the means to that end ; 
and the more efficaciously a thing is ordained for the end, 



454 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLIII. 1, 3. 

the better it is. But the end which alone renders vir- 
ginity laudable is freedom for Divine things. Hence, the 
theological virtues and the virtue of religion, whose acts are 
about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. The vir- 
gins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because 
they most closely in that regard imitate Christ, but other 
virtues make them come nearer to God by spiritual saint- 
liness. 

§ 6. Lust (luxuria). 

Lust is inordinate desire of venereal pleasures. In a 
more general sense it is extended to excess in other sensuous 
pleasures. 

These pleasures are not necessarily sinful. 

Sin in human acts, as has been often said, is what is con- 
trary to the order of reason. This order of reason ordains 
each thing suitably to its end. Therefore there is no sin if 
the end be good, and if the means be used as reason dic- 
tates, in fitting manner and order. But as it is a good that 
the corporeal nature of the individual be preserved, so it is a 
superior good that the human species be preserved. And, 
therefore, as the use of food is free from sin if it be em- 
ployed in due manner and order, so, also, the marriage bed 
in due manner and order for the ends of its institution. 

But among the works of the flesh are enumerated (Gal. 
v. 19) the sins of lust. The more necessary a thing is, the 
more the order of reason must be preserved in it ; and, con- 
sequently, the more vicious it is if the order of reason be set 
aside. But lust exceeds the order and manner of reason in 
venereal pleasures ; therefore, it is a sin. 

Man is not the absolute lord of his own body. "Ye are 
not your own, for ye were bought with a price ; glorify God, 
therefore, in your body" (1 Cor. vi. 20). He that inordi- 
nately, through lust, abuses his body, does injury to God, 
who is the Lord of our body. 



Qu. cliv. 2.] LUST. 455 

Lust is a capital sin. 

For it has an end greatly sought after, through desire of 
which man proceeds to perpetrate many sins, which all 
spring from that fountain of vice. The end of lust is vene- 
real pleasure in sense-appetite, most sought after, both on 
account of its vehemence, and on account of its being a 
" connatural " concupiscence. 

Its children are blindness of mind, want of consideration, 
rashness, inconstancy, selfishness, hatred of God, love of the 
world, dread and despair of the future state (Eph. iv. 19), 
disorders of both reason and will.* 

Sins of lust may be sins against nature when the produc- 
ing of offspring is prevented ; or the due bringing up of 
children is hindered, as in fornication ; or the honour due 
to another is violated, as in incest ; or injury is done to an- 
other's right, as in adultery, seduction, or rape. Here are 
six species of these sins of uncleanness and lasciviousness. 

Is simple fornication a mortal sin ? 

The Word of God directly answers that question. " They 
which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God " 
(Gal. v. 21). Every sin which is committed directly against 
the life of man is mortal. But fornication is an inordinate 
act which tends to the injury of that life which would nat- 
urally proceed from such sexual intercourse of the unmar- 
ried with the unmarried. For the due rearing of the human 
child not only the mother's care is required, but even more 
that of the father, by whom the child is to be supported 
and protected. We may find the law of nature even in 
beasts, where father and mother are both needed for the off- 
spring, and promiscuous concubinage is not found. Still 

* Its antidotes are, (a) flight from temptation , from the places, the 
persons, the things which produce temptation; (b) hard work, producing 
moderate fatigue; (c) judicious asceticism; (d) receiving the Holy Com- 
munion. 



45G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. cliv. 3. 

more is promiscuous concubinage contrary to the nature 
of man. His nature requires that he remain with one 
female, not for a brief period, but for a long time, or even 
for his whole life. The man needs to be certain of his 
own progeny, because of bis responsibility for that progeny. 
This determination to one settled female is matrimony, a 
part of the law of nature. 

Because sexual intercourse is ordained for the common 
good of society, and common goods fall under the deter- 
mination of law, consequently matrimony is rightly and 
necessarily determined by human law. 

Fornication is none the less mortal sin if any one suffi- 
ciently provide for the bringing up of an illegitimate child ; 
because that which falls under the cognizance of law is 
judged by what ordinarily happens, and not according to 
that which may happen in some exceptional case. 

(1) It may be asked why, if this is mortal sin, it is placed, 
in Acts xv. 20, with such things as eating blood and things 
strangled, which certainly is not mortal sin. But the ob- 
ject of the decree was to reconcile Jewish and Gentile Chris- 
tians. And while the Gentiles were warned against the sin 
of lust, which was commonly held to be no sin, they were 
also bidden to respect the scruples of their Jewish brethren 
concerning what is not in itself illicit. 

(2) It is not merely inordinate concupiscence which makes 
this sin to be mortal, for a single act of this nature is inor- 
dinate ; it may have the result of injury to progeny, and be 
the cause of separation from the love of God. 

TJiis sin "being against the good of a future child, is graver 
than sins like theft, which are against outward goods. 

But it is less than sins like unbelief, which are directly 
against God, and sin like homicide, against the life of a hu- 
man being already born. 

(1) It comes, indeed, from the most immoderate of de- 
sires, but what aggravates sin consists in the inclination of 



Qu. cliv. 4.] LUST. 457 

the will. Passion in sense-appetite diminishes sin, because 
the greater the passion from whose impulse the sin is com- 
mitted the lighter is the sin. "Through lust of the flesh 
the human race is more subjected to the devil than through 
any other" (Isidore). 

(2) "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his 
own body" (1 Cor. vi. 18) ; but this does not make it the 
gravest of sins ; for reason in man is of more consequence 
tha?i his body, and if any other sin is still more repugnant 
to reason, it is a graver sin. 

(3) But the sin of fornication is against the good of the 
human race, and against Christ. " Shall I take away the 
members of Christ, and make them the members of a 
harlot ?" (1 Cor. vi. 15). But homicide is still more repug- 
nant to the good of the race, and Divine good is greater 
than the good of the human race. Therefore, sins which 
are against G-od are greater. Fornication is not sin directly 
against God, but like all other mortal sins it is so in its 
result. 

But as the members of our body are the members of 
Christ, so, also, our spirit is one with Him (1 Cor. vi. 17). 
Hence, also, spiritual sins like heresy are more against 
Christ than fornication. 

May there be mortal sin in touches and hisses ? 

Some things may be mortal sin in themselves, "in their 
own species." In this way kisses, embraces, touches are 
not mortal sin, for they may be made without inordinate 
desire, either according to the customs of the people, or on 
account of some necessity or reasonable cause. 

But, again, some things may be mortal sin from their 
cause ; as he who gives alms in order to seduce some one 
into heresy mortally sins because of his corrupt intention. 
But it has been already seen (see page 89) that not only 
consent to the act of mortal sin, but consent to the pleas- 
ure of it, is itself mortal sin. And, therefore, since form- 



458 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLIV. 5. 

cation and, still more, other species of lust are mortal sins, 
consent even to the sinful pleasure is also sin of the same 
kind. Therefore lustful embraces and kisses fall under 
the same condemnation. In themselves they do not hinder 
the good of human offspring, but they spring from the 
root of this evil. 

Is nocturnal pollution mortal sin ? 

Not in itself, for every sin depends upon the judgment 
of reason. The first motions of sensuality are sinful only 
as they can be repressed by reason. If the judgment of 
reason is removed from them, sin also is removed.* 

The sleeper is visited by images over which he has no 
control, and, therefore, what he does in sleep, without any 
choice of his, is not his fault. 

But this is not the end of the matter, for we must con- 
sider the cause of the pollution. It may be purely corporeal, 
the body relieving itself of superfluities, and, through the 
brain, acting upon the imagination, so that the dream is the 
result of the bodily action. 

But all this may be due to some culpable cause, as excess 
in eating or drinking (stimulating drinks), and then the 
cause makes the pollution also culpable. But if there were 
no culpable cause, then the pollution is not sinful in itself 
nor in its cause. 

But, again, previous waking thoughts may produce the 
same result, whether these thoughts have been in the way 
of duty, or whether they sprang from voluntary thought of 
carnal vices with desire of such gratifications. Here, again, 
the gravity of the cause makes the sleeping act also gravely 
culpable. Whereas, if the thought were in the course of 
scientific study, or accompanied by detestation of the sin, 
then the pollution is not sinful in itself nor in its cause. 

Again, there may be an external cause, if evil spirits have 

* The author is not discussing the deadly sin against nature, pollu- 
tion produced iu a manner directly voluntary — sc, " masturbation." 



Qu. cliv. 5.] LUST. 459 

power to excite the imagination or the brain. And this, 
indeed, may be with preceding sin — sc, neglect of due 
preparation to resist the illusions of evil spirits. This is 
the spirit of the Compline hymn : 

' ' Drive far from us our ghostly foe, 
That no pollution we may know." 

Our conclusion, then, is that nocturnal pollution is never 
sin, but it is sometimes the result of previous sin. 

Observe that the action of reason is not entirely suspended 
in sleep. In the dream the soul observes and apprehends, 
but no longer, in free choice or moral judgment, exerts 
dominion over the images presented to it. 

What the author further says on this question of the 
various forms of lust may be greatly abridged. If simple 
fornication be deadly sin, much more those other forms of 
lust which add new deformity to it. In seduction, and still 
more in rape, there is the injury done to another and to a 
family, which demands satisfaction according to the laws 
of God and man (Ex. xxii. 16 ; Dent. xxii. 28). 

In adultery, beside these, there is the further injury to a. 
husband's or a wife's right, and to the claims of offspring. 

A still graver violation of nature's law is incest ; for (1) 
by that law we are bound to honour those nearest to us by 
ties of blood (Lev. xviii. 7) ; (2) by that law a natural 
check is put- upon the familiar intercoui*se of members of 
the same family, which is guarded against unbridled lust ; 
and (3) familiar intercourse with a husband's or a wife's 
nearest kin is rendered possible, which would be prevented 
if there were no such law rendering future marriage im- 
possible. 

At the same time observe that this impediment of sexual 
intercourse among those who are nearly related by consan- 
guinity or affinity is partly founded on natural reason, as 
between parents and children ; and is partly, also, founded 



460 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. f'LV. 1. 

on custom and Divine and human law, which have varied 
respecting what is decent and indecent. And remember 
that what is ordained for the common good, as sexual inter- 
course is, falls under the direction of human law.* 

Sacrilege of persons again adds a new deformity to those 
already mentioned — sc., when a person has taken a vow of 
perpetual virginity, and that vow to God is broken. 

Finally, there remain those unnamable sins, unnatural 
deeds of darkness (Rom. i.), against right reason, against 
nature, and the ends for which sexual intercourse has been 
instituted by God, some of which are the prevalent curse of 
Protestant communities to-day. In violating nature, which 
is God's order and law, injury is done to God Himself. 

§ 7. Continence, incontinence. 

Is continence {self-restraint, iynpatzia) a virtue ? 

The word is used by some to express abstinence from 
venereal pleasure. So understood, the chief and perfect 
continence is virginity, which has been already shown to 
be a virtue, under certain conditions. Vidual continence 
comes next to it, and is to be estimated by the same prin- 
ciples. 

But others (see Aristotle, Nlc. Eth., lib. vii.), under- 
stand by continence the resisting of vehement depraved 
concupiscences. So understood, continence has somewhat 
of the nature of virtue, inasmuch as reason Js steadfast 
against passions so as not to be misled by them ; but still it 
does not (as temperance does) reach the perfect idea of 
moral virtue, according to which even sense-appetite is so 
subdued to reason that vehement passions contrary to rea- 
son do not arise in it. But using the word virtue loosely 
for any principle of laudable actions, we may call continence 
a virtue. 

It may be said that self-restraint can be used badly, which 

* See, further, Supplement, chapter on Matrimony, § 



Qu. CLV. 2.J CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE. 461 

is not true of virtue. But man is truly man according to 
reason. And a man, properly speaking, uses self-restraint 
when he keeps himself to the dictates of right reason. He 
only is truly continent, not he who follows perverted reason. 
But depraved desires are opposed to right reason, as good 
desires are opposed to perverted reason. And, therefore, 
properly and truly, he is continent who abstains from evil 
concupiscences, adhering to right reason. But he who ab- 
stains from good desires, persisting in perverted reason, is 
not to be called self-restrained, but rather obstinate in evil. 

Continence * and incontinence properly apply to the de- 
sires of the pleasures of touch and taste. 

Continence implies a certain bridling of one's self so as 
not to be led by passions. Therefore it properly applies to 
those passions which impel one to pursue something wherein 

* The difference between temperance and continence may not be at 
first sight clear' to the student who is not familiar with the accurate 
moral distinctions of the Nicomachean Ethics. 

(1) The desires and passions, if not naturally moderate, may be so 
moderated by acquired virtue that one shall feel only proper desires for 
all those pleasant things which conduce to health, a sound habit of 
body, or are connected with the perpetuation of the human race. The 
habit is formed and has become a second nature ; one acts from it with 
deliberate preference. This is the virtue of temperance. 

Intemperance is the opposite — the vice of the concupiscible passions. 
The man is like a child, in that his desires are the rule of his life. 
There is no protest of moral judgment. But, unlike a child, his per- 
verted reason has adopted a vicious rule of life, and he follows it by 
deliberate choice. 

(2) But, again, a man may have violent passions which require the 
strongest effort of his will to subdue, and they are perpetually strug- 
gling against his conscience and the curb of his will. If one succeed 
in curbing them, which he cannot do by his own unassisted powers, he 
is " self-controlled " — he is continent. But the imperfect virtue which 
he possesses is in his will. 

It is manifest that, in this sense of the word, the Lord Jesus Christ 
could not be called continent. 

If a man's will does not control these violent passions, he is inconti- 



462 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLV. 3, 4. 

it is laudable that reason hold one back ; but it does not 
apply to those passions which imply a drawing back, as fear 
and the like. In these the firmly following what reason 
dictates is laudable. 

But passions impel the more vehemently after something 
the more they follow natural inclinations, such as are the 
inclinations for what is necessary to preserve the individual 
and to preserve the human race. These, then, are the proper 
objects of continence and incontinence. Yet it will be no- 
ticed that the terms are used in wider scope of all vehement 
desires, as of honours, riches, and the like. 

Continence has for its subject the hitman will. 

Every virtue makes its subject different from the disposi- 
tion which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. 

But the concupiscible nature is in the same condition in 
the continent and in the incontinent, in both breaking forth 
into violent and depraved desires. Both of these also have 
the same right reason, and, when free from passion, pur- 
pose not to follow illicit desires. The primary difference 
between them is in their choice. The continent, although 
he suffer violent desires, chooses not to follow them, since 
his moral judgment protests against them ; but the inconti- 
nent chooses to follow them despite the protest in his soul. 
Therefore continence is in the will, whose action is choice. 

The object of continence is sensuous desires, but as resist- 
ing them ; and this requires another power of the soul to 
make this resistance. 

Is continence better than temperance ? 
Continence as equivalent to virginity has been already 
discussed. But now we mean the resistance of moral reason 

nent. His moral judgment protests, as it does not in the intemperate. 
He knows, in calmer moments, that his desire is bad ; but when the 
time of action comes his will resists the protest, and he acts contrary 
to his deliberate preference and judgment. 



Qu. CLVI. 1.] CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE. 463 

to depraved and violent concupiscences. And in this sense 
of the word temperance is much greater than continence. 
For the good of virtue is laudable in being according to 
reason. And this good is much more vigorous in the tem- 
perate man, in whom sense-appetite is subdued by reason, 
than in the continent man, in whom it vehemently resists 
reason through its depraved desires. 

(1) But does not the continent man make the greater 
struggle and therefore gain a title to higher reward ? I an- 
swer that the greatness or the feebleness of concupiscence 
arises from two causes. Sometimes it comes from natural 
physical constitution, some being naturally more prone to 
concupiscence than others are. And, again, some have 
greater opportunities and external temptations. And in 
such a case the greatness of the concupiscence resisted in- 
creases the merit of resistance. 

But sometimes, as in the temperate man, the feebleness 
of the desire results from a spiritual cause, as the warmth of 
charity or the strength of reason. And then the feebleness 
of the desire by reason of its cause increases merit. 

(2) One might be inclined to say that temperance belongs 
to a lower sphere, because it is the virtue of sense-desires, 
not of the will. But observe that the good of reason which 
makes virtue laudable is shown to be greater in reaching not 
only to the will, but to the sensuous passions, so that the 
whole man is formed anew. 

Incontinence is a state of the soul, and not merely a 
matter of physical temperament. 

The body merely gives occasion for incontinence. For 
sense-appetite is the operation of an organized body in which, 
owing to the condition of that body, violent passions may 
arise. But passions, however violent, are not the sufficient 
cause of incontinence, but only the occasion for it, because 
while reason is in operation man can always resist those pas- 
sions. If they should grow so powerful as to take away the 



404 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVI. 2. 

use of reason, as in " emotional insanity/'' neither conti- 
nence nor incontinence would be possible, because the moral 
judgment which the continent preserves, and the incontinent 
abandons, would no longer exist. The cause of inconti- 
nence, therefore, is in the soul, which does not resist the pas- 
sions. And this may be either because it gives way to pas- 
sions before reason has deliberated, which may be called 
" precipitancy," or because the man weakly does not abide 
by his determinations, through " infirmity of purpose." 

(1) We notice that the bodily condition gives occasion to 
incontinence, for the soul has certain powers which use 
bodily organs and are conditioned by the state of those 
organs ; and the operation of these powers of the soul with 
their organs contribute to those mental actions which do 
not use corporeal instruments ; i.e., to the action of the reason 
and will. For the reason receives its materials from sensibil- 
ity, and the will is impelled by the passions of sense-appetite. 

So it happens that women in general, although there are 
marked exceptions, are weaker in purpose because of their 
bodily constitution (acting from impulse rather than from 
fixed moral judgment. We might call the virtuous woman 
temperate rather than continent.) They are usually led by 
their feelings rather than by solid moral judgment. 

(2) Again, there are some men who are naturally ' ' quick- 
tempered," whose passions anticipate judgment ; or who are 
"choleric," in whom the vehemence of their passions pro- 
duces the same result ; and, on the other hand, there are 
men of the feminine temperament, infirm of purpose ; but 
no one of these things is sufficient cause of incontinence. 
The concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit (G-al. 
v. 17), not of necessity, but through the negligence of the 
spirit itself, which does not will a firm resistance. 

Is incontinence a sin? 

It is recorded as one of the special sins of "the last days " 
in 2 Tim. iii. 3. And it is a sin for two reasons, because it 



Qu. clvi. 3.] COHTINEKCE, INCONTINENCE. 465 

is a departure from what right moral judgment dictates, and 
because it is a plunging into shameful pleasures. 

This is said of incontinence in its proper and simple 
meaning. But one may be said to be incontinent with 
respect to some particular thing, as when he transcends the 
limits of reason in his desire of riches, honours, and the 
like, which in themselves are good things. The sin herein 
consists in not observing due limits. 

Figuratively speaking, one might be called incontinent 
who was " carried away" by good desires, which would be 
in accordance with reason. This would pertain to the per- 
fection of virtue. 

(1) But no one can by his own strength avoid inconti- 
nence ; for the Lord says, "Without Me ye can do nothing" 
(S. John xv. 5). But man's need of Divine aid for conti- 
nence does not prevent incontinence from being sin. 

(2) But in him who is incontinent reason's moral judgment 
is overcome. (He makes good resolutions, but does not keep 
them.) Yes; but there is no necessity in this yielding; 
that would take away the idea of sin. It arises from the 
negligence of the man, who does not firmly apply himself to 
resist passion. (Hence he may feel remorse and shame.) 

Is the incontinent more sinful than the intemperate ? 

Since sin lies chiefly in the will, where there is greater in- 
clination of will to sin, there is graver sin. But the intem- 
perate man's will is inclined to sin from deliberate prefer- 
ence, which proceeds from a habit which he has acquired by 
custom ; whereas in the incontinent the will is inclined to 
sin by some passion. And because passion quickly comes to 
an end, but habit is "a quality hard to change," the incon- 
tinent feels regret when his passion ends ; but the intem- 
perate takes pleasure in his past sin, because habit has made 
it "connatural" to him. "They rejoice to do evil, and 
delight in the frowardness of evil " (Prov. ii. 14 ; Nic. 
Eth. vii. 7). 
30 



4GG TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLTI. 3. 

(1) There is an apparent objection to this, viz., that one 
seems to sin more gravely who acts against his conscience (S. 
Luke xii. 47), and the incontinent man knows how evil are 
the things which he desires, but nevertheless passion leads 
him to act against his conscience ; whereas the intemperate 
man judges that the things which he desires are good, and 
so does not seem to oppose his own conscience. 

This objection raises once more the question of ignorance 
excusing or not excusing sin. Ignorance in the reason some- 
times precedes the inclination of appetite and causes it. 
Then the greater the ignorance, the more the sin is dimin- 
ished, and it may be totally excused, since such ignorance 
makes the action involuntary so far as sin is concerned. 

But, again, ignorance may follow the inclination of ap- 
petite, and the greater such ignorance the graver is the sin, 
because the sinful appetite is greater. But the ignorance 
of both the incontinent and the intemperate comes from ap- 
petite being inclined to something ; in the one case through 
passion, in the other through habit. 

But this causes greater ignorance in the latter than in the 
former. This is true, first, as respects duration ; for in the 
incontinent the ignorance lasts only while the passion lasts, 
like the attacks of fever and ague. But the ignorance of the 
intemperate endures on account of the permanence of his 
habit, like a pulmonary consumption. 

But, again, the ignorance of the incontinent regards some 
particular thing which he estimates as at that time to be 
chosen. But the intemperate is ignorant in respect of the 
end itself, judging it to be good that he follow his unbridled 
desires. (His moral principle is destroyed; the voice of 
conscience is silenced.) 

(2) For this reason his cure is more hopeless. The 
"light within him is darkness/' and his fixed habit resists 
admonition and correction. His cure, if it come at all, will 
be in the same way with that of the incontinent; viz., by 
Divine aid, and admonition and correction. 



Qu. CLYII. l.J MEEKNESS AJ5TD CLEMENCY. 467 

(3) But is not lustful passion greater in the incontinent, 
and does not this aggravate the sin ? Yes, and no. The 
lust of the will which does aggravate sin is greater in the 
intemperate. But the lust of sensuous appetite may be 
greater in the incontinent, for he sins only from violent pas- 
sions ; while the intemperate sins from lighter concupis- 
cence, and sometimes even anticipates it. "Every one 
would think a man worse if he did anything disgraceful 
when he felt no desire, or only a slight one, than if he felt 
very strong desires ; and if he struck another without being 
angry, than if he had been angry ; for what would he have 
done if he had been under the influence of passion ? " (Nic. 
Eth. vii. 7). 

Is incontinent anger ivorse than incontinent concupis- 
cence f 

The latter is baser because it has greater inordination. 
For (1) the passion of anger has something rational con- 
nected with it, inasmuch as the angry aims to avenge him- 
self for injury done to him, which, in a certain way, reason 
dictates. The defect lies in not aiming at the due manner 
of vengeance. But concupiscence is totally sensual and in 
no respect rational. (2) The motion of anger follows the 
physical constitution in the quick-tempered more closely 
than in the lustful through concupiscence. This seems to 
make the excessively angry more pardonable. (3) Anger 
acts "above board/' while concupiscence is sly and treach- 
erous. (4) Concupiscence acts with pleasure, but anger has 
been preceded and compelled by sorrow. 

But, on the other hand, we may consider the injury done 
to our neighbour, and so anger is generally graver in this 
respect. 

§ 8. Meekness and clemency ; anger ; cruelty. 

Is clemency the same as meekness (mansuetudo) ? 

Moral virtue is concerned with passions and actions. But 



468 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVII. 2, 3. 

inward passions are the source of outward actions or they 
are impediments to action. And, therefore, the virtues 
which moderate the passions concur with the virtues which 
moderate actions, although they differ in species, in produc- 
ing the same effects. Thus, justice restrains a man from 
stealing, to which one may be inclined by the inward pas- 
sion of love for money, which inordinate love is moderated 
by liberality ; so liberality concurs with justice in the result, 
the abstaining from theft. So, in the matter now before us, 
by the passion of anger one is provoked to demand heavier 
punishment. But clemency diminishes this punishment, 
which mild course of action might be hindered by excessive 
anger. And so meekness, by restraining anger, concurs in 
the same effect with clemency. But the difference is that 
while clemency moderates outward punishments, meekness 
diminishes the passion of anger. The latter regards the 
appetite for vengeance, the former the penalties which ven- 
geance demands. 

To clemency is opposed cruelty ; to meekness, rage, wrath- 
ful passion {iracundia). 

Are loth these virtues? 

Since virtue alone subjects appetite to reason, and both 
meekness and clemency do this, it is evident that they are 
both virtues. 

(1) Observe that inflexible severity in inflicting punish- 
ment, and clemency concerning punishment, are not oppo- 
sites ; each has its place according to right reason. There 
are occasions for the one, and, again, for the other. 

(2) Clemency is related to severity as equity to legal jus- 
tice ; it considers special circumstances on account of which 
it diminishes penalties. 

Meekness and clemency are virtues annexed to temperance. 

The common ground of the three virtues is restraint of 

passions ; the difference is in the object of restraint. The 



Ql\ CLVII. 3.] MEEKNESS AND CLEMENCY. '469 

object of temperance, as we have seen, is the vehement 
desire of the pleasures of touch and taste ; the object of 
the virtues which we are now considering is anger and its 
effects. 

Equity has reference to the intention of the legislator 
going beyond the letter of his law ; but clemency moderates 
passion, so that a man does not use all his power in inflict- 
ing penalties. So far as right reason allows, it shuns all 
that which can give sorrow to another. 

The virtues which simply ordain man for good, as faith, 
hope, and charity, and also prudence and justice, are 
higher virtues than meekness and clemency, which with- 
draw man from evil. (Well worthy to be noted against 
affected sentimentality.) 

But yet, among virtues which resist depraved affections 
these may have a certain superiority. For anger, which 
meekness moderates, may exceedingly hinder a man from 
judging of the truth, and, therefore, meekness helps to 
makes a man master of himself. But temperance is the 
cardinal virtue, because fleshly concupiscences are baser, 
and more constantly beset a man. 

Clemency also approaches to charity, the chief among 
virtues, which seeks all good for one's neighbour, and 
hinders his evil. (Such is the example of Christ's meek- 
ness : " Learn of Me, for I am meek." See, also, 1 Pet. ii. 
23.) Meekness prepares a man for the knowledge of God by 
removing the impediment of anger and making one master 
of himself. Also, it hinders one from contradicting the 
words of truth. 

Concurring in the same effect with charity, these virtues 
make a man acceptable with God and with men. 

Piety and mercy, also, may have similar effects, each from 
different motive ; piety, from reverence to superiors ; mercy, 
from regarding others' evils as pertaining to one's self; 
meekness, from removing anger ; clemency, from mild 
judgment of other's faults. 



470 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVIII. 1. 

Anger. — Is it lawful to be angry? 

Anger is a passion of sense-appetite. Now, in the passions 
of the soul, evil is found in two ways : First, the passion 
is evil on account of its object, as passion. Thus, envy in 
itself is evil, because it is sadness at another's good, which 
in itself is repugnant to reason. Badness is implied in the 
very word (Nic. Eth. ii. 6). 

But this is not true of anger, which is the desire of ven- 
geance on evil, which may be sought for rightfully (right- 
eous zeal for good) or wrongfully (Eph. iv. 26). 

Secondly, evil may be found in any passion from its ex- 
cess or deficiency. So evil may be found in anger, when it 
is more or less than right reason dictates ; otherwise it is 
laudable. 

(1) But does not anger disturb the soul's tranquillity, dis- 
regard reason, and blind the mental vision ? I answer that 
it may, indeed, precede reason, and drag it away from rec- 
titude, and so be evil. But, also, it may follow reason, sen- 
sibility being excited against vices according to rational 
order, and this "zeal" is good. ''Take care lest anger, 
accepted as the instrument of virtue, become mistress of the 
mind ; but keep it as a servant, prepared to obey reason, 
and never departing from following its rightful lord" (S. 
Greg., Moral, v. 30). 

"Zeal may, indeed, cloud the eye of reason, but wrath 
blinds it." Yet it is not contrary to the idea of virtue that 
reason's deliberations be intermitted in the execution of 
what has been rationally decided. Thus, one working at 
any art would be impeded in the time for action if he should 
be deliberating when he ought to be acting. 

(2) But is it lawful to seek vengeance ? Is not this re- 
served for God? "Vengeance is Mine, and recompense" 
(Deut. xxxii. 35). It is certainly illicit to seek vengeance 
for the sake of the evil of him who is to be punished ; but 
to seek vengeance for the correction of vices and the pres- 
ervation of justice is laudable. And the emotions as moved 



Qu. clviii. 2.] AXGER. -iTl 

by reason can aim at this. When vengeance is taken ac- 
cording to the order of justice, it is from God, whose 
minister is any authority which rightfully punishes (Eom. 
siii.). 

(3) But it may be said that what removes us from the 
Divine likeness is evil, and anger does so. But we can and 
we ought to be like God in the desire of good ; only in the 
manner of seeking it we cannot altogether resemble Him. 
For in God are not human passions, which we, however, 
can make the servants of our moral reason. 

7s anger a sin ? 

S. Paul says (Eph. iv. 31), " Let all bitterness, and wrath, 
and anger, ... be put away from you." The pas- 
sions are good so far as they are regulated by reason ; but 
if they exclude its order, they are evil. 

But in the order of reason must be considered, first, what 
is sought for by way of vengeance. Zeal, righteous ven- 
geance, seeks what moral reason demands (S. John ii. 17). 
This is laudable anger. But one may seek vengeance con- 
trary to the order of reason, as when he desires that an- 
other be punished who does not deserve to be punished, or 
beyond what he has deserved, or when he seeks an unlaw- 
ful punishment, or for some other end than what is right, 
which is the preservation of justice and the correction of 
faults. This is unrighteous anger, the bitterness of wrath. 

But, again, must be considered the mode of the anger ; 
for if it be immoderate, whether in outward manifestation 
or in inward passion, it will not be without sin, even though 
one seek for righteous vengeance. 

(1) Passion, absolutely considered, has neither merit nor 
demerit, neither praise nor blame. But when regulated 
by reason it is meritorious and laudable ; when not so reg- 
ulated it has demerit, and is blameworthy. 

(2) But it may be said that no one sins in what he cannot 
avoid, which is true of anger. "Every one who acts from 



472 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Q u - CLVin. 3. 

anger, acts under a feeling of pain" (Nic. Eth. vii. 6), 
and such pain is contrary to the will. 

I answer that man is lord of his own acts through ra- 
tional choice ; and, therefore, the emotions which antici- 
pate the judgment of reason are not so in the power of a 
man that he can prevent their arising in his soul, although 
reason can impede each one, individually, as it arises. And 
thus the emotion of anger is not so in a man's power that 
he can hinder its presence within. But it is so far under 
control that its inordination is sinful. And the pain of 
which Aristotle speaks is not pain from anger, but from the 
injury done ; and this pain moves the soul to seek for ven- 
geance. 

(3) It is true that anger is natural emotion, and so far is 
according to reason; but, also, it is naturally subject to 
reason ; and if it oppose the order of reason, it is un- 
natural. 

is all anger mortal sin ? 

If one seek unjust vengeance, anger is mortal sin, as con- 
trary to charity and justice. But this passion may be venial 
sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus, the 
emotion may precede the judgment of reason, or one may 
"vent his spite" in some trifling way, as when he gives a 
troublesome boy a trifling though angry pull by the hair. 
Or, again, the manner of the anger, although the emotion 
is justifiable, may be wrong in its excess, which may be 
venial ; or it may be mortal sin, if one from the vehemence 
of his anger depart from charity towards God and his neigh- 
bour (Col. iii. 8).* 

When the Lord said (S. Matt. v. 22), " Every one who is 
angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment," 

* Distinguish, then, three manifestations of this capital sin : (a) re- 
venge is sought for in the name of righteous vengeance, even when the 
law is invoked ; (&) vengeance is taken without due authority {e.g., 
"lynch law"); (c) the penalty inflicted is more than justice demands, 
being the gratification of personal hatred. 



Qu. clviii. 4, 5.] ANGER. 473 

He had been speaking of the Old Law respecting murder ; 
and He shows its spiritual meaning — sc, that the inward 
disposition which seeks another's injury with deliberate 
consent of reason is mortal sin. 

Is anger the gravest of sins ? 

If we consider what the angry man seeks for, his passion 
seems to be the least of sins of its kind ; for he seeks the 
evil of penalty, as righteous vengeance — i.e., as a good. In 
the first respect the sin of anger is like that of envy and 
hatred. But hatred seeks evil for a neighbour absolutely 
as evil, and envy does so through vainglory. So it is plain 
that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger. 

But, as seeking what appears to be good, anger agrees 
with the sin of concupiscence. And in this respect the sin 
of anger in itself appears to be less than that of concupis- 
cence, because better is the good of justice which the angry 
seeks for than the pleasurable or useful good which the 
lustful seeks for. 

When we consider, however, the inordination of the sin, 
anger has a certain superiority on account of the vehemence 
and swiftness of the passion. " Wrath is cruel, and anger 
is outrageous" (Prov. xxvii. 4). 

Distinctions in anger, 
as a sin, may repay a moment's consideration. (See Nic. 
Eth. iv. 5). The irascible are too quickly angry, and from 
any trifling cause. " Bitterness of spirit " is shown by per- 
sistent dwelling upon the injury done ; by "letting the sun 
go down upon one's wrath." The revengeful seek for sat- 
isfaction with obstinate desire. 

But the Lord (S. Matt, v.) pointed out, not the species 
of anger, but its grades in the progress of sin. First, the 
thought of the heart ; then the outward manifestations 
of it, saying to a brother "Kaca;" and finally the com- 
pleted act of sin in doing injury under the notion of re- 



474 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVIII. 6, 7, 8. 

venge, saying, "Thou fool," which is meant for injurious 
words, the lightest form of injury. And if the first of 
these is mortal sin in the case of which the Lord is speak- 
ing, how much more the others, which are worse. 

Anger is a capital sin, 
both because its object is regarded as just, honourable, and 
desirable, which makes the sin become the parent of many 
others, and because of the violence of anger, which hurries 
the soul into inordinate acts of various kinds. 

The six daughters of anger are indignation and tumult in 
the mind, uncontrolled clamour, blasphemy and contumely 
in words, strifes and all other injurious actions. 

Is defect of anger a sin ? 

One may seek to inflict just penalty, not out of passion, 
but from sober judgment of what is right and best. Herein 
defect is undoubtedly sin. But of necessity the motion of 
sense-appetite in man follows the simple motion of the will. 
This is one of nature's laws. Therefore, if anger be totally 
absent from the feelings, there must be absence or feebleness 
of the action of the will. Consequently deficiency in anger 
is vicious, as the defect of will also is. 

(1) He who is never angry when he ought to be angry 
may imitate God in his absence of passion, but he is unlike 
the righteous Judge of all the earth. 

(2) The passion of anger is useful, like all the other mo- 
tions of sense-appetite. It makes a man more prompt to 
execute what reason dictates. G-od makes nothing in vain ; 
and if this were not so, the emotions would have no good 
function to fulfil. 

(3) Eeason's judgment does not remain entire if there be 
no anger in the soul ; for that judgment causes not only 
the simple motion of the will, but the following emotion 
of the sensitive soul. And the absence of anger is a sign 
of the absence of rational moral judgment. 



Qu. CLXI. 1.] HUMILITY. 475 

Cruelty 
is the opposite of clemency, inflicting severer punishments 
than reason requires. Bat it shoald be distinguished from 
that unnatural vice called ferocity, barbarity, inhumanity, 
which takes delight in others' pain simply as pain. Such 
vice is not human ; it can only be called bestiality, if it does 
not rather place man below the level of the brute. 

§ 9. Humility. 

Is humility a virtue f 

The Lord answered that question when He said, " Learn 
of Me, for I am meek and lowly of heart." Let us consider 
what place humility holds among the virtues. Difficult 
good has something which attracts desire — sc, the idea of 
the good ; and it has something which repels — sc, the diffi- 
culty of obtaining it. The first excites hope, the other 
tends to despair. There must be, then, on the one side a 
moral virtue, moderating and restraining hope within its 
due limits ; on the other, a moral virtue strengthening and 
impelling against despair. The first hinders the soul from 
unduly aiming at the highest things, and this is humility ; 
the second impels the soul to aim at great things according 
to right reason, and this is "magnanimity." 

Abasement may come from an external cause : "He that 
exalteth himself shall be abased." And this is penal. Bat 
it may also proceed from an inward cause, and so it is some- 
times virtuous, as when one contemplates his defects and 
puts himself in the lowest place, like Abraham, who said 
(Gen. xviii. 27), " Behold now I have taken upon me to 
speak unto the Lord, who am bat dust and ashes.'' But 
such self-abasement may also be evil, as when a man, not 
understanding his dignity as a man, considers himself 
nothing more than a developed brute, and makes himself 
like his progenitors. 

Aristotle, with all his admirable analysis of virtues, 



476 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. clxi. 2, 3. 

to have no place for humility. The explanation may be 
that he was considering man as a "social animal/' not 
as the child of God by creation and Providence. But hu- 
mility, as a special virtue, has in view especially mams sub- 
jection to God, for whose sake he is humble towards others 
also. (Aristotle is, I think, the most unspiritual of the 
world's great thinkers. His morality leaves out conscience 
towards God.) 

Does humility direct the intellect or the desires f 
It makes one check himself from seeking what is above 
his powers. And for this he must know what his deficien- 
cies are. The knowledge of one's weakness belongs to hu- 
mility as a rule directing the desires. (See Rev. iii. 3 7, 18.) 

(1) Bat are we not told to ''desire earnestly the greater 
gifts " ? And if that is consistent with humility, what can 
the virtue be but a humble mental judgment of one's self ? 
To aim at great things with confidence in one's own powers 
is indeed contrary to humility, but to aim at the highest 
attainable good through Divine assistance is not so ; on the 
contrary, " he that (so) humbleth himself shall be exalted." 

(2) Maguanimity strengthens the mind against despair in 
order that one may not be rendered unworthy of obtaining 
the good which belongs to him. But the ground of humil- 
ity in repressing presumption is reverence towards God, 
which prevents a man from attributing more to himself 
than belongs to him according to the place where God has 
put him. And this is the reason why humility especially 
implies man's subjection to God, the virtue of " the poor in 
spirit," which is perfected by the spiritual gift of godly fear 
(S. Aug., De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i. 4). 

Does humility make a man subject himself to every one? 

The Divine rule is (Phil. ii. 3), "In lowliness of mind 
each counting other better than himself." In man may be 
considered what he has by special gift of God, or what he is 



Qu. CLXI. 3.] HUMILITY. 477 

as man. But all deficiency is his own, and from G-od is 
whatever pertains to salvation and perfection. And when a 
man considers whathe is in himself, the humble reverence 
by which he subjects himself to God makes him subject him- 
self to his neighbour in what that neighbour has from God. 

But humility does not require that any one subject God's 
gifts in himself to what in another appears to be from God. 
For those who receive God's gifts may know that they have 
them (1 Cor. ii. 12). And therefore, without prejudice to 
humility, they can prefer the gifts which they themselves 
have received to what appears to have been conferred on 
others (Eph. iii. 4, 5). 

In like manner, humility does not require that one subject 
what he is as man to what another is in the same way, 
otherwise it would be necessary that each one should deem 
himself greater sinner than any other ; whereas the apostle, 
without prejudice to his humility, says, " We being Jews by 
nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles." 

But one can and ought to think some hidden good to 
be in his neighbour which he himself does not possess, or 
some evil (even unknown) to be in himself which is not in 
the other; and so each " counts other better than himself." 

(1) But it was said that humility chiefly consists in being 
subject to God ; why, then, also to man ? Because we ought 
to revere God not only in Himself but in whatever is spe- 
cially His, though not, indeed, with the same kind of rever- 
ence ; e.g., sacrificial worship. "Be subject to every ordi- 
nance of man for the Lord's sake " (1 Pet. ii. 13). 

(2) But would it not be false pretence for those in the 
highest station to subject themselves to inferiors ? If we 
prefer in our neighbour that which is of God to that which 
is our own in us, we cannot incur falsity. 

(3) But if we in humility subject ourselves to another, 
may not this be doing harm to him through his growing, 
proud or despising us ? No ; for humility, like the other 
virtues, is chiefly in the soul. And, therefore, man can sub- 



478 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXI. 4, 5. 

ject himself to his neighbour in inward affections without 
giving occasion for detriment. But in the outward expres- 
sion of humility, as in the acts of the other virtues, due 
moderation is to be exercised, lest harm be done. But if 
one do what he ought to do, and another from this take 
occasion of sinning, this is not imputed to him who acts 
humbly, because he does not give scandal (active), although 
the other is scandalized (passive, pharisaic scandal). 

Humility is a virtue annexed to moderation or temper- 
ance. 

• Temperance has been denned as the curbing or repressing 
the attack of auy passion (see page 425). Therefore all 
virtues which act in this manner are parts ("potential") 
of temperance, or virtues annexed to it. But as meekness 
represses the emotion of anger, so humility represses pre- 
sumption, the emotion of hope aiming at too great things. 

Humility is that moderation of spirit spoken of by S. 
Peter (1 Ep. iii. 4) — "the incorruptible apparel of a meek 
and quiet spirit." 

The theological virtues are the causes of this virtue, 
because they have God for their object ; but this truth is 
not inconsistent with our proposition. (Moderation or tem- 
perance may be Divine virtue in the same way. ) 

Is humility the chief among virtues f 

The Holy Scriptures give that chief place to charity. 
" Above all these things put on charity " (Col. iii. 14). 
For the good of virtue depends upon the order of reason, 
and this principally regards the end. Therefore the theo- 
logical virtues, which have for their object the ultimate end, 
are the chief. 

But in the next place the order of reason considers the 
means as ordained for that end. And this ordination con- 
sists essentially in reason itself as ordaining (the intellectual 
virtues) ; but, by participation, in the desires as ordered by 



Qu. CLXI. 5.] HUMILITY. 479 

reason, which justice, especially legal justice (not only for 
private relations between man and man, but for society), 
universally accomplishes. 

But humility makes man subject to this rational ordina- 
tion for all things in general, as each virtue does in its own 
special matter. 

(1) In the parable of the Pharisee and the publican (S. 
Luke xviii.) humility is not placed above general justice, but 
above justice to which pride is joined, for then there is no 
true virtue ; while, on the other hand, humility secures the 
remission of sins. " This man went down to his house jus- 
tified rather than the other" (v. 14). 

(2) In one way humility is the foundation of the spiritual 
edifice. For while true virtues are the gift of God, im- 
pediments must be removed. So humility holds the first 
place in expelling pride which God resists, and making man 
submissive to God, and opening his heart to the influx of 
Divine grace. For "God resisteth the proud, but giveth 
grace to the humble" (S. Jas. iv. 6). 

But in another way that is directly the first among virtues 
by which we draw nigh to God ; and that is faith (Heb. 
xi. 6). Faith, then, is the foundation of the spiritual edifice 
in a nobler way than humility. 

(3) Humility has its own special promise — "He that 
humbleth himself shall be exalted" (S. Luke xiv. 11) ; 
just as he that despises earthly riches is promised heavenly 
treasure (S. Matt. vi. 19), and they that renounce earthly 
joys are promised heavenly consolations (S. Matt. v. 5). 

(4) You may observe that Christ proposed to us the ex- 
ample of his own humility. " Learn of Me, for I am meek 
and lowly in heart" (S. Matt. xi. 29). He commended 
humility to us because it removes the chief impediment to 
our salvation, to our aiming at heavenly and spiritual things. 
So humility is the preparation of soul for free access to 
spiritual and Divine goods. But those goods are better 
than the preparation for them. 



480 TEMPEEAHCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. clxi. 6. 

S. Benedict's twelve steps of humility. 

This virtue consists essentially in desire restrained from 
inordinately and presumptuously seeking what is above its 
natural power. 

But humility has its rule in cognition ; sc, that one does 
not think of himself " more highly than he ought to 
think," and the principle and root of both is reverence 
towards God. 

But from the inward humility which is the gift of grace 
proceed outward signs of it, in words and deeds and gest- 
ures, by which are manifested what is hidden within the 
soul. And he that aims at humility first restrains its out- 
ward signs, in order that he may extirpate the buried root. 
This latter order is that followed by S. Benedict. In ex- 
plaining it, we will follow the reverse order. (12) The root 
is, fearing God and being mindful of all which He com- 
mands. Considering our desires, which must not inordi- 
nately aim at our own superiority, we reach the next step, 
(11) not following one's own will ; and (10) submitting 
one's self obediently to a superior; and (9) patiently submit- 
ting in hard and disagreeable matters. Three more steps 
pertain to a man's recognition of his own deficiencies : (8) 
Confession of faults and sins ; (7) confessing and believing 
one's self unworthy of greater things and unfit for them ; 
(6) preferring others to self in this respect. Then we come 
to outward signs of humility : (5) Not pretending to be dif- 
ferent from others, aping singularity, out of pride deviat- 
ing from what is usual ; (4) learning to keep timely silence 
without hasty speech ; (3) using few, rational, quiet words. 
Finally, in gestures humility is marked by (2) a subdued 
demeanour and (1) a quiet repressing of extravagant and 
idle laughter, etc. 

Observe that the discipline of the deadly sin of pride fol- 
lows the reverse order from that here given. 

Do not object' that the sixth and seventh steps may be 
based on a low and false estimation of your own merits and 



Qu. CLXII. 1.] PRIDE. 481 

fitness for a higher place than you now have. For you can 
consider in yourself your secret faults, and the hidden gifts 
of God in others. And you can most truly confess your own 
unfitness for greater things, referring all your sufficiency to 
God, as S. Paul did (2 Gor. iii. 5). 

§ 10. Pride. 

Is pride a sin ? 

It is inordinate desire of one's own superiority, whereas 
right reason demands that the will of each one be directed 
to what is proportioned to himself. What is against reason 
is sin; therefore this is sin. "It is a perverted imitation 
of the Most High, hating equality with equals under Him, 
and wishing to impose its own lordship over them in His 
place" (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei, xix. 13). 

And it is a special sin (S. Mark vii. 22), having its own 
proper object, which is one's own superiority. But it has 
also a certain generality, because all other sins can originate 
in pride, being ordained for its end, and having hindrances 
removed from their way, because pride makes man despise 
the Divine law. I do not say that all sins always originate 
from pride ; for although a man can transgress every pre- 
cept of the law in that contempt of it which conies from 
pride, he may also break God's law through ignorance or 
infirmity. 

Although pride is a special sin, it may corrupt every kind 
of virtue by abusing it, taking occasion for pride from the 
virtue itself. For its object may be found in the most di- 
verse matters. 

Pride is found in the sense-appetite, the "irascible de- 
sires " (cannot brutes be rivals of one another for superior- 
ity ?), and also in the will. For the difficult good which 
pride aims at is found in both sensuous things and in 
spiritual things. In the one case, the pride is in sense- 
appetite ; in the other, in the rational appetite ; i.e., in the 
31 



482 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXII. 4. 

will. Devils have pride of will. " The beginning of pride 
is apostasy from God" (Ecclus. x. 14). 

(1) What, then, do we mean by " pride of intellect " ? 
The knowledge of truth is two-fold ; one is purely specula- 
tive, which pride directly impedes by withdrawing its cause. 
For the proud man does not subject his intellect to God in 
order that he may learn the truth from Him. Neither does 
he condescend to learn from men. The truth is hidden 
from "the wise and prudent" — that is, from the proud 
who are wise and prudent in their own eyes — and revealed 
"unto babes," i.e., to the humble (S. Matt. xi. 25). 

But there is another knowledge of truth which is joined 
with love of it. And such knowledge of truth is directly 
hindered by pride, because the proud, pleased with their 
own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth. " With the 
lowly is wisdom " (Pro v. xi. 2). 

(2) The cause of pride may be found in the intellect of 
the proud man. He neglects that rule of right reason, not 
"to think of himself more highly than he ought to think/' 
And this comes from his inordinate desire of his own su- 
periority, for what one vehemently desires he readily be- 
lieves to be true, and hence his desire is turned to things 
too high for him. His considering also the defects of 
others has contributed to his high opinion of himself. But 
all this connection of reason and pride does not prove that 
pride is an intellectual vice. 

S. Gregory s four species of pride. 

(1) The more good one has, the greater his excellence. 
Therefore, when any one attributes to himself greater good 
than he actually possesses, he is aiming at his own superi- 
ority in an inordinate manner. One species of pride, then, 
is boasting of good which does not belong to the boaster. 

(2) The good in any one is more excellent if it proceed 
from himself than if he derived it from another. And, 
therefore, when any one estimates the good which he has 



Qu. clxii. 4.] PRIDE. 483 

from God as if it were altogether his own, he is unduly ex- 
alting himself by his pride. " Who maketh thee to differ ? 
and what hast thou that thou didst not receive ? But if 
thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst 
not received it ? " (1 Cor. iv. 7). 

(3) So, also, one may believe that he has received super- 
abundant gifts on account of his own merits, which is 
equally the sign of pride. "By grace ye are saved through 
faith ; and that not of yourselves ; it is the gift of God ; 
not of works, that no man should glory" (Eph. ii. 8). 

(4) One despising others may wish to appear to be of sin- 
gular excellency, like the Pharisee in the Gospel (S. Luke 
xviii.). 

(1) The second and third would be infidelity if they were 
made general propositions, that good is not from God, or 
that grace is given to men for their merits ; but the proud 
man is thinking of himself alone. Since the ungrateful 
attributes to himself what he has derived from another, it 
is evident that these two kinds of pride are also marked by 
base ingratitude. 

(2) The boasting spoken of is the falsehood — inward, per- 
haps — which belongs to pride. Excusing one's sin is sim- 
ilar, for it is attributing to self an innocency which is not 



(3) Presumptuously aiming at what is above one's powers 
may be referred to the fourth species of pride, where one 
wishes to be above his fellows. 

(4) We have seen the twelve steps of humility. S. Ber- 
nard points out the twelve opposite steps of pride. First 
in manner and looks : (1) The inquisitively and inordinately 
looking round at everything ; (2) the shallow mind showing 
itself in proud words ; (3) the ready laughter at what is 
thought ridiculous in others ; (4) the readiness to boast of 
one's own achievements ; (5) the aiming to appear singu- 
lar, as if one were holier than others ; (6) arrogance, pre- 
ferring one's self to others ; (7) presumption in thinking 



481 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXII. 5. 

one's self sufficient for great undertakings ; (8) defence of 
faults and sins ; (9) unreal confession of sins, with unwill- 
ingness to bear penalties imposed ; (10) rebellion against 
superiors ; (11) unbridled will, delighting in doing freely 
one's own pleasure ; (12) habitual sin, which implies con- 
tempt of God. 

Is pride a mortal sin t 

Pride is opposed to humility, which subjects man to 
God. Failing in this subjection, one extols himself above 
what is assigned to him according to the Divine rule or 
measure. He is of the opposite mind to S. Paul (2 Cor. x. 
13): " We will not glory beyond our measure." Thus, "the 
beginning of pride is apostasy from God," and, therefore, it 
is mortal sin in aversion from God. 

But, as in other mortal sins, there are some motions of 
the soul which anticipate the judgment of the mind and the 
consent of the will, and so are venial transgressions ; so, 
also, there are some motions of pride to which one may not 
give consent, which are therefore venial sins. 

(1) Pride is not universal sin in its essence, but from it 
all other sins may arise. Hence, it does not follow that all 
sins are mortal, except when they arise from completed pride. 

(2) Pride is always contrary to the love of God, in not 
being subject to the Divine rule ; and sometimes, also, to 
the love of our neighbour, when one inordinately prefers 
himself to another, or refuses due subjection. Then, again, 
the Divine law is contemned which institutes orders of men, 
placing one under another. 

(3) Virtues do not produce pride as causes per se, but only 
as one takes occasion for pride, and makes his virtues to be 
no virtues at all.* 

* Notice, as familiar forms of pride, the receiving of the Blessed Sac- 
rament without due preparation, rather than to appear less devout than 
others; and, again, the keeping up display at home, etc., which can- 
not be paid for. 



Ql\ CLXII. 6.] PRIDE. 485 

Pride is the gravest of sins. 

In sin we have already seen that we must consider two 
elements; viz., the turning to transitory good, which is the 
" material " part, and the aversion from unchangeable good, 
which is the "formal" and completing part of sin. Now, 
on the part of the first, the conversion to something, pride 
is not the greatest of sins, for an elevated position which 
the proud man inordinately seeks has not in itself the 
greatest repugnance to the good of virtue. 

But on the part of aversion, pride has the gravest char- 
acter, because in other sins man turns away from G-od either 
on account of ignorance, or of infirmity, or of desire for 
some other good ; but pride turns away from G-od because 
it will not be subject to Him and to His law. ''While 
all vices avoid G-od, pride alone resists Him" (Boetius). 
Wherefore it is especially said (S. Jas. iv. 6), " God re- 
sisteth the proud." Aversion from God and His precepts, 
then, which is, as it were, a consequence in other sins, is the 
essence of pride whose act is contempt of God. This makes 
it, in itself, the gravest of sins in that which completes sin. 

(1) But is not the sin which is tlie most difficult to avoid 
the lighter on that account ? Does not S. Augustine say, 
(Ep. 211), " Other sins are carried out in evil works, but 
pride insinuates itself into good works that they may be 
destroyed " ? I answer that there are two ways in which a 
sin is difficult to avoid ; one is on account of the violence of 
the assault, as anger is, for this reason, hard to resist, and 
concupiscence still more so on account of its connection 
with our sensuous nature. 

But, in another way, some sins are hard to avoid, on ac- 
count of their being hidden. Such a sin is pride. And, 
therefore, the motions of pride, secretly stealing into the 
soul, have not the gravest character before they may be de- 
tected by the judgment of reason. But when so detected, 
there are considerations which render them easy to be 
avoided : (a) The thought of our own infirmity. "Why is 



48G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLX1I. 7. 

dust and ashes proud ? " (b) The thought of the Divine 
greatness (Job xv.), and (c) reflection on the imperfection 
of the goods of which man is proud. " All flesh is grass, 
and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field" 
(Isa. xl. 6). 

(2) In this aversion from God pride increases the great- 
ness of other sins. Infidelity is rendered far more grave 
if it proceed from proud contempt than if it come from 
ignorance or infirmity. So with despair and the like. 

(3) In order to convict the pride of men, God permits 
some to fall into carnal sins which, though less, have more 
manifest turpitude. ' ' The fault of pride is less felt because 
it is found in the most elevated persons, or because it takes 
its origin from works of virtue. But lusts of the flesh are 
likely to be noted by all, and are degrading, though they be 
sins of less guilt than pride. But he who is the slave of 
pride and does not feel his slavery, falls into carnal sin in 
order that he may be humbled and truly rise " (Isidore). 

And this very fact shows the gravity of pride itself. 
Thus, the good physician may produce a less serious illness 
by his medicaments in order to cure a more deadly disease. 

Pride is the first sin and the foundation of all sins. 

Aversion from God, which completes sin, belongs to pride 
per se ; to other sins as resulting from pride. It is, there- 
fore, the primal sin, and the source of all other sins ; not 
that every individual act of sin arises from pride, but every 
kind of sin naturally springs from it. 

(1) The order of sins is not the order of virtues. That 
which is first generated is the last to be corrupted. And, 
therefore, as faith is the first of virtues in order of produc- 
tion, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which man is some- 
times led through other sins, as we read in 1 Tim. i. 19 : 
"A good conscience, which some having thrust from them, 
made shipwreck concerning the faith/' 

(2) Lighter sins, committed through ignorance or infirm- 



Qu. CLX.] MODEEATION". 487 

ity, in point of time may precede this gravest sin. But it 
causes the gravity of other sins by reaching the very foun- 
dation of all sin. "It is last in those returning to God ; it 
is first in those departing from G-od/' (Compare the order in 
Dante's Purgatorio, Div. Comm.) 

Is pride a capital sin f 

Some, viewing it as a special sin from which many kinds 
of sin arise, have numbered it among the capital sins ; but 
S. Gregory, considering its universal influence over all sins, 
made it queen and mother of all vices. 

It is not the same as vainglory, which has its place among 
the capital sins, but it is the cause of that ; for while pride 
inordinately seeks for superiority, vainglory aims at its man- 
ifestation. 

(It may be instructive to notice what the author points 
out in qu. clxiii. ; viz., that the first sin of our first parents 
was pride, the inordinate desire of spiritual good and excel- 
lence. That first sin could not be appetite for sensible 
good, because in them there was no rebellion of the flesh 
against the spirit. A spiritual good was sought for against 
G-od's rule, and above their measure. They yielded to the 
tempter saying, "Ye shall be as gods." Disobedience was 
caused by this ; from it came the sin of fleshly appetite. It 
was pride that yielded to the sinful desire of knowledge, of 
" knowing good and evil.") 

§ 11. Moderation ("modestia "). 

(In the author's arrangement humility is included under 
this. But for convenience we now consider other forms of 
it abridged from our text. Moderation is the virtue by which 
one restrains himself inwardly and outwardly within the 
limits of his station, talents, and fortunes. It is a virtue 
annexed to temperance, the latter moderating what is most 
difficult to control, sc, the concupiscence of the pleasures 



488 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXVii. 

of taste and touch ; the former, other desires where the 
difficulty is not so great.) 

Moderation controls four elements of our inward and out- 
ward life : (1) The desire of superiority, through humility, 
which Ave have already considered ; (2) the desire of knowl- 
edge ; (3) outward actions, whether in the serious affairs of 
life or in recreations ; (4) outward apparel, ornaments, 
household furniture, etc., etc. 

Virtuous desire of hnoivledge (" studiositas"). 

All men naturally desire to acquire knowledge. (Curi- 
osity begets philosophy, asking, what ? whence ? whither ? 
why ?) But this desire of knowing needs to be governed, 
for its results may be either good or bad. And, on the 
other hand, "much study is a weariness to the -flesh;" 
therefore a virtue is needed to overcome what stands in the 
way of a proper pursuit of knowledge. 

"We are not now reentering the domain of intellectual 
virtues, for the good now presented to our notice is an act 
of desire — sc, that a man have a right desire to apply his 
mind in this way or that, to this thing or that. 

On the other hand, there is a vicious or idle curiosity 
{" curiositas"). The question is not of knowledge per se, 
which in itself is good, but of the desire and zeal to acquire 
it. This may be either good or perverted ; first, when the 
evil accidentally attached to knowledge of the truth is the 
motive for seeking it, as when the motive is simply vicious 
pride. ("Knowledge puffeth up" — 1 Cor. viii. 1). Or, 
again, when the knowledge is sought for in order to get 
more freedom in sin. 

Secondly, there may be inorclination in the desire itself. 
It may be turned from the useful and obligatory to idle or 
frivolous questions (1 Tim. i. 4 ; 2 Tim. iii. 7). It may be 
eager to learn something respecting the works of God while 
referring nothing to its due end ; sc, the knowledge of Cod 



Qu. CLXVin. 1.] MODERATION. 489 

(a prevalent sin of these days). Or, thirdly, it may be con- 
cerned with fruitless questions about matters which are in- 
scrutable by any powers which we possess. (And so a vain 
conceit of knowledge or " philosophy " blinds the soul's 
simple faith in the truth revealed by Christ Jesus our Lord.) 

(1) It cannot be truly objected that since all knowledge 
is good there can be no vice in curiosity ; for the highest 
good of man does not consist in knowing every fact iu the 
universe, but in perfect knowledge of the highest truth 
(Nic. Eth. x. 7, 8). 

(2) Nor can it be justly objected that all knowledge what- 
soever assimilates man to God, who knows all things. That 
only shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, 
but not that it cannot be abused or inordinately sought for. 

(3) Philosophical studies are laudable on account of the 
truths which have been found in that way, God revealing 
them. But, also, such studies are continually abused in 
perversion of the faith. " Take heed lest there shall be 
any one that maketh spoil of you through his philosophy 
and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudi- 
ments of the world, and not after Christ" (Col. ii. 8). 

Neither should we overlook the "lust of the eyes," sinful 
use of the pleasures of other senses beside touch and taste, 
which temperance controls. To consider others' doings for 
our own utility — e.g., that we may be provoked to better 
things — or for others' benefit — sc., that they may be cor- 
rected where they have gone wrong — is an act of obedience 
to the Divine word : "Let us consider one another to pro- 
voke unto love and good works" (Heb. x. 24). But it is 
quite another thing, the meddlesome, curious spying into 
others' affairs idly, if not for contempt and detraction. 

Moderation in bodily action and gesture. — Does any vir- 
tue apply to outward movements ? 

Moral virtue orders through reason all that belongs to 
man as man. And a man's movements and gestures, so far 



490 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXvni. 2. 

as they are governed by reason, can be ordered by it. This 
ordering by reason is either according to what is becoming 
to the individual man, or what is fitting with reference to 
other persons, to places or occasions. 

(1) It is true that every virtue pertains to the spiritual 
beauty of the soul ; but motions and gestures are a sign of 
the inward disposition. Government of these requires gov- 
ernment of the inward passions. 

(2) Eelatively to others this moderation pertains to friend- 
ship or affability; and as gestures and motions are signs of 
inward dispositions, the moderating them pertains also to 
truthfulness ; a man presents himself in words and deeds 
such as he inwardly is. 

Is there a virtue which concerns recreations and amuse- 
ments f 

A man needs corporeal rest for the refreshment of his 
body. He cannot labour without intermission, because his 
powers are finite, proportioned to limited labours. So, also, 
is it with his soul, whose finite power is in like manner 
proportioned to limited operations. And, therefore, when 
he extends his mental operations beyond his limit, his work 
becomes labour, and he is fatigued, especially because in 
mental work the body also (i.e., the brain) is employed, 
the intellect using powers which operate through corporeal 
organs — the senses, the imagination, the memory. But the 
soul's rest is pleasure ; and, therefore, the remedy for 
mental fatigue is some pleasure, reason's vigorous action 
being intermitted. But words or actions of this kind, in 
which nothing is sought for except mental pleasure, are 
called amusements, frolics, games, merry pastimes. Such 
things are sometimes necessary to be used for the soul's 
rest. 

But a virtue is needed, since there are three things which 
must be avoided : (1) First, and chiefly, that this pleasure 
be not sought in base or injurious words or actions ; (2) 



Qu. CLXVIII. 3.] MODERATION". 491 

that sobriety of soul be not utterly lost ; (3) that, as in all 
other human actions, regard be had to what suits the per- 
son, the season, the place, and other circumstances. Now- 
all this is ordained by reason's rule, and a habit which 
operates according to such rule is a moral virtue. Aristotle 
calls it urbanity, ivrpansXia (JSTic. Eth. iv. 8). This, 
then, is a form of moderation restraining man from im- 
moderate sports and recreations. 

In themselves, of course, such things are useless ; but the 
end of the pleasure which they afford is the refreshment of 
the wearied soul. 

Is there sin in superfluous amusement ? 

"What exceeds reason's rule is superfluous ; what falls short 
of it is defect. First, this excess may be found in the kind 
of things used for sport ; as shameful words or actions, or 
what tends to injure our neighbour. Such excess is mortal 
sin. 

But, secondly, due circumstances may be lacking; as 
when men amuse themselves at unsuitable seasons, or in 
improper places, or with what does not befit the circum- 
stances or the persons. 

And this, indeed, can sometimes be mortal sin on ac- 
count of the excessive addiction to amusement, which pleas- 
ure is preferred to the love of God, so that one does not 
hesitate to resort to such things against the precept of God 
or of His Church. 

Or, again, one may be not so addicted to amusement, 
although too fond of it ; and this may be venial sin. 

(1) But that which excuses from sin cannot be itself a 
sin ; and amusement (a thing " done in joke ") sometimes 
does excuse from sin ; therefore it is never, even in excess, 
a sin. Yes ; some things are sins only by reason of the 
intention of doing harm, which intention jesting excludes, 
since its aim is only pleasure. And in such things the sin 
is less, or none at all. But some things also are sinful in 



492 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXVin. 4. 

themselves, and such things are not excusable because they 
were said or done in jest ; on the contrary, the amusement 
is criminal and detestable. 

(2) But what, then, would we have to say of actors of 
plays, and all whose business it is solely to amuse the pub- 
lic ? If all excess in amusement is wrong, must not all such 
people be in a state of sin ? And must not all be sinning 
who patronize them and so cooperate in their sin ? 

It has been shown that amusement is necessary in the 
conduct of human life. But for all things which are useful 
in this way, employments and services are lawfully assigned. 
And therefore the actor's profession, and that of all those 
who provide amusements for the people, are not in them- 
selves immoral ; nor are such people in a state of sin, pro- 
vided that they use their profession lawfully — i.e., that they 
employ no wrong words or actions in their occupation, nor 
exhibit their plays, etc., on unfit seasons. And although, 
" as a matter of business," they have no other duty in rela- 
tion to others except what seems so trifling', yet in relation 
to themselves and to God, they may lead a serious and 
virtuous life in habitual prayer, in governing their passions 
and their actions, and, as they not infrequently do, by large 
gifts for charitable purposes. (This liberal and kindly view 
of a large class in society is very different from the popular 
notion of mediseval Christians, and equally wide of the 
Puritan pharisaic assumptions.) 

Those, then, who with virtuous moderation aid them are 
not sinning, but acting justly in giving them the reward of 
their ministration to the social good. The sin lies in wast- 
ing one's property on such persons, or contributing to im- 
moral performances, which is cooperation in the sin. 

Is there any sin of an opposite hind ? 

Since man is a '-'social animal," the virtues of "good- 
fellowship" must have a place in Christian morals ; and Aris- 
totle was not far out of the way in giving a place in Ethics 



Qu. clxix. 1.] MODEKATIOX. 493 

to his " eutrapelia." Whatever in human affairs is con- 
trary to reason is vicious. Now, it is contrary to reason 
that one make himself irksome to others, taking no pains to 
please them, and even hindering others' pleasures. But 
those fall short in the proper refreshment of life who offer 
no amusement themselves, and make themselves disagree- 
able to those who do so. Such are harsh, clownish, morose ; 
they are vicious in their way. 

But since recreation is useful for rest and pleasure, and 
these in human life are not to be sought on their own 
account, but for the end of virtuous operation, therefore de- 
ficiency in respect of amusement is less vicious than excess 
in it (Nic. Eth. x. 6). " A few friends for pleasure's sake 
are enough, like sweetening in our food " (ib. ix. 10). 

It is an act of penitence for sins to abstain from amuse- 
ments ; but this, of course, is not the vice of deficiency here 
spoken of. 

Moderation in dress and furniture. — Can virtue or vice 
be connected with outward adornments ? 

The only vice can be in the man who immoderately uses 
them. And this immoderation is either relative to the 
usages of the society in which one lives, or in the inordinate 
affection of the user, when he employs such things intem- 
perately, whether it be according to the fashions of the 
world around him, or contrary to those usages. 

This inordination in superabundance of adornments shows 
itself in three w T ays. First, when one is seeking the admira- 
tion of others by his display. The purple and fine linen are 
the food of vainglory. Next, when one is pampering his own 
body with effeminate luxuries ; and, lastly, when, though 
there may be no inordination as respects the end, there is sin- 
ful solicitude concerning such things. We may distinguish, 
therefore, three virtues in this matter : the lowly mind, 
which seeks no vainglory ; the mind contented with the nec- 
essary conveniences of life, following the apostle's words, 



494 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXIX. 2. 

" Having food and covering, let us be therewith content " 
(1 Tim. vi. 8) ; and, lastly, the simple mind, which excludes 
inordinate desire for outward show. 

But, on the side of defect, there may be also inordinate 
affection in the negligence which will not employ attention 
or trouble to comply with what is becoming to one's station 
and the society of which he is a part. Or, again, one may 
take a sort of pride in his own sordidness, and it may be the 
more mischievous if it masquerade as religion (S. Aug., De 
Serm. Dom. in Monte, ii. 12). 

Observe that dignitaries in the state and the ministers of 
the altar are rightly clad in costly vestments, not for their 
own ostentation, but to express the excellence of their office 
or the glory of Divine worship. 

Also, it is possible to use a poor garb, etc., not for pride, 
but for a discipline of humility, and because one chooses his 
part with the poor. S. John Baptist did so as a preacher of 
repentance to men. 

Can women adorn themselves without mortal sin? 

What has been already said applies to this question ; but, 
besides, there is the special grievous sin of provoking men 
to lasciviousness by the manner of dress. The woman can 
lawfully take pains to please her husband, if she be married ; 
but she mortally sins if she intend to attract other men. 
But if her improper dress and ornaments be only from levity 
or vanity, her sin may be venial or it may be mortal. 

Customs of society also may make excusable in dress what 
is not laudable. (Qu. : " Low-necked dresses " in " fashion- 
able " society ?) 

(Our author recognizes the position of marriageable girls, 
to whom, mutatis mutandis, what has been said will also 
apply.) 

Do the ornaments of women seem to be prohibited by the 
Divine law ? S. Peter said (1 Ep. iii. 3), " Whose adorn- 
ing let it not be the outward adorning of plaiting the hair, 



Qu. CLXX.] PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE. 495 

and of wearing of jewels of gold, or of putting on of ap- 
parel.'' S. Cyprian spoke very severely from this text (De 
Hab. Virg.). " Clad in purple and silk, they cannot put on 
Christ ; adorned with gold, pearls, necklaces, they have lost 
the true ornaments of soul and body." But compare what 
S. Paul says (1 Tim. ii. 9), " Let women adorn themselves 
in modest apparel with shamefastness and sobriety," and 
learn that sober and quiet ornament is not prohibited to 
women, but superfluous and immodest dress. (A lesson for 
some modern sects in their first enthusiasm, which soon, 
however, fly from one extreme to the other which is 
worse.) 

S. Cyprian, in the same treatise, is still more severe 
against personal embellishments. But they are mortal sin 
only when they are used lasciviously or in contempt of God. 
Besides, it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty which is not 
real, and another thing to conceal some unpleasant deform- 
ity arising from sickness or other such cause ; for this is 
permissible (1 Cor. xii. 23). 

Observe, also, that since women may lawfully adorn them- 
selves according to their station in life, and may even add 
something to please their husbands, it follows that the 
workers in the arts so employed have a lawful occupation, 
even though their products be frequently abused. 

§ 12. Precepts of temperance. 

The end of the commandments is charity, to which we 
are led by two precepts respecting the love of God and of 
our neighbour. This is the object of the Decalogue. But 
among the vices most opposed to temperance adultery seems 
to be that which most conflicts with love of our brother, 
and therefore this sin is specified. Gluttony, inebriety, 
even other forms of lust, are not so directly opposed as this 
sin is. 

The Decalogue contains no affirmative precept respecting 
temperance, because it gives the universal principles of 



496 TEMPERANCE. [Qu. clxx. 

Divine law, whereas sucli affirmative rules must vary accord- 
ing to the diverse laws and customs of men. 

In themselves the virtues annexed to temperance have no 
direct relation to the love of God and of our neighbour, but 
they rather regard one's own self ; they are " self -regarding " 
virtues. It is otherwise with their effects, and accordingly 
the effects of vices opposed to these annexed virtues are pro- 
hibited. Thus, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, 
may result homicide or dishonouring of parents, which also 
may proceed from the pride by which many transgress the 
precepts of the first table. 

Pride is not found in the Decalogue, because the Ten 
Commandments are the sum of primary principles known 
per se ; whereas pride, though it is the beginning of sin, 
is hidden in the heart, and its inordination is not manifest 
to all. 

Humility and meekness are not enjoined in the Decalogue, 
for they presuppose the law, indicating the temper in which 
it is to be received. 



Part IV. — Supplement. 



INTKODITCTION. 

S. Thomas Aquinas did not live to complete the Summa.* 
His editors have tried to supply what is wanting from his 
other works. For the purpose which the present writer has 
in view he will freely use the materials thus provided, or any 
other standard authorities, such as the Ductor Dubitantium 
of Bishop Taylor, the contributions to our science made by 
Sanderson when he was professor at Oxford, or any others. 

No attempt is made to consider all possible cases ; only 
such are selected as are most likely to occur, or are most 
serviceable illustrations and expansions of what has pre- 
ceded. It was said in the preface, but may now be repeated, 
that only a cursory glance can here be given at many topics — 
e.g., the obligations of the state and the citizen — for each 
such topic would require a volume. Nothing more can be 
aimed at than to indicate, before this Supplement is con- 
cluded, some of the problems which Moral Theology must 
consider, since their solution belongs to the law of God, 
although those problems are here left unsolved. 

To prove every proposition laid down in a brief manual 
of this kind would be practically impossible. And the ele- 
ments of every science require the writer of them to assume a 
dogmatic tone even when proof could readily be furnished. 
Let it suffice, then, that the present writer has taken his 
utmost pains to lay down no proposition which does not 
express either the common law of the Catholic Church 

* Pars Tertia breaks off at qu. xc. 
32 



498 INTRODUCTION - . 

or direct deduction from the revealed law of God. Where 
lie may have erred he submits his judgment to the lawful 
authority, duly expressed, of the Church from which he has 
received his commissiou as priest and teacher. 

Some questions which seemed open to discussion among 
those who are loyal to the moral authority of the Christian 
Church have been indicated in parentheses, even when the 
writer might for his own part regard some of them as closed 
questions. 



CHAPTER I. 

CONSCIENCE. 

Conscience, as a question belonging to psychology, was 
discussed by S. Thomas Aquinas in Pars Prima, lxxix. 12, 
13. He found in man a habit of practical reason ("synde- 
resis ") by which we know the primary principles of things 
which are to be done ; e.g., that good is to be followed and 
evil to be shunned. What that moral good and evil are is 
to be otherwise determined. But the act by which we 
apply to our own conduct our knowledge of good and 
eyil, whether our judgment be correct or incorrect, is called 
conscience. In this act man testifies to himself respecting 
himself, holds himself bound or absolved, approves or con- 
demns his own actions. 

Divisions. Conscience is correct or erroneous ; certain 
or doubtful ; scrupulous or lax. 

An erroneous conscience dictates falsely — i.e., contrary to 
objective and binding law — through ignorance of that law. 
(On ignorance in this regard, see Introduction, pages 12, 
92, 466, seq.) 

A correct conscience testifies, judges, approves, etc., in ac- 
cordance with the objective law as it truly is. But it has 
only moral certainty in its judgments. Both a correct con- 
science and one invincibly ignorant, as we have seen, are to 
be followed, for it is always sin to act against one's con- 
science, whether it be correct or erroneous (Rom. xiv. 23 ; 
see Bishop Sanderson's excellent sermon on this text). But 
there may be sin in using its permission, since vincible 
error is wilful and sinful error. "The conscience hath 
power in obligations and necessities, but not so much nor 



500 CONSCIENCE. 

so often in permissions" (Duct. Dubitant. I. i. rule ?; I. 
iii. rule 2). 

But duty requires that one should earnestly and stead- 
fastly seek for that outward light which illuminates con- 
science to see the right path for conduct (W he well, El. 
Moral, iii. 365). 

When should the priest enlighten an erring conscience^ 
(See Supplement, page 599.) If the error be probably in- 
vincible, and the erroneous opinion which has been followed 
be consistent with a state of grace, the error must be opened 
or not according to prudent consideration of the person and 
his affairs. But let the priest beware of converting mate- 
rial sin into "formal" sin; and also of "casting pearls be- 
fore swine " (Duct. Dubitant. I. iii. rule 8 ; I. iv. rule 14 ; 
cp. Eom. vii. 7 ; 1 Tim. i, 13). 

A doubtful conscience. Only a few words can here be 
added respecting that wide subject in Moral Theology 
known as "probabilism." Since opinion, with its uncertain 
judgments founded on fallible arguments, and with appre- 
hension of a possible opposite, must often be our only guide 
to the right, and since in such a case we are compelled to 
act without moral (subjective) certainty that we are right in 
our choice of action, a few well-settled principles may be 
a useful clue in our difficult course. 

(1) Where there is obligation of obtaining a determined 
end, it is not lawful to reject the surer and safer means of 
reaching it in order to follow what will probably enable us 
to reach that end. 

This condemns, e.g., the popular Protestant sentiment, 
"We are all travelling to the same place, and it matters not 
what road we take." Again, the priest must apply this rule 
where questions arise respecting sacraments " generally nec- 
essary to salvation. " 

Again, this rule prohibits the physician's trying exper 



DOUBTFUL CONSCIENCE. 501 

inients on his patient if the healing art provide remedies 
which are morally certain to have good effect (Duct. Du- 
bitant. I. iv. rule 3 ; I. v. rule 5). 

(2) When the question is of the existence of an obliga- 
tion or a law, a probable opinion may be followed, even if it 
be not the safer one, for an uncertain law does not bind con- 
science. 

This moral principle, e.g., is calculated to meet a specious 
argument for perverting to the Eoman communion — sc. , 
" You are not morally certain that it has no claim on you ; 
but you admit that submission to the Roman see is the safer 
course." Unless you are morally certain that duty requires 
you to leave your religion and join that or any other, you 
sin in doing so. Therefore, you imperil your salvation by 
such a course. 

(3) Note here the difference between uncertainty of the 
law and uncertainty of the fact ; for in the latter case the 
rule is precisely the opposite. In doubt whether you have 
fulfilled an obligation under the law, that law may still be 
binding respecting that obligation. 

(4) In doubt or uncertainty you may act on presumption 
as if you were possessed of moral certainty. " Melior est 
conditio possidentis. " 

(5) If the principal and most essential fact be certain, but 
you are doubtful respecting other circumstances or necessary 
conditions, you may act upon probability ; doubt is to be 
decided favorably. 

(6) Decide, then, in favour of liberty if there be no con- 
trary presumption, and the public good put no obstacle in 
the way of that liberty. But observe that civil law may be 
stricter than the moral law in this respect ; e.g., in ques- 
tions connected with the matrimonial contract. 

(7) In doubtful cases, favours are to be regarded liberally, 
and extended as far as possible ; penalties, on the other 
hand, are to be construed strictly ; e.g., in case of an eccle- 
siastical trial. 



502 CONSCIENCE. 

Conscience may be perplexed, being compelled to choose 
between two evils. But observe the ambiguity in our 
proposition. If the "evils" be sins, you are not allowed 
to choose either of them ; both must be rejected. But, on 
the other hand, the evils may be results of sins between 
which {"mala pcence") you are compelled to choose. Then 
applies the maxim, "Of two evils choose the least " (San- 
derson's Praelect. ii. 18; Duct. Dubitant. I. iv. rule 3; 
I. v. rule 8). 

The choice, e.g., may lie between continuing in a corrupted 
church and implicitly favouring apostasy and unbelief. 

Again, a wife may have to choose between condoning a 
husband's infidelity to her by living with him, or break- 
ing up a family. 

Eemember, also, that laws are of four different grades 
(page 503), and that the lower must always yield to the 
higher. 

Ductor Dubitant. I. v. rule 8, defends the opinion that 
a lesser sin may be made a counsel to him who is bent upon 
a greater one. Thus, Pilate might rightly have counselled 
the Jews to scourge the Lord and let Him go ; " not abso- 
lutely, but comparatively ; that is, rather that than the 
other (the crucifixion), if ye will do one" of them. 



CHAPTER II. 

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. 

§ 1. General principles. 

Conscience, as the internal rule of human acts, needs an 
external guide, and law is this guide. And since Cod alone 
is the all-sufficient guide of man, all law is grounded on 
the Divine law. The atheist is the true " anomist." But 
that Divine law is communicated to man under human 
conditions, through human agents. Thus there are four 
grades of law binding conscience : (a) per se simpliciter, 
i.e., absolutely, the command of God, as His command ; 
(b) per se, but not simpliciter, human law given by a supe- 
rior who possesses authority ; (c) per se, but not simplic- 
iter (for this and the next can be changed), law proceeding 
from self, in vows and promises ; (d) per accidens (variable 
according to time and place), the law of avoiding scandal 
(q.v. page 253). (See Sanderson's Praelect. iv. 6.) 

Although affirmative laws always imply a negative pro- 
hibition, and negative prohibitions imply a positive com- 
mand, yet there is an essential distinction between them as 
such. The negative law is always obligatory, while the 
affirmative law is only so under its appropriate conditions. 
This principle is universal in casuistry, and of great prac- 
tical importance. (See Duct. Dubitant. II. iii. rule 1, §§ 
13, 14.) 

The " law of nature" the Divine will manifested by the 
natural light of reason, teaching what can be derived from 
right reason (the subject of Moral Philosophy), has for its 



504 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. 

object all that agrees with, or is necessary for, a rational 
creature. 

Its three fundamental precepts are " honeste vivere, al- 
teram non Imdere, suum cuique tribuere" (Instit. I. i. 3), 
'.' to hurt nobody by word or deed, to be true and just in 
all my dealings." 

Distinguish carefully, however, (a) these primary and 
unchangeable principles of the law of nature ; (b) immedi- 
ate deductions from them as in the Decalogue ; (c) remoter 
inferences in which differences of judgment may arise. 

Eyery rational man is possessed of the first and second of 
these as a promulgated law (Rom. ii. 15 ; see also Sander- 
son's Praelect. iv. 24). 

Ignorance of laws like these, which one is bound to know, 
is no excuse for their violation. This also is an established 
principle in the civil and the common law. " Ignoratio 
leg is quam quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat." 

Ignorance of the fact which comes under the law is a 
valid excuse. 

A doubtful law does not bind conscience, and liberty 
may be used, if no other principle forbid. Here applies 
the maxim, " Melior est conditio possidentis." 

But where there is doubt of the abrogation of a certain 
law, according to the same maxim, we must stand by the 
law. 

Also, in doubt of fact under the law, we must stand by 
the law; e.g., we are certain of a debt, but not certain that 
it has been paid ; then we are bound to pay it. 

§ 2. Human law. 

Though human laws under their requisite conditions are 
binding in conscience (Introd. page 131 ; Rom. xiii. 5), they 
have no right over judgment ; i.e., they demand only out- 



HUMAN LAW. 505 

ward obedience with a willing mind, both in public and in 
private (Col. iii. 23). 

In the authority to make laws is implied not only the lay- 
ing down deductions from the law of nature, but also the 
binding on conscience things otherwise indifferent, "posi- 
tive laws" (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 1, § 13). 

Conditions requisite in the laiv-mcther are : (a) the author- 
ity must be competent to make a law ; (b) the matter must 
not transcend the limits of the authority, e.g., religion and 
conscience in the case of civil law, the secular life in the 
case of ecclesiastical law (Qu. : Has the state authority to 
make laws respecting education ?) ; (c) the law-maker must 
not be legislating for the advantage of a clique, " or trust," 
or for other undue ends. 

Conditions requisite in human law. The thing com- 
manded must be (a) possible ; (b) not immoral, for human 
laws are not obligatory if they are not just and good, i.e., if 
they violate the higher law of nature ; (c) useful to the com- 
munity (1 Tim. ii. 2) ; (d) not unequal in application to 
the subjects of the law (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 3 ; 
Sanderson's Praelect. v. § 7) ; (e) permanent and univer- 
sal, not a " privilegium "' ; (f) promulgated, not an "ex 
post facto" law (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 6), for the 
subject of the law must have opportunity of knowing it if 
he will. /-Otherwise there may be a civil offence, but there 
is no sin, because the ignorance is invincible ; and invin- 
cible ignorance, like physical or moral incapacity, excuses 
violation of law. This applies even to the Gospel law (S. 
John xv. 22). (Qu. : Does positive law, if unequal, bind in 
conscience ? Sanderson's Praelect. ix. §§ 9-1 L.) 

What was said (Introd. page 133), that human law is not 
binding when per accidens serious injury will result and 
no manifest good will come from it (see also Sanderson's 
Praelect. vi. 8), is also true of Diviiie positive law (Duct. 



506 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. 

Dnbitant. III. i. rule 2, § 8), but not of the law of nature. 
But the principle applies equally to civil and ecclesiasti- 
cal law ; e.g., promises of aid to the Church, if meanwhile 
relatives fall into need ; rubrics of the Church, etc. 

The application of law, e.g., judicial sentence, founded 
on false presumption of fact, does not bind conscience. 
(Qu.: What means may be used to escape from the 
law ?) 

But in all these cases, per- contra, scandal must be 
avoided. 

To justify evasion, (a) the matter must be serious ; (b) 
the injustice certain ; (d) the law must be against the pub- 
lic good, not merely inconvenient for the individual. 

Interpretation of the law may be by (a) the legislator 
himself ; (h) by experts, e.g., judges ; (c) by custom. Words 
are to be taken in their ordinary and usual meaning if 
nothing absurd or unjust follow. In doubt consider (a) 
the intention of the legislator ; (Z>) the object of the law ; 
(c) the concomitant or subsequent circumstances (Duct. 
Dubitant. III. vi.).. 

Penal law is to be narrowed as far as possible, and not to 
be extended to parallel cases ; favourable law, on the other 
hand, is to be amplified by " parity of reasoning." 

Laws also founded on the law of nature, e.g., the fifth 
commandment, extend to all cases which are similar, or 
have equal or similar reason, when such is the law's evident 
intent (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 3, § 24). 

On equity see Part III. page 397. 

Human law loses its force (a) when it is formally abol- 
ished ; (b) when the motive for its establishment comes to 
an end (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 3) ; (c) through desue- 
tude, implying tacit consent of the law-maker (Qu. Canon 
law ?). But when the end does not apply in special cases, 
those cases are not released from the obligation of the law 
(ib. § 4). 



CIVIL LAW. 507 

On Dispensation the rigorist view will be found in San- 
derson, De Jur. Oblig., vii. § 3. But see, per contra, the 
case of rash vows as treated by him. 

§ 3. Ecclesiastical law. 

This directs the Church for the common spiritual good 
and for eternal beatitude. The authority to make laws 
which bind conscience is implied in the existence of a di- 
vinely instituted society ; Christian sects cannot possess it. 
And, conversely, the existence of such Divine laws implies the 
existence of one visible and apostolic Church (S. Matt. xvi. 
19, xxiii. 2 ; S. Luke x. 16 ; S. John xx. 23 ; Heb. xiii. 1?). 

When the old law, ceremonial and judicial, was abro- 
gated, the natural — the moral — law remained unchanged 
and unchangeable. But while the new (the evangelic law) 
makes the remote deductions from the law of nature be- 
come clearer, its peculiar characteristic is that it is a law 
of love and grace — the law of a supernatural life (Sander- 
son's Praelect. iv. 26, 32). 

It is (a) moral, including the three theological virtues ; 
(b) ceremonial, e.g., the Holy Eucharist ; (c) a law of coun- 
sels of perfection (see Introd., page 151). 

Positive laws of apostolic origin, i.e., of purely external 
order, are binding only so far as the Church has perpetuated 
them ; e.g., concerning eating blood and things strangled ; 
widows of four-score ; women speaking in church ; the un- 
covered head in church ; bishops not novices (S. Ambrose), 
etc. A fortiori, this principle will apply to primitive 
canons. 

§ 4. Civil law. 

Civil law directs earthly societies to the common good of 
such communities. It is (a) the Roman law (the civil law 
in narrower sense of the word), based on Justinian's Code, 
the Institutes (elements), the Digest or Pandects, and the 
Novelise ; it is (b) the unwritten law of the Teutonic races, 



508 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. 

on which are based the decisions of courts, thus originating 
the common law ; * and (c) it is enactments of the legisla- 
tures of the state or the nation, which have sometimes boldly 
deviated from the common law. 

The aim of civil law being the temporal good of the com- 
munity, that good may require the toleration of moral evil ; 
i.e., like the law of Moses, it may overlook certain forms of 
evil which are not inconsistent with the preservation of so- 
ciety. (See Introd., page 129.) Or, again, though not pro- 
hibited, they may be put under such regulations as reduce 
them to the narrowest possible limits ; e.g., high license for 
the sale of distilled liquors ; gambling-houses ; stews under 
the Papacy (Sand. Praelect. vi. 18). 

(May not a " license " for such things be viewed as an 
annual fine ?) 

Within its due limits civil law is binding on conscience, 
but ceases to be so if it be allowed to fall into desuetude. 
This, of course, is not true if the law be intrinsically bad ; 
for whatever is certainly forbidden by the law of nature 
cannot be enjoined by civil law, and whatever the law of 
nature commands — e.g., the care and education of children 
— cannot be taken away or forbidden by the civil law which 
is only indirectly Divine (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 10). 
But although civil law may not interfere with natural 
duties, it may restrain natural rights (ib. § 5). 

Laws "purely penal" bind conscience only to the pen- 
alty ; i.e., a right conscience may choose between obedience 
and submission to the penalty, e.g., "Five dollars fine for" 
etc. But " mixed penal " laws bind to obedience, and not 

* Civil and canon law, although they do not always agree between 
themselves, came into conflict with the common law in England, espe- 
cially under King Stephen (12th cent.), when the civil law was brought 
thither. E.g., in the question of the legitimation of bastards, the 
canon law mercifully allows it upon the marriage of the parents; but 
the laity in Parliament said, " nolumus Anglke leges mutare " (Blackst. 
Introd. page 19). 



CIVIL LAW. 509 

merely to a penalty for disobedience. If the penalty be just, 
that binds conscience after sentence, not before; i.e., we are 
bound to yield to that penalty and not evade it (Sand. Prae- 
lect. viii. 17, 24). 

Unwritten law, or custom, under due conditions can ob- 
tain the force of law, abrogate, modify, or interpret old law. 
(See S. Aug. quoted in Duct. Dubitant. II. iii. 19.) 

The requisite conditions are : (a) the custom must be 
good, and useful to the community ; (b) it must rest upon 
repeated, voluntary, and public acts of the community, im- 
plicitly intended as binding ; (c) the custom must have been 
long continued, without authoritative protest. 

Custom under law certainly aids in its interpretation 
(Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 6) ; but if it be plainly 
against the law, the law prevails, although the tacit consent 
of the law-makers may make that contrary custom a virtual 
revocation of the law, if it be revocable. No custom, how- 
ever, can change laws which in their nature do not admit of 
change. 



CHAPTER III. 

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

The Divine law in its primary applications, as given in 
the Ten Commandments, has been so fully presented in our 
text from S. Thomas Aquinas that only a few words of prac- 
tical application need be added. But the student will not 
overlook that admirable expansion of those commandments, 
so serviceable also for self-examination by them, which is 
contained in the Church Catechism. 

The First and Second Commandments concern faith, holy 
fear, love and worship towards God. (See Part III., page 
399.) 

On the sin of simony, Jesuitical distinctions concerning 
it, and the making pay a motive for the priest's work, see 
the twelfth Provincial Letter of Pascal, with the defence of 
it, usually appended to " Les Provinciales." The test for 
conscience may be to ask how the work is done. Is it with 
equal zeal, labour, and love where no earthly recompense can 
be expected ? 

On the Third Commandment, see Part III., page 399. 
"Curses," "swearing," as ordinarily heard, need not be 
always regarded as mortal sin in themselves, for charity will 
presume that there is absence of intention. Commonly, 
among us, at least, they may be indications of a profane 
spirit, and habits of other and mortal sins. But in this 
matter it would not be wise to overlook the very different 
associations of different classes, and the very different cus- 
toms of different European nations. 

In oaths, assertory or promissory, there must be lawful 
matter ; otherwise they create no obligation. Furthermore, 



THE FOUKTH COMMANDMENT. 511 

the implied conditions in a promissory oath are (a) that no 
serious injury will be done in observing it ; (b) that there 
shall be no serious change of circumstances ; (c) that the 
other party shall observe his pledge also ; and (d) that he 
will not give up his claim to the fulfilment of the oath. 
Perjury, in common law, is crime only in judicial pro- 
ceedings, and in what is material to the case in question 
(Blackst. iv. page 137). 

TJie Fourth Commandment. Giving time for Divine wor- 
ship is a law of nature. But since the ceremonial law of 
ancient Israel has been abolished, the observance of Sundays, 
together with other feasts and fasts of obligation, rests upon 
positive ecclesiastical law (Duct. Dubitant. II. ii. rule 6). 
Such law is found in canons 13, 14, and 15, §§ 13, et seq., of 
1603 (respecting "the Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday, 
and other holy-days, " . . . "such days as are appointed to 
be kept holy by the book of Common Prayer/' etc.), and title 
i., canon 18, of the American Church. The law is (a) affirm- 
ative, as in these canons ; i.e., binding under due conditions. 
Grave injury to body or soul is full excuse from the outward 
obligations of such a law; e.g. , for harvesters in case of 
need ; the sickly and nurses of the sick ; travellers on long 
voyages by land or sea ; those who are engaged in cooking, 
mothers in charge of infants, and domestic servants; those 
who reside at great distance from church, etc., etc. 

(b) The law is negative in requiring abstinence from un- 
necessary servile work. But to this must in practice be 
added the obligation of abstaining from what causes scandal, 
especially where Judaizing notions are prevalent, and from 
what tends to sin, seeking what promotes spiritual edification. 

With this limitation, it cannot well be maintained that 
liberal works or recreations of any honest sort are prohibited 
by the law. At the same time, we have no right, under the 
law of charity, to make our recreations a cause of servile 
work and of the neglect of holy time on the part of others. 



512 NOTES ON" THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

The common servile work, duly limited in respect of time, 
such as cooking, sweeping, etc., is not a violation of the law. 
Servile work, also, for charity or piety is to be admitted 
without hesitation. 

The Fifth Commandment. (See Part III., page 363.) 
The honour due to a father and a mother here stands for the 
various obligations which spring from the natural relations 
of human life. These are considered in various parts of 
our Moral Theology, and need not be now repeated. 

But let us add respecting children, that in the choice of a 
work for life, as well as in the choice of a partner for life in 
life's duties, they are not subject to their parents' will, be- 
cause these are the appointed and natural means of their 
reaching the ultimate end of their existence. They are to 
serve God and do their duty "in that state of life unto which 
it shall please God," not their parents, "to call them." But 
the law of nature, as well as the common law, is not to be 
overlooked, which requires that in their work for life they 
shall not forget to provide for the support of aged parents 
in their time of need. 

Parents also have a negative on their children's choice, at 
least until full maturity is reached. And this will apply 
equally to the choice of Holy Orders as life's work, or to 
the " religious " life for girls. 

(Qu. : The child is converted, and parents oppose the 
receiving of the Christian sacraments ?) 

Parents may violate this commandment by their neglect of 
spiritual instruction and training, and of moderate correction. 

(Qu. 1. Suppose that husband or wife is an infidel and 
opposes those necessary things — e.g., Holy Baptism — which 
are the blessings of children ? Also, that the other parent 
devoutly seeks for the same ? 

Qu. 2. May parents lawfully commit the care of their 
children to heretical schools ?) 



THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT. 513 

The husband's special sins are neglect of his wife, tyranny 
towards the weaker partner, dissipating funds which are 
needed for family expenses. 

The wife's special sins are lack of Christian submission 
(Col. iii. 18), irritating words, "scolding," needless provo- 
cation in general, exposing the husband's faults, etc. 

Caution : Let the priest beware of lending a ready ear to 
a wife's complaints, which many are so ready to pour into a 
pastor's ears, and of taking part in family quarrels, because 
there is usually fault on both sides; e.g., among many, exas- 
perating a drunken husband by "nagging" words instead of 
meeting him with patience and forgiveness. 

If the husband be negligent in providing for his family, the 
wife may justly expend, out of the common income, what is 
suitable for her station in life, what is necessary for children, 
and other domestic expenses. If, through the husband's ex- 
cesses, the family's support be endangered, she is not morally 
obliged to consult bim in her action. 

(Qu. 1. Debts are due at the husband's death, and she 
also and her little children must be provided for ; which has 
the prior claim ? 

Qu. 2. May investments be withdrawn from business, 
and released from claims of creditors, for her benefit ? 

Qu. 3. Can parents justly cut off children, in case of a 
runaway match, from all inheritance, and expel forever 
from the family ?) 

The master's and employer's special duty is to make 
prompt and just payment, and to see that due time is 
provided for spiritual improvement, and for recreation. 
The servant's and employee's duty is to avoid slovenly 
work, work for self in hours which belong to the other, 
and using unlawfully, selling, or giving away that other's 
goods. 

(Qu. : Suppose that the servant or employee leave before 
the stipulated time expires, what is the moral obligation ? 
33 



514 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

Certainly, if loss ensue thereby, there is no claim for pay ; 
but suppose no serious loss ?) 

The Sixth Commandment. (See Part III., page 297.) 
This, of course, includes the grave sins of hatred, dissen- 
sion, etc., which find their consummation in the malicious 
taking of human life. The law of nature is repeated in 
Eevelation (Gen. ix. 6), "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, 
etc., for in the image of God made He man." 

But God, by His agents, may demand the life which He 
has given (Rom. xiii. 4, the ideal of civil government). 

Lynch law, therefore, in organized society is murder. 

Divine law, however, does not forbid, and human law 
makes it lawful, to protect one's own life and what is nec- 
essary to life, even at the cost of the life of the aggressor — 
e.g., the burglar — provided that no other means will serve 
the purpose. Charity may demand the same course in de- 
fence of one's neighbour against the unjust aggressor. 

Manifest limitations of this natural right are : (1) He who 
takes what is not necessary to life is not lawfully killed ; 
(2) no such injury shall be done after the aggression. 
That would be revenge, not lawful defence (Blackst., iii. 
page 3). 

Common law accords so strictly with the spirit of this 
commandment that it may be well to note its distinctions. 
Homicide is — 

(1) Justifiable in order to save life or limb, but not uni- 
versally in order to save property. Special cases under 
common law, making homicide justifiable, are, (a) in case 
of arrest for felony, the accused taking flight or resisting ; 
but it is murder to kill a felon without due process of law ; 
(b) if a house be broken into for robbery at night (day-time 
also, New York), or if an attempt be made to burn it ; (c) 
in defence of chastity, either by the woman or her relatives 
(Qu. : her neighbour ?), but not in case of a woman taken 
in adultery, for there violence is absent ; (d) in case of attack 



THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT. 515 

threatening grave injury, with clearly felonious intent 
(Blackst., iv. pages ITS, 181, 184). 

(2) Excusable homicide is in case of attack threatening 
grave injury, if no means of escape — e.g., retreat — be pres- 
ent. But if the affray be over, or the assailant running 
away, homicide is criminal revenge. Husband and wife, 
parent and child, may use the same means in general for 
one another (page 186). 

(3) Manslaughter is homicide : (a) voluntary, but through 
sudden passion ; (b) involuntary, but while doing any un- 
lawful act. 

Attempt at murder is not judged so gravely in common 
law as in morals (except poisoning, in England; Blackst., 
page 196) ; it is only on a par with manslaughter. Killing 
another instead of the one intended is equally murder in law. 

An act dangerous to others, even when care is used, may 
result in the sin of homicide. It is the same sin for the 
physician to shorten human life for the purpose of avoid- 
ing suffering. Abortion is homicide, but the mother's life 
may be saved by what is injurious to her offspring. 

(Qu. : Killing it to save the mother's life — can one life be 
taken, when it will be certainly lost, in order to save an- 
other ?) 

Defensive war is lawful, for the life of the state is more 
precious than that of the individual ; therefore all that is 
essential to war is also lawful. Stratagems are lawful, ex- 
cept those which no prudence can avoid. If the innocent 
necessarily suffer in sedition, riot, or war, that is not in- 
tended, and there is no sin in the result. 

Suicide, as we have seen (Part III., page 299), is sin 
against nature, for though man has direct dominion over 
his body, it is only "dominium utile," received from G-od 
and to be accounted for. 

Since suicide is also a crime against society, it is murder 



51 G NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

by common law, and the adviser of it is guilty of man- 
slaughter (Blackst., iv. page 189). The only admissible 
question in determining the guilt of it is, as in any other case, 
did the person at the time know right from wrong ? Be- 
ware of the sentimental sympathy which condones the crime. 

(Qu. : The priest is expressly forbidden to use the burial 
service in such a ease. "What should he do if called upon ?) 

But exposure of life for a good end is lawful ; e.g., in war, 
the blowing up of a vessel with imminent danger to self. 
The end sought for is not self-destruction. 

There is no moral obligation of extraordinary — e.g., sur- 
gical — means to preserve life. On the other hand, immod- 
erate asceticism, if it injure bodily health, is unlawful, even 
if the aims are good. 

The Seventh Commandment has been fully discussed in 
Part III., Chapter VII. Only a few words, therefore, need 
be added. 

Questions connected with it require the utmost caution, 
both personal and official, because the soul's desires are 
soonest reached through the imagination. 

The Gospel law is given (Gal. v. 19-21), forbidding in- 
ordinate (not merely excessive) acts of impurity, gluttony, 
intemperance ; in the Tenth Commandment are forbidden 
the corresponding desires, imaginations, and other proxi- 
mate causes of temptation to outward acts of sin (S. Matt. 
v. 28 ; Eph. iv. 29). 

(1) Luxuria, lust, is against nature's primary law, because 
the appetite is given for the continuance of the human 
race, and the creation of the family society (Gen. ii. 18). 

Proximate causes, which may become mortal sin, are 
kisses, even touches, exciting novels acting on the imagina- 
tion, obscene speech (sometimes venial), obscene songs. 

Voluntary self -pollution, so prevalent among the young, 
must be approached most cautiously, for fear of suggestion. 

The prevalent sin of avoiding the ends of matrimony, 



THE NINTH COMMANDMENT. 517 

mortal as it is, can only be treated in the most general way, 
by frequent iteration of the ends of this Divine institution 
(1 Cor. iii. 17). 

(2) Sensuality is inordinate gratification of the five 
senses, especially taste. 

(Qu. : Is gratification, purely as such, wrong?) 

Temperance in eating, drinking, sleep, recreation, ap- 
parel, are alike commanded. In general, such moderation 
is commanded as will favour the best condition of our souls. 
Beyond this, asceticism is matter of counsel, or charity, in 
avoiding scandal of the weak. 

Note that sins against the body may produce bodily dis- 
ease, and demand bodily remedies. 

The Eighth Commandment is against unjust acts ; the 
Tenth against unjust desires. (See chapters on Right and 
Justice, on Injury, and on Contracts.) 

The Ninth Commandment forbids (a) perjury, as a sin 
against justice and against our neighbour ; then (b) lying, 
for the same end ; (c) slander ; (d) calumny ; (e) detrac- 
tion ; (/) rash judgment ; (g) injurious suspicion. (See 
Part III., page 311 et seq.) 

Lying. The Gospel law seems to be explicit : " Putting 
away lying, speak ye truth each one with his neighbour ; for 
we are members one of another " (Eph. iv. 25). But what 
is lying ? We can only answer, it is false speaking or acting 
with intent to deceive (S. Aug., De Mendacio, Contra 
Mend. c. iii.). It is not a material falsehood, for he may 
lie who speaks the truth when he thinks that it is not true. 
Lying, formally, is the wish, the will to deceive, enunciated 
in any manner whatsoever, whether by word or gesture, by 
equivocation or mental reservation. "He lies who has one 
thing in mind and enunciates another in any way. For the 
lying and the not lying are to be judged from the intention 



518 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

of the mind." The enunciation of what is known, believed, 
or supposed to be untrue, is only the " material " part. 
The essence of truth is not in the uttered words, but in the 
mutual understanding. Therein lies the obligation of truth, 
"for we are members one of another." 

The Jesuitical distinction, making lawful " partial men- 
tal restriction " and equivocation, seems to be corruptive of 
sound morals. Such casuistry says that since the other has 
no right to know the truth he may be allowed to deceive 
himself respecting your enunciation. The answer is that 
he has a right not to be told a lie even indirectly, for "we 
are members one of another." A true man will say, " You 
have no right to an answer," and bear the consequences. 
Evasion is no lie ; amphibology is a lie in intention 
(Whewell's El. Moral, iii. 393, seq.). 

Is a useful lie (mendacium officio sum) a sin? Bishop 
Taylor justifies it (Duct. Dubitant. III. ii. rule 5, qu. 1, 
§§ 9, 11, 13).* But, on the rigid side, consider the argu- 
ments presented by S. Aug., Cont. Mend., c. v.: (a) Holy 
Scripture seems to condemn all lying (Ps. v. 6 ; S. Matt. 
v. 37 ; Eph. v. 25 ; Eev. xxii. 15). The deceit of S. Peter 
is rebuked (Gal. ii. 12). (b) Not even to save earthly 
life is life eternal to be risked by sin. (c) Nor to preserve 
chastity, for the purity of the soul is more precious (c. vii.). 
(d) Nor in the hope of benefiting others spiritually ; for 
how can religious trust be put in one who will lie for a 
good cause ? (c. viii.). (e) Nor to prevent others from 
doing us an injury (c. ix.). Lighter sins are not to be done 
in order to save others from greater sin ; we choose neither 
of them ; we condemn both. Each one must answer for 
his own sin (c. xiii.). Sin is not to be measured by tem- 
poral consequences. The Divine command (Rom. vi. 13) 
is, " Present not your members unto sin as instruments of 
unrighteousness ; " and the tongue is such a member. If 
*See, also, Scott's comment on the case of Rahab, Josh. ii. 5. 



THE NIXTH COMMANDMENT. 519 

we may use it for a falsehood with good intention, why not 
any other member ? 

S. Thomas Aquinas (see page 381 et seq.) shows that 
mendacium officiosum is always a sin, even if it be a venial 
one. If so, like other venial sins, it aids in forming a char- 
acter ; and it is an easy step downwards to mendacium 
perniciosum ; e.g., in detraction. 

(Qu. 1. May another be allowed to deceive himself 
through your words, actions, or silence, when he has no 
right to the truth — e.g., in the case of lawyers, physi- 
cians, confessors, confidential secretaries, ambassadors, com- 
manders in time of war ? 

Qu. 2. Compliments in "good society" ? "Not at home" 
may not be a lie, though servants may so understand it. 

Qu. 3. May an advocate assert that his client's cause is 
just ?) 

"Lies of necessity" — e.g., to save life — must stand or fall 
with other compulsory acts. It is said that " necessity 
knows no law." But constraint of liberty or threats are not 
necessity, for there is always more or less constraint of fear 
or force. It is sin to have cowardly fear. Only such fear 
as destroys the freedom of a well-governed man constitutes 
necessity, or such force as makes compulsion. Heroic vir- 
tue rises above the common standard of compulsion. 

Another's necessity, a father's, husband's, etc., stands on 
the same plane with one's own. But antecedent rules are 
not serviceable for such cases, since formal sin is avoided 
when they are left to the emergency which is supposed to 
be outside of the law.* 

On libel and slander, see Chapter on Injury, § 6. 

* In fiction the question of mendacium officiosum is very forcibly 
presented in Scott's Heart of Mid-Lothian (c. xviii.). Tet Jeanie Deans 
acted a lie (c. xxix.) in order to save her life. Cooperation, also, in 
the form of silence, not denouncing crime, will be found in c. xxxii. ; 
perhaps, in another form, in c. li. 



520 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. 

Detraction, secret and unjust injury of another's good 
name (see Part III., page 314), is (a) simple detraction 
when the offence charged is true ; it is (b) calumny when 
it is false. It is (a) direct when, if the charge be not abso- 
lutely false, yet the truth is amplified injuriously, or what 
is entitled to secrecy is manifested, or bad motives are im- 
puted to a good or an indifferent act. It is (b) indirect, 
when good acts are denied, or diminished, or silence kept 
while others applaud, or praise is coldly given. 

The gravity of the sin is measured by the gravity of the 
intention and of the injury. But it is worse than theft. 
" Who steals my purse," etc. Eevealing wrong becomes a 
duty only when grave injury is effected by not doing so, or 
when another is entitled to know the facts. 

Caution : The priest among his people is but too apt to 
be made the hearer of detraction, and needs the greatest care 
in distinguishing what he is entitled to know from idle or 
malicious tale-bearing. 

It is sin against charity, not against justice, if a notorious 
offence be related to those who are ignorant of it. Listen- 
ing to detraction is sin against justice, if thus inducement 
to it be offered ; otherwise it is sin against charity. 

(Qu. : Talking of injury done to one's self ?) 

Restitution is obligatory after these sins, so far as is pos- 
sible ; and usually the confessor will defer absolution until 
it is made. The good name is to be repaired or restored, 
and compensation is due for loss, if any there were, even if 
the fault revealed were actually committed. (Without 
enunciating or implying falsehood one can say, " I ought 
not to have said that respecting him.") Public restitution 
is due for public detraction, private for private. Even in- 
advertent detraction has the same claim. 

Excuses. Restitution maybe excused (a) if the fault have 
been otherwise revealed, or the good name otherwise restored. 

(b) An old charge may have been forgotten ; then to 
apologize for it would be to recall it. 



THE NINTH COMMANDMENT. 521 

(c) Restitution may be morally impossible, a good name 
being utterly lost. 

(d) Tbe detraction may have been unheeded ; e.g., the 
speaker being perceived to be angry. 

(Qu. : Suppose tbat the injured party has been guilty in 
the same way ?) 

Satisfaction for insult may recall the offence, and it is 
therefore not usually to be offered. 



CHAPTER IV. 

EIGHT AND JUSTICE. 

The subject of the next three chapters — viz., Right and 
Justice, their violations through injury, and contracts based 
on justice — might here be considered as questions of Moral 
Theology alone, and no reference might be made to civil 
law except when it conflicts, which it rarely does, with the 
principles of our science. 

But, even with all the rudeness necessary in general laws, 
which, as such, cannot recognize the inevitable exceptions 
occurring and recognized in morals, the civil and the com- 
mon law are in large measure so admirable an application 
of justice to human life, and the practical use of some ac- 
quaintance with the first principles of common law as thus 
applied is so great, that it seems best to consider our topics 
both from the point of view of Moral Theology and of the 
laws of civil society. 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. 

Justice, as we have seen (Part III., page 274), is a moral 
virtue inclining the will to render to every one what is 
right, i.e., his due. Our Lord gives the law and its crite- 
rion (S. Matt. vii. 12), although His law, no doubt, extends 
beyond the natural virtue of justice to the domain of super- 
natural charity. Duty, the obligation of giving what is due, 
is correlative with right. 

Divisions. (1) Legal justice was defined (page 275) as 
the form of justice which gives to society its rights. But if 
we take the narrower definition of it — sc, civil justice ex- 



DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS. 523 

pressed in -written law — the supremacy of moral over legal 
justice is emphatically presented in Blackstone's remark 
(iii. page 392), that "a second trial is not granted in cases 
of strict right or summum jus, where the rigorous exaction 
of strict legal justice is hardly reconcilable to conscience/' 
Summum jus summa injuria. 

The same principle will he illustrated, also, by the case 
of '•'accident;'' special inconvenieuce of general law from 
unusual circumstances will warrant equitable jurisdiction 
from a court of chancery (Blackst. iii. 431). It will 
rectify some mistakes, some frauds, which may not be cog- 
nizable by common law ; it will issue injunctions to prevent 
invasion of rights. 

(2) Distributive justice gives honours and imposes bur- 
dens in due and just proportions (Part III., page 285). 

(3) Commutative justice regulates exchange between pri- 
vate individuals. 

(4) Retributive justice is a form of (2), exacting penalties 
for wrong-doing. 

Note that in particular matters of justice, ordinarily and 
regularly, lawyers are the most competent judges ; in mat- 
ters of justice which are to be conducted by general rules, 
as, also, in religion and charity, theology is supreme (Duct. 
Dubitant. I. iv. rule 10). 

Jus, right, is the lawful claim to do, to keep, or to obtain 
anything whatsoever for one's own benefit. It is the object 
of the virtue justice. 

Divisions are (1) right in things already possessed (" things 
real"); (2) right to things not so possessed ("things per- 
sonal"); i.e., jus in re, and jus ad rem. These give rise 
to real and personal actions in law. 

Property is rights in things (Blackst. ii. c. ii.). This, 
as jus in re, is either real or personal, the former being 
lauds, tenements, and hereditaments. But the last divis- 



524 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. 

ion, expressing all that can be inherited, will include, also, 
personal property (c. xxiv.). To distinguish then things 
personal, they are called chattels, which are either chattels 
real, as a lease or a mortgage, or chattels personal, viz., 
movables (c. xxv.). 

Property, as possession, is either absolute or qualified. 
This fact will give us a four-fold division of right ; viz., (1) 
dominion ; (2) use ; (3) usufruct, use with further benefits ; 
(4) service and jurisdiction, as the bishop's right, the pater- 
nal right, the right of masters, etc. 

§ 2. Dominion. 

Absolute dominion belongs only to G-od (Ps. xxiv. 1). 
But man can rightly have property as against other men 
(Part III., page 302), receiving it from God, and being in it 
independent of others. This is both natural law and posi- 
tive Divine law (Gen. i. 28). 

Human dominion, or the right to dispose of a thing in 
any manner as one's own, is (1) perfect when there is the 
right to dispose of the thing and of its use ; (2) imperfect if 
the right cover only one of these. 

"Eminent domain" {"dominium altum") is in the state, 
since its claim is superior to that of individuals; "domi- 
nium htimile" is that of private persons. 

A qualified right of property is in many cases recognized 
as existing (1) in the case of water, as appropriated by oc- 
cupancy (Blackst. ii. 403). Obstructions, therefore, the 
fouling or diverting of water, etc., may constitute legal in- 
jury as well as a violation of justice, and often of charity. 

(2) In "bailment/' also — i.e., delivery of goods in trust 
— qualified property is acquired ; e.g., by a carrier, an inn- 
keeper, a pawnbroker. A servant in charge does not so 
acquire. 

Jus ad rem is another example of qualified property, 
called "property in action," or "chose in action;" e.g., 
money due on a bond, or a promise or covenant to do any- 



HOW IS DOMINION" ACQUIRED ? 525 

thing (Blackst. ii. 397). If there be failure in such a case, 
common law will give compensation for the qualified prop- 
erty. 

Imperfect dominion is direct when it is over a thing ; it 
is indirect when it is over the use of the thing. 

Man has, by Divine gift, the second, "dominium utile," 
over his goods of body and soul. He has not direct domin- 
ion in either of these goods. (See notes on the Sixth Com- 
mandment, page 515.) 

Over external goods, however, he has both direct and per- 
fect dominion. (Qu. : Can he rightly have dominium utile 
over another person ? ) 

diildren and the insane are not incapable of dominion 
through a guardian. With respect to dominion on the part 
of minors, common law is more liberal than the civil law — 
i.e., the rights of parents over children, so far as regulated 
by human law, are more restricted by the former ; but both 
common and civil law agree with the law of nature that 
the parent has perfect dominion over his child's earnings 
while that child is under age, ''the child living with him 
and being maintained by him" (Blackst. i. 453). But the 
former makes the emancipation of the infant very easy ; 
for the father may relinquish all his right to the services 
and earnings of a minor child, in which case the child 
will have perfect dominion over them. 

In the case of other property held by the child, as by gift, 
bequest, etc., the father, if he be appointed guardian of that 
property, stands in the same position as a trustee ; and the 
child's dominion is limited by the power of administration 
which is in the parent as guardian of the property in ques- 
tion. The father receives the profits of his child's prop- 
erty, but must account for them when his child comes of age. 

§ 3. How is dominion acquired ? 

(1) Dominion is acquired by "occupancy " — i.e., the actual 



526 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. 

taking possession of what belongs to no one ; e.g., wild land 
or animals — under requisite conditions ; sc, (a) that the 
thing is a proper object of private dominion (Qu. : land ?), 
and belongs to no one ; (b) that no human law stands in the 
way ; (c) that the occupier intends to make it his own, and 
actually takes it (Instit. III. tit. i.). 

FercB natures (Blackst. ii. page 392). By jus gentium 
beasts, birds, and fish are the property of the captor, and 
may be taken anywhere, but the owner of the land may 
prohibit entry thereon. If such wild animals escape from 
their captor, they become the property of any one who cap- 
tures them again. By common law, however, there is a 
qualified property in them, " per industriam hominis," in 
confining or taming them. But this is only while they 
are actually possessed through occupancy, unless, like 
turkeys and pigeons, they are in the habit of returning. 
(Op. the seal as an international question in 1891.) It is 
felony, however, to steal those which are used as food (page 
394). Dogs, cats, etc., are not so protected by common 
law. 

(2) Finding, or discovery, is either of (a) te thesaurus," 
money lost ; or (b) of other things lately lost ; or (c) of 
things abandoned ; or (d) of things not owned (Instit. ii. 
tit. i. 9). Thesaurus goes with the land if found by the 
owner of the same ; " treasure trove/' however, may be 
reclaimed by the owner if he appear. (Op. Koman and com- 
mon law.) 

' (3) Prescription either (a) gives some acquired dominion ; 
or (b) some positive obligation, though unfulfilled, is released 
through lapse of time. Divide, then, into acquisitive and 
liberative prescription. 

Human law has the right to sanction this mode of ob- 
taining dominion, without the previous owner's consent, 
as morally necessary for the common good ; for otherwise 



HOW IS DOMINION ACQUIRED ? 527 

strifes would often arise from uncertain possession. Due 
prescription in transferring dominion therefore is obligatory 
in foro conscientim. 

There are five conditions of lawful prescription : 
{a) "Sit res apta ; (b) fides bona sit ; (c) titulus quoque 
Justus ; (d) poss ideas juste ; (e) completo tempore legis. " 

The first condition (a) requires that the thing possessed 
be a salable thing over which dominion has been exercised 
(not a loan, etc.), public, undisputed, certain, and uninter- 
rupted. 

(b) The second condition is a firm persuasion that the 
title acquired is one's own ; otherwise there is moral (Qu. : 
legal ?) obligation of restitution. The same principle ap- 
plies to liberative prescription. 

Ignorance of the law does not constitute this " good 
faith ; " although ignorance of facts may do so (Digest. 
xxii. vi. 4, 6). According to the civil law, subsequent 
knowledge of facts does not vitiate legal possession, what- 
ever moral obligation there may be (Digest, xli. iii. 48). 

(c) The title must appear to be a true one ; e.g. , buying, 
gift, etc. 

(d) But a long period of uninterrupted possession is equiv- 
alent to a title of some other nature. This length of time, 
however, is different when accompanied with other title, 
and again when so unaccompanied. It differs also widely 
in the case of movables (in most cases under the statute of 
limitations the period being six years) and of immovables, 
which require a much longer period for prescriptive title. 

Thus, by the statute of limitations, no entry shall be 
made upon lands unless within twenty years after a man's 
right shall accrue (Blackst. iii. page 178). 

Prescription is suspended by the minority of the claimant, 
and by other insuperable obstacles. 

It does not apply to anything fraudulently obtained, for 
there must be bona fides; and no length of possession under 
such circumstances can make a wrong become a right. 



528 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. 

Liberative prescription, also — i.e., lapse of right — lias its 
term fixed by civil law. But what law permits may not 
always be what a good conscience can rightly claim. 

(4) Accession. The thing acquired may be so united with 
one's own property by natural processes that dominion is 
gained over it. Thus, the offspring of brutes goes with the 
mother, "partus sequitur ventrem" (Instit. II. i. 31, 33; 
and trees, etc., go with the soil. The bona-fide possessor of 
land is entitled to all gathered fruits, unless the owner claim 
them ; but there can be no action for gathered fruit against 
the " usufructuarius " (vid. infra). But if one be pos- 
sessor of the land mala fide, he must restore what he has 
gathered or compensate for it. 

" Specification" is another example of accession. Manu- 
facture with another's materials, if in good faith, gives 
property in the product, the materials being paid for (Qu. : 
legal rights ?). This if the thing be properly new ; but 
if merely the form be altered, as in making a coat, the 
owner of the material can still claim it (Blackst. ii. page 
404). 

Alluvion, another example of the same, is the slow (not 
the sudden) growth of land on the bank of a running 
stream, which gives rightful claim to the accession. 

" Adjunction" is a similar example, If a man build on 
his own ground with another's materials, he owns what ac- 
cedes to the soil, but the other has a lien on the materials. 
If any one build on rented ground, the building becomes the 
property of him to whom the ground belongs ; but if the 
builder acted bona fide he must be compensated ; if he acted 
mala fide he can only take away the materials. (Note that 
the present law of "betterments " is uncertain.) 

In case of confusion of goods without consent of both 
parties, the entire property belongs to him whose dominion 
is invaded (Blackst. ii. page 405). 

We are discussing right and justice, but the higher law 



HOW IS DOMINION ACQUIRED ? 529 

of Christian charity may overrule the demands of strict 
justice in all such cases. 

(5) Conveyance. Another's title may be transferred to a 
new owner for a satisfactory consideration, or as a gift. 
(See the chapter on Contracts.) 

Use and usufruct. The first is the right of using an- 
other's property, the substance of it being preserved for the 
owner ; the second is the right of using and enjoying it ; i.e., 
of taking the fruits for one's own on like conditions. This 
gives dominium utile. The fair expenses connected with 
the thing are to be paid, and also all ordinary obligations ; 
e.g., an annuity on the property. It must be restored in 
reasonably good condition, and the owner must not injure 
the usufruct ; e.g., parents using children's goods. Use, 
then, does not apply to perishable goods, as articles of food. 

The usufructuarius can sell his right, but the usuarius 
cannot. 

Tenant right, subletting, etc., sometimes involve grave 
moral questions which cannot be here discussed. (See, fur- 
ther, the chapter on Contracts.) 
34 



CHAPTER V. 

INJURY. 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. 

Injury {"injuria") is the violation of another's right. 
It is at once sin against the individual man, against society, 
and against God, whose law of justice and charity is broken. 

Divisions. It is "formal injury" when it is intended; 
it is only " material " injury, when it is not intended. It 
is grave or light relatively to the injured person. It is 
direct, or it is indirect when it is foreseen and permitted in 
its cause. 

Note that the question of involuntary injury — e.g., that 
done by one intoxicated — has been considered under the 
question of ignorance, q. v., page 466. 

But common law accepts no such defence, considering the 
ease with which such plea is made, and punishing the vol- 
untary loss of reason (Blackst. iv. page 25). 

Damnum, loss, may be caused without injury, for " scienti 
et volenti nonfit injiiria," except when a man cannot law- 
fully yield his right. 

(Qu. 1. Parental right versus legislation concerning chil- 
dren's education ? 

Qu. 2. Abridging the suffering in case of mortal injury 
when so requested ?) 

Injury also may be caused without loss, as in the case of 
rash and unjust judgment. 

Injury may be otherwise divided according to its object, 
as done to goods of fortune, of body, of soul, of good name. 

For the ends of civil society the most fundamental divi- 



THEFT. 531 

sion is, (1) private wrongs, infringement of the private or 
civil rights of individuals considered as such ; and (2) pub- 
lic wrongs, " nef as," where the community as well as the 
individual is considered to have been injured. The latter 
are crimes and misdemeanours. In civil law a crime or a 
misdemeanour (a lighter act of similar nature) is an act 
committed or omitted in violation of a public law. To con- 
stitute a crime in the view of civil law there must be an 
overt act, as well as a vicious will. Felony in the United 
States is a crime punishable with death or confinement in a 
State prison. 

Minoi's. By common law an infant under seven years 
cannot be guilty of felony ; between seven and fourteen 
years, inquiry must be made whether he is " doli capax." If 
he be over fourteen years, without question the felonious act 
is felony in him. 

§ 2. Theft. 

TJieft (see Part III., page 302) is unjust taking of an- 
other's property, the owner being unwilling. The " formal " 
part is the intent to defraud. 

Divisions. It is (1) simple theft, the secret taking ; (2) 
robbery, taking with violence ; (3) fraud, deceiving in con- 
tracts; (4) sacrilege; (5) peculation, the very common 
stealing from the public purse. All are mortal violations of 
the law of nature. 

The evil intention is the formal part of the sin in theft ; 
but the crime of stealing is not altogether so viewed in com- 
mon law. 

Thus the attempt to commit a felony is only a misde- 
meanour. So also is cooperation in the form of solicitation 
or incitement to commit the theft. "The attempt and not 
the deed confounds us," is not true of common law. In 
theft also, as viewed by common law, there must be actual 



532 INJURY. 

possession taken, and not the mere preparation for it 
(Blackst. iv. 222, 231). To constitute stealing, however, 
there must be felonious intent ; otherwise the act may be 
only trespass (page 232), 

But if other injury be done, even though unforeseen, 
while one is guilty of an unlawful act, he is held to be 
answerable for that injury. Homicide committed by one 
engaged in a felonious act may be viewed as murder. 

Blackmail. Sending letters which threaten to accuse of 
crime, etc., with a view to extort money, is an attempt to 
rob, and crime by modern law. 

The theft may be of a thing so trifling as to cause no 
appreciable injury (see Part III., page 304) ; but it is not 
to be overlooked that by accumulation the thief may be 
enriched ; e.g., retail dealers by short measure and light 
weight. 

(Qu.: Suppose that the price set upon the goods is pro- 
portioned to the light weight or short measure ?) 

In the case, again, of children and servants, it is cer- 
tainly true that if the article be trifling in value, or be 
consumed, not preserved, given away, or sold, the owner 
may be presumed to be less unwilling to part with it than 
in other cases of theft. But this applies only to the " ma- 
terial " part of the act. We are bound to consider the 
formal intent, and the tendency of whab may possibly be 
venial sin in itself. 

It may be suggested, indeed, that the taking of the little 
thing without the owner's knowledge or assumed consent 
may neither harm him, nor intend to do so, nor sensibly 
enrich the taker. In this case there is, undoubtedly, the 
sin of theft, but surely not so grave as other sins which vio- 
late justice and charity. 

Since the fruits of productive property, including private 



RESTITUTION. 533 

or public funds, belong to the owner of the same until he 
transfers its use, it is evident that if the guardian or trustee 
or treasurer of that property appropriate to himself those 
fruits of it — say, using for himself the interest on those 
funds, or seeking profits on tbem in " speculation " — he is 
indirectly a thief, even if he restore the property undimin- 
ished. For he is not a " usufructuarius." * 

Extreme necessity — i.e., immediate danger of life or limb, 
etc. — "knows no law." I mean that there is a natural 
right to use, sufficiently for the pressing necessity, what- 
ever can be found, and that taking it is no theft. For the 
owner's dominium utile is subject to G-od's higher domin- 
ion and law, and the human steward is bound not to be un- 
willing in such a case of need. 

(Qu. : Suppose that the extreme need is in another, and 
that you yourself have no means of supplying it from your 
own resources ?) 

But restitution afterwards is due, if that become possible. 
What was secretly taken may be secretly restored. 

§ 3. Restitution. (See Part III., page 286.) 

Violation of right, being an offence against G-od, must in 

* Note on arrest. — A warrant from a justice of the peace is prefer- 
able to a private arrest if the offender be not likely to abscond ; because 
if it be erroneously granted, no action lies against the party obtaining 
it unless it be proved that he obtained it maliciously. The warrant, 
however, is limited by the jurisdiction of the magistrate who issues it. 

By common law, a justice of the peace, a sheriff, a coroner, or any 
peace-officer, may arrest any person on reasonable charge of felony 
presented to him, or if he himself witness any suspicious act (Blackst. 
iv. 291). But where a felony is actually committed, any private per- 
son may arrest the felon, and is bound to do so. Even on reasonable 
ground of suspicion he may do so, though he is liable to action for 
assault and false imprisonment. Any private person may interfere 
to prevent a felony, and may apprehend and detain the one attempting 
it (page 293). 

(Qu. : Disturbance in church ?) 



534 INJURY. 

all cases be made good as a condition of pardon from Him. 
Compensation, indemnification, etc., are required by com- 
mutative justice in the law of nature, and in the revealed 
law (S. Jas. v. 4), as well as in human law. 

But violations of distributive justice or of charity as such 
do not demand restitution, because, strictly speaking, they 
cannot be made good in the same manner with violations of 
commutative justice. The fault can be amended, but the 
past loss cannot be repaired. This is the principle which 
applies to penitence in respect of retributive justice. A 
propitiatory sacrifice must supply what penitence cannot. 

Note, however, that the same offence may violate both 
forms of justice. Thus a negligent ruler may cause 
grave loss to the ruled, and violate the implied contract 
with them, and become subject to the law of restitution 
proper. 

Kestitution is based upon the law of nature that " since 
all wrongs may be considered as merely a privation of right, 
the plain natural remedy for every species of wrong is the 
being put in possession of that right whereof the person in- 
jured is deprived" (Blackst. iii. 116). As a negative law — 
sc, " Thou shalt not withhold his right from thy brother" — 
restitution is always obligatory ; but as a positive law — sc, 
"Bestore at once his right" — it is binding under the due 
conditions. The obligation arises from (1) unjust posses- 
sion of another's property ; (2) from unjustly causing loss ; 
(3) from unjust cooperation in injury done by another. 

Maxims. (1) " Res clamat domino." The right of the 
owner follows the thing wherever it may go. By common 
law he may recover his property even from a iona-fide pur- 
chaser wherever it may be found (Blackst. iii. 4 ; iv. 
363). In such a case, however, the original hona-fide pur- 
chaser is not bound in conscience to make restitution if 
the thing have passed into other hands and cannot be re- 
covered. 



RESTITUTION". 535 

(Qu. : Suppose that in good faith he has sold the thing, 
to whom does the price of it belong ?) 

(Note that property thus found must not be taken with 
violence. The owner must not be guilty of a " breach of 
the peace.'' He may not enter a third person's house for the 
purpose of getting his own, if that third person have not 
been accessory to the wrong. He may take possession of his 
own house or land, and eject an intruder, as also he may abate 
a public or private nuisance as an injury to the public — e.g. , 
nuisance made by an act of commission — only it must be 
done without riot. He may distrain goods for rent not paid, 
and cattle trespassing on his premises (Blackst. iii. 5, 218; 
iv. 167). " Sic utere iuo ut alienum non Icedas," says com- 
mon law as well as the Divine law.) 

Prescription, as already noted, gives claim to property in 
pure water, etc. But damage, if any, must be direct, not 
consequential. 

(2) " Res fructifica \t domino ;" i.e., the natural fruits or 
profits of a thing, and the use or enjoyment of it, belong to 
the owner thereof. This is included in the idea of domin- 
ion. 

(3) "Res naturaliter perit domino ;" i.e., when the ob- 
ject ceases to exist, dominion of it ends ; but there may be 
still existing an equivalent which belongs to the owner of 
the previous property. 

(4) "Nemo ex re alter ius locupletari debet;" i.e., no 
one may rightfully be enriched through another's prop- 
erty ; hence it follows that the measure of restitution due 
in such a case is the quantity of the thing detained from its 
owner, together with the accrued profits. 

(Qu. : If a public treasurer or a trustee of funds make a 
profit by "speculating" with those funds, to whom does 
the profit belong ?) 

How and to whom restitution is to be made. (See Part 
III., page 285. ) In the common frauds in trade the owner 



536 INJURY. 

may be unknown or cannot be reached ; then that which is 
gotten by fraud, not belonging to the possessor, can only be 
restored by giving to charitable uses for which society at large 
is responsible. 

In many cases it is impossible to make full restitution for 
the injury done against commutative justice ; then the 
restoring such part as is possible is obligatory on conscience 
as a condition of pardon for the sin. 

Extreme necessity justifies delaying or withholding resti- 
tution. 

The restitution may be made secretly, or through an- 
other; all that is required is that the wrong be made 
right. 

Note the grave sin — very common — of keeping up the 
expenses of life, and thus defrauding creditors. 

The possessor bona fide, as soon as he knows that the thing 
possessed is not his own, is bound to restore it to the rightful 
owner, if he be known ; and this, in whole or in part, as the 
thing may be at the time, together with the profits which 
have been derived from it, if any there have been. 

If he have bought stolen property, he has run his risk in 
doing so, and he must lose, since the rightful owner cannot 
justly be made the loser (Blackst. iv. 363). 

But the possessor bona fide is bound to no compensation 
if he have consumed, destroyed, given away, or lost the 
thing, or if it have been stolen from him. For it is not the 
materially causing loss (damnificatid) which demands resti- 
tution, but the formal injury. 

But the case is different if he have become richer by the 
possession of another's property ; then he is bound to re- 
turn the natural and the civil fruits of the thing, but not 
such fruits of it as he has gained by his own industry in 
using it. 

Suppose that this wrongful possessor has sold the thing ; 
then, if the owner reclaim it, the seller is bound to return 



DAMNIFICATIO. 537 

the price to the buyer, for in the contract of sale a good 
title to the thing was implied. 

(Qu. : Suppose that he has sold at a profit, to whom does 
that profit belong ?) 

The possessor mala fide — i.e., knowing that the thing is 
not his own — is bound to compensate the owner for every 
kind of loss, including profits, which might have been de- 
rived if the thing had remained in the owner's possession. 
There are various difficult cases of conscience in this regard, 
but the maxims given above will generally solve them. 

If the thing unjustly possessed pass through various 
hands in bad faith, each person so receiving it is responsi- 
ble for the whole. 

The possessor in doubtful faith is bound to make careful 
inquiry. If this be done, and the title still remain in uncer- 
tainty, he may retain the thing with a good conscience ; 
for " melior est conditio possidentis j" the presumption is 
in his favour, and other claimants to the thing must show 
a better title than his. 

§ 4. Damnificatio. 

Though unjust damage requires indemnification, yet the 
moral fault, which offends Grod, must be distinguished from 
juridical fault as resting on a sentence from a civil court. 
For the law will punish omission of due care if it cause 
loss, whether there has been any moral fault or not. 

The unjust damager is bound to full restitution of the 
thing or its equivalent, and also of its profits ; e.g., if a 
house be burned, or if workmen lose time through your 
neglect, those who suffer loss must be indemnified for rent 
in the one case, for loss of wages in the other. 

Conditions, (a) There must have been an unjust act of 
omission ; (b) it must be the cause of the loss and morally 
culpable — i.e., through foresight, intention, or criminal 



538 injury. 

negligence. These conditions are requisite to constitute 
the moral fault ; but even otherwise the sentence of the 
court in finding juridical fault binds conscience — e.g., if 
one have used all ordinary or due care. E.g., suppose that 
animals belonging to you cause the loss ; if it be through 
your negligence, you are morally bound ; if not so, you are 
not bound to make compensation until the sentence of the 
court so decrees. 

Suppose, again, that without moral fault on your part 
loss occur through your fulfilment of your official obliga- 
tions, as in the case of a physician ; there is no obligation 
of restitution. 

Suppose, again, that you at first caused the loss without 
fault, but afterwards did not do your best to stop that loss ; 
you owe restitution. 

(Qu.: Suppose that loss is caused to society by your aid- 
ing in giving office to the unworthy ?) 

§ 5. The unjust accessory. (See Part III., page 292.) 

Cooperation may now be further considered in its appli- 
cation to injury done. 

(1) Command causing moral compulsion requires restitu- 
tion for injury done if the loss directly result from the com- 
mand, and this also if the one commanded suffer loss in 
consequence of his obedience to the command. 

(Qu.: Eesponsibility of the one commanded — e.g., a clerk 
executing fraudulent orders ; a railway clerk obeying the 
orders of his superiors ?) 

(2) Advice may be a cause of loss ; and restitution is due 
if that advice were efficacious ; but it is not due if the 
act would have been done in the same way without the 
advice. 

The advice may have aided in causing the result, without 
its being properly efficacious. 

Again, it may be inquired whether that advice were given 
with the weight of authority. If not, there may be no obli- 



THE TJX JUST ACCESSORY. 539 



are not experts volunteering their advice in difficult matters. 
Compare the injurious advice of the priest, the lawyer, the 
physician, with the friendly words of neighbours ; the former 
may be the efficacious cause of loss when the latter count 
for very little. The one who follows bad counsel, knowing 
it to be bad, may suffer in consequence thereof ; but he has 
no claim for indemnification from his adviser. " Scienti et 
volenti nonfit injuria.'' 

(3) Consent binds to restitution for loss, if it be effica- 
cious. Consider the political obligations of voters, and their 
contributing to public loss by knowingly voting for the less 
worthy, or by withholding their votes from the worthy. 

(4) Praise or blame before the act is done is equivalent 
to counsel, and is to be judged by the same rules. Eestitu- 
tion is not due when the act already done is applauded. 

(5) Participation may be either in the injurious act or 
in its profits. In both cases restitution for injury done is 
obligatory, subject to the conditions respecting cooperation 
which have been already pointed out. 

(6) By silence, by not hindering, by not revealing, nega- 
tive cooperation in injury is given. For the injury is not 
hindered when it is possible so to do {e.g., not voting for 
the more worthy candidate for office). In such cases the 
law of charity is violated, which sin calls for repentance 
and amendment, not for restitution, unless the duties of 
one's office have been neglected. 

Observe that the superior is answerable, in common law 
as well as in morals, for the negligence of his employees, if 
his own negligence were culpable. This is true of both 
servants and agents. But in common law exception is made 
if the negligence of those employees were wilful, criminal 
injury, or out of the line of their authority. But, on the 
other hand, owners of hacks, or inn-keepers, are liable for 
injuries done through drivers or servants, and can claim no 
such exception (Blackst. i. 430). 



540 INJURY. 

§ 6. What things are to be restored 1 ? 

(1) Goods of the soul The injury which is done through 
deceit, fraud, or unjust fear must be repaired ; otherwise, 
only charity binds the conscience, for " scienti et volenti 
non fit injuria." Such unjust injury may be error in faith 
or in morals, and it is the erroneous official teacher, not 
the unofficial, who is bound to correct the error, if it were 
due to ignorance or negligence, not to guile or deceit. 

Common law is very careful in defining what slander and 
libel are actionable (Blackst. iii. 123), setting very definite 
limits in this regard ; e.g., limiting the time within which 
action may be brought. 

But note the attempt of American newspapers to relax 
the common law of libel. 

But though it is strictly just so far as it goes, conscience 
must go much further to the intended wrong and the injury 
actually done. For the truth of the charge will not release 
conscience from its obligation, whatever American news- 
papers may claim, if there were no just warrant for the pub- 
lication. But the legal distinction between malice in fact — 
i.e., actual malice — and malice in law — i.e., a wrongful act 
intentionally done — is equally serviceable in our science of 
Moral Theology. 

(2) Goods of body — e.g., loss of life or limb, or violation of 
chastity — -call for retributive justice, and no proper restitu- 
tion can be made. ( Vid. infra, Satisfaction.) But all con- 
sequent losses which can be measured demand strict resti- 
tution. 

(Qu. : Is the seducer who has not made promise of mar- 
riage bound to marry the seduced ? If illegitimate progeny 
be in question, both human and Divine law make him re- 
sponsible for the support and education of that offspring, 
and, in many cases at least, this may require marriage.) 

(3) Goods of fortune have been already considered as a 
question between man and man ; but they are also due to 
the state, according to Divine command as well as the law 



WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE RESTORED ? 541 

of nature, since they are necessary for the common good. 
Lawful government, therefore, has a right to part of the 
people's goods, and that part may be collected either directly 
or indirectly, as excise or tariff. 

Conditions, (a) Taxes must be just, i.e., imposed for the 
common good ; (h) they must be laid equally on all ; if so, 
they are binding on conscience (S. Matt. xxii. 21 ; Eom. 
xiii. G). 

Note, therefore, the sin of evading such burdens, thereby 
increasing those of other citizens ; of corrupting assessors, 
custom-house officers, tax collectors, etc. But there are 
many difficult questions involved in the determining what 
is right. 

Injuries in trade. " Forestalling " the market — i.e., con- 
tracting for merchandise on its way to market, etc., with a 
view to the undue enhancing of the price of it ; " engross- 
ing" provisions by buying them up for the same purpose 
("corners"); spreading false rumours for the same end; 
getting a monopoly of necessaries, or making a combination 
for the same purpose, are offences punishable by common 
law * as well as by the Divine law (Blackst. iv. 158). Should 
they not be, at least, as severely treated by human legislation 
as "conspiracy" among labourers? The same principles 
apply to interference with workmen, preventing them from 
hiring themselves, compelling them to join unions ("scabs"), 
or other interference with the freedom of labour. 

(Qu. : Do harmless adulterations violate the law of justice 
if the price of the article be reduced accordingly ?) 

Satisfaction to retributive justice. (See Part III., page 
308.) The question is not now of what is due to Divine ret- 
ribution, but of penalties inflicted by human law, such as 
capital punishment, confinement in prison, exemplary dam- 

* Recent decisions with respect to ' ; trusts" extend the scope of the 
civil law. 



542 INJURY. 

ages, and the like. These rest upon the just sentence of 
human law, and not on the satisfaction which the penitent 
voluntarily offers to the broken law of God. 

One is bound, therefore, when condemned, to bear the 
penalty of the law if he be guilty and if the law be just ; but 
no moral law requires him to come forward and denounce 
himself. 

It follows, also, that escape by breaking jail is justly 
treated as felony by common law, as also " rescue/' or aid- 
ing another to escape. 

(Qu. 1. Suppose that the condemned to death or long 
imprisonment has opportunity to escape without injuring 
others ; is he guilty before God in doing so ?) 

Qu. 2. Suppose that he is innocent, or known to be so, 
what is his right ? What is the duty of the one who knows 
his innocence ?) 

Observe that public nuisances, being an injury to the 
community, are subject to similar retributions of justice, 
and by common law may be suppressed or fined. Such are 
houses of prostitution, gambling houses, lotteries, tramps, 
and vagabonds (Qu. : drinking "saloons"?) (Blackst. iv. 
168). 



CHAPTER VI. 

CONTRACTS. 

§ 1. Definitions and divisions. 

As viewed by Moral Theology, these are constantly recur- 
ring applications of the. laws of justice, especially of com- 
mutative justice. But common law and moral law some- 
times move on different lines. 

What is a contract ? It is an agreement by which one or 
more persons bind themselves to one or more, collectively 
or severally, to do, to give, or to omit something. 

Divisions. (1) Common law supposes some "considera- 
tion," good or valuable, which makes the contract (a) oner- 
ous. 

In morals, however, contract may be (£) gratuitous, 
which, for our purpose, at least, may include such contracts 
as " mutuum" and " depositam" (vid. infra). 

An equitable consideration, however, is of no avail if it 
tend to deprive third parties of their just rights ; otherwise 
it will stand, if accompanied by deed or immediate posses- 
sion. 

A promise, though morally binding, or a moral duty not- 
enforceable by law, will not be recognized as adequate con- 
sideration. In law, a promise is binding only if it have been 
accepted, and another promise given in exchange, or some 
act done, which constitutes the consideration. 

(Qu. : Legal force of subscriptions, apart from expenses 
incurred in consequence of such subscriptions ?) 

On the other hand, if the consideration be valuable, law 
will not inquire into its adequacy if there be no evidence of 



544 CONTRACTS. 

fraud. Inadequacy of consideration, or hardship in fulfill- 
ing the contract, does not per se avoid a contract, unless 
fraud, or force, or want of understanding of it, be proved 
(Blackst. ii. 445). If a benefit accrue to him who makes a 
promise, or loss to him who accepts it, there is sufficient 
consideration. 

(2) Civil law makes four species of contracts : (a) "Do ut 
des" — e.g., a sale or loan; (b) "facio ut facias" — e.g., 
marriage, or exchange of services ; (c) "facio ut des," as in 
the case of employees; (d) "do ut facias," as in hiring 
workmen for wages. 

(3) Distinguish, also, express contracts from implied 
ones; e.g., in employing a person to do work, wherein is 
implied the contract "do ut facias ; " or in buying goods 
without express stipulation concerning the price of them, 
implying the contract "do ut des." In morals, other ex- 
amples may be found in persons accepting office with the 
implied contract of faithful fulfilment of its obligations. 

Express contracts are formally manifested in words or 
other signs of consent. Implied agreements are "quasi- 
contracts," in which consent is only implied in suitable 
action. Thus, a physician, in the exercise of his art, is 
under what we may call a "quasi-contract" to use his 
utmost skill and to do all which his profession implies. 
Where there are social duties to be fulfilled, common law 
supposes an implied contract which can be enforced. " Im- 
plied contracts are such as reason and justice dictate, and 
Which, therefore, the law presumes that every man has con- 
tracted to perform ; and, upon this presumption, makes 
him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-per- 
formance" (Blackst. iii. 159). 

(4) Contracts are also either executed or executory in 
futuro, conveying a " cliose in action." 

Common law, also, divides them, and therefore divides 
debts, into (a) parol contracts, which, even if reduced to 
writing, require consideration, "ex nudo pacto non ori- 



REQUISITES FOR A VALID CONTRACT. 545 

tur actio;''' (b) sealed contracts— i.e., deeds and covenants 
in which the seal is by common law supposed to be evidence 
of consideration, although some of the United States have 
altered this. A deed, also, is not affected by the statute of 
limitations as ordinary debts are, which are limited to six 
years, although minors and married women are exceptions 
to this rule. (Qu. : the moral obligation ?) 

Also, since the object of the limitation is to bar forgot- 
ten claims where evidence has been lost, etc., any indirect 
acknowledgment of the contract will suspend the limita- 
tion. 

(c) Contracts of record are judgments, recognizances, 
etc., and since they have the sanction or order of the court, 
there is no going back to defect in the original transaction 
except by writ of error. 

§ 2. Requisites for a valid contract. 

(1) There must be suitable matter — i.e., things and ac- 
tions, or whatever falls under full dominion and free 
administration. 

Conditions, (a) The matter must be physically and mor- 
ally possible ; (b) it must be existent, or probable in the 
future (Qu. : contracts in "futures"?) ; (c) it must be the 
property of the contractor ; (d) it must be licit, prohibited 
by no right, otherwise promises and contracts are binding 
neither in morals nor in law ; (e) it must be determinate 
in quantity and quality, an individual thing or act, etc. 
In morals we would be bound in this regard to consider 
the mutual understanding and intention. 

(2) There must be a lawful cause. In bilateral exchange 
the cause is the obligation assumed by the other party. 
Causeless contract, or one based on false or illicit cause, is 
binding neither in morals nor in law. 

(Qu.: Profits gained by a base contract ? See Part II., 
page 226.) 

(3) There must be a capable subject of the contract. He 

C5 



540 CONTRACTS. 

must be in possession of his reason, and not hindered by 
any law. 

The contracts of wives, minors, drunken persons, etc., 
are ruled by the common law. But, by the law of nature, 
the contracts of those who are morally responsible may be 
binding on conscience when by human law, which looks to 
the universally expedient, they are not so binding* I mean 
that if the contract have been to his injury, one may con- 
scientiously use the protection of the law ; but he may not 
benefit himself by his contract, and then shelter himself 
thus (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5, § 4). 

In common law the contract of an infant is voidable ; i.e., 
it is void if the court find it injurious ; otherwise it may be 
avoided when the minor reaches full age, or he may enforce 
it on the other party. His contract for necessities is bind- 
ing on his guardian. But when a reasonable sum has been 
allowed for an absent child's expenses, a parent is not liable 
for his extravagant expenditure. 

A minor is not legally responsible if he borrow money, 
but he is answerable for his " torts "" in that or any other 
matter. 

(4) Common law requires legal proof of contracts ; but 
they are equally binding on conscience when there is no 
legal evidence (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5). 

(5) Legitimate consent must be manifested outwardly, 
but it must also be inward and it must be mutual. Even 
if the contract be gratuitous, there must be an acceptance 
of it. 

Consent, also, must be free and deliberate. An imper- 
fect act cannot produce perfect obligation. 

Suppose that a fictitious contract is made, one of the 
parties to it having no intention of binding himself, or of 
fulfilling the stipulations of the contract. Although, prop- 
erly speaking, there may be no contract, because there has 
been no true inward consent, yet the deceiver is bound 
in conscience to indemnify the deceived in all damages 



DEFECTS IN CONSENT. 547 

incurred ; and, if he cannot otherwise do so, to stand by his 
nominal contract. ( Vid. infra, fictitious marriage.) 

In law and in morals a contract made by an agent within 
the limits of his authority is completed by his act. But, 
for legal purposes, distinguish herein general from special 
agents. The principal acquires the resulting rights and 
incurs the resulting obligations. 

Silence gives consent in the case of a contract if the 
matter be favourable to the silent party. But saying to some 
third person that you make a coutract with one who is ab- 
sent is not legally making it. 

§ 3. Defects in consent. 

Error, fraud, force, and fear, under certain conditions, 
avoid a contract. 

(1) Error is (a) with reference to the matter or thing 
involved in the contract ; (b) with reference to the nature 
of the contract itself — e.g., renting, selling, etc. Every 
such error annuls the contract even if, the error having 
been discovered, the contract have been entered on, unless 
there has been a renewal of it. Eor the parties must have 
assented to the same thing in the same sense ; otherwise there 
was no contract. This is true both in morals and in law. 

(c) Error respecting the qualities of a thing does not 
usually void the contract if there be no evidence of fraud. 
The general rule is, ' ' caveat emptor. " But the quality may be 
virtually a part of the essence of the thing ; e.g. , in buying a 
horse, his having some defect which ordinary vigilance cannot 
discover. In such a case the previous principles will apply. 

In gratuitous contract, also — e.g., subscription for a char- 
itable object — error of this kind voids the contract ; for this 
supposes a fully voluntary act in despoiling one's self with- 
out any return for so doing. 

(d) Error respecting the person does not usually avoid an 
onerous contract, except in the case of matrimony. 



548 CONTRACTS. 

(e) In morals, not in law, error respecting the motive, if 
that be the final end sought for, invalidates the contract, 
for it affects the substance of it ; e.g., subscribing to what 
is reported to be in need when such is not the fact. 

(2) Fraud is cause of nullity in a nominal contract when 
without that fraud there would have been no contract 
made. This means that (a) the fraud must be material to 
the contract ; that (b) the fraud works actual injury whether 
the statement be literally true (e.g., stating that property 
in question is worth so much, when it is heavily mortgaged), 
or be known to be false when the statement was made ; and 
(c) that the injured party relied upon the fraudulent state- 
ment, and had a right to rely upon it. Thus was created 
a special trust. A false and even injurious statement be- 
lieved to be true by the person who makes it is not a legal 
or moral fraud. (See, further, § 5, Sales.) 

(3) Fear is grave or light, produced from an intrinsic or 
an extrinsic cause, necessary or free, just or unjust, pro- 
duced in order to compel the contract or otherwise. All 
sorts of fear greatly disturbing the reason of a well-gov- 
erned rational man invalidate a contract ; if they be not 
so great as to amount to that, they do not avoid a contract. 
Force, also, moral or physical, is in effect the same. If a 
contract be made with one who takes wrongful advantage of 
necessities, or uses actual and extreme violence or threats 
producing well-grounded apprehension of such violence, 
that contract is voidable in law. 

(Qu. : Suppose that the force or fear is for just cause, 
what is the moral obligation of the contract ?) 

In gratuitous contracts, however, fear or force counts for 
more than it does in onerous contracts. 

The obligation of the contract is to all things fairly im- 
plied in it, and not merely to the letter of it. The obliga- 
tion is not created or the contract made binding by an oath 



GRATUITOUS CONTRACTS. 549 

if the contract be per se invalid ; and the oath is void if it 
cannot be kept without sin. 

§ 4. Gratuitous contracts. 

(1) A promise is a gratuitous contract in which one freely 
and spontaneously obliges himself to give something gratu- 
itously to another, or to do or to omit something in his 
favour. 

Conditions, (a) There must be at least the implied will 
of obligating one's self ; (b) the promise must be free from 
all error and fraud respecting the thing and the final cause 
of it, from all compulsion and fear, even though they be 
just ; (c) the promise must be outwardly given and ac- 
cepted. 

Note, therefore, that simple promises usually express 
merely the purpose of the promiser, and, if all these con- 
ditions be not present, the promise may be revocable. 

The promise (WhewelPs El. Moral. III. xv. 377) is to be 
interpreted like any other contract, not only by the inten- 
tion of the promiser, but also by the sense in which, with- 
out amphibology, he at the time believes that it is accepted. 
This makes the mutual understanding, the implied con- 
tract. 

If the conditions on which the promise is made be un- 
fulfilled, the promise is null, for he that accepted it was 
bound to do so subject to those conditions. 

Unlawful promises were void ab initio ; it is an added 
sin to fulfil them. Here may arise a seeming conflict of 
duty, for the promisee appears to have a claim on the prom- 
iser. But we must apply the rules for a perplexed con- 
science, and the promiser's conscience is to be the judge 
herein. Fear and force have been already considered. 

Note that a promise without consideration is not binding 
in common law. 

(Qu. 1. Promising the less worthy candidate that you 
will vote for him ? 



550 CONTRACTS. 

Qn. 2. A promise of marriage, carelessly made, and 
therefore a sin — should it be kept ?) 

(2) Donation includes (a) testament. This requires ca- 
pacity to give de facto and de jure, and also ability to receive 
on the part of the recipient. Infants, etc., however, may 
receive through guardians ; but to non-existents in general 
no testament is valid ; and since in some States a legacy can- 
not be left to uncertain persons, or to a charitable object 
apart from an existing corporation, the remedy is to ap- 
point definite trustees, which should be done in all cases. 

The limits of age in the capacity to bequeath, as well as 
of title to receive in other than the natural heirs, etc., are 
fixed by the laws of the State. {E.g., in New York males 
must bo eighteen years of age, and females sixteen, before 
they can make a valid testament.) 

Observe, as a caution for the priest, the objection in 
common law to the attending physician or priest or law- 
yer's receiving a legacy. Note that witnesses ought not to 
be beneficiaries under a will. 

Every natural heir on succeeding to his inheritance ought 
to make allowance for what he has previously received by 
gratuitous donation. Civil law may seem to contravene the 
law of nature in requiring legal formalities for a valid tes- 
tament, but such formalities must be viewed as necessary 
for the security of society. But if the will of the testator 
were just and clearly expressed, conscience, says Bishop 
Taylor (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5, § 7), is not released 
from its obligation. This assumes that the rights of prop- 
erty extend beyond the owner's death. But if, on the other 
hand, man have not the natural right to direct the succes- 
sion to his property, such succession is strictly subject even 
foro conscientim to the law of the land (Blackst. ii. 13). 

But, again, if the heir accept the testament and act under 
it, does he not do so subject to all the testator's conditions, 
even informal ones ? 



GRATUITOUS CONTRACTS. 551 

In cases of doubt, the law must decide, and the general 
rule applies, l< beati possidentes." 

(b) Gift. In common as well as in civil law there must 
be actual delivery or else a deed of gift. Anything else 
would be construed as a mere promise, for the only valid 
donation is in prcesenti. Without delivery of the gift there 
is merely a contract in futuro, which requires a considera- 
tion. 

Conditions, (a) The gift must not be prejudicial to 
creditors ; (b) the donor must be competent to give, e.g., of 
sound mind at the time ; and (c) not circumvented by false 
pretences, surprise, or inebriety. Any of these defects will 
void in law and in morals even a deed of gift. Gifts are 
either "causa mortis," which come nearer to testaments, or 
"inter vivos." The former are revocable in the life-time of 
the donor, if he recover, even after delivery ; not so the latter. 

(3) " Bailment ;" loans and borrowing. Civil law makes 
various classes of bailment, which more or less affect moral 
and legal responsibility in the matter. 

(a) " Commodatum" is a gratuitous contract by which a 
thing is granted for the sole use of the " bailee " during a 
certain time, with the obligation of restoring that thing at 
the expiration of the appointed time. If revocable at the 
pleasure of the "bailor," it is called " precarium." 

(b) " Mutuum" is also a gratuitous loan, but the thing 
being perishable, a similar thing is to be returned. Money- 
lending would be an example of mutuum if, as in former 
ages, interest were illegal and held to be morally wrong. 

These are ordinary forms of borrowing. But in the former 
the bailee has no dominion over the thing ; he cannot loan 
or rent it, and if it be stolen or lost he must give full rec- 
ompense to the owner, unless he can prove extraordinary 
care (Instit. iii. tit. xiii.). If the injury have occurred 
despite all such precautions, he is not morally bound for 



552 CONTRACTS. 

the loss, but the question will be one of civil law as well as 
of morals.* 

In mutuum, also, the borrower being solely benefited is 
bound in case of accidental loss. A quasi contract of this 
kind is a loan made to a minor, which cannot be recovered 
in law. So, also, if a payment be made to him when it is 
not due. 

(c) "Depositum " is a gratuitous contract where the bene- 
fit is solely on the side of the bailor, as when valuable papers 
are left in care of a banker. Imperfect dominion is given, 
— i.e., of the thing, not of its use. The bailee is bound 
in re — i.e., he must restore the thing as it was with all 
its increase, if any there be ; but he may in good faith 
deliver it to another who claims and is believed to be the 
rightful owner. He is only answerable for his fraud, or for 
gross negligence in the care of it. If loss occur otherwise 
he is not morally answerable for that loss. 

Similarly, if one find property, he is not bound in justice 
to take charge of it ; but if he do so, he becomes a deposi- 
tary, and must use the same care as if the thing were his 
own, and he is answerable for gross negligence. 

(Qu. : A lawyer has gratuitous charge of his client's funds ; 
by forged endorsement they are withdrawn from the bank ; 
which, if either, is answerable for the loss ? I answer, prob- 
ably the bank, as having an onerous contract, deriving profits, 
and being bound, therefore, to use the greater care.) 

(d) A pledge binds in re, and the bailee {e.g., a pawn- 
broker) is bound to use ordinary care, for the benefit is 
supposed to be on the other side. So, he is not answerable 
if the thing be stolen from him. 

(e) " Mandatum" is a gratuitous commission where the 

* A very conspicuous and interesting case of commodatum is that of 
Carlyle's lending to J. S. Mill the first ms. volume of the French Rev- 
olution, if this were done simply for Mill's gratification. But how did 
the loss of the ms. occur? If it were due to the negligence of Mill's 
servant, the sending of the £200 was an act of justice. 



OXEEOUS CONTEACTS. 553 

mandatory agrees to do something with or about the thing 
bailed. Being for the exclusive benefit of the bailor, the 
bailee is held only for gross negligence. If one undertake 
to do simply what is requested, no property being put in 
his possession, he is not legally liable unless he begin to 
execute his agency. In that case he is liable for malfea- 
sance, but there is no mandatum, no contract in law. 

§ 5. Onerous contracts. 

In ordinary onerous contract by mutual consent a right is 
transferred on both sides ; dominion is given by delivery of 
some thing. 

(1) " Locatio," hiring, is (a) of things lent for pay. He 
who hires a thing must take ordinary care ; if he do so, he 
is not responsible for loss or injury unless his servants were 
negligent. The owner is bound to keep the thing in good 
repair, and if the bailee is obliged to do so, he must be rec- 
ompensed by the owner. But tenants of houses under lease 
are subject to special rules. What they have added they 
may remove, if they can do so without injury. 

(b) "Locatio operis faciendi," as when mechanics are 
employed to use materials furnished to them. They war- 
rant ordinary care and the requisite skill. If the work- 
man deviate from the terms of his instructions or contract, 
and so render his work of no use, he is entitled to no pay, 
either in law or in morals. The workman retains a passive 
lien (not a right of sale) upon the materials for his pay. 

Inn-keepers are another example of the same. They are 
liable for loss through servants, other guests, robbery, etc. 
(If a trunk be lost in the free hack they are liable.) They 
have a lien for pay on the property, not the person, of their 



(c) " Locatio merciinn vehendar'um ; " carriers, both pri- 
vate and common. (The latter carries for any who will hire 
him ; e.g., cartmen, express agents, etc.) Common carriers 
are responsible for all loss or injury, except the "act of 



554 CONTRACTS. 

God, or the public enemy." The private carrier is an- 
swerable only in case of negligence. Without special agree- 
ment, the carrier can receive only the usual pay. He is 
bound to deliver what is intrusted to him ; but the common 
carrier has a lien on the goods for his pay. The private 
carrier has no such lien. 

" Miduum," money-lending, has become a case of (a) in 
modern times. Usury has been debated. Moral justice de- 
mands that a full equivalent for the loan be returned, and 
interest will be grounded (1) on the lender's loss, if any, in 
parting with the money ; or (2) on gain having ceased ; or 
(3) in the fact that there is risk of losing if the money be 
lent. By the law of nature you are not bound to risk the 
losing, except in case of grave necessity. Ordinary fear of 
loss would give no just title to interest ; extraordinary does. 

(Qu. : Interest when none of these are true ?) 

(2) Sale or exchange. (Blackst. ii. 449.) Real property 
when sold requires the formality of a deed, but a contract 
to sell binds in law and in morals with due limitations. 
Personal property may be transferred by parol contract 
even without immediate delivery. Dominion may be trans- 
ferred at once, even if the contract name a future day for 
delivery. If the seller retain possession, he is bound to use 
ordinary care. In that case gain or loss, if any, accrues to 
the buyer. 

If a finder or thief sell, the owner may take wherever he 
finds, without compensation to the holder. This is moral 
justice. 

The thing sold must be substantially as described. Fraud- 
ulent misstatement avoids a sale. A buyer also is discharged 
from a sale made under "catching conditions." 

If the misstatement were not fraudulent, compensation 
must be made for any loss thereby. This is law and morals. 
A warranty guarantees all statements. The seller, eveu if 



ONEROUS CONTRACTS. 555 

not asked, is bound to show all substantial defects relatively 
to the end of the buyer. If asked, he is bound to show 
secret defects, for then the contract is of the nature of 
a special trust. The seller is not bound to call attention 
to manifest defects, if he have charged a suitable price. 
Special cases are determined by law. " Caveat emptor" 
applies herein. 

{Notes on common laiu of sale. If the value exceed $50, 
in order to bind the contract part must be paid down 
("earnest "), or the goods, in part at least, delivered, or a 
memorandum of the contract signed. But the vendee can- 
not take the goods unless the price is paid, or the contract 
has been for future payment. Delivery may be made to 
a carrier on credit, but the goods may still be stopped in 
transitu before actual delivery. In such a case loss, if 
any, falls on the vendee. If, e.g., a horse thus delivered 
die, the vendor is still entitled to the price. But some of 
the United States have abolished these restrictions on sale.) 

(Qu. 1 . May you sell at a high price when you know that 
there will be a speedy fall ? Yes ; justice does not require 
you to impart your special information. 

Qu. 2. Suppose that the article is harmlessly adulter- 
ated, or the quantity diminished, and the price is propor- 
tional ?) 

Monopoly by private persons is immoral, (1) when, by 
fraud or falsehood, in order to keep up the price, other mer- 
chandise of the same nature with that monopolized is hin- 
dered from coming on the market ; (2) when the market is 
bought up for the same reason ; (3) when false intelligence 
is spread for the same reason ; (4) when workmen conspire 
to keep up the price of labour by excluding others. 



gambling, lotteries are not immoral per se, as con- 
tracts, but through attendant evils. Relatively large gam- 



556 CONTRACTS. 

bling debts, however, are not binding in conscience, though 
culled " debts of honour." * 

* On payment of debts : What is binding in morals may not be 
binding under civil law, in which, experience has shown the need of 
many precautions. To be legal tender, the sum must be actually pro- 
duced, not promised or offered to be produced. It must be uncondi- 
tionally tendered at the time named. A tender of money cannot be 
pleaded in an action for general damages, or for a tort, or for volun- 
tary trespass, or in action against a carrier for goods spoiled, unless he 
have, by valid contract, limited his responsibility. (Some of the United 
States, however, have abolished this.) 

Tender may be made in case of involuntary trespass. 

Tender of money due on a promissory note stops the interest ; but it 
admits the contract. 

One may pay into court what he acknowledges to be due ; and then, 
if the creditor proceed, it is at his own peril. If he do not recover more 
than the amount paid into court, costs and interest are saved. The 
debtor may also plead a "set-off," and pay into court what he claims 
to be the balance. But set-off is not allowed where damages are un- 
certain ; as in action for tort, trespass, replevin, etc. (Blackst. hi. 
page 303}. 



CHAPTEE vrr. 

THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

§ 1. Sacraments in general. 

Since the doctrine of sacraments in general as well as of 
the sacraments individually belongs to Dogmatic Theology, 
only so much of it need here be indicated as is necessarily 
assumed in Moral Theology. 

A sacrament is denned with theological precision in the 
catechism of the Anglican Church. It is (1) "an outward 
and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given to 
us, (2) ordained by Christ Himself, (3) as a means whereby 
we receive the same and a pledge to assure us thereof." 
This definition is substantially one with that of other parts 
of the Catholic Church — e.g., the catechism of Trent ; sc, 
11 a visible sign of an inward grace, instituted for our justi- 
fication.'' In a wider sense the word has been employed 
in the Church for any sign of a sacred thing, as the Paschal 
Lamb in the old covenant, " sacrce rei signum " (S. Aug.) ; 
or for a hidden mystery outwardly signified, "sacrum secre- 
tumj " or for an oath as a sacred thing. 

A sacrament is (1) commemorative of the Passion of 
Christ ; (2) demonstrative of present grace conferred ; (3) 
prognostic of future glory (Summ. Theol. III. lx. 3). 

Requisites. It follows that three things are required to 
constitute a valid sacrament : (1) " An outward and visible 
sign" for the eye, some material thing or action ; (2) a form 
of words, a sign for the ear ; (3) a person authorized to 
administer the sacrament, because it has been ordained 
by G-od as a means of sanctification, and He, through His 
agent, is the only one who can confer what is signified. 



558 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

The first two requisites are based upon the nature of 
man (III. lx. 4). Divine wisdom provides for each thing 
according to its nature and limits ; " to each according to 
his several ability " (8. Matt. xxv. 15). But it is natural to 
man to arrive at spiritual realities through sensible things ; 
and a sign is that by which one communicates with another. 
Hence, since the holy realities which are signified by sacra- 
ments are spiritual blessings by which man is sanctified, 
they are outwardly expressed by sensible things, just as God 
speaks to man in the Holy Scriptures in a similar manner. 

Considered in themselves, sensible things do not pertain 
to the kingdom of God (S. John iv. 24 ; Eom. xiv. 17), 
but only as they are signs of those spiritual realities which 
belong to that kingdom. 

(1) The material tiling employed in the sacrament must 
be substantially that, according to the judgment and cus- 
tom of men, which was determined by Christ for that pur- 
pose. For example, the Holy Eucharist requires bread and 
wine ; nothing else can take their place ; and the bread 
must be that, leavened or unleavened, which was so named 
and used at the time when our Lord instituted the Holy 
Eucharist ; the wine also must be what was known and 
used as wine. Any substantial change in this regard nulli- 
fies the religious act as sacrament. There is no sacrament. 
Thus some other article of food might be taken ; or currant 
juice, or some other drink ; but, even if ignorantly done, it 
would be a profane and idle imitation of a sacrament and 
destitute of inward grace. 

(2) The form of words (" accedit verbum ad elementum, 
et fit sacramentum," S. Aug., Super Joan., 80) is grouuded 
(a) on the nature of the Incarnate Word who took sensible 
flesh ; (b) on the nature of man, since " faith comes by 
hearing ; " (c) on the perfection of the sacrament itself, 
which is more fully expressed by spoken words than by 



SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 559 

visible signs. Thus the pouring of water may signify 
either ablution or cooling; but the words, "I baptize 
thee/'' manifest that the water is used to signify a spiritual 
cleansing. 

The words employed are an inward thought outwardly 
spoken in whatever language is used among men. Thus 
the Greek Catholic will say in his language, " The servant 
of God, 1ST., is baptized/' etc., and the form for lay baptism 
given in the constitutions of Archbishop Peckham (1279) 
is : "Icrysten thee in the Name of the Fader, and of the 
Son, and of the Holy Goste." But the essential form and 
meaning are preserved. But this being understood, it must 
be also remembered that Christ, not man, is the author of 
sacraments, and that the determinate words and matter 
which are of Divine appointment are essential to the exist- 
ence of a sacrament. 

Hence it follows (a) that if either matter or form be 
essentially defective, there is no sacrament, and the priest 
must act accordingly, ignoring the so-called sacrament. 

(b) There may be corrupt intention perverting the words ; 
e.g., heretical denial of the faith may lead to a pretended 
baptism "in the name of God" or " of Christ," etc. There 
is no intention to do what Christ and the Church have ap- 
pointed ; there is no sacrament. Or a man at his table may 
say, " Let us eat and drink in memory of our Saviour ;" or 
in a public assembly, under the influence of the so-called 
"temperance" movement, grape or currant juice may be 
distributed. Again there is absence of the requisite inten- 
tion ; there is no sacrament. 

(c) Through inadvertence there may be "lapsus Ungues." 
If more or less voluntary it will be a graver or lighter sin ; 
but the essential question will be whether the sense of the 
words has been materially affected or not. In the one case, 
there is no sacrament ; in the other, the error does not 
affect it. 

(cl) A deaf mute cannot act as priest in the most essential 



5G0 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

parts of the priestly office. It is impossible to divide a sac- 
rament so that one person should do the visible part and 
another use the requisite words. 

Repetition in case of doubt. Sacraments were made for 
man, and should be repeated if there be prudent doubt of 
their validity. Charity, justice, religion demand this. 

If there be no such grave doubt, it is sin to repeat them. 
But reverence for the sacrament requires that the repetition 
be made conditionally, either mentally or in spoken words. 
(See the rubric at the end of the Office for Private Baptism.) 
The words, "If thou art not already baptized," etc., are 
then audibly uttered, lest persons present may think that 
baptism can be repeated. 

What has just been said applies especially to those neces- 
sary rites of the Church of God which can be celebrated only 
once, viz., Baptism and Holy Orders ; in those the doubt 
need not be so great as in other cases in order that con- 
ditional repetition be justified. 

But a merely light apprehension that the essential words 
have not been used will not justify repetition ; it is to be 
taken for granted that all has been duly said and done. 

The minister of the sacrament contributes nothing to it 
by his fitness or holiness, although he, like any other,, may 
add his private prayer for special benediction upon it. The 
minister, the matter, the words, are one in this respect. 
God alone works the inward effect of the sacrament, for He 
alone can reach the soul. Grace is spiritual, and from G-od 
only. The "character" which is given by some sacraments 
as a "sealing" of the soul, can only come from Him who 
uses material agents instrumentally for His supernatural 
work. 

The prayers which are used in conferring the sacraments 
are offered to God, not on the part of any individual, but 
from the Church, whose prayers are acceptable with God 



SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 5G1 

(S. Matt, xviii. 19). Any devout person may ask and he 
heard also. But the effect of the Sacrament is not from any 
prayer but from the merits of the Passion of Christ, whose 
power operates in and through His appointed means. The 
effect is not more because of a worthier ministrant, although 
the prayer may gain an added blessing. 

The celebration of sacraments has rites and prayers added 
by the Church, like the consecration of the water for Holy 
Baptism; not that they are essential, but for greater solem- 
nity and decency, and to excite greater devotion and rever- 
ence in those who receive the sacraments. 

The Church cannot add to the sacraments, for "they are 
ordained by Christ Himself" (III. lxiv. 1, 2). 

It follows from this that the sacraments can be validly 
administered by those who are in mortal sin, although for 
themselves they add new sin to their load of guilt by cele- 
brating in such a state. The instrument acts only through 
the power of Him who uses it. So the physician who uses 
the art of his mind in healing others may himself be dis- 
eased in body ; and the pipe through which water flows may 
be of silver or of lead. 

The unbelief of the minister is parallel with any other sin 
of his. Whether he utterly lack faith or charity, he is still 
the instrument used by the power of Christ. He may 
utterly disbelieve that any effect will follow from what he 
does, but he is not ignorant that the Church for which he 
acts has faith, and that her faith is expressed in the com- 
mission which he has received from her. He acts as her 
agent, and her faith supplies the lack of his. 

(1) But can one give what he does not possess ? Can the 
unclean cleanse the impure ? It is not the ministers of the 
Church who give or cleanse. That is done only by Christ 
through them by His own power (1 Cor. iii. 5). 

(2) But is he not cut off from Christ, since only those 
who " dwell in love dwell in God " ? Yes : but the instru- 



5G2 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

nient may be a dead one and cut off from any union with 
Him who emplovs it, and yet He may do all that He wills 
by it. 

(3) What is lacking is not what is essential to the sacra- 
ment, but what is fitting for decency and reverence (III. 
lxiv. 5). (Lev. xxi. 17 ; see also the 26th Article of Relig- 
ion.) 

It follows, also, that there is no sin in receiving from such 
an unworthy minister of sacraments. For it is not the in- 
dividual as such who is resorted to, but the minister of the 
Church ; and, therefore, as long as he is tolerated by the 
Church in his ministry, he who receives a sacrament at his 
hands does not cooperate in the sin, but communicates with 
the Church which uses such ministry. But if the unworthy 
minister be suspended or degraded, then he who receives a 
sacrament from him does cooperate in the sin. 

It has been said that those who are in a state of sin are 
guilty in administering the sacraments in such a state, since 
they are profaning most holy things. But there is no need 
of perplexity in this truth, as if the same person would sin 
also in refusing to celebrate the sacrament when it is his duty 
so to do ; for he can repent of his sin. And if he will not 
repent he ought to be perplexed, for he sins in refusing or 
in not refusing to celebrate what he was ordained to per- 
form. But in case of necessity he would not be sinning in 
baptizing one who could find no other minister, for even a 
layman would be justified in celebrating the sacrament in 
such a case. 

So with regard to open and avowed heretics, cut off from 
the body of Christ. They may, and often do, neglect the 
essentials of a valid sacrament, giving neither it nor its 
grace. But they may fully observe the requisite form, and 
then their sacrament is valid and cannot be repeated, al- 
though the inward grace may be suspended in the recipient 
until he has found his place in the Lord's body. It is, of 
course, sin to receive the sacraments from such persons, 



SACRAMENTS IX GENERAL. 563 

and no inward grace can be expected therefrom, unless, 
perhaps, ignorance is an excuse. 

It should be understood, also, that the power of confer- 
ring sacraments pertains to that indelible "character" 
which is further explained on page 566 ; and one who is 
suspended or degraded from his office does not lose this 
power, but he is deprived of the right to exercise it law- 
fully. He confers the sacrament, but sins in doing so ; and 
he who receives it from him sins also, and fails of the in- 
ward part, unless ignorance excuse him (III. lxiv. 9). 

What shall we say of mock sacraments f The Roman 
doctrine of intention presents serious difficulties, while the 
Anglican Church seems to have said nothing upon the sub- 
ject. It is evident, however, that the sacramental action 
may have more than one meaning ; it may be done either 
seriously or in jest. It could hardly be pretended that a 
profane mockery of Holy Baptism or Holy Eucharist was a 
valid sacrament because all outward requisites were pres- 
ent. There is presumed, at least, a serious intention of 
doing what Christ commanded and what the Church does. 

But there is patent objection to a sweeping doctrine that 
true intention is always requisite — sc, how can any one 
know another's intention ? If, therefore, the intention of 
the minister be requisite for the perfection of the sacrament, 
a man can never be sure that he has received it, and must 
lack the assurance of salvation which it was intended to be- 
stow. S. Thomas Aquinas's words are so moderate and judi- 
cious that they seem to be worth quoting in full (III. lxiv. 
8) : "Some say that the defect of mental intention in the 
minister is supplied in the case of children by Christ who 
inwardly baptizes ; and in adults who devoutly seek the sac- 
rament by their faith and devotion. And this might be 
well said as regards the ultimate effect, which is justification 
from sins. But as regards the 'character' which some 
sacraments imprint on the soul, it does not seem that de- 



5G4 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

vout faith can supply what is wanting in this case, for that 
is never imprinted except by a perfect sacrament. There- 
fore, others better say that the minister of the sacrameut 
acts in the person of the whole Church, and in the words 
which he utters is expressed the intention of the Church, 
which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament, unless 
the contrary is outwardly indicated by the minister or the 
recipient." 

"Perverse intention perverts the man's work, not an- 
other's. And, therefore, from the perverse intention of 
the minister is perverted what he does as man, not what 
Christ does ; just as if some one with corrupt intention 
should carry alms to the poor, which his master had sent 
with kind intention." (The alms would be equally bene- 
ficial whatever the intention might be.) 

Of course, this matter of intention should not be mis- 
understood ; whatever view is taken of it, it does not apply 
to such cases of distraction as are liable to occur when one 
does not observe what he is doing while using the most 
solemn words and actions. In such a case the habitual in- 
tention of the soul is what counts, although there may be 
grievous sin in the negligent inattention. 

The minister's obligation is to give the sacraments cheer- 
fully and without pay. But he must deny them to the 
unworthy (S. Matt. vii. 6). This means, (1) that to the 
secret sinner privately asking, the sacraments must be 
denied. 

(2) That to the open and notorious sinner privately or 
publicly applying, they must be refused (see the rubric be- 
fore the Order for Holy Eucharist). 

(3) That the secret sinner publicly presenting himself 
must not be rejected. Scandal, disturbance, and aversion 
on the part of others are grave public evils which must be 
avoided, and the priest is not a partaker of another's sin 
if he so avoid them. 



SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 565 

Requisites in the subject of the sacraments. The recip- 
ient contributes nothing but his preparation for the super- 
natural work. He can only supply what is required of him 
as conditions for receiving the grace. 

But distinguish what is required of him for a valid sacra- 
ment, from what is requisite for the inward part of it, the 
"res sacramenti." 

The first does not require faith on his part ; for if, un- 
believing and in a state of sin, he should receive the sac- 
rament, still it cannot be repeated, if it be a sacrament 
conferred once for all. Its effect is suspended until the 
spiritual obstacle is removed. 

Again, in infants, of course, no preparation or intention 
is required. But in adults intention to receive is requisite 
for a valid sacrament, for none can be unwillingly baptized. 

Other sacraments require that one shall have been previ- 
ously baptized, for they are ordinances "of the living," sac- 
raments for the Church. 

A "sacrament of the dead" — i.e., of one uncleansed 
from his sin — requires acts of faith, hope, and penitence. 
And the minister is bound, so far as lies in his power, to 
see that such spiritual acts are elicited from the candidate 
for spiritual blessing. 

For the "sacraments of the living/' still more is requi- 
site. He that comes must be in a state of grace ; for they 
are ordained for its augmentation, and they presuppose it. 
It is an added sin to receive the Holy Eucharist in mortal 
sin. (See the shorter exhortation to those proposing to re- 
ceive.) "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily is guilty 
of the Body and Blood of the Lord." 

Why are sacraments necessary to salvation ? (1) From 
the condition of human nature, which is led to spiritual 
things through corporeal and sensible things; (2) from the 
present state of man, who by sinning has subjected his 
affections to sensible things, and it was fitting that God 



50H THE LAW OF SACRAMEKTS. 

should apply His remedies to the disease which makes man 
incapable of purely spiritual things ; (3) from the character 
of man's pursuits and actions, which are chiefly engaged in 
corporeal things. Sacraments are ordained in tender mercy 
to him who would find it too hard to abstract himself en- 
tirely from the earthly, while also he must be withdrawn 
from superstitious use of material things and actions. 

The grace of God is, indeed, sufficient for all ; but God 
gives man that grace in a manner fitted to His creature. 

The Cross of Christ is the sufficient cause of our redemp- 
tion, but sacraments get their power from that, and apply 
that to the soul. "All we who were baptized into Christ 
Jesus were baptized into His death " (Rom. vi. 3). 

The Passion of Christ has made the sacraments instru- 
mental causes of grace ; i.e., God bestows His gift through 
them. The instrument is nothing but a material channel 
for the virtue of the Divine agent (Tit. iii. 5). 

This being assumed from Dogmatic Theology, now notice 
that there are some rites of the Church which cannot be 
repeated, because they stamp permanently on the soul what 
we have called a "character," like a seal on wax. Indeed 
" sealing" is the very word employed in Holy Scripture 
(2 Cor. i. 21). Such rites are Holy Baptism, Confirmation, 
Holy Orders. Some spiritual power is received for self or 
for others, either way for God. Thus the baptized are 
made a "spiritual priesthood/' participators in the eternal 
priesthood of the First-born among many brethren, offering 
up spiritual sacrifices acceptable with God through Him 
(III. lxiii.). 

Such character or seal is indelible because it gives a share 
in the everlasting priesthood of Christ (Ps. ex. 4). The 
mutable soul of man may lose its grace through his own free 
will ; but the character does not dejoend on man, but on 
Him who consecrates His people. 

But what has been said applies only to the Christian 
rites which have been specified ; not, for example, to the 



HOLY BAPTISM. 



5G7 



Holy Eucharist, for it is the completion arid consummation 
of the Christian life in union with Christ ; therefore it does 
not confer this sealing which is for a further end. Holy 
Eucharist can be many times repeated. 

§ 2. Holy Baptism. 

We must again assume from Dogmatic Theology what is 
necessary in determining the law of God. The outward 
and sensible part of the sacrament of Holy Baptism (the 
matter and the words) is clearly expressed in the catechism 
of the Anglican Church. It is (1) " water wherein the 
person is baptized (2) in the name of the Father, and of the 
Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'' The sacrament is an ablu- 
tion, the " washing of regeneration " (Tit. iii. 5). There 
is no sacrament in the water as such ; its consecration for its 
sacred use is a yery expressive rite, but not an essential one. 
Compare in this regard the great sacrament of the Holy 
Eucharist. The sacrament consists in the application of the 
water to the human body after the manner of an ablution ; 
it is water "wherein the person is baptized/' 

The word which completes the sacrament is applied to 
the person receiving it ; ''I baptize thee," or the " servant 
of God, 1ST., is baptized.'' And observe once more that in 
the other chief sacrament the word, the form of sacramental 
words, is applied to the elements, not to the recipient. 

The inward part is man's justification and illumination — 

"a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness; 

by this sacrament we are made children of grace." 

"In baptism I was made a member of Christ, a child of 

God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." 

In this washing of regeneration is applied to the soul a 
sealing consummated in Confirmation, an indelible char- 
acter which marks it forever, whether in glory or in ever- 
lasting loss. 

From these dogmatic truths follow — 

(1) Nothing else can replace the element of water ; that 



568 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

is Divinely appointed and no man can make a substitute. 
" Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot 
enter into the Kingdom of God " (S. John iii. 5). 

(2) The benediction or consecration of the water, though 
not essential to the sacrament, is not needlessly to be 
omitted, for it is added as a becoming rite for greater solem- 
nity and to excite devotion. The rubric does not expressly 
require it in case of private baptism ; but it is indirectly 
suggested "if time and present exigence will suffer.'" 

(3) Since the form of words contains two essential parts — 
sc, (a) the indicating of the sacramental act which declares 
the intention of the Church and distinguishes the act from 
other ablutions, and (b) the naming of Him who inwardly 
baptizes, according to the commandment given to the 
Church (S. Matt, xxviii. 19) — baptism "in the name of 
God," or "in the name of Christ," or any other such for- 
mula of heresy, is invalid. Such pretended baptism must 
be entirely ignored. 

Immersion. It has been said above that the outward part 
of the sacrament is a corporeal ablution signifying the in- 
ward ablution of sins. Christ " cleansed the Church by the 
washing of water with the word " (Eph. v. 26). And this 
corporeal ablution may be by immersion of the whole body 
or of the head. This adds a new signification, not indeed 
essential to the outward rite, but very expressive of its in- 
ward part, the " burying with Christ in baptism/' 

Since the head is the principal member of the body and 
the chief seat of the soul, it, if not the whole body, is im- 
mersed, or water is poured on it. Such immersion was the 
usage of the primitive Church, as we find, for example, 
clearly indicated in S. Chrysostom's 24th Homily on S. 
John : "We burying our heads in water as in a sepulchre, 
the old man is buried ; submerged, it is hidden there, and 
again arises in the new life." 

It is certainly wise to follow the more general usage of 



HOLY BAPTISM. 



569 



the Catholic Church through eighteen centuries, although 
the prevailing custom has usually the warrant of necessity 
or charity — necessity in the case of the feehle and sick, who 
would otherwise die unbaptized or be put to the greatest 
risks ; and it hardly need be said that sacramental obligations 
do not override the laws of natural right. 

It is no less open to remark that three thousand persons 
cannot rationally be supposed to have been immersed in or 
near Jerusalem in one day (Acts ii. 41). 

Charity may no less imperatively demand the alternative 
pouring (sprinkling, though valid, being illegal in the An- 
glican Church). The usual scruples of parents in the case 
of infants, the absence of sufficiency of the element, the 
severity of a northern climate rendering baptism in outdoor 
waters a risk of life, the feebleness of the recipient even 
when the biptism is not clinic — all these and the like render 
needless any scruples respecting deviation from the preva- 
lent rule of the Church in favour of the exceptional mode, 
which also has the sanction of every age of the Church. 

The priest, of course, is bound to be sure that the water 
flows upon the head ; for without this there is no signifi- 
cant washing. And indifferent or unbelieving carelessness 
in this regard is the ground for conditional baptism in the 
case of converts from religious sects more or less heretical 
with respect to sacraments. 



Trine immersion or pouring. Either one or three ablu- 
tions is valid ; the former signifying the unity of the Name, 
the latter the three Divine persons named. The laws of 
the Church in this regard have varied at different periods ; 
but our own ancient and still unrepealed rule points to the 
trine immersion or pouring. See also the 50th Apostolical 
Canon : " If any bishop or presbyter does not perform the 
one initiation with three immersions, but with giving one 
immersion only, into the death of the Lord, let him be de- 
posed. For the Lord said not, Baptize into My death [it is 



570 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

subordinate in signification], but, ' Baptize all nations in 
the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy 
Ghost.' " 

Why cannot baptism de repeated when a convert is re- 
ceived into the outward communion of the Church? (1) 
Since it is the spiritual new birth, it can be had only once 
(S. John iii. 5 ; Heb. vi. 4). (2) We are baptized into 
Christ's death, and rise with Him into a new life ; this can 
only once be done. (3) An indelible character is given. 

The minister of Holy Baptism. The priest receives in 
his ordination authority to " dispense the word of God and 
His holy sacraments." This gives validity to his official 
acts ; but he must also have jurisdiction in each particular 
application of his authority in order that it may be lawful. 
See Canons of the American Church, title i. 12, § 6 : 
" No minister . . . shall officiate either by preaching, 
reading prayers, or otherwise, in the parish, or within the 
parochial cure, of another clergyman, unless he have re- 
ceived express permission for that purpose,'' etc. (Qu.: 
Parishioners leaving tkeir parish for the official services of 
another priest ? Has that other priest jurisdiction in such 
a case ?) 

As the title of the office of deacon indicates, it is not part 
of his official wort to bnptize. As a work of charity, in 
case the official minister of the sacrament is not accessible, 
he may baptize infants. So may a layman, but the deacon 
more fully represents the authority of the Church from 
which the sacramental commission proceeds, and may cele- 
brate a solemn public baptism, which the layman may not 
do. 

What the priest's conscience ought to tell him the Church 
has been careful to enforce so far as in her lies. See the 
unrepealed canons of 1603, Nos. 68 and 69 : " No minis- 
ter shall refuse or delay to christen any child . . . 



HOLY BAPTISir. 571 

that is brought to him upon Sundays or hol}'-days to be 
christened, . . . convenient warning having been given 
him thereof before. . . . If he shall refuse to christen 
. . . he shall be suspended by the bishop of the dio- 
cese from his ministry by the space of three months." 

"If any minister, being duly, without any manner of col- 
lusion [false pretexts for not bringing a child to church], 
informed of the weakness and danger of death of any infant 
un baptized in his parish, and thereupon desired to go up or 
come to the place where the said infant remaineth, to bap- 
tize the same, shall either wilfully refuse so to do or of pur- 
pose, or of gross negligence shall so defer the time that 
. . . it dieth through such his default, unbaptized : 
the said minister shall be suspended for three months ; and 
before his restitution shall acknowledge his fault, and prom- 
ise before his ordinary that he will not wittingly incur the 
like again." 

Lay baptism. Unrepealed canons provide for this in 
case of pressing need ; although the first rubric on the sub- 
ject in the Order for Private Baptism names a "lawful 
minister." But, in the inquiries to be made respecting the 
child supposed to be baptized, the matter and the words are 
all that are named as essentials to baptism. 

God has ordained for this sacrament the most universal 
element, essential to man's life, so that it is the rarest thing 
in his experience to be where water cannot be had. And 
so this sacrament, " generally necessary to salvation/' can 
rarely be desired when it may not be had. In case of 
pressing need, then, any man, or, in his absence, any woman, 
should do this work of charity. It would be grave sin, 
however, for the layman to take the priest's official duty 
upon himself when God's ordained minister can be had ; 
for he would be offending against the reverence due to so 
great a solemnity. 

It follows from this that baptism by heretics, by any out- 



572 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

side of the Church's communion, is valid, if matter and 
words be duly employed. Provision is made for condi- 
tional baptism if there be prudent doubt concerning this ; 
but the Church makes no question concerning the person 
who administered the sacrament. 

(1) But how can an unbaptized man give what he does 
not possess ? I answer that the minister of the sacrament 
supplies only the outward part; it is Christ who inwardly 
baptizes, and He can use all men at His will. 

(2) But how can such an one be a minister of the 
Church, and receive another into the body of Christ to 
which he does not himself belong ? But he can intend to 
do what the Church does, and we suppose that he employs 
the Church's form ; and Christ's power is not bound to 
baptized men any more than it is limited to His sacra- 
mental means. 

(3) But if such a man cannot receive the other sacraments, 
how can he do a greater thing, sc, confer one of them ? 
The answer is that this sacrament is necessary to salvation, 
and therefore G-od provides for its administration generally 
where it is desired (III. Ixvii. 5). 

(See, further, a clear and fuller statement of the question 
in Blunt's Annotated Book of Common Prayer, Introduc- 
tion to Offices for Holy Baptism.) 

It is unseemly, to say the least, for a priest to baptize his 
own child. 

Sponsors. Although the 29th canon of 1603 requires 
that they shall be communicants, and decent regard for 
the office would demand the same thing, yet our recent 
permission to parents to act as sponsors, if it be so desired, 
seems to be a relaxation of the older discipline ; for parents 
may be, and in fact often are, godless people. Apart from 
this permission, it were better to have a single sponsor or 
none at all beside parents, rather than that there should be 
a profane mockery of a solemn obligation by nominal spon- 



HOLY BAPTISM. 



573 



sors who have no intention of accepting the obligations 
involved. And the American Chnrch makes provision for 
a contingency of this kind. Sponsors are to present the 
child, " when they can be had." 

The parental relation is not directly recognized in the 
rite. God-fathers and god-mothers present the child, re- 
ceive it from the priest, and are charged with its spiritual 
care, which they may see to directly or indirectly. For in 
the case of a Christian household it may often be assumed 
that parents will do their duty in the religious education of 
their children. But if there be reason to apprehend the 
contrary, the sponsors become directly answerable to God 
and the Church, so far as their power extends. 

Private baptism is only lawful in case of "great cause 
and necessity." Of course, sponsors are not to be employed, 
for the child is required to be presented in church for a 
public reception there, when the sponsor's office is called 
for. (Qn. : Can a priest be permitted to violate the law of 
the Church when wilful lawlessness refuses to bring a child 
to church ? May he plead the law of charity ? Or must 
the sin lie at the door of those who know their duty and 
will not do it ?) 



The recipient. He who neither is baptized nor wishes 
to be baptized, cannot enter the kingdom of God (S. John 
iii. 5), for there is manifest contempt of the sacrament. 
But the desire proceeds from living faith, through which 
God inwardly sanctifies His creature ; and since He is not 
limited to His own means, He may count the will for the 
deed, and inwardly justify without the outward sacrament 
(TIL lxviii. 2). 

Since the baptism of infants cannot lawfully be deferred, 
the rubric requires the pastor to admonish the people often 
that they defer not the baptism of their children longer 
than the first or second Sunday after their birth, or other 
holy-day falling between, unless upon a great and reason- 



574 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

able cause. Such, cause would doubtless be in many places 
the inclemency of the seasou. But parents should be also 
instructed not to let a mother's wish to be present stand in 
the way of dutiful obedience to a law based upon the great 
necessity of this sacrament. 

But in the case of adults there is more than one reason 
why Baptism should not be hastily administered : (1) The 
Church takes reasonable care not to be deceived, examining 
the candidate's faith and morals ; (2) she needs time for 
instruction and spiritual exercises of the candidate ; (3) she 
has usually preferred such solemn times as the eve of Easter 
and Pentecost, although special exigency, peril, and the 
like will override such reasons for delay. 

The sacrament is for sinners, ordained for their cleans- 
ing (Eph. v. 26). But habitual sinners, who have no fixed 
intention of abandoning every evil course of life, cannot be 
baptized. ("He who made thee without thy cooperation, 
will not new create thee without it" — S. Aug.) (1) They 
cannot be incorporated into Christ, which is the object of 
the sacrament (Gal. iii. 27) ; (2) there can be no cleansing 
when the will to sin remains ; (3) there must be no falsity 
in the sacramental sign ; and the outward sign of coming 
for ablution is utterly false if there be no fixed desire for 
inward purification (III. lxviii. 4). 

Conditions. (1) The candidate for Holy Baptism is a 
voluntary, if a passive agent. (" Wilt thou be baptized in 
this faith ? " ) It would be manifest profanity, and no sac- 
rament, if the form were used for one who was forced, or in 
any way unwilling to receive it. Man can die to the old life 
only by free renunciation of it ; he must intentionally desire 
the new life. If such a profanation of the holy sacrament 
should ever occur, it must be treated as void ; the sacra- 
ment must be duly administered when the penitent sincerely 
desires it (III. lxviii. 7). 

(2) While true penitence for the past and a purpose to lead 



HOLT BAPTISM. 575 

a new life are required, and the priest must have reasonable 
assurance of this, a confession to him is not to be required. 
If the penitent wish so to do he is not to be refused ; but 
no penance is to be imposed, no absolution given ; the con- 
fession is only for deeper repentance, for truer confession 
to God, for more serviceable counsels resj^ecting the new 
life. 

(3) The justifying grace of God is given only to faith ; 
therefore a right faith, explicit concerning the chief truths 
of the Gospel, implicit concerning all that God has revealed 
through His Church, is requisite (Rom. iii. 22). "He 
that believeth and is baptized shall be saved " (S. Mark 
xvi. 16). 

This is not requisite for the character which is imprinted 
by God only and which is not perfected through faith. If 
one be truly baptized without the true faith, say, into an 
heretical sect, the baptism is valid ; but no remission of sins 
is given, since that requires faith. ("Dost thou believe all 
the articles of the Christian faith ? I do/') 

One who is baptized may not have full faith i-especting 
the sacrament ; but he must intend to receive what Christ 
instituted and the Church delivers ; that is implied in the 
very act of presenting himself. ("Wilt thou be baptized 
in this faith ? That is my desire.") 

The haptism of infants. (See the 27th Article of Relig- 
ion.) Rom. v. 17, 18, applies to infants as included in the 
human race. They are able to receive the grace from their 
Lord, the character from God. S. John iii. 5 is absolutely 
universal in its application. Herein, also, is secured, as far 
as is possible, the nurture of children in the Christian life. 
They cannot bring the intention which is required in adults, 
but the intention of others offers them and is warranted by 
the Gospel. "As from others they derive the sins which 
are remitted in baptism, so by others they believe " (S. 
Aug., Cont. duas epist. Pelag., i. 22). 



576 THE LAW OP SACRAMENTS. 

The parents may be unbelieving, but " children are offered 
to receive spiritual grace, not so much by those who hold 
them in their arms as by the whole society of the faithful, 
by whose charity they are united to the communion of the 
Holy Ghost" (S. Aug., ad Bonifac, ep. 98). 

Consent of parents. It is contrary to natural justice that 
children who have not reached maturity of conscience and 
judgment should be baptized without their parents' con- 
sent. (Qu. : Suppose that one parent consents and the other 
refuses ?) 

When they have reached such age as to be morally and 
spiritually responsible for their actions in what belongs to 
Divine and natural law, they are answerable for themselves, 
and may be baptized without their parents' consent. 
Human law then holds minors answerable for their actions 
in similar manner. 

WJiat shall we say of idiots and the insane ? If the latter, 
in their previous rational state, penitently desired the sacra- 
ment, the suspension of outward manifestations of reason 
through brain disease is no hindrance to the grace of Christ 
which they need ; they should be baptized. (Cp. Conf. S. 
Aug. iv. 4.) If they never expressed such a desire, and no 
charitable ground exist for supposing that they had inward 
desire and preparation, they should not be baptized. 

But the case of idiots, born so, is like that of infants. 
They are human in their immortal spiritual nature, although 
its outward action is impeded by defective physical constitu- 
tion. They should undoubtedly be admitted into the king- 
dom of God, wherein they may have their place when they 
are set free from life-long bondage (III. lxviii. 12). 

§ 3. Confirmation. 

Confirmation has its " outward and visible sign of an in- 
ward and spiritual grace." That this sign was used and 



CONFIRMATION". 577 

appointed by the apostles is unquestionable, and it was 
therefore virtually, if not actually, "ordained by Christ 
Himself as a means whereby we receive the grace and a 
pledge to assure us thereof." 

But it holds a subordinate and complementary place with 
respect to Holy Baptism, as the means of conveying the 
seven-fold gifts which jDerfect the greater and more neces- 
sary sacrament. The new birth is only the first step towards 
moral and spiritual manhood. The natural virtues, as we 
have seen (Part I., page 69), need to be lifted up to the 
higher plane of the spiritual life, and the seven-fold gifts 
are ordained for this purpose, making the soul prompt to 
follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and ready in His 
strength for conflict with the world, the flesh, and the devil, 
not only inwardly for self, but outwardly against Christ's 
enemies. 

This may justify Bishop Cosin's words, " The nature of 
this holy sacrament (for so we need not fear to call it in a 
right sense) will be more easily understood/' etc. 

But the Catechism of the Anglican Church excludes it 
from the rank of the two greater sacraments " generally 
necessary to salvation." Otherwise it would always be con- 
ferred, as the Eastern Church, adhering to primitive usage, 
confers it, at the same time with Holy Baptism. 

It hardly needs to be added that wilful refusal, virtual 
contempt of God's ordinance, is a bar to salvation. 

The visible sign or "matter" The Church has used as 
the matter of Confirmation either the laying on of hands, 
the sign of grace conveyed ; or unction, the Scriptural sign 
of the Holy Ghost, or both of them. Both appear to have 
Scriptural warrant (Acts viii. 14 ; xix. 6. Heb. vi. 2. 2 
Cor. i. 21. 1 John ii. 27). 

Those who have regarded Confirmation as a sacrament in 
the narrowest sense of the word have not agreed respecting 
the essential matter, the visible sign. But the Anglican 
37 



578 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

Church, by her action in recent ages, has shown that she re- 
gards the laying on of hands as the essential sign ; the other 
as an added expression of significant meaning, which may 
be omitted without detriment to the rite. 

The words or form. The Anglican Church does not seem 
to regard any form of words as essential to this ordinance, 
which fact again will distinguish it from the greater sacra- 
ments, wherein the words admit of no essential change. 

The spiritual grace, as already intimated, is that of 
strength for spiritual combat. It is a further " sealing/' 
in addition to that of Holy Baptism, and is so called in Holy 
Scripture. It also imprints a character. The spiritual 
priesthood of the Christian receives a grace for its outward 
manifestation. 

The age for Confirmation. As a "sealing " and the comple- 
ment of Holy Baptism, it naturally follows immediately after 
the greater sacrament (Tert., De Bapt. vii. 8 ; S. Cypr., ep. 
70). But the Anglican Church indicates the reason for de- 
ferring what is not absolutely necessary to salvation, saying, 
" To the end that Confirmation may be ministered to the 
more edifying of such as shall receive it, the Church hath 
thought good to order that none [hereafter] shall be con- 
firmed but such as can say the creed, the Lord's Prayer, and 
the Ten Commandments ; and can also answer to such other 
questions as in the short catechism are contained ; . . . 
to the end that children being now come to years of discre- 
tion [i.e., power to distinguish between right and wrong]," 
etc. Here is no fixed rule established respecting the age of 
confirmation ; nor is there any rule elsewhere appointed. To 
the same effect, but more precisely, is the charge given to 
sponsors : "Ye are to take care that this child be brought to 
the bishop to be confirmed by him, so soon as he can say," 
etc. With careful instruction according to the charge 
given, children should ordinarily be ready on or before the 



CONFIRMATION. 579 

age of twelve, and they will have power of moral ff discre- 
tion;" but circumstances certainly vary too Avidely for any 
more precise rule to be given. 

Instruction of children. Both the English and the 
American Church make this very explicitly the duty of 
parish priests, and of deacons whose official duty it is "to 
instruct the youth in the Catechism." The 59th canon of 
1603 begins, "Every parson, vicar, or curate, upon every 
Sunday and holy-day, shall, for half an hour or more, ex- 
amine and instruct the youth ... in the Ten Command- 
ments, the Articles of the Belief, and in the Lord's Prayer ; 
and shall diligently hear, instruct, and teach them the Cate- 
chism set forth in the Book of Common Prayer." The 
American Church is less definite, although she orders to 
the same effect (title i. can. 19) : "The ministers of this 
Church who have charge of parishes or cures, shall . . _ . 
be diligent in instructing the children in the Catechism." 
Whatever may be said of " Sunday-schools," it seems 
quite certain that "Bible lessons" there are no substitute 
for this obligation, but rather, on the contrary, an immoral 
evasion of a sacred duty. 

The American Church has even ordered the duty of the 
diocesan with regard to Confirmation (title i. can. 13, § 11) : 
"Every bishop in this Church shall visit the churches 
within his diocese at least once in three years, for the pur- 
pose of . . . administering the apostolic rite of Con- 
firmation," etc. 



risites for Confirmation. (1) The unbaptized cannot 
be confirmed, for the grace is the complement of that of 
Holy Baptism. Baptism is the gate which admits to all 
Christian privileges ; and outside of that door there are no 
sacraments. Therefore, if one discover that his reputed bap- 
tism was void, he should be again presented for Confirmation, 



580 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

even if lie have gone to the bishop before. (The same prin- 
ciple applies to Holy Orders. An unbaptized person cannot 
receive the grace ; he has never been validly ordained, even 
if the outward form have been celebrated for him.) 

(2) Since Confirmation is a "sacrament of the living," he 
that receives it must be in a state of grace ; he must bring a 
penitent and believing soul, according to his age and capac- 
ity ; but the grace conferred, if rightly received, may deepen 
that penitence and faith. The faithful pastor has the one 
special opportunity in the life-time of his spiritual charge 
for the most direct and thorough private spiritual guidance. 
The age of the candidate, the tender and solemn feelings 
awakened, the dawning sense of responsibility to God and 
man, the special possibility at that period of a true conver- 
sion from the errors of childhood, open a way for God's 
priest to the inmost recesses of the soul, whither he may 
carry the Word of Life. Woe to him if he negligently 
prefer his own ease to this private ministration to each indi- 
vidual soul. 

Such a time is an eminently proper one to encourage the 
young disciple to make his first confession, if, as is prob- 
able, his conscience, being awakened by the admonitions 
given, be not at rest. He will need little encouragement to 
"open his grief," although the Church has given no such 
exhortation to him as lie will receive at the time of his first 
communion. 

(3) In case of doubt, conditional Confirmation is permis- 
sible, although the obligation is not to be pressed on one 
who reasonably thinks that he has received the sacrament. 

The sick are to be confirmed if they desire and Confirma- 
tion can be had ; but it is not to be urged as " necessary to 
salvation. " 

Finally, "there shall none be admitted to Holy Com- 
munion until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 581 

desirous to be confirmed." If fit and prepared for the lesser 
rite, be is fit and prepared for the greater, and not otherwise. 
But, also, if fit and prepared for the receiving of the Lord's 
Body and Blood, he cannot refuse the grace and the "apos- 
tolic rite" without the mortal siu of contempt of God's 
order. If the thing be known, it is an " open and notorious 
sin." 

But the law of the Church which binds the priest's con- 
science always, because it is a negative precept, must not be 
misunderstood. As in the case of any other sin, a person 
who publicly presents himself while guilty of this contempt, 
cannot be excluded from Holy Communion without grave 
scandal. "Admission" must therefore be regarded as ex- 
press consent given to a person's so presenting himself. A 
priest cannot give such consent without violation of law, 
which is an offence against God and man. 

§ 4. The Holy Eucharist. 

Moral Theology cannot present the law which binds our 
consciences respecting this transcendent mystery without 
assuming from Dogmatic Theology the revealed truth con- 
cerning it. The law is based on the truth. He that rejects 
the law virtually denies the truth. He that denies the 
truth knows no law claiming his obedience for which he 
must answer before the bar of God. 

It is not possible here to do more than briefly to state the 
truth as the Catholic Church receives it, and in her litur- 
gies gives it, teaches it, and confesses it by her faith before 
God. Lex credendi is both lex orandi and lex faciendi. 

Many questions, also, regarding the manner of celebrating 
this august rite, answers to which bind the devout priest 
as part of his law, must be relegated to the department of 
liturgies and ritual. 

First in order of time the Holy Eucharist is a sacrifice, a 
sacred thing offered to God in memory of the Cross and 
Passion of the Lord, a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the inef- 



582 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

fable benefits of that meritorious sacrifice which it presents 
before God through the great High Priest. It is offered for 
the obtaining of " remission of sins, and all other benefits 
of Christ's Passion." 

Secondly, it is a Holy Communion through which we 
participate in the perfect nature of Christ, perfect God and 
perfect man in one indissoluble unity, and through Him 
are united to one another in the mystical Body. It is the 
" Viaticum " as the appointed way to the future glory of 
the saints. We will consider the doctrine and the law of 
each. 

(1) The Holy Communion. The outward part or sign is 
" bread and wine which the Lord hath commanded to be 
received."' 

The inward part, the " res sacramenti," is " the Body 
and Blood of Christ which are verily and indeed (spirit- 
ually) taken and received by the faithful," i.e., the baptized 
people of Christ. 

Here at once we must notice a distinction between this 
sacrament and what we have previously examined. The in- 
ward part of Baptism is " a spiritual grace," whereas in the 
Holy Eucharist the inward part is distinct from "the bene- 
fits whereof we are partakers thereby." It is really and 
truly what is signified by the outward part. No such thing 
can be affirmed of Holy Baptism. The consecrated water is 
not per se the sacrament; that consists in the ablution with 
the use of the sacred Name ; but receiving bread and wine 
in memory of the Lord's Passion is not the Holy Eucharist. 
This is completed in the consecration, although consump- 
tion perfects the sacrifice. 

The sacrament, sign and thing, was ordained for the food 
of the soul. The consecration makes such food by the 
power of Him who is the Giver and the Food. 

The truth of the Real Presence, then, is essential to a 
comprehension of the Divine law of the sacrament. The 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 583 

inward part of the sacrament is really and truly in, with, 
and under the outward part, but spiritually, not after the 
manner of natural bodies, because the Lord's body is glori- 
fied ; therefore not locally subject to laws of time and space. 
This Real Presence, real because not figurative nor merely 
virtual, is admitted to be unimaginable, because our knowl- 
edge of body is derived through the senses, and the body of 
the Lord is not subject to the laws of sense. The Presence 
is discerned by reason and faith alone. " If thou hast spir- 
itually understood the words of Christ respecting His Body, 
they are spirit and life to thee ; if thou hast understood 
them carnally, they are still spirit and life, but not for 
thee" (S. Aug., Super Joan. 27). 

But the Presence is the presence of Christ, God and Man ; 
where His glorified Body is, there is His glorified Soul, and 
there, in special manner, is His Divinity, which was never 
separated, not even in death, from His human nature. 
The " res sacramenti " indeed is the glorified Body and 
Blood; but by natural " concomitance,'' all that Christ is, 
is there, making "His Flesh meat indeed, and His Blood 
drink indeed." He is in both parts of the sacrament, for 
they are one and not two ; but He is there in different 
manner, and for different ends. Where His glorified Body 
is, there is His Blood, for " He dieth no more." But it is 
joined to His Body by natural concomitance, not by the act 
of consecration. And the case is similar in the sacrament 
of the Precious Blood. Both re-present the " full, perfect, 
and sufficient sacrifice," but the sacrament of the Precious 
Blood specially re-presents that which was shed for the "re- 
mission of sins." * 

Christ is not present after the manner of bodies with 
their three dimensions. However the consecrated elements 

* Two elements do not make two sacraments. There is one spiritual 
food (S. John vi. 56), though there are two outward parts, because it 
derives its virtue from the Passion of Christ which it commemorates, 
and in that Passion His Blood was separated from His Body. 



584 THE LAW OF SACKAMESTTS. 

are divided, the Presence is not withdrawn from any part. 
Each and every part is a perfect sacrament, outward and 
inward. 

The law of the sacrament The matter, the outward and 
visible sign, must be, (1) wheaten bread, the purest that 
can be obtained. The common article sold under that 
name, more or less mixed, may suffice for a valid sacra- 
ment ; but believing reverence will certainly seek for some- 
thing different, if it may be had ; " the best and purest 
wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten " (English 
rubric). 

It may be leavened or unleavened ; and the laws of the 
Catholic Church from the earliest ages have differed in this 
respect ; but the words of the English rubric as they now 
stand — sc, " It shall suffice that the bread be such as is 
usual to be eaten" — -compared with the rubric of 1549, sug- 
gest that the law of the Western Church is not repealed, 
but only permission given to deviate from it for weighty 
and sufficient reasons. Very good reasons, based on decency 
and reverence, may be given for complying with the old 
law and custom of the English Church, as renewed at the 
Eeformation : " It is meet that the bread prepared for the 
Communion be made . . . unleavened and round, as 
it was afore, but without all manner of print," etc. " And 
men must not think less to be received in part than in 
the whole, but in each of them the whole Body of our 
Saviour Jesus Christ." 

(2) The wine must be true wine; i.e., the juice of the 
grape, not that of currants, apples, or the like. Christ 
so constituted His sacrament, and man has no power to 
change it. The unfermented juice of the grape is certainly 
unlawful material ; whether it annul the sacrament is, 
perhaps, an open question. But, also, it must not be over- 
looked that pure wine being liable to acetous fermentation, 
if that change be complete, there can be made no sacrament 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 585 

of the Blood. The consecration must be repeated with true 
wine.* 

The mixed chalice, following the example of our Lord, 
who blessed the cup to which a little water had been 
added, has the warrant of all parts of the Catholic Church, 
was required by rubric at the Eeformation, and is most 
expressively significant of the union of the Divine and 
human, first in the Incarnation, then in the Holy Com- 
munion. But the omission of the rubric undoubtedly sus- 
pends the law. Whether the opposite usage is now obliga- 
tory is quite another question. (See the recent judgment 
of the Archbishop of Canterbury.) 

The quantity of water added must be very small. 

The form. The words of consecration spoken in the per- 
son of Christ, who invisibly consecrates, are invariable. 
The nature of the sacrament itself is illustrated by com- 
paring the variable words in communicating the faithful 
with the absolutely unchangeable form of consecration. S. 
Thomas Aquinas, III. Ixxviii. 1, clearly presents the sub- 
ject : iC This sacrament differs from the other sacraments 
in two particulars ; first, that this sacrament is perfected 
in the consecration of matter ; but other sacramental rites 
in the use of consecrated matter. Secondly, in those the 
consecration consists only in a benediction, . . . but 
in the Holy Eucharist it consists in a change which can 
be accomplished only by God's power. Hence the minister 
in this sacrament can only utter the words. [In Baptism 
he must pour the water ; in Confirmation he must lay his 
hands on the candidate, etc.] And, therefore, the form of 
this sacrament, as suitable to the end, differs from other 
like forms in two respects. First, the others imply the use 

* As there is reason for thinking that the consecration of the bread 
is completed before the other copsecration is begun, it may be held 
that the previous consecration counts, and that the wine only, if it 
can possibly be obtained, need be consecrated. 



586 THE LAW OF SACHAMENTS. 

of a sign, as, e I baptize thee ' (or, ' Keceive the Holy Ghost 
for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God, 
now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands'). 
But the form of this sacrament expresses only the consecra- 
tion of matter. And, secondly, other like forms are ex- 
pressed, like those just given, in the person of the minister, 
either as doing the act, or claiming authority, or imploring 
the Divine gift (as in the absolution of the liturgy, ' Have 
mercy upon you,' etc.). But the form of this sacrament is 
uttered in the person of Christ, that all may understand that 
the minister contributes nothing to its perfection, but only 
utters the words " (while Another consecrates the elements). 

The minister. The priest in his ordination receives au- 
thority to consecrate the Holy Eucharist. He is enjoined 
to be "a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His 
holy sacraments," of which this one is chief. But he 
needs power of jurisdiction if he exert his office for the 
benefit of the faithful. He is not a minister to all man- 
kind, but to that flock committed to his care. And we 
have seen already (page 570) the law of the Church which 
regulates this jurisdiction. 

If Holy Orders are indelible, however, lawlessness or any 
other sin— e.g., heresy or schism — does not take away the 
power of making a valid Eucharist. The priest sins in 
using his functions, and the res sacramenti gives him no 
spiritual grace, but rather that condemnation for unworthy 
approach to sacred mysteries of which the apostle speaks. 
And the faithful are certainly bound to avoid him, and not 
to be partakers of his sins (2 Ep. S. John v. 11). 

Distinction, however, must be made between one who is 
publicly sentenced by the Church and one who is privately 
known to be wrong. For the latter is still tbe minister of 
the Church, and it is not partaking of his sin to join in his 
sacrifice where he has jurisdiction, and to receive the Holy 
Communion from his sinful hands. 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 587 

Doctrine and law of reception. How can we express in 
few words the benefits which are partaken by a devout 
reception of the Holy Communion ? They are all which 
Christ gives to the loving soul ; for, in giving Himself, He 
gives all— (1) Increase of grace previously bestowed, sustain- 
ing and strengthening the spiritual life ; (2) new gifts of 
grace according to devout prayer for it ; (3) the weakening 
of sinful concupiscences, so that devout reception becomes a 
spiritual medicine for the weak ; (4) through increase of 
love, and therefore more sincere contrition, pardon for ven- 
ial sins committed ; (5) union with Christ (S. John vi. 
56) ; (6) union with His members in the one mystical Body ; 
(7) preservation in future temptations ; and, lastly, (8) the 
pledge of glory (v. 54). 

Tin's is a sacrament of the living, and he that eats must 
first be cleansed (1 Cor. xi. 29). If he himself place impedi- 
ments in his way, he cannot be united with Christ, though 
he receive His Body and His Blood. (See 29th Article of 
Eeligion.) He is not a "partaker of Christ;" i.e., he 
does not spiritually receive the precious nutriment of his 
soul. 

The distinction, then, between a sacramental reception 
and a spiritual communion is real and fundamental. The 
sacramental may lack the spiritual effect, while, on the 
other hand, the rubric respecting the communion of the 
sick gives most explicit instruction concerning spiritual 
communion where there is a hearty desire and preparation 
for sacramental communion. 

Children who have not reached the "age of discretion" 
are not in the Western Church admitted to sacramental 
communion, yet it would surely be derogatory to the love of 
their Saviour to suppose that the devout desire of the 
Church which brings them to Holy Baptism is unavailing 
for their spiritual communion with Him. 

But he that receives in mortal sin is further guilty of 
sacrilege. He signifies by his act that he is united with 



588 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

Christ and incorporated in the mystical Body, which cannot 
be without faith and love. Therefore he acts a profane lie. 

He may do this ignorantly — ignorant of the law which he 
has broken, but which does not excuse him for his igno- 
rance ; or, ignorant of his sin, because he has not examiued 
himself as he is bound to do (1 Cor. xi. 28) ; and he 
sins in receiving, because his very ignorance is sinful. 
But, again, he may grieve for his sin, and resolve to avoid it, 
while he has not that perfect contrition which would spring 
from perfect love ; then his contrition will be deepened in 
the reception itself. He has not sinned in the reception. 
Or he may have forgotten his sin even with due examination 
of himself ; then his general contrition will doubtless make 
him a worthy communicant (III. lxxx. 4). 

What was said (page 564) with reference to the minister's 
giving the sacraments to the unworthy need not be here 
repeated. 

Fasting communion. Catholic custom and law are un- 
varying in this respect. The few exceptions only prove the 
rule. S. Augustine is trustworthy witness to usage when 
he says (Ep. ad Januarium, 54) that that custom "is ob- 
served throughout the world ; " so that he is bold to say : 
" It pleased the Holy Ghost that in honour of so great a 
sacrament the Lord's Body should enter the mouth before 
other food." 

The words "fasting communion" may be somewhat mis- 
leading, since fasts are an exercise of penitential devotion. 
Such fasting precedes the day of reception ; but here the 
words simply imply that the Holy Food shall be the first to 
be taken on the day of reception, counting from the begin- 
ning of that clay. 

Communion in the evening naturally involves a violation 
of this law and custom. 

Spiritual devotion, from which are gained the effects of 
this sacrament, naturally demands that the offering of the 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 589 

soul in Holy Eucharist be the first duty of the new day ; and 
if an act of private thanksgiving be added, there will be, after 
reception, a decent separation made between the heavenly 
banquet and the common table of home, with the other 
occupations of the day. 

At the same time, it should surely be remembered that 
"fasting communion " is not a moral law, but an outward 
observance, which, like any other positive law of Church 
or State, admits of exceptions. Even where the law is 
strictest, exception is made in case of communion of the sick. 
And parity of reasoning may apply the same judgment to 
other cases of infirmity, especially in a rigorous northern 
climate. For no merely positive law overrides the certain 
demands of a weak, sickly nature ; nor should such be de- 
prived of sacramental communion when it may be had. 

(Qu. : If necessity, which knows no law, compel a viola- 
tion of the rule for the sake of charity, is there any good 
reason for partial abstinence ?) 

Decent reverence for the consecrated water of Holy Bap- 
tism requires that it be carefully removed ; say, by an outlet 
at the bottom of the font, or otherwise. And yet that water 
is not a sacrament. But the sacrament of the altar is per- 
fected in the consecration, and the res sacrament i remains 
there as long as the outward part endures in its natural con- 
dition of bread and wine. Hence comes the obligation of 
reverent consumption of what remains after communion, 
and the profanity of carelessness respecting fragments of the 
consecrated elements. Wilful negligence is due either to 
unbelief in the Church's doctrine or to sinful profanity. 

Also, it will be seen that if taken from the church to the 
sick, or kept for that purpose, it is still the sacrament, both 
matter and thing. 

The "Viaticum." Although the Greek Church gives the 
Holy Communion to infants after their baptism, the general 



590 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

law of necessity of sacramental reception seems to apply to 
those who have some nse of reason, however imperfect it 
may be, and who can therefore offer some inward devotion 
in their receiving. This being understood, it appears that 
the Viaticum should be administered to all baptized persons 
who are old enough to receive it devoutly, and have shown 
some desire for it, some inward devotion to the Lord 
who died for them, some contrition for their errors and 
their sins, the minister putting the most charitable con- 
struction upon words uttered in feebleness, and perhaps in 
pain. 

The fact that before the priest arrives to give the Viati- 
cum the sick has lost his reason, can hardly be considered 
a bar to fruitful reception, if previously he were penitently 
desirous and prepared to receive it. The sick is like the in- 
fant receiving Holy Baptism, but has added his own faith 
and love to his spiritual needs. If he is to be debarred, would 
not distraction of mind at the instant of receiving be also a 
bar to fruitful reception on the part of the most sincere 
penitent who presents himself at the altar ? Surely the love 
of Christ finds no obstacle in such a case. This also is the 
law of the Church whenever she has made any declaration 
upon the subject ; e.g., of the Fourth Council of Carthage, 
can. 76 : ce If it is believed that he is dying, having sought 
reconciliation with Cod before his delirium, let him be rec- 
onciled by the laying on of hands, and let him receive the 
Holy Eucharist." One who has never had the use of reason, 
or has never shown evidence of penitence and desire for the 
Viaticum, must be left to his Judge. (Qu. : Can the deacon, 
in case of absolute necessity, carry the Viaticum and admin- 
ister the same ?) 

Frequent communion is rather a matter of counsel than of 
precept. But the law of the Anglican Church fixes a mini- 
mum in three times a year. (Canons 21 and 22 of 1603) : 
" Every lay person is bound to receive the Holy Commun- 



THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 591 

ion thrice every year," " whereof the feast of Easter to be 
one." Christmas and "Whitsuntide, though not named in 
those canons, are properly the other two seasons for receiv- 
ing. 

(2) The Eucharistic sacrifice is offered to God as "the 
memorial His Son has commanded us to make," saying, " Do 
this in remembrance of Me." It is offered as a sacrifice of 
thanksgiving "for the innumerable benefits procured unto 
us" by Jesus' Passion and Death, His Resurrection and 
Ascension, for it is not the sacrifice of a dead victim, but 
it is offered by a living High Priest who offers Himself. It 
is offered through the merits of our Saviour, and in its in- 
ward part offered by Him for the " obtaining the remis- 
sion of sins and all other benefits of His Passion," for those 
who offer and for "all His whole Church." 

It is then the duty of every priest to fulfil the function 
for which he was ordained and to offer this holy sacrifice as 
often as he may, the ordinary maximum being once daily, 
except on special occasions like Easter, Whitsunday, and 
Christmas, or when serving two congregations. The An- 
glican Church seems to have fixed no minimum ; but as 
the question now before us is of the offering of the Chris- 
tian sacrifice, not of the communion of the people, it is 
evident that the priest who has no cure is not released from 
his obligation of making frequently the Eucharistic obla- 
tion. 

The American Church has omitted the rubric requiring 
the presence of some of the faithful at the sacrifice to repre- 
sent the congregation. But the law must still be consid- 
ered binding that, except in case of unforeseen accident, 
there shall always be some one at least to unite with the 
priest, and claim the promise that " when two or three are 
gathered in Christ's name, He will be with them." 

Christ has been immolated once for all ; but in this me- 
morial sacrifice the "one, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice" 



592 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. 

is re-presented to God, and its effects become fruitful for us 
and for all in whose behalf it is offered (III. lxxxiii. 1). 

Provision is made for fulfilling S. Paul's injunction 
through S. Timothy (1 Tim. ii. 1), at the Offertory prayer, 
and for the departed after the consecration, in the words 
" we and all Thy whole Church ; " and although there is no 
positive law to that effect, there can be no good reason for 
not inviting the faithful to join inwardly in those special 
intercessions for individuals which the devout priest will 
desire to make at those periods in the liturgy. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

§ 1. The virtue and the sacrament. 

Penitence is a moral virtue of the will, producing painful 
detestation of past sin from some spiritual motive, with 
purpose of casting off that sin and of bearing whatever God 
may lay upon the penitent as a penalty (not equivalent) for 
his sin. 

As a moral virtue of the will, it should be distinguished 
from the inward sorrowful passion of sensibility, sorrowful 
shame, pain at loss or disgrace, and the like, which are not 
part of the virtue, although they may accompany it. Tears, 
therefore, and similar signs of sorrow, although they are 
natural, are not parts of repentance, though they may be 
signs of it. But they may also be absent from true repent- 
ance. The virtue is in a will which freely chooses to for- 
sake evil, and in a rational soul which detests its actual sin 
as an offence against God. As such a virtue, not as a pas- 
sion of the sense-appetite, it is commanded, because we can 
freely intend to blot out sin so far as lies in our power to do 
so, and to use the Divine means for removing it. Such a 
repentance proceeds from filial fear, and can spring only 
from some love of God in the soul (III. lxxxv. ). 

Perfect repentance blots out all sin through the merits of 
Christ's Cross (Ezek. xviii. 21), for the Passion of Jesus our 
Saviour avails for the sins of the whole world (1 Ep. S. 
John ii. 2). But the condition required implies the ability 
to repent, not merely the feeling remorse for the conse- 
quences of sin, but the hating it for God's sake. For no 



594 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

sin that man wishes to be destroyed, will God permit not 
to be destroyed. The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost 
which is irremissible, seems to be that sin which comes 
from such utter hardness of heart that no repentance will 
ever follow it. 

Furthermore, repentance is an indispensable condition of 
salvation ; and no actual mortal sin can be remitted without 
it. For the offence of mortal sin consists in aversion from 
God and turning to some transitory good. Hence for its 
remission is required that our will be so changed that it 
turns to God with detestation of that choice of other good 
and full purpose of amendment of life. This is the virtue 
of penitence (III. lxxxvi. 1, 2). 

Since venial sin is not absolutely inconsistent with the 
love of God, a general sorrow for whatever is displeasing to 
our Father, and a sincere and persistent effort against such 
offences, a general confession of them in the Lord's Prayer 
so far as they are perceived, may be acceptable proofs before 
God of a penitent mind with respect to such transgressions 
(III. lxxxvii. 1). 

The consequences of sin are not taken away in its remis- 
sion. The soul turns to God and is forgiven, but the dis- 
position to fall, and other penalties also, may still remain, 
the " chastening " of the Lord. 

Bat our Lord instituted a sacrament of penitence for the 
remission of sins committed after baptism (S. John xx. 23). 
No material thing is consecrated as the instrument of Jesus' 
love for sinners, but He consecrates certain living agents to 
do His will. 

And yet, in the narrowest and strictest sense of the word 
sacrament, this gracious gift of Jesus' love may not be so 
entitled in the Anglican Church. For though there is an 
" outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual 
grace" — sc, the person consecrated for the purpose — we 
may not be able to say that any one visible or audible sign 



THE VIRTUE AND THE SACRAMENT. 595 

besides the minister of grace is so determined by Christ's 
institution that the grace given is inseparable from that 
sign or those words. * 

The schoolmen, in accordance with their theory, made 
sins as detested, the matter of the sacrament ; inward repen- 
tance, the res sacramenti; the form lately adopted in the 
West— viz., "Ego te absolvo "—the necessary words ; and the 
remission of sins, the spiritual gift. But the Anglican Cath- 
olic will regard this scholastic subtlety as a needless narrow- 
ing of the gracious love of the Redeemer. 

TJie matter. Although the 25th Article mentions the 
fact that the Lord seems to have attached His absolution of 
sins to no "visible sign or ceremony," the laying on of hands 
is an apostolic sign of the conveyance of some special grace, 
and it became so commonly associated with sacramental ab- 
solution that the rite itself was called by that name (Cone. 
Carthag. 4). But though, for the reasons just given, this 
ceremony cannot be considered as essential to a valid sacra- 
ment, and in the public absolutions of the Church it is 
quite impossible, yet in private confession it will be certainly 
expedient to follow primitive usage in this respect when the 
absolution is given. (See Blunt's Annotated Prayer Book, 
page 285). 

The form. S. Thomas Aquinas (III. lxxxiv. 3) shows that 
the words, "I absolve thee," are most suitable, " conveni- 
entissima," but not that the grace is tied to that form ; and 
we know that the early Church seems to have employed prec- 
atory forms, like those now used in the Anglican Church 
in public absolutions. But the priest is consecrated with 
authority to do what the more personal words, like the cor- 
responding form, ci l baptize thee," express ; and though not 

* See Homily on Common Prayer and Sacraments. Nothing here or 
elsewhere said of sacramental ordinances in the Church must be con- 
strued as consciously conflicting with that homily, which the writer ex 
ammo accepts. 



59G SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

necessary for validity, those words are eminently suitable 
ones for private absolution, as in fact the English Church 
requires them in the only case where the form of private ab- 
solution has been appointed; sc, in the confession of the 
sick. On the other hand, the American Church, in her only 
provision for private absolution after confession, sc, that of 
prisoners appointed to die, has required the Absolution of 
Communicants to be used. Either form, then, must be re- 
garded as equally valid ; but the one is personal, the other 
plural in form, and seems therefore less suitable for the 
ordinary exercise of this sacerdotal office. 

Christ Himself has ordained this sacrament in His Church, 
but not as " generally necessary to salvation " in the sense 
in which the two greater sacraments are necessary. For 
Baptism and Holy Eucharist would be needed for all in 
order to attain to union with Christ, under any circum- 
stances ; but this is a refuge in case of lapse from baptis- 
mal grace, necessary as medicine in sickness, the ordained 
means for spiritual cure by Him who said, "Whose sins 
thou dost remit they are remitted to them ; and whose sins 
thou dost retain they are retained/' 

Contrition for sin being regarded, in accordance with the 
spirit of the Anglican Church, as the requisite condition for 
a beneficial use of this ordinance, whether in private or in 
public ("Ye who do truly and earnestly repent you of 
your sins," etc.), its three parts will be (1) confession, (2) 
absolution, (3) satisfaction. 

§ 2. Contrition. 

Contrition is detestation of past sin, which causes inward 
pain on account of it and humbling before G-od, with fixed 
purpose not to offend again, and cheerfully to bear whatever 
God may impose because of it. It is perfect when it pro- 
ceeds from charity, from the love of Cod. It is imperfect 



confession. 597 

when the motive, although supernatural, is lower — e.g., 
thought of the baseness of sin, fear of hell, not merely of 
temporal consequences, and desire of heaven. But this im- 
perfect contrition may be, and doubtless often is, deepened 
into perfect contrition for sin as an offence against the love 
of God, by a devout use of this means of grace. 

Contrition, however, in both cases must be complete to be 
effectual ; i.e., the sin must be detested more than anything 
beside, and the penitence must be, implicitly at least, uni- 
versal, as including all sins. 

Intensity of feeling, as we have seen in viewing the virtue 
of penitence, is not essential to complete contrition ; for it is 
in the rational soul which hates and detests sin, not in the 
sensitive feelings, except accidentally and by a kind of over- 
flow. 

Some sins ma}" be forgotten, and then only a general con- 
trition, like that expressed in the daily offices of the Angli- 
can Church, can be offered to God. But they may be par- 
tially forgotten, and then the searching of conscience which 
is obligatory will bring them more fully before the soul, and 
will itself be a sign and cause of more complete contrition. 

The purpose for the future must be an efficacious one ; i.e., 
the fixed intention of using all necessary means and efforts 
to avoid all occasions of sin. (Qu. : Expressed fears of re- 
lapse ?) 

Such contrition, finally, is life-long ; for the lost state of 
innocence can never be recovered, the time lost in the turn- 
ing from the road to blessedness never brought back ; and 
pardon therefore does not wholly wipe out the past. 

Perfect contrition, with purpose of confession to God and 
due satisfaction, gives full restoration to His love, a full title 
to absolution. Charity covers the multitude of sins, and 
brings full remission of their eternal consequences. 

§ 3. Confession. 

Confession is an outward act of penitence, made with the 



598 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

lips which speak to God. It is public, made with the whole 
congregation assembled together, or it is private confession 
of particular offences made to the minister of God's absolu- 
tion alone, in order that pardon may follow for the individ- 
ual soul. The manner of confession is a matter of positive 
ecclesiastical law, and has varied in different parts of the 
Church in different ages. 

Since the Anglican Church has now no positive law respect- 
ing confession, even in case of mortal sickness, the sinner 
being only counselled in the matter, private confession must 
be regarded as subject of counsel, not of precept. The argu- 
ment for it, so far as the penitent is concerned, is the 
greater certainty of the requisite conditions of absolution ; 
the "confession, not in general terms, but of actual particu- 
lar offences against Divine love. The very act of confession, 
where it is not obligatory, which is our own case, makes the 
private act a far more weighty sign of true contrition than 
the habitual and familiar words of a general confession can 
be. 

The Roman argument for the necessity of private confes- 
sion, so far as the minister of absolution is concerned, is 
based upon his office as spiritual judge. He is to receive 
the worthy, to reject the unworthy, to bind and to loose on 
earth what is bound or loosed in heaven. But it is evident 
that the priest's judgment must necessarily be limited to 
what is truly and fully laid before him. So far we can be 
of accord with Roman discipline. The question asked by 
the penitent, "Am I fit to come to Holy Communion ?" 
may well be answered by the counsel, " Make your private 
confession, and then your priest will be your earthly judge, 
and give you, if you be truly penitent, the comfortable per- 
sonal ministration which God has employed him for." 

But the assertion that he is to be judge in all cases what- 
soever, is not that of the Anglican Church ; it does not 
seem possible, even if expedient ; for it implies a knowledge 
which cannot be had, which even the penitent himself may 



confession. 599 

not have. How, for example, can he be judge of sins which 
the penitent has forgotten, or of the reality of a general 
contrition for those offences ? Neither has trial proved it 
expedient, if supposed to be possible, judging by such testi- 
mony as we find in Gaume. 

The Anglican Church gives warning that we must judge 
ourselves, so far as that is possible ; she commands a con- 
fession following on self-examination, and there would 
seem to be no good reason for not making very brief pause 
in order to recall the " manifold sins " . . . in "'thought, 
word, and deed." 

But if the private confession be made, there are plain 
obligations of the priest in hearing it. 

(1) He must avoid all signs of wonder, horror, even of 
rebuke, during the confession, lest the penitent be discour- 
aged and even cloak his sins. Let him rather give encour- 
agement to continue, because there is no sin too great for 
the love of Jesus to cleanse. 

(2) He must allow no needless mention of others' faults ; 
even cooperators in sin must not be named, and tbe ap- 
proach to that must be promptly checked. 

(3) If ignorantly in fault the penitent may be better 
instructed (a) in what is necessary to salvation ; (b) when 
society is concerned and scandal is to be avoided ; (c) when 
tbe penitent himself is in doubt and makes inquiry ; (d) 
when there is reasonable hope of ultimate good from doing 
so, and no danger of great injury to any other. If none of 
these four conditions be present, the confessor is not always 
bound to make known obligations which would probably be 
not fulfilled if known. Silence is sometimes golden. For 
example, restitution may be certainly due, but the penitent 
has been acting in good faith, and will certainly not be able 
to see his obligation. 

(4) After tbe penitent has finished what he has to say, 
only the fewest and most necessary questions should be 
asked, and those suited to tbe age and person. Spiritually 



600 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

intelligent adults may need none, except perhaps to elicit 
necessary or qualifying circumstances. 

Boys, and in general those unaccustomed to self-examina- 
tion, may be assisted in this respect. 

(5) In questioning children, say, in preparing for Con- 
firmation, the utmost caution must be used respecting pur- 
ity of life, lest they be prompted to evil knowledge ; but, 
on the other hand, it may be quite too readily presumed 
that no unchaste words or actions have defiled their souls, 
even in the case of girls. 

(6) The sick need, of course, the greatest tenderness ; 
and in mortal disease favourable presumption must be 
stretched to its utmost limit. Half-articulate words, dis- 
tracted attention, drowsiness, the effect of medicines excit- 
ing the brain, or producing partial delirium or somnolency 
— all tbese and the like seem almost insuperable obstacles, 
and charity will take the most favourable view which cir- 
cumstances reasonably allow. 

The seal of confession can under no circumstances what- 
ever be broken. Outside of his ministry for God the priest 
does not know what in confession he hears ; it must be as 
though it had never entered his ears. Not even to the 
penitent himself may God's minister allude to it, without 
permission first asked and obtained ; and this even when 
action with respect to others is expedient. The Anglican 
Church, while recognizing private confession, has ruled 
that the seal is sacred, adding, however, an exception from 
the ordinary law of the Church. Canon cxiii. of 1603 says,* 
" If any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the 
minister, . . . we do straitly charge and admonish 
(said minister) that he do not at any time reveal and make 

* References of this nature are based on the assumption that unre- 
pealed canons of the English Church {mutatis mutandis) are part of 
the Canon Law of the Church in the United States. 



ABSOLUTION. 601 

known to any person whatsoever any crime or offence so 
committed to bis trust and secrecy (except they be sucb 
crimes as, by the laws of this realm, his own life may be 
called into question for concealing the same), under pain of 
irregularity" — i.e., of deposition. 

§ 4. Absolution. 

Tbe Church bas received the keys of the kingdom of 
heaven (S. Matt. xvi. 19). The door stands open, because 
Christ has opened it, to all believers. But it is sin that 
closes it again, and the power whicb removes tbat obstacle 
is called a "key." G-od alone has tbat power ; but in the 
Man Christ Jesus was that power to take away tbat ob- 
stacle by tbe merits of His Passion, and He has the keys. 
But tbe ministry of them is on earth, and bas its outward 
as well as its inward part. As He inwardly washes in Holy 
Baptism, employing the visible element of water, so He in- 
wardly absolves, employing tbe consecrated instrument on 
earth. 

But the keys are a power of binding as well as of loosing, 
of shutting as well as of opening. As God Himself puts no 
impediment in the way of any one trying to enter the king- 
dom of heaven, but withholds His grace from the un- 
worthy, so the priest can make no impediment on earth, 
but be may be bound not to use the keys in opening and 
loosing, because be cannot remove impediments unless God 
first inwardly take them away. God Himself must first 
absolve, in order that there may be place for tbe absolution 
of the priest. If God do not absolve, the other is an empty 
form. 

Furthermore, in this, as in every other ministerial act, 
tbe priest must have jurisdiction as well as authority. 
Such jurisdiction he receives when some part of the Lord's 
people is committed to his care. Special jurisdiction he 
may receive in special cases, as the law, custom, or special 
license of the Church allows. 



G02 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

(Qu. : Must not consent of the pastor be had in receiving 
the private confession of a parishioner ?) 

The chief earthly union with Christ is in Holy Com- 
munion ; but it is a sacrament of the living. If sin close 
the door to that union, the door must be unlocked through 
confession and absolution. The Anglican Church, accord- 
ingly, has made these an essential part of her liturgy. 
And her people should be instructed not to receive if they 
come so late to church that they have not truly and ear- 
nestly confessed their sins and received that public absolu- 
tion. 

Art. xxxiii. and the canon law of the American Church 
(title ii. can. 12) distinctly claim the authority of the 
Church to refuse to open the door of the kingdom of 
heaven ("depriving of all privileges of Church member- 
ship ; " excommunication), which of course excludes from 
even the outward form of confession and absolution. 

Doubts respecting the present disjjosition of the penitent 
are to be decided in his favour when absolution is in ques- 
tion. The minister, who has only the outward part of sac- 
raments to perform, leaves all beyond to the only competent 
Judge. 

Conditional absolution may sometimes be given ; not, in- 
deed, conditioned by any future act, but when the return 
of a relapsed penitent does not fully justify refusal to give 
absolution, and charitable presumption, on the other hand, 
is unable to solve the doubt in his favour. 

Or, again, a sick and dying man may have expressed 
some contrition and sent for the priest, and God's minister 
may be doubtful whether, if the sick had the power so to 
do, he would penitently confess his sins. If there had cer- 
tainly been intention to make a contrite confession, there 
would be no ground for keeping back absolution because 
the priest arrived too late to receive that confession in God's 



ABSOLUTION. 603 

name. But in the doubtful case the conditional absolution 
may be given. 

Absolution must he denied (1) when there is no evidence 
of a determination to amend ; (2) when restitution or sat- 
isfaction is refused ; (3) when the remedies directed are 
refused, or previously proposed remedies have not been 
employed, especially when evil habits are concerned, and 
no special contrition is exhibited on account of the new 
sin ; (4) when there is evident unwillingness to forgive 
others ; (5) when perseverance in evil ways is shown by an 
unwillingness to avoid the proximate occasions of sin, or of 
giving occasion to others' sin, those occasions being volun- 
tary and not necessary. 

By "proximate occasions" understand those which, in 
the particular case, bring strongest temptation and great 
probability of sin. Some of these are morally involuntary ; 
but others are voluntary ; i.e., they will cause only trifling- 
loss, if any. The latter must be abandoned, no matter 
what purpose of resisting the temptation is professed, and 
absolution must be deferred until this is done. Round 
dances and the use of stimulants may serve for examples 
when they are occasions of sin. Fear of future relapse, 
even if reasonable, is not good ground for withholding ab- 
solution from a contrite soul, if there be no evident cling- 
ing to the sin. 

Absolution may be deferred for a short time, and the 
delay may aid in deepening penitence for sin, (1) when 
the penitent has previously promised to avoid occasions of 
sin but has not done so ; (2) if, able to make thorough self- 
examination, he have neglected it ; (3) if he have promised 
restitution or signs of forgiveness to another, and have not 
done so ; in general, it may be safer to defer absolution 
.until obligatory restitution has been made. 

(4) Habitual sinners may be absolved only if there seem to 
be full purpose of amendment of life ; but if there have been 



604 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

neglect of previously prescribed discipline, absolution should 
surely be deferred until sincerity has been more fully evinced 
than by the feeling, perhaps a transient one, shown at the 
time of confession. 

In such cases, also, it is wise, and may prove very bene- 
ficial, to require an explicit promise of return immediately 
upon the first lapse, if any should occur. This very thing 
will itself be a most salutary penance and discipline, if there 
be any sincerity in the sinners soul. 

Absolution, however, should not be deferred in these 
cases for a long period ; a fortnight will usually be long 
enough. 

§ 5. Satisfaction. 

Although satisfaction is an act of justice in paying a 
penalty for past transgression, a penalty either voluntarily 
assumed or made voluntary by cheerfully accepting God's 
chastisement, no equality according to justice can be 
dreamed of. Sin is of infinite guilt, and no earthly pains 
can be adequate compensatiou. Satisfaction is not to be so 
understood. But, yet, penalty is accepted as just, and as a 
painful medicine curing past sins and preserving from fu- 
ture ones. Something has been taken from the honour due 
to God; therefore something is to be taken from self and 
given to God as a partial return of that lost honour. 

If it be asked how man can "satisfy" or pay his debt to 
God, we shall reply that man becomes a debtor to God in 
two ways : first, by benefits received ; next, by sins com- 
mitted. And as thanksgiving and worship is the return in 
the one case, so is satisfaction in the other. But there can 
be no equivalent return for all that God has done for us ; 
we can only do what lies in our power by way of return. 
And love accepts this as a just return. So, also, as re- 
gards satisfaction to love for offences against it, no equiva- 
lent can be paid ; but something may be offered to love 
which love will accept for the sake of Christ's merits. 



SATISFACTION. 005 

Chastenings from God take something from ns without 
our will, hut patient bearing of them makes them become 
voluntary satisfactions for sin (Heb. xii. 6). So, also, 
since satisfaction is penal, we can impose penalty on our- 
selves which, though love makes it light, is still penalty. 
"We can give goods of fortune in alms ; goods of body in 
abstinence or fasting ; goods of soul in special prayers. 
And each of these and the like may be j)enal satisfaction. 

Such penances may be imposed upon himself by any one 
who turns to God. But since in private confession the soul 
is submitted to the priest as an earthly judge with power to 
bind and loose under the Supreme Judge, he is bound to 
impose suitable penalties while remitting sins in the name 
of his Lord. These, it has been seen, must be punitive, 
salutary, and medicinal ; if possible, all in one. Thus, the 
taking away of outward and proximate occasions of sin will 
be at once punitive, salutary, and medicinal. Games lawful 
in themselves, society not immoral, may have proved an 
overcoming temptation ; it is properly imposed satisfaction 
to forbid them. Fleshly lusts may have overcome the weak 
soul, and the body is punished when its luxuries are pro- 
hibited ; and so on. 

The penance, then, should be according to the sin ; but 
also adapted to the age and condition of the penitent, being- 
such as to test the sincerity of his repentance and to deepen 
it. It should not be too long continued ; a fortnight is 
usually long enough ; it should not be public, not very diffi- 
cult to observe, or such as will cause physical weariness. 
Thus, fasting or abstinence, though punitive discipline, 
may be unsuitable for labourers or children ; but other acts 
of mortification respecting luxuries may be easily substituted 
for these. 

As medicinal, the penance should be adapted to the 
special sin. Thus special prayer for enemies is a remedy 
for an unforgiving spirit. At the same time, it will be re- 
membered that long prayers, much time spent in church, 



GOG SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. 

and the like, are not marks of penitence or devotion, or fit 
penances, but rather the doing all in the name of Christ. 

Finally, a few words may be added respecting venial sins 
as coming before the confessor. These may be compared 
to sins against a father when the son has still filial affection 
in his heart, and is not turned out of doors. But, on the 
other hand, they may indicate a habit which, if not re- 
pented of, will show mortal contempt of the Father ; and if 
they grow into habits they are sure to end in mortal sin. 

If they be not consented to ; if they arise from negli- 
gence, inattention, sudden motions of the soul, like wan- 
dering thoughts in prayer, impatience, vain words, etc., they 
may receive repeated absolutions under due conditions. 
For example, let them be followed up by regular and suit- 
able discipline — say, each evening after a fall, by light 
penances adapted to them, etc. If there be sincere contri- 
tion for them, and a persistent effort to amend, with steady 
though feeble progress, the penitent is entitled to repeated 
absolutions for them. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE VISITATION OP THE SICK. 

Moral Theology cannot overlook the special law of God 
respecting the sick. There is a corporal work of mercy for 
all Christians, of which the Lord will say at the last: "I 
was sick, and ye visited Me ; " but there is also a religions 
obligation of positive law laid down in rubric and canon : 
' ' When any person [i.e., any member of the Church] is sick, 
notice shall be given thereof to the minister of the parish ; 
who coming to the sick person's house shall say," etc. 

(The law respecting prisoners, i.e., under like conditions, 
is the same.) Here is an official duty and obligation, based 
on the law of God (S. Jas. v. 14). " Is any sick among 
you ? Let him call for the elders of the Church." It is to 
be fulfilled in a solemn and official way, like any other func- 
tion of the priest's office ; e.g., vested with surplice and 
stole. 

The canon of 1603 does not seem to require even official 
notice. " When any person is dangerously sick in any 
parish, the minister or curate having knowledge thereof, 
shall resort unto him or her," etc. But, of course, for an 
official visit, such as is contemplated by the rubric, some 
previous arrangement will be convenient. 

This official and obligatory visit has other objects beside 
the provision, on the one hand, for sacramental penitence 
and Holy Eucharist elsewhere discussed, and, on the other, 
such charitable consolation, advice, and prayer as any 
Christian may take to the sick-room. It is, so to speak, 
the coming of the Lord to His sick member, in the person 
of His minister, for spiritual strength and help. " The 



G08 THE VISITATION OF THE SICK. 

prayer of faith shall save the sick." This is the spirit of 
the office provided by the Anglican Church. 

But it is still more distinctly presented in that rite of the 
primitive Church which God's Word appointed through 
S. James (v. 14); se., " They shall pray over him, anointing 
him with oil in the name of the Lord." Unction of the 
sick belongs to the whole Catholic Church, Eastern, Latin ; 
and the Anglican Church retained it in the Prayer Book 
of 1549. It may be called sacramental in the general sense 
of the word ; viz., " an outward and visible sign of an inw'ard 
and spiritual grace;" but it may be doubted whether it is 
a sacrament in the narrowest sense of the word. None 
maintain that it is "generally necessary to salvation," and 
the omission of the Unction of the Sick in the Prayer 
Book of 1552, and ever since, seems to leave the rite as a 
matter of counsel, not of precept, and to treat it accordingly 
as sacramental rather than as a proper sacrament. I mean 
that the Anglican Church appears to regard the outward 
and visible sign as not permanently fixed by Divine appoint- 
ment. Thus if we read that the Lord (S. Mark vi. 5) laid 
His hands on the sick, His disciples (v. 13) "anointed them 
with oil and healed them." If S. James spoke of the 
anointing, the Lord, before He ascended, said that His 
disciples shall "lay hands on the sick, and they shall re- 
cover." So, also, no form of words can fairly be pointed 
out as essential to this sacramental rite. Prayer over the 
sick was ordained through S. James, but the Catholic 
Church has no such form of words for the unction as is 
essential to proper sacraments. 

This seems necessary to be said when a law of the Catholic 
Church is in question. Viewing the unction of the sick, 
then, as a Divinely appointed means of grace, but not with 
us of precept, but only of counsel, if it be devoutly desired 
by those who are truly penitent, and have received abso- 
lution of their sins, they may with confident faith expect 
to receive (1) pardon for the feebleness of spirit which their 



UNCTION OF THE SICK. 609 

sin has produced ; (2) strength and comfort from the Holy 
Ghost for special trials of sickness, and support in the 
last dread hour of dissolution ; or, if it so please God, res- 
toration to bodily health. " The prayer of faith shall save 
the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up ; and if he have 
committed sins they shall be forgiven him." 

To those who cannot recognize and devoutly receive this 
spiritual help, it will not be given. 

Catholic usage implies that the oil employed for anointing 
of the sick shall be blessed by a bishop, for its sacred use. 

Finally, it must be added, whatever lawless custom may 
tolerate, that the law of the Church still binds every con- 
scientious priest ; and if he be called to do the last earthly 
office for those who are departed from this life, he may 
not use the Order for the Burial of the Dead "for any 
unbaptized adults, any who die excommunicate, or who 
have [while possessed of their ordinary faculties of self- 
government] laid violent hands on themselves," and so have 
died excommunicated by their own act. What the priest 
shall do when he is called upon in any such case, this is not 
the place to consider. But he is certainly bound to re- 
member that these days are such as render disobedience 
to the law here given more than ordinarily sinful, because 
lawlessness makes man the master of his own life, and the 
priest is bound to protest in the name of God and His 
Church ; and that protest can only be duly given by dis- 
tinct separation in death of the voluntary suicide from him 
whose life has been surrendered when God called for it. 
Also, it must surely be remembered, in determining whether 
suicide has been voluntary or not, that a coroner's jury is not 
an ecclesiastical tribunal. That may have respectful atten- 
tion, but the Church must judge for herself respecting her 
own offices, with all charity, but also with truth and loyalty 
to God. 

39 



CHAPTER X. 

HOLY ORDERS. 

§ 1. Introductory. 

The doctrine of Holy Orders, their divine origin, their 
authority and functions, cannot here be discussed. But 
some few propositions, familiar to Churchmen, but wholly 
rejected or unknown by the great majority of religious 
people among us, must here be assumed. For he who be- 
lieves the truth revealed from God in this matter — sc, the 
Divine authority of the Christian priesthood — necessarily 
finds a law binding upon himself, whether he be priest or 
layman, and he must answer before God for his obedience to 
it. Whereas, on the other hand, he who knows no such 
truth, knows no law in this matter ; while the Protestant 
scoffer at '"'sacerdotalism" is only consistent in scoffing at 
the law, which, perhaps, if he be a priest, he has sworn 
before God that he will diligently observe and keep. 

The existence of Holy Orders as a Divine institution in 
the Catholic Church is based upon the existence of sacra- 
ments, and especially of the Holy Eucharist as sacrament 
and as sacrifice. Preaching the Gospel, the prophetical 
office, is superadded ; but, important as it is, it is not of the 
essence of Holy Orders. Any Christian man may be licensed, 
if the Church see fit, to carry the Gospel to the world. The 
fountain of this authority, indeed, is the apostolic office, for 
apostles and their successors were bidden to carry the Gospel 
to all the world, assured that their Lord would be with 
them in doing so until the consummation of all earthly his- 
tory. God has set prophets in His Church after apostles. 
Not all are apostles ; not all are prophets (1 Cor. xii. 28). 



INTRODUCTORY. Gil 

But Holy Orders are ordained for the external ministra- 
tion of sacraments. The Lord said, " Make disciples of all 
nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father, and 
of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost " (S. Matt, xviii. 20) ; 
"This do in remembrance of Me" (S. Luke xxii. 19); 
" Eeceive ye the Holy Ghost ; whosesoever sins ye forgive, 
they are forgiven unto them, etc." (S. John xx. 22). All 
visible authority is summed up in the apostles, by them to 
be divided and distributed to various orders and offices in 
the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The 
apostles were "deacons" of the Church (and so are their 
successors), but they gave this function of the one ministry 
to chosen men (Acts vi. 6). The apostles were priests 
(and their successors may be vested as priests and do the 
priest's peculiar work of consecrating the Holy Eucharist), 
but the Church needed resident priests wherever the faith- 
ful were found and required their ministration. Therefore 
the apostles gave this function to others (1 Tim. v. 22 ; 
Tit. i. 5). But they reserved to themselves and those 
whom, like S. Matthias or Barnabas or Timothy, they asso- 
ciated with themselves in the full authority of their office, 
the general power to dispense sacred things, and to rule the 
Church. The Church of Christ, as an organized, visible 
body, was found wherever their authority was found. Where 
there was no such authority there could be no organized and 
visible Church. 

Difference in orders, then, depends upon the different 
degrees of participation in the fulness of the apostolic com- 
mission. The body of Christ has many members, "and all 
the members have not the same office " (Rom. xii. 6 ; 1 Cor. 
xii. 5. See Art. xxiii.). But each and all are servants of 
their brethren ; they minister, not " in their own name, 
but in Christ's, by His commission and authority," re- 
ceived directly from those to whom He has previously 
given it. 

" It is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy 



612 HOLY ORDERS. 

Scripture and ancient authors, that from the apostles' time 
there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church 
— bishops, priests, and deacons." And so, since the law of 
faith is the law of prayer, we pray in the Collect at the 
Ordering of Priests, " Almighty God, giver of all good things, 
who by Thy Holy Spirit hast appointed divers orders of 
ministers in Thy Church, etc." He who does not believe 
this, has no right to profane the service of God by present- 
ing himself to receive such a holy office. 

A devout Christian is not a priest because he is a good 
man. In the inward and spiritual order, indeed, he is one 
of the "holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices ac- 
ceptable to God through Jesus Christ." He has a "holy 
priesthood" (1 S. Pet. ii. 5); but in the outward order he is 
not an apostle, he is neither king nor priest in the visible 
Church. For all are not apostles having authority to rule ; 
and it is not grace which is conferred by the visible priest, 
but the sacraments of grace, while God only can bestow the 
inward part. A good man can teach by word and example ; 
he may be licensed to read Holy Scripture in public, to use 
public prayers with the faithful ; even, if law permit, to ex- 
ercise the prophetic office which he receives from the suc- 
cessors of the apostles ; but the existence of sacraments, as 
has been said, implies men consecrated for this instrumental 
service without which necessary grace cannot in general be 
had. 

§ 2. Holy Orders a sacrament. 

There is (1) " an outward and visible sign " — sc, the lay- 
ing on of hands — (2) "of an inward and spiritual grace" (3) 
" ordained by Christ Himself as a means whereby we receive 
the same and a pledge to assure us thereof." But Holy 
Orders have not " like nature of sacraments with Baptism 
and Holy Eucharist." And this will be evident enough when 
we consider the matter and the form, and compare them 
with the two sacraments "generally necessary to salvation." 



HOLY ORDERS A SACRAMENT. G13 

In the latter case there is an indispensable material thing 
required without which there can be no sacrament. Not so 
in the ordering of bishops, priests, and deacons. 

TJie matter. If, then, in a general way, we define Holy 
Orders as a " sacrament of the Church in which is given 
spiritual authority, and grace is conferred for due perform- 
ance of ecclesiastical offices," we shall keep ourselves within 
the sure boundaries of our faith ; but if we undertake to 
find dogmatically the essential "matter" and form of words, 
we may involve ourselves in needless difficulties. It is 
enough for Anglican Churchmen to know, and for Anglican 
theology to affirm, that the laying on of hands is an apos- 
tolic sign attached to this conferring of authority by those 
who have authority. 

The state of the case is not very different with respect to 
the oral sign, the form of words in this sacrament. In Holy 
Baptism and Holy Eucharist there is a form of words un- 
varying from the beginning and throughout the Catholic 
Church. But if we seek for any such form in Ordination 
we may fail to find it. The intent is plain enough in all 
varying forms. It is the transmission of authority from 
him who possesses it with power to confer it. <l Take thou 
authority to execute the office of a deacon in the Church of 
God committed unto thee, in the Name, etc." Alternative 
forms, accordingly, in the Ordering of Priests, however 
originated, will create no difficulty, nor tend to invalidate 
the sacrament. " Beceive the Holy Ghost for the office and 
work of a priest in the Church of God ; " or " Take 
thou authority to execute the office of a priest in the 
Church of God now committed unto thee by the imposi- 
tion of our hands " — these are equivalent forms, and if they 
are not vain and idle ceremony, which God forbid, they 
are equally God's means for conferring the inward and 
spiritual grace of the sacrament. 



014 HOLY ORDERS. 

Tlie grace. This is, (1) a consecration whereby the ser- 
vant of Christ becomes a dispenser of sacramental grace to 
others. That can be truly said to him which was said to 
S. Timothy : " Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which 
"was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the 
hands of the presbytery;" or, more definitely still, "Stir up 
the gift of God which is in thee through the laying on of 
(apostolic) hands " (1 Tim. iv. 14 ; 2 Tim. i. 6). 

(2) In the ordination to the priesthood (Qu. : ordination 
to the diaconate ?) is imprinted an indelible " character " 
on the soul. Even the degraded priest remains forever a 
priest who has consecrated and touched the Lord's sacra- 
mental Body. Holy Orders, therefore, can under no pos- 
sible circumstances be reiterated. 

§ 3. The law. 

The special and positive laws enacted in local canons are 
binding on conscience, because the Church has authority 
from God in making them. But examination of them does 
not belong to our subject. And, on the other hand, the 
solemn, tender warnings of the Church which are uttered 
by the ordaining bishop before he gives the heavenly grace 
are such as the priest cannot too often make his earnest 
study. But nothing can be added to them. Our present 
task is the considering those necessary deductions from 
the doctrine of Holy Orders, which have formed a part of the 
law of the Church Catholic, and are therefore part of the 
moral law which guides our conscience. 

(1) Holy Baptism is the door to all the sacramental rites 
of the Church ; therefore Holy Orders presuppose baptism, 
and the supposed conferring of them is null in the case of 
an unbaptized man. He is incapable of receiving that 
character which Holy Orders stamp on the soul prepared 
for its reception. He cannot absolve penitents, nor conse- 
crate a valid Eucharist. If the error be discovered, he 
should bo baptized, and then receive valid orders. If he 



THE LAW. G15 

were advanced to the episcopate, he could not confer valid 
orders, but the gracious gifts of the great High Priest are 
not conditioned, on His part, by the imperfections and 
errors of His ministers ; neither is it to be believed that He 
will jjermit such error as this to lie hidden. 

It will also be noticed that the Catholic Church has pro- 
vided against the perpetuation of this error, or any other 
such error, by requiring that three bishojDS unite in the law- 
ful consecration to the episcopate. 

Confirmation, though eminently proper, is not essential 
to the- receiving of Holy Orders. It is not essential, 
because the baptized man is capable of this special grace ; 
it is eminently proper, because the minister of Christ pecul- 
iarly needs what Confirmation confers. 

(2) He who receives Holy Orders in a state of mortal sin 
is validly ordained, and his official acts confer a grace which 
he does not himself possess. He condemns himself in re- 
ceiving ordination ; he condemns himself whenever he offici- 
ates in such a state of sin ; " holy things for holy persons " 
is the law of the Church, the law of God. But there is no 
need of perplexed conscience on his part, as if he must 
sin in officiating, and sin in not officiating ; for he can 
repent of his sin, or he can resign his office. (See Art. 
xx vi.) 

It has also been noted above (page 561), that as long as 
the Church tolerates a bad man, a heretic in heart, a wil- 
ful sinner in any matter, Christian men may receive the 
sacraments at his hands, although they should, if it be pos- 
sible, avoid him. 

Neither should be overlooked the grave sin of presenting 
to Holy Orders, or of conferring them on, those who are 
ignorant of the faith, on those who are heretical concern- 
ing it, on those who have not been tried and proved, on 
men of worldly life and conversation. To " lay hands 
hastily " on such persons is to be " partaker of other men's 



GIG HOLY ORDERS. 

sins " (1 Tim. v. 22). No one can dispense with the un- 
changing law of God in this or any other matter. 

(3) The priest's office centres in the Holy Eucharist ; but 
this implies also all that is requisite in preparation for that 
august sacrament. And this means preparing men by the 
Word of God, by baptism, by sacramental penitence, by the 
visitation of the sick and unction of them, if authorized 
and desired, and the like, all for the consummated union 
of the believer with the Son of God in Holy Communion. 

But since the higher office in the Church always includes 
the lower, he is commanded to read public prayers, 'which 
the licensed reader may also do ; he may serve at the altar 
as deacon, etc. In like manner, the bishop himself may 
act as priest or as deacon, because he includes these offices 
in his higher function. He may be parish priest, and be 
required as such to do, personally or by his deputies, all 
that is required of a parish priest. 

(4) What has been said of the sacramental character of 
priest's orders would seem to apply to deacon's orders also, 
mutatis mutandis. His primary duty is to serve in the 
Holy Eucharist, and he is so instructed by the bishop at 
his ordination. In that nearest approach of heaven and 
earth, he delivers the everlasting Gospel to the people of 
God. The Epistle, although it also is the Word of God, is 
not ranked by the Church as being on the same exalted 
level. A " sub-deacon " (lay reader ?) may be authorized to 
read that ; but the deacon receives special authority with 
respect to the Gospel which the Church delivers to the 
faithful through him. But since the higher office includes 
the lower, the deacon may do those ministries which belong 
to others, and these accordingly are specially assigned to 
him by the bishop at his ordination. He becomes licensed 
lay reader, or he continues the function ; he is catechist ; 
he does what any Christian man may do when no priest can 
be had, e.g., baptizing infants, etc. 



THE LAW". 617 

(5) The bishop has received the power of conferring all 
the authority which lie himself possesses, or a part of the 
same, on other men. But, besides this, having received 
jurisdiction in his diocese, he only can give jurisdiction to 
the priest for a part of that diocese. This law of the 
Catholic Church is explicitly laid down in the " Letter of 
Institution" as given in the Prayer Book : "We do by these 
presents give and grant unto you . . . our license and 
authority to perform the office of a priest in the parish of 

E . And also do hereby institute you into said parish, 

possessed of full power to perform every act of sacerdotal 
function among the people of the same, you continuing in 
communion with us, and complying with the rubrics and 
canons of the Church, and with such lawful directions as 
you shall at any time receive from us, etc/' 

But, in like manner, the bishop himself must h&xe juris- 
diction for a lawful exercise of the functions of his office. 
He is not a bishop over the whole Catholic Church, but 
over the flock committed to his care by lawful authority. 
Therefore he cannot lawfully ordain those who are not sub- 
ject to him, unless he have received commission to act for 
one who has jurisdiction in the case in question. 

But since the character conferred is indelible, while he 
may be acting unlawfully, he may be heretical, schismatic, or 
he may be deposed, still his official acts are valid ; they can- 
not be repeated where the act, once validly done, is life- 
long in its consequences. 

The case is parallel with others mentioned before, and 
further proof, if any were needed, would be found in the 
fact that the deposed bishop, if restored to the exercise of 
his office, cannot be consecrated anew. But those who 
receive the sacraments from this deposed bishop have no 
claim to the grace which belongs to those ordinances, be- 
cause they sin in communing in any way with one who is 
cut off from the one Body of Christ. 

Such a bishop, then, may validly ordain, and his ordina- 



618 HOLT ORDERS. 

tions cannot be repeated ; but he can give no mission for a 
lawful performance of sacerdotal or any other ministerial 
functions. 

(6) The exclusion of women from Holy Orders, while they 
may be licensed to exercise other and appropriate ministries 
in the Church, seems to rest on the unvarying law of the 
Church from the beginning. 

(7) Finally, for all in Holy Orders there is that personal 
purity and holiness of life which the bishop's charge so sol- 
emnly presents. A few details of outward law may here be 
given. And, first, since men are set aside for God's service, 
they are, beside the great sacrifice of the altar, to be con- 
tinually offering sacrifice of praise and intercession. The 
Anglican Church explicitly orders this in her preface to the 
Common Prayer : "All priests and deacons are to say daily 
the Morning and Evening Prayer, either privately or openly, 
not being let by sickness or some other urgent cause." This 
is not the place to try to define what constitutes an " urgent 
cause," and in practice the determination must be left to 
the individual conscience ; but it is certainly to be observed 
that the obligation does not rest on duty to a parish, but is 
the personal obligation of the individual, because he has 
been ordained for this. If "he be at home and not other- 
wise reasonably hindered," he is to say his office in church 
in order that others may unite with him, if they will. 
But the obligation is more general, and personal in char- 
acter. 

The American Church retains the daily offices and omits 
the law. But the very lowest ground on which the consci- 
entious minister can take his stand surely is, that the public 
or private recitation of the daily offices, if not obligatory 
on the American priest and deacon, is at least for him a 
matter of grave counsel on the part of the Church. He is 
sworn to be " diligent in prayers, and in reading the Holy 



THE LAW. 619 

Scripture, " and the Church has given a daily order in which 
to fulfil his vow. It ought to be needless to add that this 
implies a devout attention, avoiding as far as possible even 
venial distractions. 

The priest further promises what the deacon does not — 
sc, to "lay aside the study of the world and the flesh," 
which must be understood to mean the renouncing all 
secular occupations so far as they may not prove to be of 
absolute necessity for the sustenance of life. 

Lawful amusements, also, may not be lawful for him, if 
they frequently give others occasion to sin, and in his case 
afford scandal to the weak. The practical application of 
this principle will vary too widely in different parts of the 
Church to render it possible to base precise laws upon it. 
What would give the most serious scandal in one section, 
and also permanently injure pastoral influence, will in 
another section be the very opposite of this, though equally 
lawful in both. Much might be said of the law of special 
holiness which binds the priests of a holy God. Israel's 
priests received it for us. " They shall be holy unto their 
God, and not profane the name of their God ; for the offer- 
ings of the Lord . . . the bread of their God, they do 
offer ; therefore they shall be holy " (Lev. xxi. 6). How 
much rather, then, those who consecrate and offer, not the 
shadow, but the very image and sacrament of the everlasting 
sacrifice in heavenly places ! 



CHAPTEE XL 

HOLY MATRIMONY. 

§ 1. The law of nature. 

Matrimony maybe defined as the permanent union of one 
man and one woman, legitimately made, for the generation 
and education of children, and for mutual service in the 
family life. Such a union is a law of nature ; not that 
there is any physical force bringing it about, but because 
man is naturally inclined to it, and, by his own free will, 
his uncorrupted nature will lead him to such a union. The 
family is prior in time to the state, and even more necessary 
for the continuance and well-being of society and the indi- 
vidual. If man is by nature a " social animal," still more 
is he by nature a member of a family (Nic. Eth. viii. 12). 
The family is essential to the well-being of man ; for, first, 
the man and the woman are mutually dependent upon one 
another for bodily and spiritual service, as well as for the 
exercise of natural affections ; and, next, children must not 
only be brought into existence for the continuance of the 
human race, but they must be supported, educated, and 
assisted in the early part of their life through many years ; 
they need to be counselled and guided even when they begin 
to be independent of their parents ; and all this requires a 
determined parentage, such as is wholly inconsistent with 
that promiscuous concubinage which characterizes many 
lower species of animals. 

Anthropologists may find perversions of this law of nature 
among some barbarous tribes ; but this fact constitutes no 
argument against the existence of the law, since science 
cannot well close its eyes to the actual corruption and deg- 



THE LAW OF NATURE. 621 

radation of no small portion of the human race. To assert 
that all which actually exists among men is natural, is a 
patent absurdity which needs no refutation by Moral The- 
ology. 

Because matrimony is a law of nature, it does not follow 
tbat all are required to marry when they reach suitable age. 
What is necessary for the perfection of the individual is 
binding on all. But that which is required by society in 
general is naturally distributed, one doing this, and another 
that. So it may be true, and it is true, that some may 
serve the community in other ways than by marrying, find- 
ing elsewhere the " vocation " to which God has called them. 

A life-long contract. Other contracts between man and 
man may be for a limited time, but the natural aims and 
results of this contract of matrimony distinguish it and 
make it life-long. 

Concubinage, or the union of man and woman outside of 
matrimony and for a limited time, is contrary to the law 
of nature, and is therefore per se one of those deadly sins 
which exclude from the kingdom of God. It voluntarily 
fails of those ends which the God of nature intends. Its 
aim may be merely sensuous gratification, or it may be 
evading the responsibilities which follow the production of 
children, whose welfare requires a life-long care. Either 
way, or in both ways, one of nature's primary laws is vio- 
lated. And this is per se mortal sin ; because the bonds of 
charity between man and man are broken, and equally so 
those between man and God, whose primary law is violated. 

A fortiori, promiscuous fornication is violation of nature's 
law, and mortal sin (1 Cor. vi. 9). 

The Catholic Church found the civilized world polluted 
far and wide by every conceivable violation of the law of 
nature ; but she renewed the law of nature as part of her 
discipline, and grace to obey it was given. 

But matrimony is not subject only to the law of nature. 



622 HOLT MATRIMONY. 

Since this permanent union of the man and woman must 
be voluntarily entered upon, it involves a contract of which 
society must take cognizance, and the family thus formed 
is one of the units which constitute the state, and becomes 
subject to its just laws, both in the creation of the con- 
tract and in the further ordering of the partnership. And, 
finally, marriage, as a sacrament of the Christian Church, 
becomes Holy Matrimony, and the definition given above 
needs to be completed thus : " Matrimony is a permanent 
union," etc., having power of conferring on the parties to 
it sanctifying grace for due fulfilment of its objects. 

Thus, Holy Matrimony is, at the same time, a contract of 
which civil law and morals take cognizance, and a sacra- 
ment out of which spring special obligations. 

As a contract, it is a free and voluntary agreement be- 
tween two parties entering into life-long partnership, giving 
one another nuptial rights, mutually promising to fulfil all 
those duties, and receiving all those rights, which are essen- 
tial to the existence of a family. See the betrothal in the 
marriage service. 

As a sacrament, if duly received, it confers grace for the 
sanctification of this union, for faithful execution of the 
promises made, and specially for its great object — the holy 
education of children as the children of Grod (Tert., ad 
Uxor. ii. 8 ; S. Ignat., ad Polyc. ii.). 

§ 2. The sacrament of Holy Matrimony. 

The word sacrament is, of course, now used in its wider 
sense of (1) "an outward and visible sign (2) of an inward 
and spiritual grace given unto us, ordained by Christ as (3) 
a means whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to as- 
sure us thereof." But if we attempt to follow the me- 
diaeval theologians in their scholastic distinction of matter 
and form, Ave may find them not at one among themselves, 
and involve ourselves in needless confusion. 

It is sufficient to observe that mutual consent, expressed 



THE SACRAMENT OF HOLY MATRIMONY. 623 

by words or other outward signs, is the efficient cause of 
the contract, and the outward part of the sacrament. Each 
of the two parties gives and receives rights in relation to 
the other (1 Cor. vii. 4). This is not a promise concerning 
the future; such a promise is an espousal or betrothal. 
The contract of marriage is de prcBsenti ; its words are : 
"I [now] take thee to my wedded wife." The spiritual 
grace sanctifies the contract, and gives the needful means 
that the persons concerned "may surely perform and keep 
the vow and covenant betwixt them made." 

This sacrament makes the marriage indissoluble except 
by death. "What God has joined man cannot put asunder. 
But as a contract, although it be for life, the state may 
have the same control over marriage as over other contracts. 

The subject of this sacrament is any baptized person hav- 
ing no impediment. Baptism is the door to the Christian 
life, and those who have not entered by that door, though 
capable of making the marriage contract with its accom- 
panying obligations, are not capable of making a Christian 
marriage. Denying this principle of Moral Theology is 
denying the existence of anything distinctive in Christian 
marriage. 

Hence, it follows that if the sacrament confer grace, or 
create any added obligations over and above those of the 
civil contract of marriage, that grace and those obligations 
are absent from the union of a Christian with an unbap- 
tized person, or of two unbaptized persons. Such a mar- 
riage, under the recmisite conditions, is altogether valid as 
a contract ; but it seems to be eminently improper for a 
priest to give the nuptial benediction which is intended for 
those who have united themselves in Holy Matrimony. 

The marriage of one of the faithful with one who belongs 
to some heretical sect, stands on a different footing. For, 
as such a person has been introduced into the Christian 
fold by Holy Baptism duly administered, the same person 



624 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

is capable of receiving a valid sacrament in Holy Matri- 
mony ; and we may trust that the inward grace is not ab- 
sent from one who devoutly asks for it. 

But the obligations of the Church to the offspring of 
such a marriage are part of her law received from God (1 
Cor. vii. 14). Hence, on account of the practical difficul- 
ties in the way of fulfilling those duties, the Church is 
bound to discourage such marriages between the faithful 
and those who are, outwardly at least, separated from the 
fold (2 Cor. vi. 14). 

Since Holy Matrimony is a "sacrament of the living/' 
one who receives the grace must have no unrepented sin 
burdening his conscience. 

Who is the minister of this sacrament? We can only re- 
ply, the parties to the contract themselves. For, as a con- 
tract, whether publicly or privately made, it is binding, and 
need not be repeated. Suppose, then, that one or both of 
the two parties, at the time of making the contract, were 
outside of Christ's Church : if converted, they will not be 
remarried ; their baptism gives them a claim to the nuptial 
benediction ; but their already valid contract now takes the 
character, obligations, and grace of such a marriage as 
they would have celebrated at first had they been wedded in 
God's Church.* 

Suppose, again, that in ignorance or heedlessness two 
baptized persons — e.g., a runaway couple — have gone to a 
justice of the peace for a civil cermony, or, in some State of 
the Union where such a form is valid, have taken one an- 
other for man and wife, in the presence of two or three 
witnesses. The contract will be valid, we suppose ; then 
the union is that of Holy Matrimony, and cannot be re- 
peated Avith the Church's service, for the parties are already 
married. 

* This view is controverted. But the question will not take a prac- 
tical shape when the law of the Church is obeyed. 



THE CONTRACT. 625 

The nature of the contract, and its social relations, re- 
quire that it be in the presence of witnesses. Marriage, 
accordingly, in the presence of a Protestant minister or of 
a justice of the peace is valid, confers the rights, creates the 
duties, and cannot be repeated. 

What the Church adds in her marriage service is the 
benediction of the priest (the parish priest of one or other 
of the two parties. No other without license can lawfully 
give it. Canons of American Church, title i., can. 12 ; 
Canons of 1603, No. 62). 

This benediction may follow, or it may precede, the civil 
recognition of the marriage contract. 

Note that a deacon has received no such power to bless 
in God's name. 

Conditions of honourable and holy Matrimony. There 
are three goods which distinguish Holy Matrimony, and 
separate it from fornication and concubinage : (1) The sac- 
rament which makes it honourable, holy, and indissoluble 
by any earthly power in state or church ; (2) fidelity to a 
promise made to " keep only unto " one so long as life lasts ; 
(3) children as the gift of Cod, to be nurtured for His ser- 
vice. These three, of which the first is chief, separate the 
spiritual union of Christians in Holy Matrimony from the 
fleshly union of beasts and fornicators. The law of con- 
jugal debt is laid down in Cod's word, 1 Cor. vii. 3-5. And 
note the sin of refusing obedience to it, in order to avoid 
the burden of offspring. 

§ 3. The contract. 

Betrothal is a true, deliberate, mutual promise, duly ex- 
pressed, that this contract will, within a reasonable period, 
be made. Such promise may be either public (of which the 
first part of the Anglican marriage service retains the form) 
or private ; but it is subject at the time only to the condi- 
tions requisite for lawful matrimony. Such espousals, com- 
40 



626 HOLT MATRIMONY. 

monly treated so lightly, are binding both in law and in 
morals. Law, therefore, not only punishes for pecuniary loss, 
but gives exemplary damages if such promise be violated. 

Careless promises, however, respecting the future may 
possibly be no true betrothal ; although civil law may dis- 
courage such by giving damages for "breach of promise.'" 

The contract must be fulfilled within reasonable time ; 
that is implied in the act of betrothal. 

Hoiv is such an "engagement" dissolved? (1) Long- 
continued absence of either one of the two parties certainly 
releases the other, if it be so desired, for the contract was 
not made subject to the serious injury of either of them. 
(2) Grave and permanent disease releases, for a serious 
change of circumstances may annul any contract defuturo, 
in foro conscientim. (3) Since the parties promise to give 
nuptial rights to one another, unchaste conduct in either 
will release the innocent from the promise made. (4) The 
contract de futuro may be dissolved by mutual consent — 
e.g., when the parties discover their "incompatibility." (5) 
Although the marriage of either to a third person is unlaw- 
ful, yet if done it annuls the betrothal previously made. 
(6) The extreme youth of the betrothed, or either of them, 
may render the promise void, because it required full use 
of judgment and will to bind one's self for life-long obli- 
gations. 

Even if the betrothal were confirmed by an oath, it would 
be dissolved under these conditions. 

But ordinary misfortunes are not a just plea for release 
from the promise formally made and accepted. Herein 
civil law seems to be essentially just. 

(Qu. 1. Suppose that one of the parties to the " engage- 
ment" find it impossible to take the marriage vow to " love," 
etc., is the other bound to release from the contract, while 
securing damages for breach of promise ? (See Irving's 
case, found in Froude's Life of Carlyle.) 



THE CONTEACT. 627 

Qu. 2. Can a priest lawfully bless a marriage with a third 
party when the previous contract has not been released ? 

Qu. 3. Suppose that seduction has followed promise of 
marriage, is it a ^constructive" marriage ? It may be so 
construed in an exterior tribunal, nothing appearing to the 
contrary, because the consummation of marriage may be 
supposed to have followed mutual consent to the bond. 
But inforo conscienticc a promise concerning the future is 
not a valid marriage bond, and the act charged is simply 
the deadly sin of fornication. But usually the only repara- 
tion possible is, of course, the solemnization of marriage 
between the guilty persons. 

Qu. 4. Suppose that parents refuse their assent after the 
betrothal ? Minors certainly sin gravely if they engage 
themselves without parents' consent, and the contract is 
void. But if the parties be of full age, judgment must 
be made between the reverence due to parents' counsel and 
the rights of children to order their own life.) 

How is the contract of marriage made? (1) Consent 
must be mutual and de prcesenti ; (2) it must be voluntary 
and deliberate consent ; (3) it must be manifested by out- 
ward signs. If these three be all the requisite conditions 
of valid matrimony, it follows that a contract of this kind 
secretly made, though it is grave violation of the laws of 
God and man, and in the case of Christians forfeits all 
claim to the blessing of the sacrament, yet is a valid mar- 
riage, gives the rights and creates the obligations of matri- 
mony, and must not be repeated. Although there is con- 
tempt of God, yet the two parties have the disposal of their 
own persons, and of all that marriage requires. The evil 
results following from such marriage without witnesses are 
too apparent to call for any justification of the laws of 
Church and State in this matter. 

A conditional consent to the contract, though highly im- 
proper, would not invalidate the contract or the sacrament 



628 HOLT MATRIMONY. 

(1) if the condition be verified, and (2) be not inconsistent 
with the ends of matrimony. Thus, if the condition were 
that the nuptial debt shall not be paid, there would be no 
marriage. Again, if the condition affect simply the past or 
present, the marriage stands if the condition prove true. 
If the condition be de futuro — e.g., "1 now marry you if 
you make your will in my favor within six months," or " if 
you join the Church/' the marriage is not perfected until 
the conditions of it are fulfilled. Needless to say that no 
priest of the Church can lawfully have any share in such a 
conditional contract. 



A more difficult question is that of fictitious 
If both parties have " married in joke," conscience can find 
in the fictitious contract no obligation ; although external 
tribunals, considering how easily this pretext for dissolving 
marriage may be fraudulently employed, may be slow in 
accepting it. If the parties have treated one another as 
man and wife, this must be held to be true inward consent 
to the outward contract. 

A more difficult case is where there has been sincere con- 
sent on one side and fictitious consent is asserted on the 
other. Certainly the parties are bound to separate until 
the error is rectified. If the reputed marriage have been 
consummated there is the obligation of giving a true con- 
sent to the contract. 

(Qu. : If the marriage be not consummated, can the par- 
ties in such a case have the contract annulled by mutual 
consent ?) 

The consent may be given for some base end, as when 
one marries in order to get a fortune ; but this does not 
affect the outward contract or the sacrament. There is 
valid matrimony without the grace which God gives to a 
devout seeker for it. So far the case is parallel to that of 
one who baptizes for pay, or who simoniacally buys the 



IMPEDIMENTS. 629 

sacraments. The evil end is accidental to the sacrament ; 
it belongs to the contracting party, not to God's institu- 
tion. 

Marriage of minors. Consent of parents is not necessary 
for a valid contract, since by the law of nature parents have 
not power over their children's souls and bodies in such a 
life-long relation as matrimony involves. If they had, they 
could also make void a marriage vow, which is absurd to 
maintain. But reverence and obedience may make such a 
marriage unlawful before God, as before the state. And 
the priest gravely sins against God and against society who 
marries a minor without the parents' consent, except under 
pressure of the gravest moral necessity — e.g., gravida pu- 
ella. 

It will be remembered that contracts in general made by 
minors are not bound on them by law, though the other 
party, if adult, is so bound ; and the former, not the latter, 
can sue for breach of promise (Blackst. i. 436). 

Yet, in conscience, if the minor have full possession of 
his powers of judgment, and the contract be not an injuri- 
ous one, he is morally bonnd to fulfil it when he reaches 
age of independence. And this principle includes the con- 
tract of marriage. 

§ 4. Impediments. 

Impediments to valid marriage may arise from the law of 
nature, and no human power can alter it or remove them. 
Impediments to marriage, as a sacrament of the Church, 
may arise from God's revealed law binding on His Church. 
And, finally, as a social state, marriage may be prohibited 
by civil laws, which vary in different places and ages of the 
world. This distinction among impediments is important 
to observe in considering them. 

It will be understood that these impediments must exist 
as such at the time of celebrating the nuptial rite. If any 



630 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

of them should afterwards occur, it would not annul a valid 
marriage. 

Impediments to matrimony may be (1) only prohibitory , 
11 impedientia ;" i.e., the marriage is unlawful, but it is 
valid when made. 

(1) Prohibitory impediments are: (a) lack of consent 
from parents in the case of minors, which has already been 
noticed ; (b) previous espousals, when the party to them 
has not been released from the contract, also noticed above ; 
(c) clandestine marriage. Since marriage involves social 
relations, the state may require security for a public con- 
tract, and violation of such laws will constitute an unlaw- 
ful clandestine marriage. And it is certainly an obligation 
of the priest to conform to civil law in this matter, and in 
all others where the law of the state does not contravene 
the law of the Church, which is supreme in matters of 
religion, and Christian matrimony is certainly a matter of 
religion. If the two authorities oppose one another, the 
conscientious priest can only say, "We must obey God 
rather than man/' 

But the Church herself, also, has always strictly regu- 
lated this matter of the publicity of Holy Matrimony. The 
English canon, requiring three publications of the banns, 
fixing the hour between eight and twelve in the forenoon, 
the place as the parish church of one of the parties, suffi- 
ciently shows that the English Church forbids clandestine 
marriage. The American Church, tolerating the absence 
of most of these precautions, has certainly not abolished 
them all. For the parish priest, according to her canon, is 
still the only lawful minister, in this as in any other relig- 
ious rite ; although license may be said to be tacitly given 
when he knows of the interference of another and does not 
protest against it. Clandestine marriage, then, must be 
defined as marriage celebrated without due cognizance of 
(1) the Church, (2) the State, and (3) — in the case of mi- 
nors — the parents. 



IMPEDIMENTS. 631 

Clandestine marriage is grave sin in the parties and in a 
priest who sanctions it, except under the gravest necessity. 

(Qu. : Is it not an unlawful clandestine marriage when 
the parties leave the State or the parish in order to evade 
the civil or the ecclesiastical law ?) 

(d) There are certain seasons of the Christian year when 
the marriage of Christians, with its accompanying festiv- 
ities, is unbecoming. Such seasons as Lent and Advent, 
therefore, are by the ancient ecclesiastical law of the An- 
glican Church prohibited seasons ; and although toleration 
of contrary custom may be held to be virtual abrogation of 
a purely positive law, yet, the reason for it still remaining, 
it must be held to be at least decent that the marriage at 
such seasons shall, if celebrated at all, be as quiet and pri- 
vate as the nature of the service admits, (e) A vow of celi- 
bacy, not duly released, is a prohibitory impediment. (Qu. : 
(/) If civil law bind the priest, when it is not in conflict 
with higher law, may not prohibitory impediments arise 
from this source ?) 

(2) Impedimenta dirimentia. These make a marriage, 
in the view of the Church, void ab initio, although some of 
them may render it simply voidable in common law ; i.e., 
the rights of marriage last until the sentence of the court 
annulling the marriage. Thus the children, if any, will be 
legitimate, etc. 

These impediments, so far as Christian marriage is con- 
cerned, rest upon the law of the Church, for she has au- 
thority from Christ in this matter, since such authority is 
necessary for the government of the Christian society. The 
law of the state she cannot recognize, if any such law should 
interfere with her duty to the souls which are under her 
authority. For the Church alone has power in matters of 
religion, power to bind and to loose (S. Matt, xviii. 18). 

The state, on the other hand, regulates only the outward 
civil contract, with its results. The education of children, 



C39 HOLY M LTKIMON V. 

therefore, involves the same principles; they are destined 

tn become citizcus of the state, but they are already, by 
baptism, members of the household of God. The state has 
the right to demand that they be duly prepared for future 
citizenship, but the Church has the obligation and power 
to train them as members of the society to which they be- 
long. If the Church does her duty to her children, what 
the state requires will he duly provided for, and the state 
will have no further claim in the matter. 

Invincible ignorance of an existing impediment does not 
render the marriage valid, for there "was not in the begin- 
ning any true contract of marriage, and the law is not con- 
ditioned by the knowledge or the ignorance of those who 
are subject to it, 

And, furthermore, although prescription may establish 
various civil claims — e.g., in this case those of children — no 
lapse of time can make wrong to become right, or render 
valid a union which was never Christian marriage at all. 
Separation a thoro appears to be the only alternative in 
such a case. The hardship of it is parallel with that of 
physical or mental disease. 

These impediments, it will be observed, directly and pri- 
marily affect the nuptial contract ; indirectly, and second- 
arily, the marriage sacrament. They are : 

(a) Error. This is either substantial or "accidental" — 
that is, it either concerns the person, or the qualities of the 
person. If the error were of the former kind, there was 
never any true contract, and the marriage was voidr/J initio. 
For consent is the cause of matrimony, as we have seen : 
and what avoids consent, avoids matrimony. But consent, 
the act of the will, presupposes an understanding of what 
is consented to. This being absent, there is no true con- 
sent. This is the law of nature respecting contracts in 
general. 

But there maybe error, even with accompanying fraud, 
respecting the qualities of the person married. The person 



(3) ^ 


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Y (3) 


GRAND || 


(j GRAND \\ 


// GRAND 


UNCLE 1 


U PARENTS J J 


\\ UNCLE 



7 (2) « 


if U) \\ 


Y ( 2 ' N> 


PATERNAL || 


/(FATHER & U 


//maternal 


UNCLE J] 


\\ MOTHER J 


\\ UNCLE i 




TABLE OF 
CANONICAL DEGREES. 



IMPEDIMENTS. 633 

is poor, sickly, quarrelsome, of intemperate habits, a widow, 
a false nobleman, etc. A T one of these things affect the 
essence of the contract, and it must stand, even if it would 
not have been made in case the circumstances were known. 
This is the law of both Church and state. 

(b) Consanguinity is the natural relationship of those 
descended from the same father or mother, or both. As an 
impediment to marriage, it depends partly upon the law of 
nature, partly on Divinely revealed law, and partly upon 
human positive law. And these may establish different de- 
grees of prohibitory consanguinity. 

Observe that the question of legitimate descent does not 
enter into consideration. 

The line of cognation is either direct or collateral ; direct, 
as between parent and child ; collateral, as between brother 
and sister. The student of the subject is liable to be con- 
fused at first in the numbering of degrees, since the civil law 
numbers in different mode from the canon law. It will be 
convenient for our purpose to adopt the degrees of the civil 
code, which reckons the number of persons concerned. Thus, 
either grandchild or sister stands in the second degree ; 
first cousins, in the third degree, etc. 

According to the canon law, as will be seen in the ac- 
companying table, brothers and sisters are related in the 
first degree, first cousins in the second degree ; the reckon- 
ing being made from the middle line. It will appear from 
the table that by ascending one more degree, and then de- 
scending to right and left, we should have cognates in the 
fourth degree, and so on. (See table of degrees.) 

In the direct line, ascending and descending, consanguin- 
ity avoids marriage indefinitely. This is ruled by the law 
of nature. For the relation of husband and wife is inconsis- 
tent with that of parent and child. But the Divine revealed 
law goes further, and protects the family relation by pro- 
hibiting marriage to those who are ordinarily associated 



634 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

already by the intimate ties of the family. In other words, 
marriage is prohibited within the third degree, inclusive 
(degrees of civil law). This is the Levitical code, and the 
law of the Anglican Church, and courts of common law will 
treat such marriages as voidable (Blackst. i. 434). 

It will be observed that half-brothers and sisters count as 
those related through the same father and mother. 

Positive canon law has varied in extending still further 
prohibited degrees. The modern Roman Church prohibits 
marriage within the fourth degree, inclusive (canonical de- 
grees) ; but the law being merely a positive ecclesiastical 
regulation grounded on the already existing intimacy of the 
relatives, dispensation from it may be obtained when good 
reasons are presented. 

The Church cannot claim the power of dispensing from 
Divine law ; and the question must therefore present itself 
how far this law extends. Beyond brothers and sisters (i.e., 
second degree), the question may possibly belong to positive 
ecclesiastical law. 

(c) Affinity. This is created by conjugal union, whether 
licit or illicit. The Divine law says, "They are no more 
twain, but one flesh " (S. Matt. xix. 6). The husband be- 
comes related to his wife's family as he is connected by 
blood with his own. And the wife takes the same position 
with respect to her husband's relatives. Affinity, therefore, 
according to the law of the Anglican Church and the common 
law, follows the same rules with consanguinity. The death 
of husband or wife leaves affinity unchanged, because, like 
consanguinity, it depends upon a past act which is unalter- 
able ; sc, that man and wife have been conjoined and be- 
come one flesh ; not that they are so conjoined. 

S. Paul explicitly extends the principle here involved to 
unlawful concubinage (1 Cor. vi. 1G). 

This seems to rest upon a law of nature. For if affinity 
create no such cognation, a man might marry his step- 



IMPEDIMENTS. 635 

mother, which Revelation declares to be an abomination 
(Lev. xviii. 8). At the same time it is to be noticed that 
the limit of prohibitory degrees of affinity seems to be a 
question of positive Church law. And as the bond is not 
so close as that of consanguinity, marriages may be allowed 
in the one which would be prohibited in the other. So the 
Roman canons, extending prohibited affinity to the fourth 
degree (canonical degrees) in case of lawful union, set the 
limit at the second degree in case of unlawful union. 

No affinity is created between the blood relations of hus- 
band and wife. Two brothers may marry two sisters, or 
father and son may marry mother and daughter ; or the 
father may marry the daughter and his son may marry the 
mother, etc. "Affinitas non parit affinitatem." 

(d) Fear or force. For our purpose these are the same, 
since we mean by either of them an excessive disturbance of 
mind through fear of present or future clanger of life or per- 
son. Such an excessive fear avoids marriage when the cause 
is external, the force unjust, and impelling to the contract. 
If these conditions be absent, fear does not annul the contract. 

Parents may urge an unwelcome marriage upon a child. 
If a daughter were overwhelmed with fear of her parents' 
displeasure, it might be maintained that there was no free 
consent. But, on the other hand, the pressure exerted may 
be that of arguments and persuasions, and then the compul- 
sion will be a moral force, not that which constitutes a true 
impediment to valid marriage. 

The violence which avoids marriage is the carrying off of 
a woman under protest for the purpose of marriage. 

If threats be used against a seducer to compel his prom- 
ised marriage with his victim, the force is not unjust and 
the contract is valid. 

(e) Impotence. Physical impotence or mental malady 
will annul the contract of matrimony ; in the former case, 



636 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

because of impossibility of fulfilling all of its obligations; 
in the latter case, because no contract is made, since that 
implies a deliberate and intelligent consent. Physical 
impotence, however, will not be a bar to a valid sacra- 
ment, if it be known to the parties married. 

Since the contract is for life, neither of these, if it follow 
after marriage, can annul what has once been validly done. 

(/) Age. Under seven years of age, a pretended marriage 
is absolutely void ab initio. Over that age it is voidable ; 
i.e., the party concerned, on reaching the age of legal con- 
sent or marriageable age, may annul the contract. The age 
at which marriage becomes valid, though unlawful — i.e., 
the age of "legal consent" — is fixed by Church law and the 
common law at fourteen for males, and twelve for females. 
But note the changes made by laws in some of the United 
States. (See Blackst. i. 436.) 

(g) Crime. Formal adultery — i.e., the crime committed 
with knowledge of an existing marriage relation — is a bar to 
matrimony between the guilty parties. Two adulterers may 
not marry at the death of husband or wife. 

Or if the lawful partner be murdered in order to marry 
another ; if there were mutual conspiracy, it would be pro- 
faning holy things to give the Church's benediction on such 
a contract. 

(Qu. : Suppose, in either of these cases, repentance, con- 
fession, absolution ?) 

(h) Disparity of religion. This can be no impediment 
to a valid civil contract sanctioned by the laws of the state 
to which the parties belong. But the case is altered if we 
have before us the Christian union which the Church con- 
templates. An unbaptized person is incapable of entering 
into it. Matrimony with such a person is not the sacra- 
ment of Holy Matrimony. The Church cannot give her 



IMPEDIMENTS. 637 

benediction upon the union, and the priest who should con- 
sciously repeat the words in such a case would be guilty of 
a profane fiction (2 Cor. vi. 14). For Christian marriage 
has for one of its chief goods the training of children as the 
children of God ; which, in the case supposed, is excluded 
by the wilful rejection of the baptismal covenant. 

But since the contract lawfully made is valid matrimony 
so far as it goes, though it be imperfect matrimony from 
the Christian point of view, two wedded unbelievers re- 
ceived into Christ's fold will not be remarried, but may 
receive the nuptial benediction. 

(Qu. : On the other hand, if the state annul their contract, 
will the Church regard it as binding on their conscience if 
they be converted to the Christian faith ?) 

Special difficulties of" conscience occur where one partner 
in the marriage tie is converted to the Christian faith and is 
baptized, while the other is not. Frequent as such cases 
are, the moral conditions vary extremely, and this brief man- 
ual is not the place for their discussion. Only it must be 
insisted on that laws of nature and the moral law of God are 
irreversible by any human power. And they are binding 
even on those who are ignorant of them, for they could know 
them if they would. On the other hand, ecclesiastical posi- 
tive law can be suspended, the power of dispensation being in 
the Church which makes the law, and the exercise of that 
power in general being in the ordinary of the diocese where the 
case occurs. Such cases being frequent in the early Church, 
are partly ruled by S. Paul (1 Cor. vii.). The convert may 
not separate from the unbeliever, if no serious hindrance to 
the Christian life arise from the union ; children in such a 
family have claims which the Church must recognize, etc. 

(Qu. 1. Suppose that the marriage has been one within 
the prohibited degrees. If it be prohibited by the Divine 
law, it remains unlawful. If prohibited only by the posi- 
tive law of the Church, it may be sanctioned by the power 
of dispensation. 



638 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

Qn. 2. Suppose, again, the frequent ease of a convert 
where a second civil marriage has been consummated while 
there is still living a previously married husband or wife, the 
state having annulled the first contract. There has been 
no sacrament of Holy Matrimony in either marriage. What 
does the law of nature require concerning the permanence 
of the marriage tie, and can the state dispense from the law 
of nature ? 

Qu. 3. Suppose that one of two so divorced parties be- 
comes a convert to the Christian faith, is that person free 
to marry in the Lord if the unbeliever have fundamentally 
broken the marriage vow ?) 

Denunciation of impediments. This is an obligation on 
every one who has reasonable ground of suspicion of their 
existence, whether those impediments are " impedientia " 
or " dirimentia." (See the preface to the Anglican mar- 
riage service.) Not even an oath to keep the objection 
secret will be binding against grave injury done to the com- 
munity or to a third person. 

(Qu. 1. Suppose a confidential communication officially 
made to the physician, the lawyer, the priest, not in con- 
fession, is not this a possible exception ? 

Qu. 2. Suppose that grave injury will be done to the re- 
vealer of the impediment ?) 

One credible witness presenting an impediment, even 
impediens, must stop the ceremony until the case can be 
investigated, due security for indemnification being pro- 
vided. (See the rubric in the marriage service.) 

Doubtful cases. Suppose that the parties to the proposed 
union are in doubt respecting the existence of an impedi- 
ment to their union. The doubt may concern an impedi- 
ment arising (1) from Divine law or the law of nature ; or, 
(2) from positive ecclesiastical law. The first will require 
moral certainty for a favourable decision, for the Church 



IMPEDIMENTS. 639 

cannot supply the defect by her power of dispensation ; e.g., 
one supposes that his partner is dead (Enoch Arden). If 
the fact be not so, however strong has been the probability 
of it, and whatever civil authority may have decided, the 
second union will be no Christian marriage. 

But, in the second case, if doubt remain after careful 
inquiry, and the doubt concern the fact, not the law, the 
marriage cannot be celebrated. But if the same doubt 
arise after marriage, under the same conditions the mar- 
riage must be regarded as valid. 

(Qu. : A case of special difficulty is where a marriage, 
invalid according to Divinely revealed law, has been already 
contracted in good faith — say, before the conversion of the 
party to it — and children's claims, etc., have arisen from it, 
and there is probability of infamy, scandal, etc., if its nul- 
lity be publicly exposed. Shall the material sin be left ? Is 
the case like that of restitution due, when the debtor is in 
good faith ? In such a case may restitution be left unre- 
quired, if it be foreseen that admonition will work grave 
injury, and effect no countervailing good ? 

A plain exception to the laxer course, if it be admitted 
at all, is (1) when the public good overrules the advantage 
of an individual ; (2) when the penitent's conscience is 
alarmed and asks the question of moral obligation and 
validity of marriage. Then, if the marriage were by Divine 
law void db initio, let the penitent live as if unmarried.) 

Rehabilitation. This is the perfecting of Christian mar- 
riage between parties who have lived together as man and 
wife. Its principles are implied in what has been already 
written, but they may be summed up in this place as fol- 
lows : 

(1) If there have been no true consent to matrimony, on 
one side or on both, such consent may be given privately, 
or before confidential witnesses, and the nuptial benediction 
received. 



G40 HOLY MATIilMONY. 

(2) If clandestine marriage have been duly blessed by a 
priest, the form is empty of blessing, but repentance may 
restore it. Or, if there have been a ceremony, binding, in- 
deed, on conscience, but celebrated by some justice of the 
peace, some Protestant minister, or other person who can- 
not give the nuptial benediction, there may be a private 
perfecting of the marriage in the presence of confidential 
witnesses, without scandal or loss of good name. (Say, the 
latter part of the marriage service, "I pronounce, etc.," 
together with the blessing.) 

(3) Suppose that public scandal has already been given by 
the conduct of the parties ; their duty requires them to 
make public reparation by a public ceremony. 

(Qu. : Suppose that only one of the two consents to this 
reparation; may not the bishop give dispensation, and a 
private ceremony be celebrated ?) 

(4) Again, there may have been an impediment known to 
exist at the time of marriage, so that the ceremony was 
null ab initio, and this impediment may have been after- 
wards removed. In such a case, the consent of the parties 
can be privately renewed ; or, if the impediment be publicly 
known, the consent can be renewed before witnesses ; that 
is, the marriage service which was null before will be duly 
celebrated. 

§ 5. Divorce. 

The inseparability of man and wife is part of the law of 
nature (S. Matt. xix. 4-6). God has joined them so that 
"they are no more twain, but one flesh ; " and " what God 
hath [so] joined, let not man put asunder." Children are 
the common good of man and wife ; the family relation is 
in its very nature a permanent one ; and as this requires the 
indissoluble union of man and wife, such a union is part of 
nature's law. 

But only the law of Christ has restored that perfect law 
of nature to its due perfection. 



DIVORCE. 041 

But if this be true of the marriage contract, much rather 
is it true of the sacrament of Holy Matrimony in the Church, 
a mystical representation of the inseparable union of Christ 
and the Church. In the life-time of husband or wife it is 
impossible for the other to be married again. The cere- 
mony is a nullity (1 Cor. vii. 10, 39). Many of the United 
States confound divorce a vinculo with divorce a mensa et 
thoro. But the distinction is fundamental in Moral The- 
ology, and well guarded in common law also. 

Divorce a vinculo is based on impedimenta dirimentia, 
which must have existed at the time of the pretended nup- 
tial contract. The Western Church, at least, including the 
Anglican canon law, allows no such divorce for crime occur- 
ring after marriage (Blackst. i. 441). 

But compare the canon of the American Church, title ii. 
13: "No minister of this Church shall solemnize matri- 
mony in any case where there is a divorced wife or husband 
of either party still living; but this canon shall not be held 
to apply to the innocent party in a divorce for the cause of 
adultery/' etc. This may seem to be sanctioning such a 
marriage "by indirection." 

Per contra, in this difficult question note the arguments 
of S. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. (comparing with his 
Retract.) i. 6, 7, ad. fin., 22 ad fin.; ii. 1, etc. He seems to 
know no Church disci pline in the matter ; and naturally so, 
for marriages with unbelievers (as standing on a different 
basis), common as they were, would tend to confuse legisla- 
tion. But he thinks that S. Matthew gives no warrant 
for remarriage.* 

Does the innocent party cease to be spouse because of the 
other's guilt ? Can an evil-doer thus annul a bilateral con- 

* In S. Matt. xix. 9, the adultery of the wife is understood to be the 
ground of the putting her away, not the justification of a second 
marriage. 

41 



642 HOLY MATRIMONY. 

tract ? If so, the guilty also is free to marry (the ordinary 
course in the United States). Divorce a thoro is not divorce 
a vinculo (a distinction easy to be overlooked in the ordinary 
quotations from primitive sources). Objection may be 
made (ii. 10) that this law of indissolubility is a severe one 
for the innocent. But incurable disease or any separation 
a mensa et thoro is equally so. A contentious, offensive, 
imperious wife is sent away ; a good wife is abandoned by a 
drunken sot ; is there freedom on both sides in such a case 
because of the manifest hardship? (Cp. Canon of 1603, 
No. 107.) 

To the same effect S. Augustine argues in De Bono 
Conjug., c. 7. The law of God is not subject to the varying 
and imperfect human law. 

Divorce a thoro, whether sanctioned by the state or 
privately made, is certainly lawful for grave causes, for a 
serious breach of contract by one of the two parties may 
release the other from its obligations. The state does not 
make the divorce, but sanctions it with reference to the 
civil rights involved. This separation is permitted, not 
commanded (S. Matt. v. 32). The innocent may pardon 
the offence, even in case of adultery, not as condoning sin, 
but as forgiving the penitent ; for divorce is not a penalty 
for the innocent (Duct. Dubitant. I. iv. 8). 

There are cases, however, when sound morals will for- 
bid a separation, even in case of adultery ; e.g., both parties 
may be equally guilty in this respect ; or the innocent may 
have condoned the offence by subsequent cohabitation ; or, 
after long absence, it may have been supposed that the ab- 
sent partner is dead, etc. 

This separation for good and sufficient reasons may be 
made by mutual consent, provided there be no danger of 
incontinence, or other grave injury. 

Grave danger to body or soul — e.g., danger of perversion or 
apostasy — may even make separation become a positive duty. 



DIVORCE. 043 

At the same time, it may be well to caution the inex- 
perienced priest not to lend a ready ear to all complaints, 
especially of wives, but to remember that his office is that of 
peace-maker, not of encouraging separation and neglect of 
vows, where the other course is possible. 

It Avill not be overlooked that man and woman in making 
the marriage contract are on a footing of absolute equality, 
and any breach of that contract is in itself of the same 
criminality, whether husband or wife be the guilty party, 
although the wife's sin may involve more injurious conse- 
quences, and so become a graver offence. 



CHAPTER XII. 

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE AND OF THE 
CITIZEN. 

The state is a community of men living together for 
earthly ends, under one law and one government, whose 
function is to execute the law and defend the society 
against assaults from within, sedition, privy conspiracy and 
rebellion ; treason and war from without. 

The Divine law respecting the state is given, Rom. xiii. 
1-7 ; Matt. xxii. 21. 

(I.) Its rights are: (1) In the person of its duly con- 
stituted representatives, to be obeyed within its due limits. 
Herein its sanction is Divine, and obedience is part of the 
Gospel law. 

But difficulty at once arises in determining those limits ; 
the higher the functions of the state are placed the greater 
the difficulty. (See Dan. ii. 44.) In general, however, these 
limits are : (a) The moral law, the law of Christ, which is 
superior ; and (b) the Catholic Church, as guardian of relig- 
ion and morals, which, in her sphere, has a superior law. 
If any part of that church intrude on the secular sphere, 
per contra, the state is supreme. 

(Cases : The Roman Catholic communion ; the Mormons.) 

(c) Personal rights or family rights, of both which the 
state is the appointed guardian. If the state touch these, 
its ordinance is null. 

(2) The state has eminent domain over the lives and 
property of its citizens. For personal rights would be in- 
operative without the protection and order of civil society. 



DUTIES OF THE STATE. 645 

Both life and property, accordingly, are demanded in case of 
extreme need. Its law commonly accepts a man's last will 
and testament, but may annul them. 

(3) The state has the right to make war in national de- 
fence, and to put down sedition by force. Therefore it has 
the right to use the lives and property of its citizens for this 
purpose. 

Herein is clear proof that the state is an entity, and not a 
mere aggregate of individuals. For acts are done by men 
which, if privately done, would be robbery and murder 
(Whewell, v. § 837). 

(4) The state has the right to punish, even with loss of 
life, for public and private wrongs (Rom. xiii. 4). For 
it has the right to do what is necessary for its existence 
(Qu. : The right to punish injury done to one's self, as a 
member of the state ?), and is bound to protect its citizens. 

(5) It has the right of contract under the laws of commu- 
tative justice ; and 

(6) In general, of all acts necessary to its preservation or 
its well-being. Such are to impose taxes (Eom. xiii. 6, 7), 
including tariffs ; to require the education of its children 
(Qu. : To try to educate them itself ?) ; to regulate or re- 
press, by fine or other punishment, public vices which injure 
its social life (lotteries, gambling, drinking-saloons), even 
when these are not direct violations of the moral law. 

(II.) The obligations and duties of the state correspond to 
its rights. 

Through the ministry of those who are voters, and 
their representatives in executive, legislative, and judicial 
power, it is bound (a) to preserve itself in well-being, 
through national defence against enemies without and 
within, and for this end to provide and sustain an effi- 
cient _army and police ; (b) to uphold and enforce the 
laws impartially with respect to all, high and low ; (c) to 
make just laws for the purposes of its own existence. Hence 



64G DUTIES OF THE STATE AND OF THE CITIZEN". 

arise the duties of civil station, in governors, legislators, 
judges, officers of the army, etc. 

The special virtue of the state, therefore, and of those who 
represent it, is justice, both distributive, commutative, and 
retributive. 

Further than this, the question has difficulty, because 
first must be decided what is the function of the state. Is it 
more than to protect the lives, liberty, property of its citizens, 
as a social police, leaving all other moral, intellectual, relig- 
ious, and charitable functions to the voluntary association 
of its people ? If so, we escape, to a large degree, the clash- 
ing of different means for similar ends. Is that government 
the best which governs least ? The tendency just now is 
altogether in the opposite direction. (Bennett law in Wis- 
consin.) 

Or has the state moral duties ; e.g., to promote purity 
and good living by repressing obscene publications, lotteries, 
etc. ; to promote science by observatories, etc. ; intelli- 
gence by universities, etc. ; humanity by putting down the 
slave-trade, cruelty to animals, towards Indians ; hospitals, 
asylums, poor-houses, etc. ; education, however imperfect, 
by public schools ? Or are all these the province of volun- 
tary associations on the part of those only who approve, and 
agree in the means for promoting these objects ? 

If the former, we are logically led into the religious 
sphere, and a conflict of church and state ensues. Besides, 
that cannot be. duty which cannot be well done. 

Or, thirdly, while providing primarily for its own preser- 
vation and the social well-being of its members, may the 
state — i.e., governors, judges, legislators — be indirectly influ- 
enced by moral considerations, without making them the 
primary object of action ; e.g., not enforcing immoral con- 
tracts, bets, etc. ; choosing for necessary taxation what in- 
jures the moral standing of the people ; providing schools 
for those not otherwise taught ; aiding parochial schools, 
etc. ? 



DUTIES OF THE CTTIZEJST. 647 

Notice, also, that many laws— e.g., marriage laws, punish- 
ments of crime, etc. — are indirectly auxiliaries to the moral 
education of the people, stamping with the reprobation of 
society what are also sins. Emanating from the conscience 
of a people who are generally Christian in their training, if 
not in their lives, they stamp with public reprobation vices 
which civilization, as such, cannot check. It did not in 
Greece or Eome ; on the contrary, they grew with that civili- 
zation as they did in the renaissance of it. 

Duties to the state correspond to the duties of the state, 
and need not be further developed. Eespect, obedience, 
support, defence are implied, and these as Christian obliga- 
tion. The state has divine right. What rights, is a debat- 
able question (Whewell, § 881). 

Sins against the state are, (1) sedition ; if secret, privy 
conspiracy ; if open force, rebellion ; like schism, setting up 
a rival power against that which has Divine right. (2) 
Fraud, in depriving it of its just dues. (3) Treason (Whew- 
ell, § 883), in this nation, " giving aid and comfort" to its 
enemies. What has been said in Part III. of obligations to 
authorities can here, mutatis mutandis, be applied once 
more. But our space forbids more than this brief allusion 
to topics which, like so many previously introduced, can 
only receive a cursory glance in these first Elements of 
Moral Theology. 

Miserere, IESU. 



INDEX. 



Abortion, artificial, 515. 
Absolution, 601 ; conditional, 602 ; 

denial of, 603 ; deferral of, 

603. 
Abstinence, 435. 
Accession, 528. 
Accessory, the, 292, 538. 
Accidental homicide, 302. 
Acedia, 241. 
Acts, good and evil in, 26, 37 ; 

voluntary, 27 ; indifferent, 28 ; 

circumstances of, 29 ; conse- 
• quences of, 39. 
Actors of plays, 492. 
Adjunction, 528. 
Adoration, 338. 
Adulation, 389. 
Adultery, 459. 
Advocate in court, 310. 
Affability, 388. 
Affinity, impediment of, 634. 
Age, impediment of, 636. 
Alms-giving, 220. 
Ambition, 412. 
Amusements, 490, 619. 
Anger, 55, 470 ; absence of, 474. 
Anxiety, 270. 
Apostasy, 172. 
Appetites, the, 16, 19. 
Arrest of criminals, 533. 
Asceticism, 428. 
Assent, 160. 

Attention in prayer, 335. 
Audacia, 409. 



Authority, limitations of, 371 ; 

secular, 371. 
Avarice, 392. 

Backbiters, 314. 

Bailment, 551. 

Baptism, Holy, 567 ; immersion 
in, 568 ; trine, 569 ; minister of, 
570 ; by laymen, 571 ; private, 
573 ; recipient of, 573 ; requi- 
sites for, 574 ; of infants, 575 ; 
of idiots and the insane, 576. . 

Beatitude, 4 ; conditions of, 5. 

Belief, 162. 

Beneficence, 217. 

Benevolence, 211. 

Betrothal, 625. 

Bishop, the, 616. 

Blame, 40. 

Blasphemy, 172. 

Blindness, spiritual, 173. 

Boasting, 387. 

Capital punishment, 298. 

Captiousness, 390. 

Cardinal virtues, 68. 

Cause, final, 1. 

Character imparted in Sacraments, 

566. 
Charity, 73, 144, 184, 190 ; not an 

emotion, 190 ; loss of, 194 ; 

order of, 202 ; charitas vim, 

191 ; charitas patrim, 191, 194 ; 

precepts of, 233. 



650 



INDEX. 



Chastity, 449 ; virginal, 450. 

Children's duty to parents, 363, 
512 ; instruction of, 579. 

Choice, 21. 

Circumstances of acts, 14, 26, 29. 

Clandestine marriages, 630. 

Clemency, 467. 

Commandments, the Ten, 141, 398, 
495, 510. 

Commodatum, 551. 

Communion, Holy, 582 ; fasting, 
588 ; as viaticum, 589 ; fre- 
quent, 590. (See Holy Eu- 
charist.) 

Communism, 303. 

Compassion, 215. 

Compliments, 382. 

Concubinage, 621. 

Concupiscence, 11. 49. 

Confession, 309 ; private, .597 ; 
seal of, 600 ; in court of law ; 
308 ; duty of the confessor, 549. 

Confidential knowledge, 309. 

Confirmation, 576 ; visible sign in, 
577 ; form of, 578 ; requisite 
age for, 578. 

Consanguinity, impediment of, 633. 

Conscience, 499 ; perplexed, 502 ; 
erroneous, 30, 500. 

Consequences of acts, 39. 

Constancy, 421. 

Contention, 246. 

Continence, 460. 

Contracts, 542 ; consideration in, 
542 ; express, and implied, 544 ; 
requisites in, 545 ; of minors, 
546 ; error in, 547 ; fraud in, 
548 ; fear and force in, 548 ; 
gratuitous, 549 ; onerous, 553 ; 
of Holy Matrimony, 622, 626. 

Contrition, 246, 596. 

Contumely, 311. 



Cooperation, 292, 538. 

Correction, fraternal, 227. 

Counsel, 151 ; spiritual gift of, 266. 

Courage, 403. 

Cowardice, 407. 

Craftiness, 269. 

Crime, denunciation of, 307 ; im- 
pediment of, 636 ; plea of the 
criminal, 308 ; the criminal de- 
fending himself, 308 ; arrest of, 
533. 

Cruelty, 475. 

Curiosity, 488. 

Cursing, 317, 510. 

Custom, law of, 509. 

Damnificatio, 530, 537. 

Deacon, the, 616. 

Death, 111 ; fear of, 405. 

Decalogue, the, 141, 398, 495, 510. 

Defects in things sold, 320. 

Degrees of consanguinity, table of, 
633. 

Delectatio morosa, 89. 

Denunciation of crime, 307 ; of 
impediments, 638. 

Depositum, 552. 

Derision, 316. 

Despair, 178. 

Determinism, 16, 20. 

Detraction, 314, 520. 

Devotion, 329. 

Discord, 244. 

Disobedience, 372. 

Disparity of religion as an impedi- 
ment, 636. 

Dispensation, 136, 142, 347, 352. 

Dissension, 215. 

Divorce, 640 ; a thoro, 642. 

Dolus, 269. 

Dominion, 524. 

Donation, 550. 



INDEX. 



651 



Doubts concerning impediments, 

638. 
Dress and furniture, moderation in, 

493. 
Drunkenness, 446. 
Bulla, 367. 
Dulness of heart, 173. 

Ebriety, 446. 

End and aim of man, 1. 

Enemies, love of, 200, 212 : prayer 
for, 333. 

Envy, 242. 

Equity, 397. 

Error as an impediment, 632. 

Eucharist, Holy, 581 ; the matter of, 
583 ; the form of, 585 ; the min- 
ister of, 586 ; reception of, 587. 

Eucharistic sacrifice, 591. 

Evangelical law, the, 145, 507. 

Evil in acts and in will, 25. 

Exchanges, 285. 

Exti'avaganee, 417. 

Faith, 75, 162 ; and reason, 157 ; 
confession of, 161 ; fides for- 
mata, 163 ; certitude of, 164. 

Falsehoods (see Lies), 381. 

Fasting, 436 ; obligation of, 437 ; 
appointed times for, 440 ; who 
are excused from, 438. 

Fear, 11, 183, 407 ; excuse of, 409; 
godly, 476 ; of death, 405 ; in 
contracts, 548 ; as an impedi- 
ment, 635. 

Female temperament, 464. 

FercB natures, 526. 

Flattery, 389. 

Folly, spiritual, 237. 

Food, animal, 297. 

Force, 10 ; in contracts, 548 ; in 
matrimony, 635. 



Fornication, 455, 621. 
Fortitude, 405. 
Fraternal correction, 227. 
Fraud, 269 ; in contracts, 318. 
Freedom of the will, 22. 

Gambling, 226, 555. 

Gifts, 551 ; spiritual, 237. 

Glory, 413. 

Gluttony, 443. 

Godliness, spiritual gift of, 398. 

Good, the, in acts, 25 : in will, 29, 

35. 
Gratitude, 373. 
Guile, 269. 

Habits, 58 ; infused, 59 ; of sin, 

104. 
Hate, 48, 56, 238 ; hatred of God, 

239 ; of our neighbour, 239 ; of 

truth, 49. 
Heresy, 166, 171, 247. 
Hiring, 553. 
Holiness, 329. 
Homage, 367. 
Homicide, 297 ; justifiable, 514 ; 

excusable, 515 ; accidental, 302. 
Honour, 297, 367, 412. 
Hope, 175, 183. 
Humility, 475 ; twelve steps of, 

480. 
Husband, sins of the, 513. 
Hypocrisy, 386. 

Idolatry, 354. 

Ignorance, 12, 504 ; sins of, 92, 
466. 

Immersion, 568. 

Impediments of matrimony, pro- 
hibitory, 630 ; annulling, 631. 

Impotence, as impediment, 635. 

Imprecatory Psalms, 333. 



652 



Imprudence, 266. 

Incest, 459. 

Inconsiderateness, 267. 

Inconstancy, 268. 

Incontinence, 463 ; of anger, 467. 

Indifference to danger, 409. 

Infant Baptism, 575 ; consent of 
parents to, 576. 

Infidelity, 168, 248. 

Infirmity, sins of, 99. 

Ingratitude, 376. 

Injury, 530 ; in trade, 541. 

Injustice, 277 ; in legal proceed- 
ings, 306. 

Insensibility, 428. 

Instruction of children, 579. 

Insult, 311. 

Intemperance, 429, 461. 

Intention, 33. 

Intercession, 332. 

Interest for money loaned, 554. 

Involuntary, the, 8. 

Ironia, 387. 

Jactantia, 387. 

Joy, 213. 

Judgment, 279 ; lawfulness of, 

280 ; from suspicion, 281. 
Jurisdiction, 570, 586, 601, 617. 
Jus, 272 ; jus gentium, 274 ; jus 

divinum, 273. 
Justice, 274 ; legal, 275, 522 ; 

private, 275 ; commutative, 285 ; 

distributive, 285 ; retributive, 

285. 

Knowledge, desire of, 488. 

Latvia, 355. 

Law, 118, 503 ; eternal, 119 ; of 

nature, 123, 503 ; written, 283 ; 

human, 126, 131, 504 ; unjust, 



121, 131, 306 ; Divine, 137 ; 
the old and the new, 138 ; the 
evangelical, 145, 507 ; muta- 
bility of, 134 ; of custom, 135; 
when not binding, 133 ; inter- 
pretation of, 506 ; civil, 507 ; 
penal statutes of, 379 ; the law- 
yer, 310. (See Equity.) Dispen- 
sation, 136, 142 ; promulgation, 
119. 

Lay baptism, 571. 

Liberality, 390. 

Lies, 381, 517 ; " white lies," 518 ; 
",lies of necessity," 519. 

Loans, 551. 

Locatio, 553. 

Long-suffering, 420. 

Lord's Days, 400, 511. 

Lotteries, 555. 

Love, 47; of God, 211, 235 ; of 
neighbours, 197, 202, 205, 213, 
236 ; of enemies, 200, 212 ; of 
relatives, 207 ; of a wife, 209 ; 
of brutes, 198 ; of self, 100, 198, 
203 ; of one's own body, 198 ; 
of sinners, 199. 

Lust, 454, 516. 

Lynch law, 299, 378. 

Magnanimity, 411. 

Magnificence, 417. 

" Make-bates," 316. 

Malediction, 317, 510. 

Malice, sins of, 103, 105. 

Mandatum, 552. 

Manslaughter, 515. (See Homi- 
cide.) 

Martyrdom, 406 

Masters and servants, 513. 

Matrimony, Holy, 620 ; sacrament 
of, 622 ; subject of, 623 ; minis- 
ter of, 624 ; conditions of, 625, 



G53 



627 ; marriage of those not 
Christians, 623 ; with a heretic, 
624 ; contract of, 622, 626 ; dis- 
solution of, 640 ; fictitious, 628 ; 
of minors, 629 ; impediments to, 
629 ; clandestine, 630 ; rehabili- 
tation of, 639. 

Meanness, 417. 

Means, 15 ; choice of, 21. 

Meekness, 467. 

Jleudacia. (See Falsehood.) 

Mercy, 215 ; corporal and spiritual 
works of, 221. 

Merit and demerit, 41, 159, 337. 

Minors, 531 ; rights of, 525 ; mar- 
riage of, 629. 

Mixture in the chalice, 585. 

Moderation {Jlodestia), 487. 

Modesty, 450. 

Mollities, 422. 

Money-lending, 551, 554. 

Monopoly, 555. 

Moroseness, 390, 493. 

Mortal sins, 102, 114, 195. 

Motives, 15. 

Mutuum, 551, 554. 

Necessity, 305, 533. 
Negligence, 268. 
Nocturnal pollution, 458. 

Oaths, 348 ; assertory and promis- 
sory, 510 ; obligation of, 350 : 
construction of, 371 ; dispen- 
sation from, 352. 

Oblations, 341. 

Obedience, 368, 371. 

Observantia, 367. 

Occupation, 525. 

Offices, daily, 618. 

Omission, sins of, 323. 

Orders, Holy, 610 ; sacramental, 



612 ; matter and form of, 613; 
requisites for, 614. 
Ornaments of women, 494. 

Pain, 63. 

Parents, 512 ; duty to, 363. 

Passions, 44 ; good and evil in, 45 ; 
order of, 46 ; sins of, 97, 101. 

Patience, a supernatural virtue, 
418. 

Patriotism, 363. 

Penalty, eternal, 112. 

Penitence, 593 ; sacramental, 594 ; 
the matter and the form, 595 ; 
penance, 605 ; penal statutes in 
civil law, 379. 

Perjury, 357. 

Perseverance, 420. 

Piety, 398 ; filial, 363, 512 ; claims 
of, 364. 

Pity, 215. 

Pleasure, 50 ; natural and un- 
natural, 51 ; the measure of the 
good, 53 ; moral character of, 52. 

Pledge, 552. 

Possessor, bona fide, 536 ; mala 
fide, 537 ; in doubtful faith, 537. 

Praise, 40. 

Prayer, 330 ; special, 331 ; for 
earthly goods, 332 ; for enemies, 
333 ; vocal, 333 ; distraction in, 
335 ; continual, 335 ; meritori- 
ous, 337 ; of sinners, 338. 

Prescription, 526. 

Presumption, 181, 412. 

Pride, 481 ; of intellect, 482 ; the 
first sin, 486 ; twelve steps of, 
483. 

Probabilism, 500. 

Prodigality, 396. 

Promises, 383. 

Property, 302, 523. 



654 



INDEX. 



Prudence, 65, 261. 

Punishment, 285, 377 ; of sin, 112. 

Pusillanimity, 416. 

Quarrels, 249. 

Rashness, 267, 409. 

Real presence, the, 582. 

Reason and faith, 157. 

Realus, 112. 

Recreations, 490. 

Rectitude, 39. 

Rehabilitation of marriage, 639. 

Religion, 325 ; disparity of, 636. 

Reproaches, 312. 

Resistance to law, 308. 

Restitution, 286, 520, 533 ; to 
whom made, 535 ; what to be 
restored, 540 ; of good name, 
287. 

Respect of persons, 296. 

Retribution, 48. 

Revenge, 377. 

Reverence, 366 ; to man, 367. 

Rich, the, virtues and vices of, 410. 

Rights, 272 ; natural and positive, 
272 ; divine, 273 ; of property, 
302; of minors, 525; of the 
state, 644. 

Robbery, 302, 305. 

Sabbaths, 400, 511. 

Sacraments, recpiisites of, 557 ; 
matter and form of, 558 ; ficti- 
tious, 559, 563 ; repetition of, 
560 ; minister of, 560 ; requisites 
in the subject of, 565 ; necessity 
of, 565 ; character, sealing, im- 
parted in, 566. 

Sacrifice, 339 ; the eucharistic, 591. 

Sacrilege, 359. 

Sale, 554 ; defects in, 555. 



Satisfaction, 541, 604. 

Scandal, 253. 

Schism, 247 ; schismatical clergy, 
249. 

Sedition, 252. 

Self-command, 23. 

Self-defence, 301. 

Self-depreciation, 388. 

Self-love, 100, 198. 

Self-restraint, 460. 

Shame, sense of, 432. 

Sick, Visitation and Unction of, 
607. 

Simony, 359, 510. 

Simulation, 386. 

Sin, 77, 87, 97 ; venial, 114 ; mor- 
tal, 102, 114, 195 ; causes of, 90, 
106 ; punishment of, 112 ; divi- 
sions of, 79 ; effects of, 110 ; 
gravity of, 82, 100 ; injury in, 
84 ; of the heathen, 170 ; of 
omission, 78 ; of husbands and 
wives, 513. 

Slander. (See Detraction.) 

Sloth, spiritual, 241. 

Sobriety, 446. 

Solicitude, 270. 

Sorrow, 63. 

Specification, 528. 

Sponsors, 572. 

State, the, rights of, 644 ; func- 
tions of, 646 ; duty to, 647. 

Strife, 244. 

Studiositas, 488. 

Suicide, 299, 515, 609. 

Sundays, 511. 

Superstition, 353. 

Suspicion, 281. 

Swearing, 510. 

Tale-bearing, 316. 
Taunts, 312. 



05; 



Temperance, 424, 461 ; rule of, 
426 ; divisions of, 431 ; precepts 
of, 495. 

Temptations of the devil, 109 ; 
tempting God, 856. 

Testaments, 550. 

Testimony, legal, 307, 309. 

Thefts, 302, 531. 

Truth, 153. 

Turpe lucrum, 226. 

Tyranny, 253. 

Unbelief, 168. 
Unction of the sick, 608. 
Unfriendliness, 390. 
Unjust gains, 226. 
Use and usufruct, 529. 
Usury, 554. 

Vainglory, 413. 
Vengeance, 377. 
Venial sins, 114, 606. 
Veracity, 289. 
Verecundia, 432. 
Viaticum, the, 589. 
Vices, 76. 



Violence, 11. 

Virginity, not illicit, 450 ; how far 

a virtue, 452. 
Virtues, cardinal, 68 ; intellectual, 

60, 64 ; theological, 69, 176 ; 

moral, 62, 68 ; acquired, 71 ; 

infused, 73 ; relation to charity, 

188. 
Visitation of the sick, 607. 
Voluntary, the, 8, 27. 
Vows, obligation of, 342 ; expedi- 
ency of, 344 ; of minors, 346 ; 

dispensation from, 347. 

War, 249 ; the clergy in, 237. 

Weakness of spirit, 422. 

Wife's sins, 513. 

Will, the, 8, 16 ; freedom of, 22, 

24 ; good and evil, 29. 
Wine, use of, 446. 
Wisdom, 65 ; spiritual, 237. 
Witness, in court of law, 309 ; 

false, 310. 
Worship, 338. 

Zeal, 471. 



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